STRAUSS. I believe we do not have to give long reasons why we should study Hegel in our capacity as political scientists. It suffices to mention the name of Marx. And Marx, or at least Marxism, is a legitimate subject of political science however _____ conceived. There is another reason or objective which has very much to do with the scope of political science. Political science was always understood to deal with the political community, the commonwealth, or to use a term which came to the fore in modern times, with the state. Now...but the state is no longer now generally taken as the comprehensive theme of reflections on human society. As you all know from practice , the term which is now in vogue which means the whole of a society is culture, rather than state.

Now this change from a clearly political orientation to one which is trans-political is at the root of the political _____ super-political, and Hegel has very much to do with this _____.

The fact that I chose Hegel's Philosophy of History and not his Philosophy of Right, despite the fact that the Philosophy of Right has been published by Hegel himself, and so we have here Hegel himself without any questions in connection with reading the Philosophy of Right, while the Philosophy of History are lectures given by Hegel and as Hegel more or less improvised them in different years and out of what his students and apparently very intelligent students jotted down, the original editors put together these lectures, and the more recent editor gave quite a different version of Hegel because they had found lecture notes which had not been known or considered by the first editors. But this--precisely that this is a lecture and not a book is in the case of Hegel, at any rate, a great help, because Hegel is an unusually difficult writer, and in his lectures he is much more easy to follow

than in the works which he has published himself.

In addition, there is this other reason why we should study the Philosophy of History: because Hegel's political philosophy proper as presented in the Philosophy of Right, is essentially related to his Philosophy of History, and one understands his political philosophy proper as philosophy of right better if he considers the historical matrix out of which that philosophy emerged, and that exactly we find in the lectures on the Philosophy of History.

One can say Hegel was the first to make the understanding of the history of political philosophy an essential ingredient of political philosophy itself. But in the past the situation was generally that like, say, today the history of physics to physics. You can be a first-rate physicist without being versed in the history of physics. I mean, you would have heard some names, like Newton and so on--that goes without saying--but this of course cannot be called the history of physics. Now Hegel makes this a form of political philosophy... we think of Locke. There is no concern with the history of political philosophy--he fights certain individuals who were very powerful in his time and who he thinks were fundamentally wrong, like Filmer, but to go behind that and give a survey of, as it were, a reasonable survey of the history of political philosophy, is in no way his concern. For I suppose you all know the fact that Hegel was born in the year 1770 and died in the year 1831. These dates are not altogether negligible, because there are other dates with which they are connected. I mention those which are crucial for Hegel: 1781, Kant published his Critique of Pure Reason; 1785, a man probably unknown to all of you, a German writer (writes Jacobi on the blackboard) published a book on the doctrine of Spinoza. This was a very big splash and had very great importance for Hegel. And though Jacobi is not comparable to Kant in any way, but Jacobi gave a very important turn to speculation in Germany and Hegel particularly. And the third date is known to all of you--1789, French Revolution. These are the minimum facts one must know if one wants to understand Hegel.

Now I will speak now about Kant and Spinoza in a very provisional way, only what is necessary to have some answers to Hegel. Now Kant is very famous up to the present day as a critic of metaphysics. So is, of course, David Hume. But we must consider the peculiarly Kantian features because they alone determine Hegel. According to Kant, man is faced with a fundamental alternative: either a rationalism or empiricism, or more precisely, either the dogmatism of pure reason, or Ratonism; or empiricism, or epicureanism. (I hope I didn't mix you up by the many "or's"; the two alternatives are clear. Dogmatism of pure reason is Ratonism; empiricism as presented is epicureanism.

Now this underlies the fact that we find throughout the ages this alternative which we can loosely call that between spiritualism and materialism. But Kant sees this situation in a new way. I give you first his diagnosis of these two alternatives. First, the world has a beginning in time, and is limited in space. The reverse, the world has no beginnings in time and has no limit in space. Second, the thinking self is individual and therefore indestructible. Against that, the epicurean: everything within the world is indivisible and perishable. Three, the spiritualistic view: we are free in our actions. The others say our actions are fully determined by nature or fate. And finally, the one school says there is a highest cause of the world, whereas the others say there is nothing beyond the natural things and their order. The situation--I do not know whether this is a historically correct view - we know that epicureans of course did not assert, admit, that everything within the world is divisible: the atoms are not divisible. So Kant constructs, one could say, the two alternatives--as it were, he presented the two ideal types rather than _____, which is of course legitimate.

Now the situation according to Kant and which distinguishes him from his predecessors is that he says that, very crudely stated, these positions, alternative positions, are demonstrable. In other words, not so that neither has demonstrated his position, and you can still

still say that maybe in a generation from now someone will come up and establish either Platonism or epicureanism. Kant says that each of these schools proven its thesis. So, what is the conclusion? The demonstrations must be based on a fundamental defect. They may be formally correct as demonstrations, but still based on a fundamental defect. And therefore no demonstration is possible. I add one important point in Kant's analysis of these two opposed positions. 'The Platonist position, which would of course also include Leibniz in modern times...the general thesis given to this philosophy (?)...this position is favorable to morality and religion, and therefore fundamentally popular. I mean, not that it is easy, so that everyone can read Leibniz, but the thesis of Leibniz appears in this relationship.... The other position is unfavorable to religion-- I mean epicureanism--and Kant draws a conclusion which is quite remarkable: this materialist-atheistic position can never become popular. This is one of the gravest historical errors which Kant _____. But this shows how different the situation at the end of the eighteenth century was from what it became in the nineteenth century.

What is Kant's solution? The assertions of the empiricists--ah yes, epicureans, we must not be very squeamish--we know one alternative are true of the phenomenal world, of things which can occur to us in ordinary life or in science. The phenomenal world is--we can distinguish from another world: the things which have an existence in themselves outside of ourselves, what Kant frequently calls "the thing in itself," also the "noumenal" world. In other words, atheistic-materialism is the only way in which we can proceed in trying to understand, say, the growth of a tree, a thunderstorm, or whatever it may be. Good. But it is also clear that this is absolutely limited to all attempts at finding our bearings, or explanations. It is not simple, not true of the things themselves. The assertions of dogmatism, of Platonism, are true, but they cannot be theoretically established, demonstrated. But they are true only in practical intent, as postulates of practical reason.

The moral law is the only thing within them which cannot be understood as part of the phenomenal world,

according to Kant. Now the moral law, as we understand the moral law according to Kant, we are left to the mind, the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, we are on moral ground, and we can do that because empiricism, or epicureanism, has nothing to say beyond the phenomenal world. In all study of phenomena, we must assume that every action of men is a form of necessary causes. That makes men irresponsible. I mean, a man committed a murder: it was due to his temperament, his I.Q., his environment, and so on, you know; but as moral beings we know that we are under the moral law, and hence that we are free to obey it--and also to disobey it--and therefore, that men's actions must be understood as right or wrong as due to the right or wrong views of their freedom. And for their view of their, of that, freedom, they are fully responsible. The good or evil act on cannot be traced beyond the act of freedom, which is free beginning. He chose, say, to commit murder, you cannot trace it beyond that without destroying the responsibility. It is the starting point, and not the result of previous causes.

Kant surely claimed to have refuted the metaphysics by refuting the two kinds of metaphysics--spiritualism and materialism. And to repeat, Kant does much more than say neither of these two antagonists proved his point. Then the issue would still be open: maybe some greater spiritualist or materialist would come up in the future and... No, Kant has shown that the demonstrations are valid demonstrations, and therefore something is wrong in the very question. Good.

Now let me leave it at this point about Kant and say a few words about Spinoza. Spinoza was not very well known at that time, and the first man who spoke highly of Spinoza and not as a character--that had been done before, that business that he was an honest man--but of his intellect and of the solidity of his doctrine, that was Jacobi, who was an opponent of Spinoza, but who felt that Spinoza's doctrine is the culmination of human reason. If human reason follows its own laws, then it will arrive at Spinoza's doctrine.. at the denial of the person[illegible] of God, the denial of immortality, the denial of freedom. Now, Spinoza's doctrine is..has the form of a didactic system, like Euclid's work, starting from definitions, axioms, et cetera, which are simply presupposed. And Spinoza doesn't give you any reason why he gives these definitions or , and therefore one can say Spinoza starts in a dogmatic way. This led to the demand of those who were attracted by Spinoza in one way or the other after Kant, that this cannot be done. These very premises, or whatever Spinoza's true premises are, must..are themselves in need of deduction. One must truly begin from nothing. Spinoza's metaphysics, now, is neither materialistic nor spiritualistic. There are two attributes, of God or nature, called by him extension and cogitation, which are irreducible to each other. Soul cannot be reduced to matter, and matter cannot be reduced to soul. And they are attributes of the one substance, i.e.,

God. All particular things--me, this, etc.--are modes of an attribute of God. Now this is clearly a mode of the attribute of extension, because an extended thing, but if I feel pain, this is clearly a mode of the attribute of thought, of cogitation. All particular things are modes of an attribute of God, yet the highest form of the knowledge of God, which Spinoza calls intuitive knowledge, is knowledge of the singular things or events as modes of God. In other words, if you know God in himself you know God much less than if you understand, say, this thing, or this event, the room. If you understand it as a consequence of other modes, of a given attribute of God. God's full being, one could say, is in the particulars, is in the singular things, as Spinoza says, in God's developed stage, and not insofar as he is transcended or undeveloped.

Spinoza asserts the strict necessity for everything. And in this respect, he clearly belongs to the epicurean-empiricist camp. What does he do with freedom? Spinoza replaces the distinction between free and necessary by the distinction between free and compelled. You may remember that Hobbes in the Leviathan is doing something of this kind. So in other words, if you do something freely, this is as necessary as if you do something under compulsion. What does this mean? The free acts are as necessary as the compelled or compulsory ones. A thing is free if it exists by virtue of the necessity of its nature alone, and is determined to act by itself alone. In this sense, of course, God alone is free. But we act as distinguished from our being acted upon, if something takes place within us or outside of us, if that follows from our nature within us or No, if this event, which happens either within us or outside of us, can be clearly and distinctly understood as following from our own nature. Our mind acts, as distinguished from being acted upon, insofar as it has adequate ideas, insofar as it has clear and distinct knowledge. In a word, freedom is necessity, understood necessity. Freedom, one could say, is self-determination. Self-determination, as distinguished from indetermination. Your nature, your innermost being, determines you; the action is determined. This is freedom.

Now after these few remarks about Spinoza's teachings, I will try to make a very provisional statement of what Hegel is about.

Hegel starts from the assumption that philosophy is the quest for the substance, for the single substance, of which everything else is a necessary attribute or mode. . in such a way that its flowing or emerging from the substance can be clearly and distinctly understood. That substance is what Kant meant with the thing in itself. Kant has proven that the thing in itself is not knowable. That what is knowable, Kant said, is only the phenomena, which are only for the thinking subject, not things themselves - -the phenomena which are constituted by the

activity of the subject. But what about that activity of the subject, Hegel asks? The activity of the subject which produces the phenomena, is not itself a part of the phenomenal world, because it produces phenomena. The activity of the subject in building up the phenomenal world and the moral law, this is the thing in itself, according to Hegel. So, in other words, Kant has discovered the true thing in itself without being aware of it. What Kant calls the transcendental activity of the ego: that is the thing in itself. Hegel has a simple formula for that: the substance--I mean, that which Spinoza was seeking, single substance--is the subject.

So Hegel gave by this combination of Kant and Spinoza..Hegel, and also some of his German predecessors, brought forth a new kind of metaphysics which cannot be mistaken for the pre-Kantian metaphysics, as I sketched them along Kant's lines before. The first ground or grounds, we can say, is not transcendent, as God or the epicurean atoms are--is not outside of man. The chief theme of this metaphysics is the life of the human mind, and is primarily, to use a book title of Hegel's, "phenomenology of the mind." Understanding the life of the mind--this is, well, not the whole, but this is the most important part, one can say, of this new metaphysics.

Now before I go on, I would like to see whether we have..whether I make myself understood. Now please be frank. Did you..were you able to follow this very crude presentation of what Kant effected or claimed to have effected, and of what Spinoza did on the other hand,and how this was combined in Hegel's mind? Yes?

Student: You describe Hegel as taking, as arriving at the conclusion that somehow Kant had not understood properly the thing in itself. I didn't quite understand what the two factors were that came together in Hegel's mind.

Strauss: Well, we have the phenomenal world. I mean, the only world we know empirically. But this world, according to Kant, is constituted by acts of the thinking ego, I mean not the habitual desires of this or that libido, but by reason following its essential laws. Now where is reason? Where does reason belong? Is reason a part of the phenomenal world? It cannot be. Why not--and that is not clear in Kant--why not simply say this is the thing in itself?

Student: That's what Hegel says.

Strauss: Yes, in a very simplified statement. So, in other words, Kant had the thing in itself, so to speak, in his hands and did not recognize it; and this he called mind. Whereas, Spinoza by saying that this reason, or to use a more general term here, the subject--this is the substance--if you understand substance in the way Spinoza understood it as consisting equally of extension and cogitation, then you won't understand anything

that Kant had said.

Mr. Reinken: Two questions or two statements. First, when Kant and later Hegel speak of this reason, the subject, do they mean the average common reason of the actual human race, rather than the reason of some of being?

Strauss: Well, that is a great question, one of the most difficult questions regarding Hegel. In one sense, it surely does not mean merely human reason: There is..a great question is, Hegel speaks of God all the time, and there is divine reason effective in everything in nature as well as in history. But the great question is, for which there are no--I mean, which cannot be settled so easily by quotation, is this reason which is effec in everything, is this self-conscious reason, or does reason reach its self-consciousness only in man? That is the question. And there is a great ambiguity regarding this point. Do you understand this? I mean, the aver reason, that is not of very great importance, because it is so often wrong. I mean, we would always have to say reason properly, following its own la I mention one point in passing: there is something Kant and Spinoza have in common, and although they are very antagonistic to each other--Kant was antagonistic to Spinoza--namely, Spinoza's chief work, whatnowwould be called his metaphysical work, has the title Ethics. I mean, people wrote about God and His attributes, etc., but they didn't call their books Ethics. Kant on his part taught the primacy of practical reason. Theoretical reas is limited to the phenomenal world, and the most important question for me how shall I live, is wholly beyond theoretical reason, according to Kant. The primacy or supremacy of practical reason--this will be preserved in Hegel. Hegel makes, as it were, the paradoxical attempt to integrate Kant's primacy of practical reason into an again theoretical philosophy. Hegel's philosophy is a theoretical philosophy, but it integrates the whole o practical philosophy into the theoretical framework. This is, in a way, the secret of Hegel's philosophy of history, but we will come to that later.

Now I will give a few other points, in order to prepare ourselves for Hegel. For Kant, as already in a way for Spinoza, morality or goodness is no longer the perfection of human nature in the ancient and Thomistic sen That is out, for different reasons. Kant's reason can be stated very simply as follows: if morality were the perfection of human nature, we would already know that human nature is good. Ja? Only then can its perfection b good. How do we know that? We cannot presuppose that. Therefore, we have to make an entirely different beginning.

According to Kant, morality is not deducible from anything else. According to the traditional views, morality is deducible from something else--from human nature, or from God, or in another way. In Kant, this is impossible; because if it were deducible from something, morality then its laws would not have the categorical, to use a Kantian term, act in

such and such a way and don't ask questions. That is categorical, because otherwise it would act in such and such a way in order to. Then you can raise the question, but maybe there are other ways in order to get that "in order to" which we have to be moral. So morality has no support beyond reason itself. Is then morality completely alien to everything that is? If there is not some necessity or some support, and here is where the postulates of God and the immortality of the soul come in. . morality. . we do not know that God exists, you do not know that the soul is immortal, but we must know, postulate, the existence of God and the immortality of the soul if we do not wish to despair of morality. Morality belongs to the noumenal world. Only through God and immortality can there be a proper proportion between morality and happiness. Here in this life we do not find the proper proportion between the prosperity of the wicked and the misery of the just. There cannot be. That can only be if there is a just judge of the universe and life after death. The moral community must be understood. . I'm sorry, the moral commands must be understood as commands which carry with themselves promises and sanctions. This Kant still presupposes. Now Hegel disagrees with that entirely. He rejects the concern with reward of virtue altogether. He he says has to be rewarded for having helped his brother in need or having saved the life of a child. Hegel criticizes the concern with the reward on moral grounds; hence there is no longer for Hegel a way from morality to the future life in the sense of the life after death. This is out for Hegel. But there is this other thing in Kant already which becomes more important in Hegel. We must be morally concerned. One could say that the concern with a reward is extra-moral, because a truly moral man does not wish to be rewarded, is not concerned with being rewarded. But we must be morally concerned with the existence of the social order in which morality is not persecuted. Does this--is this not our moral duty to be concerned with the society in which I don't way which is safe for morality because there would also be the reward business,- but in which morality is not persecuted for the following reasons. Because if there is, there is a conflict of duties: of the duty to obey the civil law and the duty to obey the moral law. As moral beings we are obliged to wish for such a state of things, that this conflict does not exist or

There must be a necessity somehow compelling the amoral lawgiver to give laws compatible with morality. There must be a kind of convergence between the is, what the lawgiver or the lawgivers do and so on, and the ought, the moral law. Now this is the meaning of Kant's philosophy of history. Extra-moral things, like in the natural traits and the ever-increasing costs of war, costs not yet the atomic bombs but just the plain budget, make it more and more inevitable that government should be republican and not monarchic, and therewith the rule of law within the states and between the states. Even if there is no way from morality to the postulate of a future life, there is a necessary connection between morality and the vision of the political future, of the future of men on earth. It is very interesting that Kant's philosophy of history was not presented by Kant in his great systematic works. There the postulate of the immortality of the soul is central. But this he did in some occasional writings, which we will discuss

in the next quarter. But they are very important and crucial for the understanding of what Hegel is about. There is, as it were a conflict which one can study in the late eighteenth century: What is more important, the moral order after life, or in the earthly future? We can say philosophy of history won out by virtue of the acceptance of the second alternative. We will see that later.

In Kant, the emergence of the..the convergence of the is and the ought (writes on blackboard)..for Kant, this convergence is something in which we must believe, for which we must hope. One cannot be truly moral if one does not hope for the future of morality. For Hegel, this convergence is a fact, something demonstrable. There is no longer any chance which would completely upset all apple carts, so to speak; or in other words, there is no longer inscrutable providence. Hegel speaks of providence, as you will have seen, but it is a scrutable providence. There is an order, a moral order in history, but this moral order is in all interesting respects perfectly lucid to us. So a scrutable providence reigns. There is a.. one speaks of a necessary convergence between the is and the ought--of the amoral, not necessarily anti-moral, and the moral. More generally of disorder and order. The extra-moral world, the world of the noumenal, is a world of moral disorder, not only today where we know this from well-known facts mentioned by the president yesterday, but at all times the world was not a very orderly place. Order comes out of disorder, without being intended. This is, one can say, the simple formula of Hegel's philosophy of history. People do not dream .. when Alexander invaded Persia, he didn't dream of a society based on the rights of men which would be established millenia later, and nevertheless, he worked without knowing it. The actions more generally stated..order comes out of disorder without being intended. Now this thought was quite familiar to people in Hegel's time, as already in Kant's time by the way, the greatest example is the cosmogonies of the modern age: the planetary system, how did it emerge out of some world or whatever it might be understood, and then we have this wonderful system--the sun and the stars and the fixed and all the rest. Coming closer to home, what Hegel calls the system of wants, which had been analyzed by kAdam Smith. He also order coming out of disorder. Everyone thinks of himself alone, no one of the common good. But precisely this brings about the common good. If the baker and candlestick maker would think of the common good, he would bring into dispute the beautiful economic laws which make society run.

Now what was understood of the state, say in cosmogony and in economics and perhaps also in some other spheres, is enlarged by Hegel to the whole of history. In the whole course of history, no one thinks of establishing the rational order. And for the very simple, important reason that no one can know it in advance. How could Alexander the Great have had an inkling of the rational order, if his teacher, Aristotle, believed that there are men who are by nature slaves? are something incompatible

with the natural order. So men have said they move toward it blindly. And yet this blind movement has an order, an even order, toward this rational order. The process produces both the rational order and the awareness of the rational order. I mean, after all, it could be thinkable, could it not, that men had known at all times the end, but it was not possible to execute, to achieve the end for a variety of reasons until, say, in Hegel's time. But they could not even have known it.

The historical actors do not consciously strive for the end; and in this respect, the historical process resembles a natural process. What do the parts of our body or of an animal body do when they tend towards something? There is no conscious striving there. So the historical process is in a way like a natural process, an organic process. And that is indeed the case according to Hegel. But this has very grave implications. If the historical process is like an organic process, there must be a peak. In all growth there are limits. There is..it has been arranged that the trees won't grow into heaven. So there is a term of growth, so there must be a term of the growth. And what follows, may I ask, after a being has reached the term of his growth? Let us say--decay. Let us not speak unnecessarily of death. And so, decay. Good.

Now I ask Mr. Reinken to read here something from Hegel's Philosophy of Right, a passage which we will need as a kind of motto for this course. Well, no, I could read it myself. On page 227, that is from the Preface to the Philosophy of Right. Here Hegel had opposed throughout the Preface the people, who want..the philosophers who want to teach the state, i. e., the government, what they should do; and that is not the functic of political philosophy. To say one more word about preaching what the world ought to be like: philosophy arives always too late for that. As thought of the world, it appears at a time when actuality has completed its developmental process and is finished, completely. What the conception of philosophy teaches..history also shows this necessary: namely, that only in a maturing actuality the ideal appears and confronts the real. It is then that the idea rebuilds for itself this same world in the shape of an intellectual realm: comprehending this world in its substance. Then philosop comes and when philosophy comes, it paints its gray in gray. A form of life has become old, and this gray in gray cannot rejuvenate it. Only understanding..the owl of Minerva begins its flight in the dusk. Minerva is the goddess of wisdom. Wisdom appears when dusk is come, after the historical processk. let us take a simple example, Greece, a very great society for Hegel. When does philosophy come? and deal with Greek society? When the decay had come, after the sophists and so on, as Hegel puts it. So this is the crucial point, it seems, in Hegel. We must check on that. If this is true, then Hegel's Philosophy of History, which deals not merely with Greece or Rome or the Far East or the Middle Ages, but with modernity and even the completion of modernity, which according to Hegel could not take place prior to the French Revolution and after the

taming of the French Revolution by Napoleon. But what of the task of the future? Through, except the theoretical task, to understand. Spengler wrote his Decline of the West during the First World War, I think it came out for the first time in 1917. This was a sensational thing--a book with the title, the setting or going down of the West. But he only said with a certain with a nasty harshness, one could say, what Hegel had meant. That modernity, if we mean by modernity the development, say, roughly since the Reformation, is the final stage; and after that, nothing of any importance can come. There may be a spreading, say the South American republics may function and may not function, but and so on; but no fundamental change, no creation, is any more possible. This seems, is at least one strand in Hegel's thought, whether it is the only one we will have to consider.

Yes. Now at this point I thought I should mention and again I invite discussion because I cannot assume that I make everything clear to everyone. Yes?

(change tapes)... practical philosophy, becoming speculative, i.e., theoretical. And this surely applies to Hegel. Now he could not deny that this has a great practical use, that people..I mean, Hegel hoped he could convince some of these foolish democrats that it is much better to be ruled by a benevolent king and by high-class, permanent civil service than by a tyrannous demagogue. He hoped. But the question is, to that extent, was, of course, meant to be practical. But it was much more a defense and a defense through understanding, so proving the reasonableness of what already existed. You know such a defense of an established order, even if meant to be purely theoretical, is bound to have practical consequences. I mean, to the extent which Hegel convinced people, he decreased the power of the revolutionary movement, and after all, out of his loins, so to speak, the Hegelian Left, as it is called..You know, there was that splitting: Hegelian Right, which was conservative and identified itself with the established order, and then there was the Hegelian Left, the most famous of the Hegelian Left was, of course, Marx--who broke with Hegel radically. But Marx says somewhere, according to Hegel the philosopher comes always post festo, you know, after the festival, when everything is over. And what Marx wanted is that the philosopher should..the philosophers as he put it, on another occasion, " hitherto the philosophers have only interpreted the world (i.e., theoretical); but what is important is to change the world." So Marx's philosophy, we can still call Marx's doctrine a philosophy, is the reaction to Hegel and therefore, in a practical, but in a very different way in which Aristotle's Politics, for example, was practical.

Student: .....could not possibly apply to the practical philosophers.

Strauss: No, in other words, don't look for any innovations, or any fundamental change. Sure, I mean, Hegel surely would have been opposed to the senseless privileges of the Prussian nobility which still existed in fact, because you want the best men should be in highest positions, regardless of whether they are noblemen or commoners. But this was

no longer a fundamental change, because the principle was readily admitted. You know that the..career as a French prime minister at that time was a career open to talents, i.e., not according to birth. Yes?

Student: You said that modernity for Hegel was the final stage. Would that then mean that the philosophy that mirrors modernity would be the culminat on of philosophy?

Strauss: Sure. But this despite still the very enormous theoretical effort, Hegel's own philosophy, you know. In Kant, the philosophy of history offers an infinite progress in the future, i.e., that the rational order will never be truly established, only to ever greater approximation. This required a complete revamping of Kant's doctrine, and this synthesis with Spinoza, of which I spoke at the beginning..
But there may be quite a few subordinate changes, both theoretical and practical, that goes without saying, but no radical reorientation.

This sounds very strange to us, but we must not forget that the people, that the philosophers, generally speaking, surely in modern times, but to some extent also in ancient times, laid this claim to finality.
Let us take, not to speak of Descartes, but Aristotle did not visualize that his notion of the cosmos and of man within the cosmos, and therefore also about virtues and vices and what the good order is, could possibly be turned down as radically insufficient. He didn't do that. So in Hegel this so-called historical awareness, in Hegel's words, as we will read, "the individual is the son of his time," and by that he means of course not only the man in the street but also the philosopher. Hegel was the first to face this difficulty: that the philosopher is the son of his time, and yet how can he have found the eternal truth? And Hegel's general answer is, he can if he lives in the moment in which time, as it were, coincides with eternity.

Student: ..history and philosophy might coincide..

Strauss: This is a very insufficient statement, because that would presuppose that the truth is known to philosophy at the beginning, which is not the case.

Student: So far you have interpreted Hegel without mentioning his dialectic at all. You interpret him as saying that there is an end point in history. Do you think that the dialectic offers you a way of getting out of this interpretation? I don't see that.

Strauss: This shows up in the difference between Khrushchev and Mao. Khrushchev said we have now the final society, i.e., the society without contradictions. But Mao denies this, and Mao denies not only that present-day Russia is not yet paradise, but denies that there could ever

be a society without contradictions. And there is a Marxist justification for that. You know, Marxist..Marx calls the whole history of mankind as we know it, or believe to know it, the prehistory. History begins only with the universalization of communism. Now..but history means, of course, change. But I suppose what for Mao it means is that, it must mean is that contradictions which occur after the establishment of communism are radically different from the class conflicts, that kind of contradiction which existed in all of historical society. Now are there questions, because I forgot it.

Student: My question is if..what exactly are you saying that Hegel had in mind? Should history..if history is going to stop, then the dialectic will stop.

Strauss: Yes, but there is no difficulty there. If all contradictions are reconciled--if Hegel's key word is reconciliation.

Student: Every move to a different level which reconciles the conflict that existed before...

Strauss: Yes, but for Hegel this is exactly the point--there is a final and absolute reconciliation. There is no longer any further, fundamental task for the human race. But I'm perfectly open, we will discuss this when..I think it is, in a way, the crucial question, because it is the most controversial thing in Hegel's Philosophy of History. Did he or did he not believe in the finality of his doctrine and of his.. of the social order as in substance establishedin his time? Yes?

Student: Did, according to Hegel, the men of the past could not understand the end toward which things were driving, the end became valuable only in the end. How is it possible for men who were found, say, at the end of certain eras, say Plato and Aristotle, to have even any rightful claim to be philosophers at all?

Strauss: To which Hegel'answers, they were philosophers of the first order. But what is a philosopher? A philosopher is a man who seeks wisdom, and they were all men who sought wisdom, but only now is philosophy capable of getting rid of the distinction between the quest for this and the conquest.

Student: But what is it that enables the quest for wisdom to come at the end of an era. I mean, it is possible that wisdom itself could not come until the whole historical cycle has completed itself. But what is there which, according to Hegel, which would cause philosophers to rise at the end of the Greek period of history as opposed to the middle of it, if all philosophy is a quest for wisdom?

Strauss: There is an element of truth in that, that people are more

given to thinking, to wondering, to questioning, in times of crisis than in times when everything is obviously in order. I believe that the last English philosopher of the first rank, David Hume, published his Treatise of Human Nature in 1740. In 1745 came the second pretender to Scotland and was defeated, you know, and the order which had been common from the Puritan Revolution and finally established in 1688 was now settled, so the old issue between the on the one hand and the archbishops and lords on the otherwas now absolutely settled. There was no longer a question..well, naturally one had not settled the question of how far the masses had the say in government--you know, the rotten borough question, the whole question of reform, then in the nineteenth century, the question of social legislation. But these were no longer issues of that fundamental character as those which had come from the sixteenth century on. I mean to say that the greatest names in English philosophy--Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume--being located there, can be said to have something to do with the fact that this was the social crisis of England. Whereas in Germany, the great development of philosophy came much later, because the crisis began to touch Germany with the approach of the French Revolution and after. Of course..one can say that..there was Leibniz before, but Leibniz was the only figure..and I mean, I say this only in order to defend Hegel against I don't say this one case can say simply; we have to have a much greater basis of induction.

Student: Perhaps you can explain how some philosophers who seek to sell programs seem to come before the events you describe: Hobbes, Locke for instance--they talk about innovations, they were innovative; the situation occured later rather than before.

Strauss: I do not know what Hegel would say, but I am somewhat fearful that he might say they were not philosophers of the first order. The contempt for British philosophy is a very powerful tradition in Germany. and then a Frenchman, I don't know who it was, one of these germanified French thinkers visited Schelling (you know, Schelling was the friend and in a way a competitor of Hegel) came to, spoke to Schelling about Locke. Schelling simply said, "Je despise Locke," "I despise Locke." I mean, I believe this is an important part of the story. The English philosophers, of course, had some influence, but not in the case of the greatest developm of German philosophy. After the development of German idealistic philoso had lost its power over the public mind, which was roughly around 1840-48, then the English and French came over quite strongly, and John Stuart Mill was a big figure in Germany, say in 1860-70, but with the recovery of Kantianism, it was finished. So, I mean, I am just trying to guess what Hegel..he would not regard them as but the point which you take is of course absolutely correct. They initiated. I mean, one cannot possibly deny that there was not this terrific corporation of science and technology before: Bacon and Descartes demanded it. Yes?

Student: I missed a part of what you said..that Hegel began with the quest for the substance of which all else is the necessary attribute or mode

and the activity of the subject producing, the subject produces the thing itself, and this statement--am I correct?--has logical overtones.

Strauss: In Hegel one can say everything has a logical overtone. But, no, let me say only this: don't pay too great attention to this, what I said about this prehistory of Hegel, Kant and Spinoza, was a deliberately provisional statement to link, to lead up to, this new kind of thinking. It was..if you have any difficulty, forget about it. The main point I want to make is only this famous formulation of Hegel: the substance is the subject which points directly to Spinoza, because the substance..i.e., there is only one substance, etc., and on the other hand, instead of the subject coming to this position through Kant, because it was Kant, not Descartes, whose notion of the subject became of decisive importance for Hegel. Just forget about it. I just try..don't worry too much about it. You probably have no teaching experience, and as a teacher one has to lead from all parts of the horizon to something, and one is not always successful. That has to be--teaching can never become a scientifically conducted affair. Yes?

Student: May I ask a question about the meaning of the word "subject" the way you use it? Ordinarily, we think of substance as opposed to procedure. Would here Hegel say that subject is the substance? I'm a bit confused.

Strauss: No, the substance, say the core, that out of which everything else must have proceeded and through which everything else must be understood, is not, is the subject. The subject..take the Cartesian, if you like, ego cogito, the Cartesian ego which thinks, but with only this difference: for Kant..in Descartes, there is at least some lack of clarity as to whether the thinking ego is not itself a substance like the old soul-substance; this is wholly out in Kant, and therefore Hegel chose as subject that which organizes, orders, the sensations into an ordered world, that which is, which legislates to itself a moral life. However, these two things of the ego may be connected, that is the substance. This needs a long commentary, as someone pointed out before. There is a question of what about God: is not God that subject? That we should have said the substance is God, which would have been a very familiar assertion, or at least a much more familiar assertion than what Hegel said.

I would like to mention only one point regarding the relation of Hegel's political philosophy to his philosophy of history. One can say that Hegel's political philosophy, which he presented in his Philosophy of Right, answers the question of the right political order, and the political order is always right; whereas his philosophy of history answers the question of how the right political order became actual and known. You see these additional considerations here. Then the question is, Why does Hegel leave us such a supplement to political philosophy, say, as Aristotle or Locke did not leave? What was the Aristotelian answer to the question of how the good social order has become actual, or Plato?

Reinken: In speech.

Strauss: That is not actual. Is it actual, in the first place? Is it actual, and if it becomes actual, how does it become actual? Chance. That's out in Hegel. . I mean, that's the negative condition of the whole Philosophy of History, that chance doesn't play any significant role. And what about h ving become known; how is the right, the just order, how does it become known?

Reinken: Aristotle sat down and thought about the nature of man

Strauss: But he had to be guided, he had to have some guidance; I mean, there must be, in other words, the nature of man is not sufficiently clear.

Reinken: Constitutions of the bad city.

Strauss: That doesn't let us know about the good city. On the basis of what can you distinguish between the good and bad regime? I give you a very simplistic answer, which is of course altogether out of place. He had his knowledge of what is by nature right, whether all men have such knowledge to a sufficient degree is very uninteresting to him. But, at any rate, it is possible for men to know what is by nature right, in Plato. Now this natural right doctrine became developed later after Aristotle, into a doctrine of natural law, especially in the Middle Ages. This was the answer to how is the good order known--fundamentally because it presupposes the natural ord But here a new question arose, in the sixteenth century and later especially. Vico was a good example which we study on occasion--Can there be a natur law if it is not duly promulgated? But I take an extreme case: can man b obliged to act according to natural law if he hasn't the slightest inkling of its character? And so the question of promulgation and in a way, of cours in Vico's works this takes on. . becomes the backbone of the whole thing: the proof that natural law as ordinarily understood, especially by these prin Grotius, Helvetius, and Pufendorf, this natural law could not have been know until very high in the Middle Ages, and therefore the question becomes, naturally, how did these pre. . these benighted men, more or less anyway, how did they build up their societies, how did they find their ? And then he makes the familiar distinction between the three stages--divine, heroic, and human, societies, but this is already a kind of philosophy of history in Vico. So that, in other words, the immediate, entering wedge for philosophy of history is the question of the promulgation of natural law. Which does not create a grave difficulty if one accepts the Biblical account, it was promulgated to our first ancestors, and through their faults this awareness was lost and therefore is no longer a question of the first order, but it is only a grave question from a practical point of view. How can you be harsh on these poor savages who don't have any recollection of these things any more and act on their dim lights? It's more a practical question. But as a theoretical question, the tacit premise of the whole thing is, of cou the Biblical account of the origin of man and of the human race is no longer literally accepted. Yes?

Student: I wqs going to ask if a body of logic is a premise of Hegel's Philosophy of History, and if it is, what work?

Strauss: That is a very good question. It is hard to answer that ques-. But let us state it as follows. Hegel's Logic has, so to speak, nothing to do with what is or dinarily understood by logic. It has much more to do, if one wants to use an illustration, with Plato's doctinre of ideas. Much more. I will try..you must not forget that the establishment of logic as a separate discipline is understood, even post-Aristotle, you cannot presuppose that in Plato and earlier thinkers. Now, what is Plato concerned with? I give you some textbook answers. The truly being beings are the ideas. The ideas can be perceived only by the pure mind, not by the senses. They are eterna' unchangeable, and always the same, identical with themselves. I mean, this leaves the subject untouched these assertions. The usual answer is, of course, that Plato hypothesized concepts and the concept of a mode-- not to mention a more dignified is really unchanged. And it's also not mystical. You can see modes, but you cannot see mode. And Plato, by unbelievable incredible stupidity, which is sufficiently excused by the low development of the human mind at the time, hypothesized. Let us not quarrel with that. Now, Plato sketches in the Republic, Seventh Book, a pursuit which he regards as the highest of which man is capable, and that he calls dialectics. This is somewhat . Why Plato calls it dialectics I must now postpone, though we may have occasion to bring it up later. Now, this dialectic has to do with ideas and nothing but ideas. It moves, as it were, from one idea to another, until it has exhaust- the whole realm of ideas, and then it reaches the highest idea, that to which all ideas owe their being ideas, as well as their knowability. And that he calls the idea of the good. Ja, good. Now, but Plato never presented this dialectics of the ideas. He gives the sketch of it, to some extent, and a very comical sketch to boot, in the dialogues called Sophist and Statesman and so on, but he never, there is no Platonic system which is presented. Hegel's Logic is that. Hegel, one can say Hegel presents in the Logic what Plato calls the highest generality of being, the greatest of being. He presents them systematically and exhaustively, and shows then in the following parts of his system,which can be called the philosophy of nature an- philosophy of the mind, how these ideas--I speak of Platonic not the Hegelian- why these ideas and the whole realm of ideas necessarily externalizes itself into major on the one hand and minor on the other. In the mind alone is the true perfection reached. That is, of course, Plato. So if you..Socrates cal- this the term peculiar to him, light into the logon into the speeches, accounts, the conditions. That is a very hard thing, let us leave that open. But obviously "logic" is derived from "logos"; and you can, therefore, under- stand that in a sense it is possible to call the rhetoric of the ideas "the logic But surely not in the sense of the hard rules of thinking or this kind of thing.

Student: Where is Hegel's speculative philosophy contained? in his Logic?

Strauss: Yes, and in his philosophy of nature and his philosophy of the mind. He wrote a book, a kind of compendium for students, in the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences. There you have the whole presented, theoretical. Surely, the word which is applied in the textbooks at least when I was a student, is "panlogism." Hegel surely is the most radical rationalist that ever wrote. Nothing is accepted as given; everything must be understood as necessary, by seeing its genesis. This is the process of the dialectic. If you take Spinoza's Ethics, which is as rational externally as Euclid's Elements, but where does he get his axioms, where does he get his definitions? We must begin from scratch. In this sense, Hegel is much more radical than Descartes. Hegel begins freely, from nothing in a sense. He begins, for some reasons, his Logic with being, as distinguished from nothing. He could as well have begun it with nothing, and it would have led. I mean, one would only have to rewrite the beginning of his Logic. It would have led from nothing to being common elements. That is a claim of Hegel that he has achieved perfect clarity about everything--I mean, not about the contents of the person, of his neighbor, and of this kind of thing, of which only a pub..a political scientist..but all things of any importance to a human being. This he claims. There are, I mean, all data are, as it were, transformed into evident necessities, and they too as data I mean, obviously the observed facts on the hand, the world, we don't understand, because we don't know the causes, we don't understand the necessity. And that there is such a thing as the world. We all know that, but do we understand it as necessary? No. We take it as given. There is another formula which Hegel uses for his logic, which is of course somewhat ambiguous, but still of some help. The Logic describes God as he is, prior to the creation of the world. The two branches of His creation are nature and the human mind. Ja? But they, this creation must be understood as a necessary progress. is free only in the sense that God creates it without any compulsion. Necessity is only within it, but otherwise not.

Student: You stated that Hegel rejected any ordinary ways of thinking. For example, there is a sense in which Hegel rejected the principle of contradiction; but the principle of contradiction is used in our ordinary reckoning and reasoning, and so forth.

Strauss: What Hegel only means is that if you dig deeper, then the principle of contradiction won't be helpful. On the other hand, Hegel would never say that Mr. Burnham has glasses and he puts them on

Hegel is, in a way..his Philosophy of History, anaway, is one of the most empirical philosophers--at least, according to his claim. Of that I am aware. Precisely by looking at history as it was and no arbitrary constructions and monkey business, will the reason of history appear. Well, we will have a number of other conversations about this the character of Hegel's thought, and his other writings. Let us now call it a day until Thursday.

STRAUSS: ....from Hegel's point of view Now, regarding the original -what is the -as Mr. Bruell rightly saw, the original history, say, to use Herodotus as an example, and the philosophical history of Hegel, have something very important in common over against what we may loosely call academic history. And how can we state this as simply as possible? What is characteristic of men like Thucydides and Herodotus?

Student: They represent the spirit of their times.

Strauss: The spirit lives in them. To state it very simply, they belong. They belong. And, therefore, when Thucydides speaks, the spirit of Athens speaks through him, regardless of whether he wishes to convey it or is aware of it or not. Now, reflexive history..the reflexive historian, does not belong. For example I take a simple case, a man who writes a history of the fourteenth century, today, he is obviously not a fourteenth century man. There is some alienness between the student and the subject matter. And why does a philosophic historian belong? He too belongs. Yes? After all, he..the philosophic historian will write about the fourteenth century as well, but he is not a fourteenth century man.

Reinken: He understands the phenomena of spirit, the fact that these are...

Strauss: In other words, the philosophic historian deals with that in the fourteenth century which is still present and which will always be present, -ja?- namely, that which forms a part of the spirit as a whole in its completion. This is very roughly why Hegel thinks that there is a profound connection between this wholly nonphilosophic original history and the truly philosophic history, over against the half-philosophic reflexive history. This corresponds very much to Hegel's spirit of the whole the preface. Yes. Now, there is of course one difficulty regarding. a minor difficulty, which Hegel did not develop. You must not forget this is not an elaborated book; these are lectures. But you mentioned only Thucydides and Herodotus; but he gives some other examples. Let us limit ourselves to the classical ones for simplicity's sake.

Student: Seneca and Caesar.

Strauss: Ja, but what is..Let us take Caesar, a particularly clear case. What is the difference between Caesar and Herodotus? the most obvious difference?

Student: Caesar was a general.

Strauss: And Herodotus?

Student: No.

Strauss: So the Persian wars, which are in a way the peak of Herodotus, Herodotus did not participate in. And..he was not in <u>charge</u>. Hegel thinks, therefore, and this is not quite clear, what does it mean to

belong. Does it mean to be a member of the society? Or does it mean to be politically active on a higher plane? Now, from the latter point of view, say, Churchill would be an eminentexample in our age, and to some extent also DeGaulle. Only Churchill is much more historic than DeGaulle is, and Hegel would say that this is much more relevant for understanding the twentieth century--what has happened there--than the laborious productions of the academic historians, and so on. Good. But this is not entirely cleared up, because the statement in this generality as he makes it on one or two occasions, that the original historians are statesmen and generals, is refuted not by Thucydides but by Herodotus.

Student: In connection with that statement that the ancient historians are generals, he says that the situation in our time is completely altered. I don't understand..he doesn't seem to develop that.

Strauss: Yes, but what he has in mind is that the professors have taken over. I mean, it is of course not literally true, to some extent, Napoleon wrote his memoirs on St. Helena, and so on
but generally speaking, but today as you know every general writes, gives his account, and whether they are very relevant, I don't know: I have never studied them very closely. Now, there is..yes?

Student: Does this mean that our culture is essentially comprehensive and immediately changes all events into historical representations?

Strauss: Yes, one could.. this is in Hegel's mouth an ambiguous statement. It could also refer to the bookish character of the nineteenth century, compared with the Greeks and Romans, much less bookish.
Now, there is another point I would like to take up right away. Hegel makes it clear that what he is presenting in this book is based on speculative or theoretical philosophy. Speculative or theoretical philosophy proves that, stated simply, reason rules the world. But still, what does philosophy of history do? Is it simply based on the, say on Hegel metaphysics; or does it not have a kind of..is it not meant to carry conviction to some extent by itself? You refer to that.

Student: In one place, he says that proves the thesis, but not in terms of absolute proof, but in accordance with the facts...

Strauss: What does that mean? One can perhaps say it proves, as Hegel calls it, we proved here historically, empirically, that is to say, without presupposing altogether this metaphysics' truth. How does he proceed there? Let us try to illustrate. There is some reason to assume that Greece played a considerable role in the history of the human mind. But Hegel is still not primarily concerned with the philosophers, but with what the Greeks did in other respects, especially politically. How would he find that out? He would have to find out..I mean, why does he then prefer, say, Herodotus and Thucydides to modern historians?

Student: Because they do represent that spirit...

Strauss: So in other words, the gist of Greekness is directly available to us if we linger, as he puts it, with Homer too of course, but especially with Thucydides and Herodotus, and this is infinitely more

important than to know since of that detail that we know regarding dates, regarding tribute rates, the number fallen in a given battle, and who was the grandmother of that general, and so on and so on. And here we have the gist of the Greeks. Now, and what Hegel has in mind really, if we would read, say, one hundred books--if I may use a very popular notion, Great Books of the various societies or cultures--and would linger with them then something would emerge, out of that(we would of course also consider th sequence in which they were written) and then there would emerge without any doing violence to the facts, would emerge this picture of the progress of reason.. to that extent, it appears to be empirical. We must see this at greater detail. Mr. ____, did you want to say something? Oh, I'm sorry.

Student: When he speaks of Thucydides, he says that speeches are not the original speeches, and he says Thucydides is only reflecting the spirit of society--is he using that as a proof of what you just said, that he so reflected that Thucydides was able to make up the speech?

Strauss: But they were all Greeks, weren't they, and therefore they are of course all of a fundamental unity of culture, if I may use this term, is perfectly compatible with great variety and even antagonisms within it. And what Thucydides does is to present to us a great variety within Greekness; and he does this for some reason especially in the form of speeches which he has at least written from even if he had heard the gist of the speeches from some reporters, or maybe had heard the speech himself.

Student: Does he say that Thucydides did not have to reflect upon this in order to be able to create...?

Strauss: No, reflection has a stricter meaning in Hegel. I mean, he knew that Thucydides and Herodotus were very thoughtful men. But reflection is not identical with thought; reflection is a certain kind of thought. And it is a kind of thought which has a, well, let us provisional say, a thought which does not belong. They were outside. I mean, therefor any natural science generally speaking would belong to the sphere of reflective thought. But every thought which presupposes that we belong is not wholly reflective, because there is always the presence, the conspicuous presence, of the thinking ego is essential. Reflection is a kind of--how can I describe it more simply for present purposes?--you know the distinction between intellect and reason, the traditional distinction: the intellect, which grasps the essences, reasoning, ratio, which leads up. Now something like that distinction is implied by Hegel. Only the terminology is completely changed. The lower is called understanding, nous, intellectual, and the higher is called reason. That has very much to do with Kant. But it is in an entirely different medium, the reassertion of the old distinction between understanding and reason. The key point is this: reflection is simply controlled by the principle of contradiction, and reason is dialectical, i.e., thinks through contradiction. That is, so reflection has this very narrow sense, you see, and it is also, as you see reflection means a certain question of a distance from the object, implies abstraction, merely abstraction. Now, there is this remark which that when he speaks of, when he says that in a sense one cannot learn anything from history..the passage has

often been quoted. Now there is a point..Burke says already before Hegel, from history much political wisdom may be learned as habit, not as precept. Now the vulgar view is you can learn wisdom as precept Therefore, if you want to have a victory like Hannibal's, you have to do what Hannibal did, you know all the rest. Burke has already denied that, because the circumstances differ, fundamentally the circumstances differ in each case, but yet we are helped in our understanding by observing how different wise action looks in different circumstances. You know, this kind of flexibility we surely can acquire through well-conducted historical readings.

Now, I do not remember now what the immediate context was in which I began to speak of this point. I know now..now, these people who think they can derive precepts from history: a very good example, superficially at least, would be Machiavelli's Discourses on the first ten books of Livy. He reads Livy, and then he says he draws lessons, recipes, from what he saw. If you want to establish a commonwealth, you must stand alone. You can read almost any of these 142 recipes of the Discourses have this character. This is what Hegel regards as something very inferior because of its abstraction; it doesn't see the connection. And the key point for Hegel is as Mr. Bruell p-brought out that all political action, all political action takes place within a specific - to use a present-day term - culture, and therefore the rules, the recipes, are not translated, transferable, from one culture to another; in other words, something which works well in culture A would be fatal in culture B, etc., etc. So this, to repeat, reflective means abstract, lacking the concreteness which either the immersion in your society, say Thucydides, or the universality again that is also again concrete.

Student: So reflection is neither understanding nor reason.

Strauss: No, I think from Hegel's point of view it would be called understanding in this limited sense, I mean the limited sense that it is lower than reason. In the nineteenth century, non-dialectic. Hegel uses the expression, the rigid or stiff understanding, which here, either-or, and without seeing the transition, the radical change from one to the other, what he calls truly speculative thinking. Well, some of these points will surely become clearer as we go. Now there is one point I think which we would state right away, and merely as a thesis, so that we never forget it and try to understand it. On page 9-10 of your edition, it is made clear that the premise which he presupposes in these lectures on the philosophy of history is--now what does he say here; we cannot read it, it is very long. Let me see, near the beginning, I would say, there is that reason..we can leave it here this time without discussing his relation to God. "The substance as well as infinite power is for itself the infinite material underlying all the natural and spiritual life which it originates, as also the infinite form that which sets this material in motion." Let us leave it at that. And let me..keep in mind only one point. The premise is the omnipotence of reason. And you can also say this is simply a somewhat unusual statement for the omnipotence of God. But the key point is this: reason (and this is surely no longer compatible with ordinary theology) reason is both the form and the matter. That reason should be the form, this would, wasn't always so. But that reason should also be the matter, that everything is rational, this is exactly what people mean when they speak of Hegel as panlogist. And we must try to understand this to begin with wholly untenable assertion: nothing outside of reason, which is not rational. Yes.

Now, Hegel starts first by a reference to what he has shown elsewhere, and since we have not read that, and so we will simply have to regard this as a mere assertion and forget about it, and hope we get some illustration of this paradoxical assertion.
But Hegel knows that you cannot merely make assertions and say, 'As I have proven elsewhere...' We must appeal to something which the readers l and therefore he links, he reminds us of the religious basis.
On page 1', line 15 following--you have to count--let me just say this: one thing is clear, you will have learned at home or in Sunday school, that there is divine providence as a wise government of the whole, that is what I say, God's wise government of the whole, only I will be going to show you the wisdom of the world, and it is better to show it to you than merely to assert it, which is of course a very complicated method. Now let us go on here.

Reader: "What a difference, what a contradiction, will manifest itself between this belief and our principles.

Strauss: Now listen. So Hegel does not beat around the bush. I mean, he does not say, My view is identical with the religious view, there is a difference, there is even a contradiction, a contrariety, between them. Yes.

Reader: '...just as was the case in reference to the demand made by Socrates in the case of Anaxagoras' dictum, for that belief is similarly in debt to it. It is what is called the belief in a general providence, and is not followed out into definite application or displayed in its bearing on the grand total, the entire course, of human history. But to explain history is to depict the passions of mankind, the genius, the act of powers that played their part in the great stage. And the providentially determined process which these exhibit constitutes what is generally called the plan of providence. Yet it is this very pla which is supposed to be concealed from our view, which it is deemed presu tious even to wish to recognize."

Strauss: So in other words, the ordinary view is that even providence includes, as it were, prohibition against praying into providence, and for Hegel this proposition is in no way valid. Yes?

Reader: "The teachings of Anaxagoras as to how intelligence reveals itself in actual existence was ingenious. Neither in his consciousness nor in that of Greece at large had that thought been farther expanded. He had not attained the power to apply his general principle to the concrete, so as to deduce the latter from the former. It was Socrates who took the first step in comprehending the union of the concrete with the universal. Anaxagoras, then, did not take up a hostile position towards such an application..."

Strauss: No, Socrates- Socrates did not take this following position. No, there is this ambiguity in German uses the personal pronoun, the person, "he," and it is the translator's business to find out who the "he" is. Yes. But this is not important for us now. So on.

Reader: "He did not take up a hostile position towards such an application. The common belief in providence does. At least it supposes

the use of the principle on a large scale, and denies the possibility of discerning the wisdom of providence. In isolated cases, this plan is supposed to be manifest. Pious persons are encouraged to recognize in particular circumstances something more than mere chance; to acknowledge the guiding hand of God, e.g., when health has unexpectedly come to an individual.

Strauss: Ja, and Hegel says, Well, there is, they say, this is providence, and why not in the fate of large societies in order to grasp whole historical processes. What is spoken here incidentally of Socrates, the union or reconciliation of the concrete and the universal--this is another, this gives us a hint of what Hegel means by that reason is both the form and the matter, the concrete too, and not only the forms, the categories, or whatever we call it, are rational and must be understood as rational. Yes, and in connection with his attempt to show that what he is doing is only to do consistently what is implied in the Christian or the Western religious tradition, and therefore it shouldn't be paradoxical. It is paradoxical, you say, that reason, that everything is rational. But it is not paradoxical to say God has created everything wisely. And you admit, he says, this 2 and 2. And now put 2 and 2 together, and you arrive at my view. Yes?

Student: But isn't there a further difference that in some cases, for instance in the books of the prophets, certain political events are attributed to providence--the Babylonian captivity and so forth--and he is to have a different notion that there has to be a reason which is ruling in the world throughout to a specific end, rather than simply reasonable things happening to favored nations.

Strauss: No, but I think Hegel would simply say, Well, what the prophets say is all right, but what about God? Does He not also govern the Persians, the Babylonians, the Greeks, and so on and so on, and must we not also seek for His wisdom there? I mean, speaking still ad hominem--you know what that means, on the basis of opinions of people other than himself.

Now, on page 15 in the center, now let me raise the question, what is the plan of providence in world history? I see now that may not be necessary. I will read on. Has the time come to understand that plan? In other words, the plan could not always be understood, but sooner or later the time will come, in religions we might say, at the end of time, it would become clear. But Hegel finds his judgment day, so to speak, could come while, during history. And then he goes on, and that In addition only the following general points I would like to observe. In the Christian religion, God has revealed Himself, i.e., has given men to know what He is, so that he is no longer...

Reader: "In the Christian religion, God has revealed Himself, that is, he..."

Strauss: He appeals againto something which everyone wants. Now what does it mean, God has revealed himself?

Reader: "In other words, He has given us to understand what He is, so that He is no longer a concealed or secret existance. And this possi-

bility..."

Strauss: TThat, of course, is what the Christians no longer admit, that there does not remain any longer a mystery, a divine mystery, but this is Hegel speaking. Individualism is a religion in which everything is revealed, especially of God. Yes.

Reader: "and this possibility of knowing Him, thus afforded us, renders such knowledge a duty. God wishes no narrow-hearted souls or empty heads for His children, but those whose spirit is of itself, indeed, poor, but rich in the knowledge of Him, and who regard this knowledge of God as the only valuable possession. That development of the thinking spirit which has resulted from the revelation of the Divine Being as its original basis, must ultimately advance to the intellectual comprehension of what was presented in the first instance to feeling and imagination. The time must eventually come for understanding that rich product of active reason which the history of the world..."

Strauss: Yes, this is clear. And this is something which is not in your edition, chapter 7. Now the peculiarity of Christian religion is that with it that time, the plan of providence has intended has come. This constitutes the absolute epoch in world history. The absolute epoch in world history in which the plan of God becomes known. But in the original version, in the New Testament texts, this was not yet in the form of reason. Now, in and through Hegel, it is, now also has become rationally clear. Therefore, the absolute, the consummation of the absolute epoch and therefore we can say, the absolute epoch simply, is here, is Hegel's. In Hegel, the plan of history has become clear, so that it can be thought rationally in classrooms, which could not be said before. So let us keep in mind this expression, "the absolute epoch." Hegel lives in the absolute epoch, and he will later explain quite clearly what the reasons are, why one can say that around 1820 or thereabouts, the absolute epoch of world history has come.

Now we must not, we must read the crucial, the most important passages, we have a lot of things we will postpone. Now, what is.. I mean we are confronted with this question which we cannot solve for the time being, we will find some passages which will help. Reason is the form and the matter, and therefore there is nothing which is not rational. This needs a very long footnote, and the footnote is Hegel's Logic, we can say. But we must see, we must limit ourselves to the remarks which Hegel makes here in this context. Now the difficulty is indicated, for example, on page 16 at the beginning of the third paragraph.

Reader: "It must be observed at the outset that the phenomenon we universal history belongs to the realm of spirit. The term, 'world,' includes both physical and psychical nature. Physical nature also plays its part in the world's history, and attention will have to be paid to the fundamental natural relations thus involved. But spirit and the course of its development is our substantial object. Our task does not require us to contemplate nature as a rational system in itself."

Strauss: Now let us stop here for one moment. The spirit of which Hegel speaks here and which we can loosely say is identical with reason, spirit is understanding, in contradistinction to nature. And therefore

this is the problem of Hegel to prove, I mean to show, that spirit and the spiritual or the intellectual is reason, rational, is not so terribly difficult. But what about nature? He speaks in a passage which is not here even of the opposition between nature and spirit. How does spirit, which is in itself a potentiality, acquire its content? That is another way of putting, of stating the question, How does form cause the matter? On page 17, paragraph 3, "The nature of the mind or spirit..."

Reader: "The nature of spirit can be understood by a glance at its direct opposite, matter."

Strauss: In other words, the simple reaction would be, well, Hegel cannot possibly say that matter is spiritual or, more generally stated, that reason is the form and the matter. Here there is an obvious obstacle, but not for Hegel, as we will see. Go on.

Reader: "As the essence of matter is gravity, so, on the other hand, we may affirm that substance, the essence of spirit, is freedom."

Strauss: That, I think, is a beautiful and suggestive combination. Matter is related to spirit as gravity or heaviness to freedom--to wind. Matter is not wind. Good. Nietzsche used this then later in his Zarathustra when he spoke of the spirit of heaviness .. as the one which spirit of heaviness, because our spirit can be heavy, as we know, and this is the one spirit which Hegel, which is opposed to all createdness. Now let us go on. Yes.

Reader: "All will readily assent to the doctrine that spirit, among other properties, is also endowed with freedom. But philosophy teaches that all the qualities of spirit exist only through freedom, that all are but means for attaining freedom, that all seek and produce this and this alone. It is a result of speculative philosophy that freedom is the sole truth of spirit. Matter..."

Strauss: That means that spirit is in no way compelled by any other thing. Freedom, not compulsion, it acts only through its own impulses, laws, whatever you call it. Yes?

Reader: "Matter possesses gravity in virtue of its tendency toward a central point. It is essentially composite, consisting of parts that exclude each other. It seeks its unity, and therefore exhibits itself as self-destructive, as verging toward its opposite and indivisible part. If it could attain this, it would be matter no longer: it would have perished. It strives after the realization of its idea."

Strauss: That's the key point here. So in other words, matter points by itself towards spirit. Matter following its own logic would destroy itself as matter and become spirit. This is .. matter is for Hegel something essentially self-contradictory, which doesn't mean that it doesn't exist. And this fundamental contradictoriness is the mind because the mind does not have this radical self-contradictoriness, that wishes something which by reaching it would cease to be mind. There is another passage which is not in your translation which I would like to read to you, in which he says, as it were, in passing:

"If the divine essence were not the essence of man and nature, it would be an essence which were as nothing." I mean, in other words, the transcendence of God as it is usually said is here, has become very questionable. God is what He produces, and this can be roughly divided into nature and mind, nature and man. Yes. Now there is this point which we have not yet discussed. No, that comes later. Let us see.

Now, there is one point about which you have not spoken, Mr. Druall, and I don t blame you for that, because the matter was so enormous. There is something called mind, but the difficulty is due to the fact that the German word which Hegel uses, Geist, means both mind and spirit, and therefore sometimes one says mind, and sometimes spirit--it is very hard to translate it by the same term all the time. But - so there is the doctri of the mind, becomes relevant for the understanding of history by an intermediate thought. I mean the divine mind--let us speak of the divine mind, and there is of course also the mind of man, i.e., the mind of individuals, but this would not be of any help for the understanding of history. There is an intermediate thought which enables Hegel to make his philosophy of the mind the basis of the philosophy of history. And what is that?

Mr. Druall: Is it the world-historical figures, the heroes...

Strauss: No, not yet. The folk-mind. I mean, there are folk-minds. The universal mind, if I may say so, realizes itself through folk-minds, through a kind of collective minds and not simply through individuals. This is here rather suddenly introduced, but it is obvious that without this concept of the folk-mind there would be no possibility of giving an account of history in terms of mind. History has to do primarily with political societies, states, empires, kingdoms, but this is for Hegel not enough. The political life is a part of a larger whole. This thought is today extremely popular, of course. At that time it was only beginning of what is now called culture, and what Hegel calls the mind, specific mind, folk-mind. These are the true subjects of history, not political history, only as an ingredient of it. One can perhaps state it as follows: History is rational because it is a work or activity of the mind. But the mind is historical because it is collective mind, folk-mind, and therefore the mind embodied in the historical ages. A passage which I believe the rule which Hegel gives here is this: that every folk-mind goes through a cycle, from a beginning through a peak to its decay. And this is a necessary process: I mean, there will be no chance, no traffic accidents, as it were, will prevent the completion of such a cycle. When a given folk-mind has reached its end, has realized itself fully, then the mind goes over, the world mind goes over to another nation, which begins where the preceeding nation left off and had to leave off; and then nation number one ceases to be of any interest. I mean, to the people who belong to that nation, but not to the objective observer. Take a country like Portugal, which played a very great role once, had a high development. Today it is not in the forefront any more, to put it mildly. One could give other examples, too.

Now there is one passage which I thought I should read, --very import. passages of the book are missing - "The folk-mind (Da, the folk,, this is the key point, it's hard to say how to translate the German word volk. The simple translation into English would be "nation," but they see the inadequacy of it and therefore translate if by "folk" but we have to read it as that. A community surely of language and culture and also, naturally of descent. That is clearly implied. These nations have a nature, in the

that for some they belong to a certain climate and other conditions. Hegel will speak of that later. But more specifically, their nature is their disposition, fundamental disposition. But dispositions atrophy if they are not actualized. And the actualization means, according to Hegel, they are posited as it were. This will, this folk makes itself responsible for what it does. And this is not merely irrational process, without choice and freedom. So a man or a nation is what he is not by nature, but by his action or his choice. This is seen at great length.

So while there is something like nature, this nature becomes relevant only by actions of the will, by actions of the mind. And through this transformation it ceases to be natural, and becomes spiritual. As spiritual, becoming spiritual, the folk-mind cannot die out, but it becomes the matter for a higher principle embodied in another people. So here we have at least the partial answer to the question, Why can reason be both form and matter? Because at earlier stages of the mind, of the Mind, are matter for the higher stages, and the great question is of course when that is mind at all, loosely called matter simply, how can this also be mind in a manner? He has given an indication only by the general remark about matter and its essential contradictoriness which we have read. The process leading from one folk to another is rational, which means nothing is lost. The essence of a folk-mind is preserved. This is naturally crucial, because if something important is lost, one cannot speak simply of progress as a change, but maybe what was lost was much more important than what has been acquired since.

The folk-mind, we can say, if this is of some help for the later discussions, is the mediation between nature and mind. There is one passage which I must read to you, unfortunately also not in your translation. He discusses here the transition from one folk-mind into another. And here he says, "The universal mind never doubts, but the folk-mind which belongs to universal history-inas, must come to the knowledge of that which is its work, it must reach the point where it thinks itself." The folk-mind in other words is fundamentally not conscious of itself. But at a certain stage it acquires consciousness of itself, it knows truly its work. Previously it didn't know that its work was coming down as Antigone's laws, they are imposed on the Greeks and at a certain stage, people come to see they are our laws, we make them. This thinking, this reflection, has no longer any respect of the immediate meaning here Antigone and this law which comes from she doesn't know where and she bows reverently to it. But from a certain moment on, this reverence ceases. There takes place a separation of the subjective mind, of the mind of the individual, from the universal mind. The universal mind, which expresses itself in these generally accepted views and values, etc. The individuals reassert within themselves, they are no longer above all and they strive for their own purposes. Think of Alcibiades, of whom Hegel surely thought: Alcibiades, what did he care for Athens? Athens was for him an opportunity, and if that opportunity ceased to be an opportunity, he betrayed her. We have already noticed that this is the corruption, the decay of the people. Everyone makes his own purposes according to his passions. At the same time, however, while the mind, spirit, withdraws within itself, thinking becomes now a reality by itself, an independent reality, and the sciences emerge. The sciences emerge with this liberation or emancipation of the individual, which is identical

with the decay of the folk-mind, of the common spirit. Hence, science and corruption, or the destruction, of the people are always connected with each other. Did you ever hear such a proposition?

Student: Rousseau.

Strauss: Rousseau, especially in the First Discourse, Discourse on the Sciences and Arts. So you see this is accepted by Hegel, the sciences and corruption go together. This is very important, very important for a reason which I indicated last time. Does anyone remember?

Student: The owl of Minerva.

Strauss: Can you spell it out?

Student: That historical understanding comes when we have hit the peak.

Strauss: Not necessarily so, but in the proper sense and also simpler-- what is true here of the Greeks is also true of Hegel, of Hegel's time. This consciousness, this full consciousness of the modern Western mind achieved in Hegel is connected with the corruption of modernity. The owl of Minerva, as Hegel has rightly called it, begins its flight in the dusk. Yes?

Student: Hegel however says Aristotle liberated Alexander the Great from his particular inclinations and allowed him to be a great man, through and says that Alexander embodies the spirit of Greece in some way.

Strauss: Ja, but on the other hand, of course, he was a great figure of Greece, the great figure of Greece. I mean for Hegel. That was the truly great spirit of Athens is out at that time. And you get what later came to be called Hellenism, which prepares in a way the Roman Empire (that's something else because the question of Alexander will come up later). Anyway. There are more remarks which we have not read unfortunately. At the end, the mind arrives at full consciousness; full consciousness will not mean that you can explain every detail of the funny dream you had, but in important respects.

Student: Would Hegel have to be raised at a time when the corruption of modernity--would you accept that proposition or would you say there is something fundamentally different about his own philosophy that would enable him to write at a period when things weren't corrupt; the reason that there is no more corruption, nowhere else for the world spirit to go in modernity--it's reached the end?

Strauss: Ja, but why does he make this remark about the owl of Minerva when he speaks of his doctrine and the function of his philosophy in the modern world? I mean, if it had occurred here only, then one could say, well, hitherto it always happens, that when a culture broke down and reached its fulfillment, then disintegration accompanied by the possibility of self-understanding. But now, in this fortunate time of Hegel, this is no longer the case. But unfortunately he wrote the passage about the owl of Minerva in his introduction to his Philosophy of Right, i.e., in connection with modern thought.

Student: Well then, if that's so, then would that be incompatible with saying history has reached an end, the world spirit...?

Strauss: No. I mean, that is a very dark question, because it is hard to know what Hegel thought of the beginning and the end of the hu race. That is one of the amazing things of Hegel, that one simply doesn' know what he thought about that. I mean, he discusses very briefly the question of the species, animal species, somewhere in the Encyclopedia (I always think of the social sciences) of the Philosophical Sciences; and then he simply says, well, this question of taxonomy has utterly noth to do with the question of the coming into being, the order of coming into being. But the question of his individual universe is not eternal, the question of the genesis of the species, is very important. It is impossible to say. It is unbelieveable, you can say, but here we are. Here we are, that Hegel did not discuss this question. Therefore, whether the human race was likely to last for millions or billions of years, or only a few hundred years...

Student: But still, in order for Hegel to be right, the spirit should have reached....

(change tape)

Strauss: ...an order based on the condition of rights of man, but not this is the right order and the only sensible order: all problems are solved in it. There is no reasonable possibility of protesting it. Unreasonable, plenty. You know someone, a high official, who is not appointed to the position he would like is of course disgusted and perhaps would try to do all sorts of things, but has no legs to stand on. There is no longer a publicly defensible consciousness in the world to which a man can appeal against the truth as presented by Hegel in his Philosophy of Right. This is the point. Yes.

Student: Just one point.

Strauss: And there are other difficulties, because there was a great social question, yes, not yet so powerful in Germany in Hegel's time, but it became of course very powerful with the industrialization of Germany and the problem of democracy connected with that, you know But we are concerned only with what Hegel explicitly said, we cannot-- must try to understand how this is possible, that someone should have ma this preposterous assertion.

Student: Could he be somehow asserting that the corruption of modern political institutions wouldn't really matter very much, because there would be no further stage-- you could sort of exist with a corrupt political order? It would not threaten to go on.

Strauss: No, let us assume that after all there are certain built-in resistances against political corruption, ja? I mean, people simply get fed up with it. And then there will be some kind of revoluti which of course is no longer interesting revolution. I mean, no princip such as the French Revolution, but it is only a return to the principle already codified in Hegel. This kind of thing--is that what you mean?

Student: No, more something along these lines: that the Greek world as it was more or less viewed, once people began to take an individual look at the laws and accept them; while in the modern world, presumably, we can go on with everyone taking his individual view and not taking the political view because we're not threatened in the same way the Greek world was by someone coming after us and...

Strauss: But the Greeks did not know that, of course.

Student: No, but I'm saying how can he say we're at the end of history in modern times?

Strauss: I suppose something of this kind he must have thought--there is a kind of tone--each will of course expand: He has given some sort of..he was wondering what was going to happen in this country and in Russia. But he didn't know. But I think in the spirit of the philosophy one could say this rather would spread to America as well as to Russia, but no avidance. Yes.

Student: I understood you to say that . . . . . there remains no rational way to a restoration, perhaps irrational. . .

Strauss: Ja, people did think simply of Hegel as a kind of Western cowboy who finds this modern life where crimes are taken care of by public authority and everything is taken care of in an orderly manner, but it is very dull, and would like to do things, and they might have some success, because there is a time when crime is not properly taken care of by public authorities. But gradually people come to see this is impossible to leave to the arbitrary will of individuals and the revamping of the police systems and also be a change in the laws. But these are not fundamental things. They can be very important to the individuals involved, but no new principle can ever....You see, when we come to the book, we will see that every epoch of which Hegel speaks had a principle of its own, which was an entirely new principle at the time. There is no longer a place in the world for a new principle. There is plenty of space for spreading and for the ever more adequate embodiment of the principle, I mean think of penal law, how terrible that still was in many respects 130 years ago and had plenty to do there. But this is only a further elaboration, there is nothing of fundamental difference.

Student: My question is how can one say that, given Hegel's understanding of the rational as I understand his understanding of it, how can you say that an idea is irrational, since an idea after all is action.

Strauss: Which idea?

Student: Any idea . . . so-called irrational tendencies..

Strauss: No, Hegel says it is not an idea because it is irrational. Say a kind of Gary Cooper, a romanticist, or a Clark Gable or whatever. That is not an idea because it is not rational, it is a childish dream which has certain appeal to some grown-up people, but it is a childish thing. And it is of course also because it is irrational, it has no power.

And there can be occasionally somewhere in a western town perhaps or village or hamlet, but that would be easily stopped. And even if it creates an uproar for a couple of years, by some strange concomitance of circumstances, it has no future. You have heard the expression, "He has no future." That is what he means. There is nothing which has a future except the con--I will state it inoffensively--except the constitutional state, run by a civil service and of course that can easily be done, by a very responsible and highly educated civil service. And if people think they can do without a good civil service and without a properly trained one, then Hegel would say that after a short while you will notice that this doesn't work and because it is not in accordance with the spirit of this time. Yes?

Student: You said before that the relation between corruption and the rise of science. Is it correct to assume, or to understand, that the rise of science is possible because the major problems have been solved, according to Hegel?

Strauss: Ja, in a way yes, and only because they have been solved is it possible to give the theory.

Student: I don't understand then the relationship between the solution and the rise of science and corruption.

Strauss: That is a long process. He is speaking here of a much broader one. When the--I think he is here thinking primarily of what happened in Greece. There was this order, this old order, culminating in a way in the Persian War, Persian victory, and then gradually, in pragmatic terms, Greece becomes much more powerful, much more wealthy. Then there begins the public tasks do no longer have this grand, compelling character. As the Persian war, there begins this movement towards a as seen in the Spartan war, and in this, especially during the preparation for war, we see a disintegration beginning. The ultimate reason is not that there are but the absence of such compelling public tasks, wholly public tasks, one can almost say, as the defense of Greece against Persia. And in connection with this, these individuals--well, some think it is wonderful to have a stable of racing horses and to win in Olympia each time, Alcibiades, and of course, since he was a clever man to have conversations with Socrates, and other people; and others who simply say, who don't like this playboy existence at all, and they say no, we stay with Socrates and talk with him from morning to evening--ja?--about what is virtue, what is courage, what is education, and whatever it may be, and yet do no longer truly participate in the life of the polis. Individualists, ja, but this individualism is of course the condition of science. Aristotle says this too. So political science is most important, if philosophy is science. Hegel's great work has the title, The Science of Logic. And yet, as it were, you can't eat the cake and have it. The time in which the German cities were flourishing, late Middle Ages up to perhaps later, (Hegel would never use this example; I use it only for from the point of view of social health) but science would have been absolutely impossible. Hegel's view in other words, I mean, Hegel's view (we will see other examples of that later) of the order, of the human order, is not as in the Hegelian tradition as frequently presented: that you get the good and the beautiful and the true all at the same time in the same manner. That is not so, according to Hegel.

The development, I mean, man's most important desire, according to Hegel, and his highest desire--his desire for knowledge--demands a price. I mean, not really this price, which goes without saying the infinite supply, but it is not possible under the same conditions under which society has really flourished. But there are quite a few objections to this interpretation of Hegel, and let us be open and see what we find out.. Let me see whether there is any point which I.. I would like to see on page 20 at the beginning of the second paragraph.

Reader: "The question of the means by which freedom develops itself to the world conducts us to the phenomenon of history itself. Although freedom is primarily an undeveloped idea, the means it uses are external and phenomenal, presenting themselves in history to our sensuous vision."

Strauss: In other words, the end of history is not visible, strictly understood. What is visible is and I mean what we observe and what we hear about, is what in the light of the end appears as means. And that is what men ordinarily speak about but they do not speak about it as means; they speak about these battles, these revolutions, these restorations, or what have you. Yes, go on.

Reader: "The first glance at history convinces us that the actions of men proceed from their needs, their passions, their characters, and interests, and impresses us with the belief that such needs, passions, and interests are the sole springs of action, the efficient agents of this scene of activity. Among these may perhaps be found aims of the liberal or universal kind--benevolence it may be or noble patriotism. But such virtues and general views are but insignificant as compared with the world and its doings. We may perhaps see the ideals of reason actualized in those who adopt such ends and within the sphere of their influence. But they bear only a trifling proportion to the mass of the human race, and the extent of that influence is limited accordingly. Passions, private aims, and dissatisfactions of selfish desires are, on the other hand, most effective springs of action. Their power lies in the fact that they respect none of the limitations which justice and morality would impose on them; and that these natural impulses have a more direct influence over man than the artificial and tedious discipline that tends to order and self-restraint, law and morality."

Strauss: Yes. So what we see first, I mean, as unsophisticated thing, just reading the report, that these big actions and transactions are the actions of individuals; and then we see there are good guys and bad guys, and the one we like and the other we resist, and in other words, we study their motives, was he public-spirited or just a man concerned with self-aggrandizement. Generally stated, their passions Now from the higher point of view, Hegel says, these passions are the means for the world-historical process and they are much less--I mean, the usual moralistic view as Hegel calls it is not very helpful, because sometimes a man was very good and he is--I mean even politically of a high order--and yet so to speak in an outlying district, of no importance for the history of the world. And then another man of very dubious morality who however was at the right place at the right time and could use the proper levers and he was concerned with his self-aggrandizement without any question and yet--but the situation was so that he could not

aggrandize himself, but by doing a public service of the first order and bringing about the transition from principle A, which had become obsolete, to principle B. Hegel s dialectics this is of course Napoleon. But he's also thinking of Alexander the Great and of Caesar and of some other people. So the means the end is the end, the rational end: the good or true or just society, however you call it. But the means by which it is brought about are the passions of men; and partly to say the least, are the . We will see, I think, that Hegel s view of the passions is not, and of these world-historical individuals is not quite as tough as that of Machiavelli; and I think Hegel means, is pointing in the direction of Carlyle, much more forward, than in the direction of Machiavelli. You know Carlyle's notion of the hero much more than in the direction of Machiavelli, back. This is unfortunately not sufficient. Now here he says at the end of the passage we read, the passions are in a way natural; the virtues are artificial--namely, due to dissonance, conscious dissonance, this old issue of nature and convention is here still alive. Only for Hegel it is different: what is natural is lower than what is brought about by the mind. And Hegel has to answer this question: what do the passions have to do which are always selfish, with the universal end? That is the proper place to start, and this is a more specific formulation of the same problem which, generally stated, means that reason supplies both the form and the matter. In a manner, reason is effective in these terrible warriors and tyrants, and makes them what they are. It was not Napoleon, God knows what went on in his mind this occasion. But it was not merely Napoleon with these particular affairs, but something in Napoleon which is responsible for that new Civil Code, the Code Napoleon, and for this complete change in civil law and other matters. Too, strange as it may sound, but I believe you will see it, that Hegel's conception of the world-historical individual is more moral than that of Machiavelli. I think, in a way, he moralizes the hero and does bring about this union between the universal and the particular.

Now, let me....one word. Hegel reminds us of the belief in providence, and he says what I will do really is to prove what everyone has asserted, that there is a divine government of the world. In the coming of modern times, of the modern rationalism, the British poet Pope had written a poem which has a line "to vindicate the ways of God to man." And Hegel says, as it were, I shall vindicate the ways of God in history to man and this means the following--because what seems so shocking and what seems to contradict so much the belief in a wise government of the world, when we look at history, we answer that evil which is about, physical evil as well as moral. The victory of evil is temporary and sometimes more than temporary: think only about the Roman emperors and about the Just a few chapters from time to time, and there you see what absolute beasts who would hold human beings in thrall, I mean no possibility it seems of saying a good word about them. Hegel wants to, the vindication of providence means the justification of evil. That is crucial. So if we may play fast and loose with these general terms, form and matter, somehow corresponding to the difference of good and evil, evil is as necessary for the final perfection as good. And in a more immediate sense, it is even more important, because these great revolutionary changes are brought about by men whom we in our unsophisticated and healthy world would call evil rather than good.

Student: Then that again raises the question of what happens in the modern time when there are no more big changes. What purpose would evil serve then?

Strauss: Je, this is the point. This is obviously the same question. I mean, how did Hegel think things would go from here? But fundamentally there can no longer be a revolution--I mean, you know, except a replica of the French Revolution, say, if they would make a revolution in what is now Yugoslavia, which at the time was then Turkish. Hegel would probably say it was good, I don't know, but I suppose so. But still what is now is only men's passions.

Student: What about the problem, presumably, the people in our times in the states which are modern are still the same; they still have the same passions, but now these passions can no longer have a purpose, nothing to which they can be the means.

Strauss: That's very good, because the order is solid; because if someone has a passion and expresses it in a manner not conducive to the common good, then he will become an ordinary criminal; and if the criminal police and the courts do their duty, he will be taken care of. Now, of course, Hegel is not so much concerned with vulgar passions leading to sex, and murder--ja?--but he is concerned with these great passions, the great political ambitions -- they also can be very dangerous, of course, and--well, there are always laws of high treason, lese majeste, and so on, something to worry about. But the fundamental problems are solved. There are always loose ends around, but this is not a philosophic problem.

Student: He seems to conjure up holes in his vindication of providence, because if he wants to explain why there is evil, he does it by saying evil serves a purpose, and it's a good purpose.

Strauss: Yes, but we have not discussed the whole thing--the question why there should be passions of the non-world-historical kind is not discussed. But I suppose one could find, explain why an animal-like man must have these passions--otherwise, you know, I suppose it is quite good, that people of different sexes love one another. You cannot get that without making some allowance for the passion of genesis. Ja? You can't, this is an impossibility
and the same would be true, and I think he would also follow that to some extent, on Adam Smith regarding what he calls society as distinguished from state, or to put it harshly, commendable private vices, public benefits. I mean, if there were not people who were unreasonably eager to get richer and richer, this would lead to some very great damage for the community. And, well, you know that is relatively simple, and was done long before Hegel to vindicate private passions. But here we are concerned with private passions on a world-historical level. Good.
Now, Next time Mr. _____.

Strauss: Now, Mr. __, you spoke chiefly--that was the length of it-- of this Moralität, Sittlichkeit business. I'll use the German terms for the time being. Why..don't.. what is the purpose of this discussion in Hegel? It didn't become quite clear, and I believe that was the reason why it was so hard to follow you. Why is this issue important?

Student: My knowledge of the issue is limited....

Strauss: I think this becomes perfectly clear from the discussion. Maybe from what we discussed last time, this-- I do not remember now so clearly, but I think it becomes clear from what we read today. Mr. __, you remember what the... why this issue is so very important for Hegel, I mean without going into any deep things, very obvious things. He wants to present a philosophy of history, and there is one great,massive author, very popular and well-known. What is the common view of history, I mean at that time? No longer today perhaps..

Student: The objections that philosophy presents a process opposed to history, that it would force ...

Strauss: Oh, no, that is not a popular argument if it is based on philosophy.

Student: That history is just a long tale of misery.

Strauss: Yes, Hegel wants to show that history is rational. And the ordinary view is that history is not rational at all. And, ja, a long tale of misery. But this is not... there is also great prosperity there, in history. So what is the key point?

Student: Well, it's more, it seems to be a recollection of . . .

Strauss: Ah, so the prosperity of the wicked and the misery of the good. Now, wicked and good is a simple moral distinction; and therefore Hegel is confronted with the problem of morality. To what extent is morality in this simple sense the vantage point for judging of history? And therefore the distinction which Hegel made on other grounds, between Moralität and Sittlichkeit, comes in. But this is...so Hegel grants, as it were, that the simple moral man is right in his judgment on history but he questions his competence. You have to have a broader view of morality than the simple man has, the simple moral man. So the sim...this is the key point, the purpose of the discussion. Now as for the distinction itself, and I...it is hard to see how one could translate it conveniently into English. Could you make a suggestion?

Student: Well, the one point where Hegel speaks of both Sittlichkeit and Moralität, the passage where

Strauss: That is a merely verbal help, yes, when you have to define what it means. Yes?

Student: Well, sort of like mores or the French

Strauss: Yes, but it is a bit more, has a bit-- if you would say the "ethos" of the society it would be slightly better than to speak of mores. One could also suggest, to translate Moralität by subjective morality and Sittlichkeit by objective morality, I mean just as a help, but this needs also some discussion. But what is Hegel thinking about?

Hegel's primary conception of morality is derived from Kant. And it is really, you can say, his formulation of the Kantian. According to Kant, the only thing of absolute worth is a good will. And this good will consists in respect of the moral law, or the law of reason. This...Kant thought that this purely formal thing, the mere respect of the moral law...well, the formel for Kant this moral law means more specifically: Act in such a manner that your maxim, the maxim guiding you, with a view to which you act, is susceptible of universalization. Now what does this mean? You have the maxim to get along in the world by hook and by crook. I don't mention any individual among you but an indeterminate individual. And then Kant says, how do I know that this is immoral? Answer: I try to give it the form of universal law: Everyone ought to get along in the world--everyone, not only you who wants to have this special exception made for yourself-- everyone is obliged to get along in the world by hook and by crook. And then Kant says, then you see that this is impossible, as this is a self-contradictory proposal, and therefore... oh, there is if you say...if a man has a maxim to help his neighbors, and then you try to universalize that, then you see this works; hence, it is a moral maxim. That's a very crude statement, but sufficient for the present purpose. And this is what Hegel denies. Hegel says, why this good will? This fundamental integrity, as one might call it, is indeed essential to goodness, it is unable, by itself, to produce any content. I mean it takes crude, merely brutish self-assertion. But if one takes a very nasty content, but doesn't regard himself as an exception, but says everyone should do it, there is a criminal says I want to do .. to engage in racketeering (but this of course presupposes that the majority of people don't do it, because otherwise the whole plan, the moral maxim wouldn't work.) But if you take...so this is indeed precluded by morality in the Kantian sense. But on the other hand, all kinds of... think of very beastly moralities, taught by so-called intellectuals and not by them with a view to their aggrandizement, because then they wouldn't try to teach it, they would keep it secret and act on it, of course. But then these things can be preached - master moralities - as universal morality, because not valid for everyone-- you have to be a master for that--but surely without any regard to persons. Good. And Hegel says therefore there must be something else which cannot be produced by the individual conscience legislating for itself, and this is, let us say, morality in the objective sense. That what is embodied in the institutions and in the ethos of a given society. So, and Hegel says if we make this distinction,

then we can get rid of the difficulty created by the prosperity of the wicked, and can have a non-moralistic but in a deeper sense moral view of world history, that is what he is driving at. One can put it also...now Hegel uses here sometimes phrases which do not remind you directly of Kant, strict Kantian ethics, but something broader. When he speaks in this passage to which you referred, of the peasant or herdsman, a simple fellow who has never heard of Kant, or even of ethics. Honest people, they exist at all times. And let us take such a view--I mean they exist in all kinds of societies, even if there are cannibal societies, even there there is a difference between honest men and other people. They only believe that cannibalism is a perfectly good thing. But not by virtue of any corruption. They are as honest as anyone in our societies. But that has to do with the defectiveness of their objective morality. Is this clear?

Student: I don't think . . .

Strauss: Let us first try to explain it relatively independently of what Hegel himself says. Now, in other words, Hegel means by morality, we can say, simple honest decency, without any regard to its content. And now he says if you take morality in this sense, history is indeed a terrible spectacle at first glance. Not quite, because he will say immediately that this honest man takes himself seriously; then he is not concerned with reward for virtue, and then what is the prosperity of the wicked and the misery of the good, is independent of results. So there is no morality to speak of, but the more important consideration is, as I said before, that the important point is not this merely formal honesty, which means in effect you are a nice guy doing, acting according to the principles of your society. But the important question is, What are the principles of your society? What is the substantive morality? And this substantive morality changes. The Greek morality is not the morality of the Middle Age, and that is not the morality of our time. This change of the moralities, this is the most highly moral thing in the world, and this is brought about by the revolutionaries, to use a non-Hegelian term. And the revolutionaries, with their crimes, they are the most important men in the world from the highest moral sense, even if they do all kinds of lousy things--you know, where the simple man says they are disgusting--and because of the kinds of things they do....but this is indeed deplorable, Hegel says, but he doesn't count compared with the revolutionary. This is what he is driving at. Now let us return to the discussion. Did you want to say something?

Student: This final way of getting over the difficulty, by saying that whatever the world-historical people do is sort of okay in a certain sense, because they're advancing the more important progress of the idea, really leaves the distinction of Moralität and Sittlichkeit completely, doesn't it? They're not operating in the sphere of Moralität or Sittlichkeit.

Strauss: No, they are, I mean their concern or that to which they are dedicated is Sittlichkeit. Yes. But not because morality in that sense doesn't change. There are always honest people, always people who do not prefer their own selfish interests to the interests of the society to which they belong-- this exists always. And that is always respectable, but it is not enough, because it ultimately depends...I mean, let me say this simply, in this way: The moral man not entirely what Hegel means to say-- is law-abiding, and law-abidingness is always a fine thing, but we cannot avoid the quest. By which law does he abide? If this is a law favoring cannibalism it is inferior to a law which forbids cannibalism and even which establishes effectively the dignity of every man. And that makes all the difference. And he is a revolutionary, not law-abiding, but law-breakers. Law-abiding I equate now with morality.

Student: But with Sittlichkeit.

Strauss: Ja, but by breaking the law, by being a crimin in this sense, he brings about a higher level of Sittlichkeit, of morality in the full sense of the word. Yes, Mr. Bruehl?

Student: What about the case where from the simple poi of view he wouldn't seem to be bringing about a higher level but a lower level? For instance, the story of Cyrus, the corruption of Sparta into an Oriental despotism.

Strauss: But Hegel would simply say this is a wrong interpretation of what happened, you know, this was a fiction of But Alexander the Great would be an example. An Alexander the Great by destroying the polis, in a way, by depriving it of its life, brought about the Hellenization of the non-Greek world, and that was a great opus. Although he did terrible thin killed his best friend, you know....

Student: I'm not concerned with that, but suppose...

Strauss: You should be concerned.

Student: My question is not concerned, but it is direc to the fact that perhaps what he was trying to instill was better

Strauss: Ja, but Hegel denies that. That is his "optimism," that the historical process is progressive; and if something is destroyed which(Hegel admitted that in a way classic Greece was something which has never be restored, but nevertheless, pagan as a whole, it deserved to perish, because something much better came out of it, modern Europe.) Yes?

Student: What about the question of Antigone, and the opposition between piety to the gods and piety to the state, or law-abidingness?

Strauss: Yes. This is a long question which Hegel will take up in the section on Greece. We will come to that. This dialectics, the family and the polis, is essential to the polis, and this is the ultimate reason why the polis is destroyed. We come to that. The of the Antigone problem, the family We come to that. Good. Now let us then turn to--or did you want to ask a question?

Student: I wanted to ask the same question.

Strauss: I see. Now I wish to remind you briefly of wha we discussed last time and also to look at a few passages in last time's assignment. Now the key assertion to repeat is that histor is a rational or reasonable process. Now, there are three ways in which Hegel lays the foundation for that. First, the omnipotence of reason has been proven by, according to Hegel's claim, by Hegel in his Logic, in his philosophy. This is presupposed. Secondly, Hegel says that this omnipotence of reason is granted by all his students or listeners, because it is implied in the belief in providence. And thirdly, the reasonable character of history will be proven a posteriori, empirically, in philosophy of history Good.

Now the difficulty is this: Reason has to do with universals, with universal ends. History has to do with particulars-nations, conflicts among nations, individuals, their deeds and sufferings. But this is mediated, this conflict or divergence between the universal and the individual, is mediated to some exte by the nation. The nation is something universal, something commc comprehensive, compared with the individual. A nation is constitu by a national mind, the folk-mind, but still it is something particular, the French mind, the mind. But each folk-mind is a part, or facet, or stage of the mind, the world-mind, and therefore this is a reconciliation between the universal and the particular. As regards the individuals in particular, without knowing it, they or some of them bring about the work of the world mind and that is the doctrine of the world-historical individuals.

It is perhaps...but this is not in the translation, but Hegel says somewhere here in the original, "the unmoved mover," using the language of Aristotle. The eternally unmoved infinite, and then we have history. How,what is the connection? The unmoved mover has no consciousness of itself. Consciousness presupposes individuality, the ego, the finite ego. But the ego primarily wills itself, its own satisfaction and happiness, its own finite ends. And the question is, therefore, the way in which the individual is led from his finite ends to the universal absolu (as another way of putting it). Let us turn to the translation, page 28. In the center. One moment. That was from last time, we did not finish it.

Reader: "This union of the two extremes, the embodiment of a general idea in the form of direct reality, and the elevation of a speciality in the connection with universal truth...."

Strauss: That is only the reverse side of the first. How can the individual with his finite, narrow ends become the, in a way, the absolute mind by understanding the whole; and the other way round, how can the unmoved mover become conscious of itself? Yes?

Reader:".Is brought to pass at first sight under the conditions of the utter diversity of nature between the two, and t indifference of the one extreme toward the other. The aims which the ancients set before them are limited and special...."

Strauss: "Finite" it is..

Reader:"..But it must be remarked that the agents themselves are intelligent, thinking beings."

Strauss: Yes,"knowing, thinking beings." So in other words he wants only to satisfy his interests, say, in food, or shelter, nothing else. Very fundamental. But he has intelligence, he thinks about the means of getting food or shelter And this very fact, that he uses intelligence, if only in a very instrumental sense, only for these finite purposes, this has infinite consequences. Because this...the universality of intelligence itself, of any thinking however instrumental, leads to infinite consequences. Yes?

Reader: "The purport of their desires is interwoven with essential considerations of justice, duty, etc."

Strauss: So in other words, this fellow who is only concerned with food and shelter, but he has to live together with others who also want food and shelter, and then the question arises inevitably sooner or later, is he entitled to do that, to get this piece of food or to find his shelter here or there, and by this very fact although he is always concerned with right only incidentally--he is concerned with food--but the consideration of right is a universal consideration. He has some crude notion of justice, but this crude notion of justice, by its dialectics, will lead eventually to the full notion of justice. Yes?

Reader: "For mere desire, volition in its rough and savage forms, falls not within the scene and sphere of universal history. Those general considerations which form at the same time a norm for directing aims and actions, have a determinate purport; for such an abstraction as good in itself has no place in living reality. If men are to act, they must not only intend the good, but must have decided for themselves whether this or that particular thing is a good. What special course of action, however, is good or not is determined, as regards the ordinary contingencies of private life, by the laws and customs of the state. And here no great difficulty is presented. Each individual has his position; he knows on the whole what a just and honorable conduct is. He has to...."

Strauss: Simply by being a member of society, he learns it from childhood on: this is to be done and this not to be done. Of course there are criminal parents, negligent parents, but they are the exceptions. And therefore, generally speaking, that is so. But here is something which you omitted: "Every individual is the son of his nation, on a determinate stage of the development of that nation. No one can jump over, or disregard, the spirit of his nation as little as he can disregard or free himself of the earth on which he lives." Good. Now let us turn to page 29 in the translation, second paragraph.

Reader: "It is quite otherwise with the comprehensive relations that history has to do with. In this sphere are present those momentous collisions between existing acknowledged duties, laws and rights, and those contingencies which are adverse to this fixed system, which assail and even destroy its foundations and existence, whose tenets may nevertheless seem good, on the large scale advantageous, yes even indispensable and necessary. These contingencies realize themselves in history. They involve a general principle of a different order from that on which depend the of a people or a state. This principle is an essential phase in the development of the creating idea, of truth striving a urging towards consciousness of itself. Historical men, world-historical individuals, are those in whose aims such a general principle lies."

Strauss: Yes, let us stop here. So in other words, in a way, there is a need for...no, it is necessary that the customar morality, the only morality known to the people in question, is questioned. Not merely by argument, but by deed. In a sense, the deepest crime, much deeper crime than an ordinary crime, because an ordinary crime does not make doubtful the established order. But the revolutionary, as distinguished from an ordinary criminal, questions the law as a whole and not merely this particular law. (if a criminal does question a given law; because the ordinary murderer does not say: The provision against murder shoul be abolished, but only he wants to get away with murder) But there is, a revolutionary questions the law as a whole and tries to pres it by another law which he claims to be better, a higher right; but this higher right cannot be accepted except by a break of a radical kind. Now here is where heroes come in. The crucial conclusion which Hegel draws here is this: that the passions animating the historical heroes are not immoral, because they are in the service of that higher right. For the purpose of their passic and of the idea of the universal is the same. The historical hero identifies himself with the great public task. He does not merely abduct that task in order to serve his thirst for immortal fame, in the way he looks around, which alignment might be most conducive to my forthcoming, not merely now but to my immortal fame; btt he identifies himself with it, even if Napoleon, for example, would have sided with the French Revolution or certain elements of it, only because this was the only thing which promised him great success. Obviously, if he had taken the side of the ancien

regime, he would have been guillotined, or at any rate he wouldn't have become the success he was. So granting that even if originall this was a merely calculating identification, it couldn't remain that. He had to adopt, he had to identify himself wholeheartedly. In other words, the historical hero is characterized by passion, but he is a passionate partisan of a cause and that distinguishes him from the mere climber. Now here the objection arises, is the use, I mean the world mind, so to say, uses the human beings as means. Napoleon and Caesar, and when they have fulfilled their function they are just thrown out. Napoleon goes to Helena, no one cares. Caesar is murdered by Brutus and Cassius, it doesn't mean anything. But they have fulfilled their function. This is what he calls the ruse of reason. The use of human beings as means not immoral? Does the world mind not act immorally? But Hegel's answer, let us see, page 33, paragraph 2.

Reader: "But though we might tolerate the idea that individuals, their desires and the gratification of them, are thus sacrificed and their happiness given up to the empire of chance to which it belongs, and that as a general rule , individuals come under the category of means to an ulterior end, there is one aspect of human individuality which we should hesitate to regard in that subordinate light, even in relation to the highest, since it is absolutely no subordinate element, but exists in those individuals, as inherently eternal and divine. I mean morality, ethics, religion. Even when speaking of the realization of the great ideal aim by means of individuals, the subjective element in them, their interests, their cravings, their impulses, their views and judgments though exhibited as the merely formal side of their existence, were spoken of as having an infinite right to be consulted. The first idea that presents itself in speaking of means is that of something external to the object, of having no share in the object itself. Merely natural things, even the commonest, lifeless objects used as means must be of such a kind as adapts them to their purpose; they must possess something in common with it. Human beings least of all sustain the bare external relation of mere means to the great ideal aim. Not only do they in the very act of realizing it make it the occasion of satisfying personal desires which purport to that aim; but they share in that ideal aim itself, and are for that very reason objects of their own existence not formally merely as the world of living beings generally is, whose individual life is generally subordinate to that of man and is properly used as an instrument; men on the contrary are objects of existence to themselves as regards the intrinsic import of the aim in question."

Strauss: I think we can stop here. The main point has become clear. Man is an end in himself, Hegel says, as it were; but how, and why? Surely his nose is not an end in itself. He is an end in himself only by virtue of the divine which is in him, and this is not treated as a means in this use of the individuals by the world mind, because this divines a new idea, the new cause--the divine. In other words, the great actors are sacrificed

Their virtue...there is another way of putting the objection: their virtue is not rewarded; hence, no providence. Hegel's answer in page 34 in the second paragraph.

Reader: "In contemplating the fate which virtue, morality even piety experience in history, we must not fall into the litany

Strauss: No, it is...yes, yes, I'm sorry. Yes, that's the paragraph.

Reader: "...that the good and pious offer for the most pa They fare ill in the world while the evil dispose and the wicked prosper. The term "prosperity" is used in a variety of meanings--riches, outward honor, and the like. But in speaking of something which in and for itself constitutes an aim of existence, that so-called well or ill-faring of these or those isolated individuals cannot be regarded as an essential element in the rational order of the universe, with more justice than happiness or a fortunate environment of individuals, it is demanded in the grand name of the world's existence that it should foster, nay, involve executions a... ratifications of good, moral, righteous purposes."

Strauss: And this of course is done in fact. I mean, a higher cause is victorious. And these people who say the good are not rewarded, they have...they are very immoral, because they want to have a reward for their virtue, instead of regarding their virtue as its own reward. Yes?

Student: Would you just go back a minute to this idea of the use of human beings as ends, as means. He says actually human beings have to have some share in the end towards which they're be... used. Well, doesn't that contradict what he said in other places about, oh, the passion of the world-historical individual being... he does seem to be used as an end. He even uses the example of th... wind or the fire which is used to make a building to keep out the wind and which is fireproof, as the example of what happens to the passions when they're used in such a way as to frustrate their purp

Strauss: Which purposes? The very irrelevant part of the purposes. Napoleon wished to continue ruling France after he had done his work. Absolutely uninteresting
Who cares? But the main point, the Code Napoleon, his new legislation, it was finished, and that stayed.

Student: Well, is it the good that men do lives after the

Strauss: Absolutely. That's what Hegel means in a somewh unorthodox manner. But he claims...but as for the fact--you said i differently--your objection at the beginning of your statement, namely more from the point of view of the simple decent man, of the simple man--how did you put it? I mean, he is, as it were, discredited completely by the world-historical person. Hegel would deny it. He would simply say that his simple-minded view of justi which he doesn't know that it's simple-minded, he doesn't know the implicit dialectics, but if he understood what he wants, the victo of right comes about, although in a manner in which he would not

recognize it. Ja? I mean, by the way, I mean there is partly something of Plato in that. Here is a very crude notion of justice Say justice consists in leaving everybody what belongs to him, in giving everybody what belongs to him. Very simple-minded, but to some extent a very sound view. But difficulties arise there. To take the simple Platonic example, if you give a madman a gun of which he is the rightful owner, is this a just action? No; then you have to make a distinction here. Just action is not onl to give everybody what is his property, but also if there is a reasonable certainty that he will use it well, can use it well. And once you begin, an enormous field develops, and Hegel says when we think that through, no holds barred at any point, then we arrive eventually at the notion of justice codified by Hegel in his Philosophy of Right, which is the true order, the just order, and this could never have come into being except by all these revolutic which have taken place throughout history. So in other words, the simplest, the simple peasant or herder somewhere in Mesopotamia, no one knows where--he, what he ultimately wanted without knowing has now become actual. So he is not disavowed, although he would not recognize the full actualization of what he meant by simply, well, say even sacrificing his children to Baal, which would be wholly incompatible with the rational order of things. But what di he mean by that ultimately? That there is something higher than th individual, higher than man, which can demand the sacrifice of one own son--ja, the greatest sacrifice. Well, to some extent that is true, although not in this simplistic way that you sacrifice a child. Ja? Good.

Student: Isn't this a question which can only arise fro past events too-- the relationship between individuals and the wor spirit as means and the user, and at the present time you couldn't say that states committed to sacrifice individuals for the sake of future development. It just doesn't legitimize that sort of thing.

Strauss: Ja, but why?

Student: Because there is no future city.

Strauss: Yes. All problems have been solved; the order now existing is just, and therefore this can only be a crackpotish, and therefore simply criminal affair. That's the reason. Although why could this go on? I mean, after all that is the Marxist, and not only but especially the Marxist point: the order presented by Hegel's Philosophy of Right is not the just order, and therefore...

Student: (inaudible)....sacrifice individuals....

Strauss: Ja, sure.

Student: This is the Marxist....

Strauss: Ja, no question. And they don't even take the trouble which Hegel took to justify before the forum of ordinary moral spirit. Ja, but they could perhaps say, well, Hegel did it.

You must read Hegel, as Lenin said, study Hegel's Logic, and then you will become a Marxist-Leninist. Whether it is so simple is another matter. Good. On page 37 in the translation, line 9ff. That is the sentence to which we refer frequently.

Reader: "The religion, the morality of a limited sphere of life, that of the shepherd or a peasant for example, in its intensive concentration and limitation to a few purposely simple relations of life, has infinite worth, the same worth as the religion and morality of extensive knowledge and of an existence rich in the compass of its relations and actions. This inner focus, this simple region of the claims of subjective freedom, the home of volition, resolution and action, the abstract sphere of conscience, that which comprises the responsibility and moral value of the individual remains untouched and is quite shut out from the noisy din of the world's history, including...."

Strauss: You see he can speak in an almost Kantian manner of the absolute worth of the good will of the individual, as you say. He says...I don't question that, but go on.

Reader: "...including not merely external and temporal changes, but also those entailed by the absolute necessity inseparable from the realization of the idea of freedom itself. But as a general truth, this must be regarded as settled, that whatever in the world possesses claims as noble and glorious, has nevertheless a higher existence above it: the claim of the world spirit rises above all special claims. These observations...."

Strauss: Yes. So in other words, the right of the world mind goes, transcends all particular rights, we can say, like the right of that simple herder and peasant. His good will has an infinite life, Hegel is to answer. But precisely if we take his morality seriously, we know that he cannot be interested in reward for his honesty, and therefore if he complains about strange things going on in the world--there is simply injustice--think of some poor peasant in the Ukraine, and you know this...Well, here if he was a decent man, his decency remains unimpaired
What happens now is something much more important. I don't know whether Hegel would have gone so far as to defend the action of Stalin and similar but still there is surely this problem of whether historical action, world-historical action, can be measured by the standards of private morality, because Moralität is the same as private morality. Yes, Mr. _____?

Student: Presumably what is invaluable, what has absolute value about this peasant or this shepherd is the good will and the decency with which he approaches the moral problem, not his particular views. Those presumably would change as time marches on.

Strauss: Yes, he simply could not be expected to have thought through these complicated questions. This is simply for him a traditional morality, and ordinary morality is also traditional morality without...incompetent to question the sufficiency of the tradition. This is already . . .

Student: In other words, to change the tradition, you mig. have to get rid of him in a violent manner; but that's not a claim. that's not saying he wasn't a good man.

Strauss: Yes, sure, yes.

Student: Isn't there a greater question of justice involv. than the question of the peasant--all the people who existed before Hegel's time, because in a way they were deprived of the opportunit for the future.

Strauss: Ja, but, well something of this kind is hard to avoid. If you speak of progress in any sense. All you have to say is all moralities, all cultures as we say now, that are or ever were are equally good, which is very hard to defend. You know, the is a certain kind of present-day liberals who in effect say that, if not in so many words. This is hard to do, because if this is... for the very simple reason that most cultures were not liberal, and therefore if they say they are as good as a liberal culture, they seem to contradict themselves. So I think one has to make a choice we all have to do that. And therefore Hegel cannot be blamed for that, that he says the morality of secularized Christianity is the highest, above all, and the proof he claims he will give here. I'. sorry, I've neglected you.

Student: I just wanted to say one thing. If you say tha the morality of the peasant or the herdsman or whatever, is of infinite value, not necessarily in a judgment that doesn't affect him, but in his attitude--how can the world spirit...is it still above what is called an instrument here?

Strauss: Well, this is a repetition of Kant's notion of morality: He says, I see what you mean, and I bow down to these simple people who are honest people. There is something very high in that, but it is not the only thing which is high. Even Kant himself, Hegel would say, got into troubles because these simple people of good will are so good and so decent because of their innocence. They are not truly intelligent, and as Kant puts it, the trouble with innocence is that it is so easily lost, and therefore goodness is something that we need and therefore it is not enough to be decent and obedient and law-abiding, but you need knowledge of principles to confirm it; and therefore his whole moral philosophy is necessary to buttress this simple goodness, which left to itself would not be good enough. So that is...Hegel could argue here on a Kantian basis, because of the insufficiency of the simple good will, which in a way Kant admits.

Student: So it is the way of expressing very high goodness, but which is still...

Strauss: Surely, in Hegel it is not meant as literally as in Kant. In Kant, it has the simple point which it also had in Rousseau, and that was obviously somewhing which both men and many more men, but especially for among the greatest of these two men

there was a deep experience, the feeling of humiliation, as it were, which they as men of the mind had--and what brilliance, what depth, confronted the simple artisan or peasant, who has nothing to do with the marvels of the understanding, but is an honest man. That was a terrific thing, I mean, we can still understand that, I believe, and in a way we can understand it at all times. But it took on this crucial philosophical point only in the eighteenth century, in the context in which it came to be necessary to ascribe the highest worth to morality in order to be entitled no longer to ascribe it to religion, i.e., positive religion. If we call moralism, the view according to which moral virtue is the highest: this is the peculiarity of the eighteenth century. The Stoics said something different although it sounds like that, for the very simple reason that for the Stoics part of what virtue is the virtue of physics and logic, which shows it is not simply identical with moral virtue. But in the eighteenth century, coming already earlier, moral virtue was regarded as the one thing needful, because by some very outstanding thinkers and the most famous are surely Rousseau and Kant - and this is questioned by Hegel. Hegel of course is in this sense philosopher old-style, that the highest is thinking rather than morality. (Ja, thinking based on morality) And this is...the view that moral virtue is the one thing needful is...has reached the level of philosophical teachings in the eighteenth century, and especially in Kant. But Kant himself admitted that he got the decisive impulses in this respect through Rousseau. So we have to mention Rousseau, too, here. There are others, but the general tendency was in these centuries to find a way out from positive religion, the simple usual explanation: the religious wars, conflict, to find a common basis that all men of good will could agree; and for some time, of course, it was said morality plus natural religion. You know, natural religion as distinguished from real religion. But then the great question came and especially raised by Kant, which comes first? Is our concept of God not in itself dependent on our concept of justice, morality. Can we worship a God who is not just? But then we have to know what is just and what is not - morality.
Kant has thought this through more than anybody else. Yes?

Student: One question on rewards, if I could return to the previous quotation that we read on the other page. You said about, in asking the question about was the universal idea doing something immoral: to the world-historical figures, you said no, because the greatest things in them were carried on. I was wondering, what about men of lesser vision, men who didn't intend to overthrow the whole order. Like those Caesars after Caesar, whose entire ambitions were realized, and when we compare them with Caesar, their lower ambitions were not realized.

Strauss: Let's see, that was of course--when did you mean now--maybe you mean Marcus Aurelius, or what? I mean, the good emperors or the bad emperors?

Student: A bad emperor, let's say...

Strauss: Ja, Nero, but you know what happened to him.

The moral man in the simple sense cannot be displeased with it, because Nero was...

Student: Let's say a tyrant...

Strauss: There were quite a few.

Student: Now, would there be, did Hegel ever consider w

Strauss: He would simply say, you are a moral man, why are you concerned with reward for virtue. And there is a remark, I forgot where, of utter contempt for people who want to be rewarded if they have helped their friend or saved their brother or mother from a terrible situation and they want to have still a reward for that--what disgusting people--and also if you are constantly appalled that crooks of the first order are prosperous--why do you not, if it is a matter of general public decency, all right, vote for the right candidates and see that laws and perhaps also the judicial procedures are changed, that these racketeers don't have the power they have now. That's the sensible thing. But when you go beyond that, is it not some hidden envy ....

Student: Still Hegel was saying more, was saying that specifically for the world-historical figures they should not have their private ambitions satisfied, whereas all others...

Strauss: No, Hegel only raised this question--this is an objection made by others which Hegel has to meet. He sees no difficulty in that, that there are great individuals, the heroes, who bring about these epoch-making changes and have their satisfaction in bringing about these changes, but then are thrown on th rubbish-heap of history. That's it, Trotsky said that.

Student: Then there's no particular reason why the world-historical figures should suffer these things and not a petty tyra.

Strauss: No, no, but only in this case where Hegel says, in the case of the world-historical heroes, Hegel confronted with this simplistic popular criticism. If a tyrant is drawn in the dust like Nero, everybody's satisfied with that, there is no quest but that a man who should have brought about the most salutary changes should then be discarded, that seems to be shocking. Yes?

Student: I don't think that Hegel denies that these heroes are rewarded in the ordinary sense of that word. He doesn't meet t objection by saying that they are moral in the ordinary understand of moral. In this passage we discussed, he doesn't appear to me that he has said that these men are not immoral in the ordinary sense of that term.

Strauss: No, no, that is true; in other words, he morali them, much more than not only Machiavelli, but also Plato would ha done. That is quite true, and he prepares Carlyle's hero-worship obviously at this point. It's true. But I think that this is

implied in what he says that...after all he knew the crimes which Napoleon had committed, you know . . .

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: No, I think Hegel would have judged that they were crimes, but they are not at the same level- ja- and that is a kind of pedantism to measure them
but as a statement of the valid (it speaks as much from my interpretation as from yours) --the valid knows the weaknesses of the hero, including the moral weaknesses. All the seamy side of his li he has a seamy side, we know that. Why does it not also include those things which at least from a moral point of view are criminal But this is not the true thing of the hero.

Student: But more than that, it's a question of the problem of the state, for example, which requires immoral acts ,and this he would have overlooked as being immoral, although he might have overlooked intemperance, for example.

Strauss: Yes, but still the form of the statement is of cours more Machiavelli's notion: you know, Romulus killing his brother Remus, this kind of thing. Hegel does, but in Machiavelli's construction this man is concerned only and fundamentally with his own selfish advancement, his immortal glory,and then he figures out the only way to become immortal is to do services to others which will always be remembered. But he does not identify himself in the way in which he does according to Hegel. In other words, if you mean that Hegel moralizes the hero beyond Machiavelli, is this what you meant?

Student: Well, partly.

Strauss: I'm speaking now from the Khruschevian point of view You know, he sits there in his well-built house. . .

Student: That's that sets the seal on Khruschev's individual accomplishment. He's beginning to behave like people.

Strauss: Oh, I see. That's another way of putting it. But still, I wonder whether he is, this is a situation which is according to his own desires. Yes?

Student: Would it be correct to say that Hegel's teaching wit respect to history undermines the kind of primitive virtue that he professed to admire?

Strauss: No, one could put it this way, speaking from Hegel's point of view, he puts it into its place. It is not the highest.

Student: In his point of view, I can see that, yet it strikes me that his reducing in a sense of the simple idea of probl through history is, however correct it may be, still is an unedifie teaching from the standpoint of the simple man.

Strauss: Oh, yes, there is no doubt about that.

Student: In that sense, it could be immortal.

Strauss: Oh, sure, in other words, it could be edifying for th simple man, only in the last stage of the development, where his simple morality is now substantially identical with true justice. But one could also say the earliest simple men are not hurt by it because they are dead, and in their times they had already accomplish it. Yes. Good. Now let us go on and see whether we can make some progress.

Now, history is the actualization of the purpose of reason in and through the individuals. But history presents itself primarily political history, as the fate of states. This needs some clarifica tion, because the state depends on religion. This is a thought whic is developed in the sequel. And religion is the fundamental phenome and the relation between religion and the state is now the subject. What is your result, Mr. Bruehl, which comes first, which comes out on top, religion or the state?

Student: Well, religion is necessary because morality is the bond of the individual to the state, and he denies those who say th religion presupposes the state. He denies that proposition.

Strauss: Ja, so religion is the fundamental phenomenon?

Student: Yes.

Strauss: But does it mean that it is the highest phenomenon? I mean, we are speaking now only of religion and state.

Student: No, because it is unconscious.

Strauss: Yes, now let us...now I'm anticipating what follows later. I would say this, religion is the fundamental phenomenon, and religion, specifically speaking, Christianity, the absolute religion God has become man; the union of God and man. Now Hegel's philosophi is the central Christian dogma in its rational form, what is in a non-rational form Christian religion as such. So the final secular zation of Christianity, which is the fulfillment of Christianity, there the state is surely absolutely necessary. Whether religion as religion is crucial is an open question; we will discuss some passages from the Philosophy of Religion later on. This I would lik But what is the state? There is a discussion here. A certain kind of union between reason and the individual. In and through the stat the individual becomes himself, i.e., free. Why? Freedom...yes?

Student: The state frees him from his own subjectivity, from being bound to his own purely natural life.

Strauss: Ja, but how does this come off? I mean, the primary phenomenon is desire- ja, is desire- and what is...and there is a certain kind of desire which we call will. Will is reasonable desi rational desire. Desire in accordance with reason. But what is a desire in accordance with reason? As we have learned from Rousseau or Kant?

Student: Generalized desire.

Strauss: Generalized desire. The volonte general, the general will. In merely desiring, for food or whatever, I am not free, because I'm pushed and pulled by my stomach and by some molecules and whatever it may be. I do not determine myself; I a determined by my stomach. To be free means to not to desire but t will; and this willing,and I will only if I obey the law, the law which is generalized desire. No longer simple desire. Therefore, the state is the actualization of freedom; and not as the people i the eighteenth century thought, that freedom precedes the state. The alternative view is the state of nature. Men are free prior t entering civil society and not after. Hegel rejects that and has asserted sympathy for the so-called patriarchal society which is under the state. In the patriarchal society we overcome merely selfish desire, and dedication to the whole is to be found there. But why is Hegel not satisfied with patriarchal society? Yes?

Student: Because that's not a self-conscious society?

Strauss: Ja, it is, so to speak, instinctive rather than rational.

Student: Is he thinking primarily of China or of the Chinese

Strauss: No, I think he has in mind certain theories about patriarchal societies advanced by some romantics.

Student: Well, I was thinking the kind of relationships he talks about within the family sound like traditional Chinese.

Strauss: That could be. There will be a long discussion of China later. Yes, this passage is...were discussed by you. The fundamental distinction between the state on the one hand and religion and philosophy on the other. Religion is primary but religion is not the highest. The highest is philosophy.

Student: There's a difficulty in regard to those distinctio at one point, he seems to speak of, well he talks of religion or philosophy and art being developmental--they build up what came before, whereas a political constitution does not depend on what came before. It's unique.

Strauss: Ja, I remember that you quoted that and I didn't remember the passage in Hegel. Do you know where it is?

Student: Yes, page 47 in our text, in the middle of the pag

Strauss: That is a discussion of patriarchal society?

Student: No, he's talking about the constitution. This underlined passage.

Strauss: Ja, I remember. Yes, page 47. What does he mean by that?

Student: What I got out of it is that science and art develo

out of, develop continually through history, or it seems to say that they're proper to a given age...

Strauss: Could it not be that Hegel expresses, means somethi more limited? Where imitators in a way of Greek art, German philosophy, poetry, give something in a way. This is something very different, say, from the French Jacobins who tried to imitate ancient Rome, and Hegel is speaking on this rather external level: that the imitation of art and of ancient art and of ancient philosophy is something more defensible than the imitation of ancient political institutions, because the ancient political institutions for instance, let's take the most simple example

There is a completely different thing; whereas on the level of art and philosophy, it has a greater possibility. I won't say that this suffices, because underlying that is Hegel's fundamental distinction between the kinds of mind. There is a subjective mind, subject of psychology; the objective mind, that is the state and society; and the absolute Mind, religion, art and philosophy. You know, Hegel cannot possibly have deified the state, because th state is on a definitely lower level than religion, art and philosophy. That's clear. It is surely connected. Mr. _____.

Student: What I got out of that was the idea that as philos develops, the principles which have been transcended are still pa of philosophy, because otherwise one wouldn't understand the migr But since the state is just the latest principle, you know, each stage is just the principle of the state, you couldn't look back to the previous states and to try to imitate them; whereas in philosophy in order to understand this succession, you have to understand the Greek philosophy as the Greeks do it, and then transcend it.

Strauss: But in a way you say more clearly what I tried to say, namely this: when we speak of political things, we mean, thi primarily of action. And then we think of philosophy, to take th clearest case, we think of thinking. Now in the sphere of action an imitation or reactivation of classical antiquity is absurd but in the sphere of thinking, reactivation of classical antiquity is absolutely essential if we want to understand our own thought. On this page (this is not in the translation) he refers to Montesquieu. Now Montesquieu was more responsible than anyone el for the notion of the folk-mind. Therefore it is very important emphasize what Hegel does not do. That for Montesquieu, the folk-mind is the product of n factors--climate, population, character, nature of the territory, the fates of that particular nation, and so on. So the folk-mind is a product. For Hegel it is the origin of everything else in the nation; and therefore Hegel's meaning i radically different. But the practical conclusions are not so ve different, against the traditional notion of political philosophy as Mr. ___ points out. It is impossible to treat the political constitution, political order of a country, in isolation from its spirit, a spirit expressing itself especially in its religion, an therefore the classical notion--at least apparent classical notio

that the political question can be treated in isolation is fundamentally wrong.

Student: Could you just sort of comment on the relation of th to Aristotle's notion of the regime which goes beyond the simple state also; I mean, certainly he didn't say there was a state and then, that everything else was part of it.

Strauss: Sure, but what is a regime? What is a regime? I mean, every society has...a society is a multitude of human beings. But this multitude of human beings is as such the matter, the and it is given a form by the regime. Aristotle uses the example of 50 men, and they are now used as a tragical chorus is a comic chorus. They are the same men, the matter is the same, but these are two essentially different choruses, two essentially different societies, because they are ordered differently, with a view to a different purpose. Now...so if you have a multitude of men, they may be ordered--let us take the simplest example, linearly in a linear manner. Each counts as much as everybody else: democrac And you can have it in a pyramidal form, going up to one head-- would be monarchy; and aristocracy would be something in between. And you can make all kinds of subdivisions. Now the regime is tha is characterized by the quality or the characteristics of the grou of the kind of men who set the tone of that society in broad dayli I mean, not like the people in Hollywood now who in a certain sens can be said to set the tone of the society, but those who actually rule, set the tone by ruling, by giving the laws. And so there is a...form is connected, is inseparable, from the end. The kind of men are characterized by that to which they are dedicated. If the are oligarchs, then they are dedicated to wealth, and this gives t society its character. If they are aristocrats, I mean, I take the simplistic formula simplistic, if they are aristocra they are dedicated to virtue, and the end of the society which the control is virtue. Is this what you meant?

Student: Yes.

Strauss: Now, where does Hegel come in? All right. But I discussed this in a different way...but it is fundamentally the same question...in my course on Comte. The same question.

Student: The question then becomes, certainly Aristotle wouldn't have thought that you could just change...by simply changing a government, where you could deliberate on the best form of government, that would be unrelated to what we now call culture. This was the Hegelian...

Strauss: But there is no concept of culture in Aristotle; for better or worse, it doesn't exist. Now, I mean what is...

Student: Well, put it this way. Hegel seems to be arguing directly against the idea that you could simply construct a govern ment regardless of what the people think.

Strauss: Ja, Aristotle would grant that.

Student: Aristotle would grant that, too, so there's at leas

Strauss: Yes, but still there is a very profound difference. Yes?

Student: Well, it seems a peculiarly modern notion here, tha you can have a political constitution in the abstract. Hegel seem to be talking against that.

Strauss: Ya, sure, in other words, against the certain simpl tic men like Montaigne. Where Aristotle and Hegel are in agreemen We are now concerned with the difference between Aristotle and Hegel. Yes.

Student: Well, put it this way: could you formulate the differences as being this: you have a regime which one way or another you enforce on the society and that sets the whole tone, so it's the constitution of the regime that is the important thing, and things follow from that.

Strauss: Right, but there must be a certain aptitude of the matter; if not, it wouldn't work. No, that is not the fundamental difference. I mean, surely Hegel is, you can say, more quietistic more passivistic than Aristotle, but this is only a difference of degree, not an essential difference. What is the fundamental difference? When Aristotle speaks about such things as the city and the regime, there is a broader background which is not necessarily of importance within the moral-political considerations, bu is somehow there. And without it, Aristotle could never have writ the Ethics and the Politics. What is it?

Student: The idea of the regime.

Strauss: No, that is intrapolitical; but we're speaking fro the broader, the more comprehensive...

Student: Natural right.

Strauss: This is also too limited, because natural right is itself a political part.

Student: There is a single Greek culture.

Strauss: Oh, no, that is modern and wholly

Student: The natural ends of man?

Strauss: Beyond that, nature, the cosmos. And in Hegel the is no cosmos; you can say, there is no cosmos. The universe, the material universe, as it is called, is of no great importance for Hegel, but the place (I speak now provisionally) the place of physis or cosmos is taken in Hegel by the historical process. Therefore, the cultures, to use post-Hegelian terms, are the Hegelian or Comtean or modern substitute for physis. That is the

question. Let me state it differently, more precisely, perhaps. The classical notion of physis, of nature, is inseparable from the concept of nomos. I know this is not the textbook version, which says this is an invention of the Sophists, but this is simply not true of nomos, of man-made establishments, conventions, and they ar understood here as fundamentally arbitrary. Now, what...and of course it was admitted there is a variety of soch nomoi--n--but no particular order. In that I mean one could perhaps try to say why do the Persians conceive of their gods in this way and the Egyptian in that way, how is it connected--one could do that, but this wouldn't do away fundamentally with the arbitrary character. Now what Hegel implies is, if I try to state it now in classical terms: that the sequence of the nomoi--China, India, etc., etc.--this is the true physis, the absolute. In other words, that is th simplest form, and therefore radical change a bad approach to political things.

Student: But then presumably this way in which we use a cultu or civilization nowadays is different from Hegel, because somehow the center is taken out, there's no longer the spirit which guides everything.

Strauss: Ja, you can say, that is perhaps a bit harsh... But you can put it this way. What we now call culture has a defin order, hierarchy, and religion has the central position. But the present-day view of a culture is egalitarian. There are n element morality, economics, mores, laws, government, arts and crafts, skills, I don't know what, the language structure, n things. And there is no right whatever to say one of these elements is mor important, more interesting, than the other except from the purely subjective view. Some people like art more than they like technology, and so they will study the arts, but in themselves they are all equal. This egalitarian is certainly prevailing...

Student: Certainly post-Hegelian.

Strauss: This can easily be seen because you don't know, you cannot delimit a culture anymore. You have to speak of subcultures, and you have even to speak,--ja, and the line between a culture and sub-culture is not always kept. You know, they speak of the culture of juvenile delinquents in Chicago. There may be a different one in Boston or St. Louis or you know ..In other words, it becomes ever more meaningless, the connection between culture a the noblest things which it originally had, is lost, is lost. And then, I do not know how I get
and there are n cultures, and they are from the point of view of social science, absolutely equal--because any preference would be subjective, you know that. That was not yet so in Hegel. And thi notion developed in the nineteenth century more and more and is no I believe that, well, I have not studied all the literature, but I believe that Benedict, Ruth Benedict, plays a considerable role in making the concept of culture so popular. Patterns of Culture, I believe, is the book. It is required reading in our college, and still a basic work. Now, in her case it is very clear. This was, as she says in her preface, if I remember very well, that her whol

thought was due to stimulation by Spengler in his Decline of the West. Now, it is interesting, whatever you may say against Spengler, and many things can be said against him--Spengler's folk meant only high cultures. I forgot how many, six or eight. Whereas in Ruth Benedict, any culture, I mean in other words, two different North American tribes of Indians, the one gentle and the other savage, are a favorite example of hers, which is of course a sign that the notion of, the concept of high culture is lost. And the consequence was that you have to use strictly superficial distinctions now, like preliterate and literate, and not to say underdeveloped and developed--but they have found a new one, emerging and non-emerging. Yes. No, it is very interesting to see how here the strictly scientific motivations, value judgments, goes along with a democratic, i.e., value-inspired motivations-- not to hurt anybody's feelings. No, there is no doubt about it, t this is part of the story, and this very strange, this pre-established harmony between strict scientific objectivity and extreme version of democracy gives food for thought, to expatiate a bit about.

Well, now we have things different from Hegel, but since we have no access to Hegel, to anything for that matter, if we do not think about ourselves and our opinions, this kind of reflecti is not extraneous to our study. I hope you are aware of it. Now next time who will be? Mr. _____. Someone wanted a paper... you.

Strauss....in which you mentioned at the end, America the land of the future, is indeed crucial as we shall see later, because if this is Hegel's last word, then he has to be understood as some people do understand him, that Hegel does not claim the end of history has come; and since we cannot know anything about the future and therefore we must stop in the present. We will take this up later. I would like to raise another question. You began by stating to us Hegel's criticism of simple empiricism: that you can just look at things without any preconcieved notion. In the late nineteenth century, people spoke of a science without any presuppositions. Now I think today this is generally ... but empiricism simply understood wouldn't be a science without any presuppositions, except those which arise while we look at the fact. And in this connection there was a switch from this notion, from this criticism of simple empiricism, to a criticism of the wrong kind of generalities—some of the people who say morality is always the same, and epic poetry is in India as well as in Greece and the difference is therefore not important. What is the connection between the two criticisms

Student: Well, the first he says that when people allege the criticism of philosophic history, as insinuating an idea, they are taking the basis that no ideas at all...all ideas make...

Strauss: Yes, and how do we go on from here to the criticism of these false generalities?

Student: Well, this again, I think goes back to his, our earlier statement: that the essential part of history that this is an idea that reveals itself in successive stages, is proved already, that this is the essential way in which we must look at history; and these other ways of looking at it will yield nothing. But this is a result of the Logic.

Strauss: But Hegel promises to some extent that he would prove his philosophy of history independently of the Logic.

Student: Well, that's coming in the sequel; though when he shows that this is the principle...

Strauss: But he would have to give us an inkling of how he proceeds. And it is absolutely in the spirit of Hegel to have such a kind of empirical procedure. How would this come about? Now as to the question which I just raised, he ... these people say they proceed strictly empirically but the result is simply, it is impossible to understanding anything without concepts, that they will get the wrong kinds of concepts, and in particular, such concepts which do not make allowance for diversity. Ja? I mean, and see, only the things which you find everywhere and which will never make you understand history, i.e., variation, difference, change. But now how could one proceed empirically? Hegel says empiricism is the key, empiricism in the full sense in which he means it, is the key. Now what is behind that? I mean what simple reasoning is behind that, which if you...very simple reasoning without going into all the subtleties?

Student: That reason is the most potent force in the world, and hence would have to be revealed in the world's history, so ...

Strauss: Yes, but somewhat more precisely, the essence of man's freedom, and therefore if we look at human affairs, history, we have to look at it from the point of view of history, of freedom. What is the traditional view of man, the traditional definition of man?

Student: Well, that he is a composite of reason and of passions which are unreasonable.

Strauss: What is the simple sentence which has been quoted throughout the ages?

Student: A political animal.

Strauss: A rational animal, a rational animal. And therefore we have to look at rationality, because for animality as such would not explain it, because otherwise there would also be a history of horses, of rats, of microbes, and so on, which is not likely to be the case, so—good. But why suppose the replacing of rationality by freedom; is this the invention by Hegel, does anyone know that? There was a very famous man prior to Hegel who explicitly attacked the definition of man as a rational animal and said no, the specific difference is not rationality but freedom.

Student: Rousseau.

Strauss: Yes. So you know where?

Student: Second Discourse.

Strauss: I mean, whatever Rousseau meant by it, but at first glance that seems to be the basis for what Hegel has in mind. But let us assume that we do not know that, that man is a free being discovered by rationality or maybe something else. If we would proceed in a purely empirical manner, somehow Hegel is trying that, how could one do that without making any assumptions outside of the subject matter? by being loyal to the phenomena which we are studying and not distorting them from a point of view alien to them. How would one have to proceed? Yes?

Student: You would have to try to understand each successive society as it understood itself, at least in terms of its own philosophy and its religion, and then...

Strauss: Yes, but how do you proceed? But it is not so simple. I mean, people do that today with, how do you call it, Gallup polls and other questionnaires of sorts—which you cannot address to dead people, that is true. Nor can you address them to people who are not, do not permit you to do that, and this would have been the case in most societies of the past. But how can you do that? I mean, which is probably not sufficient, but this is surely an objective beginning.

Student: Well, of course, this is already in a way using his theory, but not in a crucial way. You would have to look at those men in the society who coming, so to speak, late in the development, were the ones who reflected on the whole development, and hence thought the spirit of their own age and put it

into writing. Yes, as he says, if you want to know what Greece...read Thucydides.

Strauss. All right that is a very good example. But if you read Thucydides you learn a lot about Athens and Sparta and many more things. But about one thing you learn almost anything—except a little bit.

Student: The Greek mind?

Strauss: Yes, but I mean something more special. I would say, well, what is according to Hegel is the most important thing by which the folk-mind is what it is?

Student. Consciousness of freedom.

Strauss: No, more fundamental.

Student: Religion.

Strauss: Religion. What do you learn of Greek religion from Thucydides? Well, if you read him, study him very thoroughly and listen to every overtone, you learn a bit. But otherwise you don't know anything, because that is exactly the meaning of the book. to show the Peloponnesian War in contradistinction to the Trojan War took place without any divine interference. And Thucydides even suggests that this is the key to the Trojan War—as little as Athens and Zeus interfered in, or Apollo for that matter, interfered in the Peloponnesian War. when he was an eye-witness.— as little did the gods interfere in the Trojan. That was for Attica a dawn, So this wouldn't be good enough. But we have already the answer implied, I mean, but of course one can say, prior to study, why should religion be the fundamental phenomenon? There must be a more elementary consideration which Hegel does not bring out, but which he implies, and I think it is this: we— this is the premise in the more, in a more simple manner. We understand a man or a group of men, if we look in the first place at what they look up to, to what they are dedicated. They of course will fall short of it, that goes without saying, but this gives the hint, gives us the best clue to what they are, what they will, what they esteem—or to use the language of the present day—what are their values. Good. So we have to begin from that, and this is not a very difficult thing, because it is written large everywhere: the lawbooks, the official documents, written or unwritten, that can easily be found out. I have been told by a student of Chinese things that the Chinese travelers who wrote books about the neighboring barbarians, as they called themasked the people they visited first, How do you bow to your kings? This is a more special version of that. Men have to bow to something, and of course they bow to their kings. But how? But we have to generalize that properly. You see these Chinese travelers were in a way quite thoughtful men, and that will be understandable that they are dedicated. And if there should be people who are not dedicated to anything, a possibility which Hegel will discuss (we will see that next time) they are in a way not yet human beings. There are such individuals or maybe even societies. But the world-historical nations, as Hegel calls them, they all have dedicated themselv to something; and by this they even tacitly admitted Hegel's philosophy of history because since these things changed—I mean, Zeus was out at a certain time and his whole family—then it is by the logic of their submission they must go over from Zeus to another worship. Although the empirical Greece didn't do that.

This is very roughly what Hegel has in mind. We have...ask first...

we do not say this and this is the most important—economics, relations of production, or art or , but we ask the people themselves, what do you regard as most important. And we do not make simple statistics and ask some people w are perhaps too foolish to understand our question; we ask the most intelligent, the authoritative, the men who are most entitled to be regarded as spokesman for that society. Then we are as objective and as empirical as we can get. And what Hegel cl then, if we look at these nations, these cultures as they are today, and get this mas of information about these things, then we will see that without any doing on our part, without our manipulating the evidence, these answers order themselves into a certain sequence which is empirical. This is Hegel's assertion at least. But the starting point, I think, is empirical. Yes?

Student: But isn't our conception of an intelligent man that he is not like a common man? We wouldn't be studying the aspirations of the common people by studying the aspirations of the intelligent man.

Strauss: That depends. I mean, well, do you believe if, say, a Homer says, Zeus is the father of gods and men, the common man would say, No, but Heracles is the father of gods and man. Of course not. In other words, there would be no difference. There would be no difference. But the common man might have sometimes difficulties understanding such a question. Well, take a very simple case, there is still, there is no longer I suppose a small island in the South Seas, and an anthropologist comes to study the people there, and also to find out about their mores and about their way of thinking and so on. Can these people understand that? I mean, they could understand someone coming to them in order to trade with them.. and..or because he has been guilty of murder in his homeland and has to escape and find refuge with them, and other motives of the same kind. But that someone should come only in order to find out what they think and other purposes—that they simply would never understand. That mere fact that the anthropologist comes into the islar changes the island to the extent to which this is not understood. It is clear, becau then the whole framework is in a way destroyed by the realization of the possibility. So. And now to understand a question, a very simple question which the common man could answer but which he might not be able to understand, and the more reflective man would understand that—only in this sense I mean it. Yes.

Student: I think, though, there's the point that in modern day, if you want to apply this principle to modern-day America, it would get more difficult becau there you would find more people who would say their values are such, but of course the common man is only interested in money. It would be more difficult to get at the basis of what they all ...

Strauss: There is no question that a society which is constituted by the official knowledge or admission that there is such a thing as science, is a different society. But where do we find that? I mean this, we are so spoiled by the many centuries of the western world. But even if we look at earlier Greece or, for that matter, earlier Roma-ja-how distrusted and misunderstood the people were who came, who said we want to understand and nothing else. Today that is taken for granted—every boy and girl learns it in the first grade of elementary school. Don't ask me how well he understands it, but some awareness he has, at least some intelligibility or familiarity, but nevertheless, although it is the case most familiar to us, it is a very special case, because society is not defined as such by the presence within it of theoretical men, and only if you use a very loose word like intellectuals . And say a shaman in Siberia is fundamentally the same as what a

professor in the United States now, that is I think still based on a profound misunderstanding of what science is. Yes?

Student: Isn't there a problem involved in maintaining on the one hand that the way to understand past ages is to understand what people in them look up to, and on the other hand to maintain that most of the people of the age, people who actually carried things out, were actually unconscious of what they were doing, leading to, and the world-historical individuals had more limited motives than what we see they accomplished; and even the philosophers who came at the end of the age could not see really what things were leading to--is it really possible to understand people of an age as they understood themselves and on the other hand to say that they really didn't understand what they were accomplishing?

Strauss: That is another question, whether it is possible to understand other people, another society, as they understood themselves. For Hegel there is no question it is possible. Let us disregard it - ja? We may take up the question on another point, but for Hegel it is taken for granted. But otherwise, I mean if we disregard this issue which falls outside of Hegel, I do not see your difficulty. For example, regarding the Greek gods. This antedates the philosophers by far. Speaking from an older point of view of Hegel, we have Homer and Hesiod and the tragic poets, here we can know what goes on, the presuppositions of these words, though it is not of course a specialty of the poets, but all their listerners knew as a matter of course what Athena or Apollo mean, and so on, if there were not figures of which everyone knew in a way. Homer might have known more about them and might have been able to tell stories about them which not everybody could tell--I take this for granted--but that there were such beings and that they had a fundamental, these characteristics which they have in Homer is presupposed. I see no difficulty here. I mean, I think that would be...Plato meant something else by Athena and Zeus than the ordinary Greek man. But how do we know that? Answer: By reading Plato- ja? And here it is clear from the context that is already something which is no longer commonly accepted or popular--it is very true that Socrates was condemned for not accepting the gods as the city understood them. This is also a simple fact of history. There is nothing subtle in that. I mean, there are many, many questions of the greatest subtleties which arise on that basis, but the proposition itself I believe is simple and common-sensical. I would be grateful if you would give me an example which abstracts this so to speak at the beginning.

Student: Maybe I'm bringing in something which is beyond the question simply of whether Hegel understands people on the basis they would understand...

Strauss: No, that would be a question which we would have to consider, whether Hegel does not manipulate the evidence. ja? If he does that, that is too be but then he is disloyal to his own intention. But the question is that this evidence which does not have...this is exactly the point, not far-fetched things they found digging up somewhere they found an inscription which throws an entirely new light on the Greek gods--Hegel is not unterested in that. He makes this perfect clear. Because if it were such a far-fetched thing, which only by this particular thing it would not have been a public power in Greece. In other words, how far these gods were already of Oriental origin, ja, that is not--for the Greeks they were the gods on Olympus and worshipped by the Greeks above all; although the other nations already knew of them in a way, having other names for them and so on. One has to stick to that first. It is not so difficult, I mean, it is surely not far-fetched for hegel. Now was there any other point? Mr. _____.

Student: Mr. Strauss, doesn't this presuppose at least in a historical context that the way to understand another people or the evidence that this person would take necessarily written evidence?

Strauss: Yes, I believe so. Or at least written, either by the people themselves or at least written down when there was still time. Let us assume there is an illiterate tribe, and some literate writer goes and tells us the answers he received to his questions. This we would accept. Yes, there is some virtue of writing that cannot well be denied. But this is the only way these things are accessible to later ages which are not connected through an oral tradition with the people concern

Student: Well, the problem is, or the apparent problem at least in my mind. I'm trying to get to is, then, these become essentially public statements, they are sort of common property.

Strauss: Yes, public, therefore makes them easily accessible.

Student: This makes them easily accessible to the historian. How valid is this understanding of a first of an individual and secondly of a group of individuals by their public statements?

Strauss: All right. That is naturally a question we must raise, but there is, one could say, one has the right to raise this question only after this is made clear what the explicit opinions and public opinions were. If you find out, say in Egypt or Mesopotamia or wherever, you had a certain teaching regarding the gods, and then you find out (also of course by written evidence, how else could you?) that the priests had a secret teaching in which they regarded this public teaching as sheer opium for the people—then we have to take notice of that. That goes without saying. That is clear, but this needs proof. The primary thing, clear as the day, that this was the Egyptians and Mesopotamians believed and we have to start from that. Even as a psychoanalyst must start from the manifest content of dreams before he can interpret them. Even a Marxist must start from the manifest superstructure—laws or whatever they may be—before he can show, find out, how this related to the true things, the infrastructure. But we must start from the manifest by all means, from the known we must go to the unknown and not the other way around. I once heard of a psychoanalytical writer who tried to explain the fact of sexual desire by the fact that (he was speaking only of the man) they desired to return to their mother's womb, which is a beautiful example of explanation of the known by the unknown. Ja? Good. Because the whole psychoanalytic theory would not be possible if there were not sexual desire as in the first place, I mean desires of a male man for a female human being. That is the absolute starting point. But if this has to be explained by such an inferred desire for grown-up men to return to their mother's womb, then anything goes. So. Yes?

There is a passage for last time's assignment which we have not discussed, which we must pay an attention. It is on page 57 of the translation. What Hegel says here about the beginning of history, Mr. _____, you remember, what is the point which he makes here.

Student: He makes the point that history begins with the state and not with the individual man or clan-based societies or even with family-societies.

Strauss: No, that is not the main point here in this first part, when he refers here to Schelling and Schlegel; people have asserted the existence of a

primitive people from which all art, science and art has always been
This original nation antedates the human race proper and is internalized in the old myth under the image of gods. In other words, the beginning was perfect, a perfect beginning, this is the view which Hegel attacks. The beginnings are imperfect. Now Hegel of course mentions here only some theories of contemporaries, but has a much broader bearing naturally. Yes?

Student: The Biblical....

Strauss: Surely. The Biblical account. Not Adam and Eve, with perfect knowledge and in addition perhaps divind graces, but are at the beginning, that is absolutely crucial. Otherwise how could the whole history be a history of progress?This point we must at least mention. Now here we come, let us turn to page 63, line 4 from bottom.

Reader: "Here we need adopt one of history's logical results, viz, that every step in the process..."

Strauss: Can you begin before, when he speaks of logic? A little bit be:

Reader: "The logical, and still more prominent, the dialectical nature of the idea, in general, viz, that it is self-determined, that is assumes successive forms which it successively transcends, and that by this very process of transcendi its earlier stages, gains an affirmative and in fact a richer and more concrete shape--this necessity of its nature and the necessary series of pure abstract forms which the idea successively assumes is exhibited in the department of logic."

Strauss: Ja, but this is in the German it is "logic," not the department of logic. But in this case one seems to know that this is a correction by Hegel's son, and Hegel himself wrote in "philosophy." So in other words this is somewhat schoolmasterly; departmentalization is not Hegel's work. So this fundamental character of the idea, of the concept, is known in philosophy, and here meaning the philosophy of history. We have to accept

Reader: "Here we need adopt only one of its results, viz, that every ste in the process as differing from any other has its determinate peculiar principle. In history this principle is idiosyncracy of spirit."

Strauss: You will see this is a bit too fancy for the translation: "in the peculiarity of the spirit, the people." In other words, there Hegel has sh that there is an order of concepts, let us say, in the logic, the order of concepts which follows necessarily each other, and this of course does not immediately conce us here, but one thing we must accept, that there is an order, a necessary order, and the necessary order we have to do with in history is the necessary order in whi the folk-minds follow each other.

Reader: "..peculiar national genius. It is within the limitations of thi peculiarity that the spirit of the nation concretely manifested expresses every aspe of its consciousness and will, the whole cycle of its realization, its religion, its polity, its ethics, its legislation, and even its science, art and mechanical skill all bear its stamp."

Strauss: In other words, science too is a part of the folk-mind. Strictly understood, that would mean there is no universal science. Ja? Greek

science is not modern science, so that...Yes.

Reader: "These special pecularities find their key in that common peculiartty, the particular principle that characterizes the people, as on the other hand, in the facts which history presents in detail, that common characteristic prin ciple may be detected."

Strauss; In other words, say a treaty, a battle, things whihh occur everywhere, but Greek treaties, Greek battles, are somehow Greek, and Babylonian battles, you know--to some extent even the things which go through everywhere will be affected by the peculiar spirit of the people which, in which they take place.

Reader:"That such and such a specific quality constitutesthe peculiar genius of a people is the element of our inquiry which must be derived from experier and historically proved."

Strauss: So in other words this cannot be taken over from any preceeding discipline, like logic or so Yes. So here, in other words, we as on our own and cannot refer to Hegel, to the Logic, but what is the difficulty here? I mean what is this, how do we proceed empirically?

Reader: "To accomplish this presupposes not only a disciplined faculty of abstraction, but an intimate acquaintance with the idea. The investigator must be familiar a priori,we'd like to say, with the whole circle of questions to which the principles in question belong."

Strauss: And so on. And as he explains later, that to state it differe however empirically we wish to proceed and we wish to proceed empirically--we must b able to dinstinguish between the important and the unimportant, between the essenti and unessential, and that more empirical doesn't tell us anything. Things don't run around with a tag, "I am essential" or "I am unessential." How do you...so therefore there is no empirical without preceeding principle of relevance, concepts. So in other words, philosophy of history cannot be simply independent of philosophy but this is only here stated in a very general way. One must have some awareness of the essential, and here he speaks of the fundamental ambiguity regarding the essenti It is differently understood by intelligence, Verstand in German, and by reason, in German Vernunft. The lower form of understanding is based on, starts from, the fact that there is an unchangeable human nature, which on a certain level is true. I mean for example, there could not have been any human life without such things as memory, and there is no reason to assume that the memory differs in the different cultures. And therefore if there is a psychological study of men this would be equally valid for all cases. But this is a lower level of understanding. The higher level is based on the insight that it is of the essence of human nature to change. Man is always thinking, one can say, but is not always thinking the same. The content of his thinking radically changes and with this content we are concerned Therefore Hegel calls this "concrete" versus the abstract way in which we disregard the content, when we analyze for example processes of retention, processes of reasoning, without consideration of the content. In other words, for the Verstand, for the lower, the content comes from elsewhere. As you see very clearly in formal logic, ja, rules of reasoning are here, but the content must come from elsewhere. I mean, the logic doesn't tell you that the syllogism is impeccable in form is wrong in matter. Take any simple formal correct syllogism: All these war; all men are these; hence, all men war. See? And hence both premises are materially wrong. Logic, formal logic doesn't tell you that. But Vernunft in Hegel's sense produces its content as well as the form. Let us turn to page 65 in the second paragraph.

Reader:"A similar process of reasoning is adopted in reference to the correct assertion that genius, talent, moral virtues and sentiments, and piety may be found in every zone and under all political constitutions and conditions, in confirmation of which examples are forthcoming in abundance. If in this assertion the accompanying distinctions are intended to be repudiated as unimportant or non-essential, reflection evidently limits itself to abstract categories and ignores the specialities of the object in question, which certainly fall under no principle recognized by such categories."

Strauss: In other words, Hegel wouldn't deny that this is true. It is correctly said that genius, talent, moral virtues and sentiments, etcetera, can be found everywhere, but the differences are here disregarded--the differences, what is the object of the genius, of moral virtues, talent and so on, in different cultures-this is what truly counts. The one form of this formalistic, of this relatively concrete of changes is moralism, the belief that there is a universally valid moral law, in the light of which all human actions have to be judged. A law.. as accessible to Chinese as to a Westerner or anyone else. That moral law is formal it does not determine the content. For example, it is compatible with slavery, with serfdom, or with denial of the legitimacy of either slavery or serfdom. You can be honest slave owner, you can be an honest feudal lord with serfs, you can be an honest and loyal free-laborer. And you can be an honest slave, you can be an honest serf, you can be an honest wage-earner, it is unaffected by that; and yet does it not make ultimately a moral difference, whether there is an institution of slavery and of serfdom,or the denial of both? The fully moral content is brought about by action which may be action against the moral law. We have discussed this subject, the form law--this we have discussed last time. On page 62 in your translation, will you read that?

Reader: "Universal history" after these remarks?

Strauss: No, may I see? 66, I'm sorry, I made a mistake. Here, 66, I'm sorry,

Reader: Bottom of the page "We may fairly decline on this occasion the task of tracing this formalism and error of such a view and establishing the true principles of morality or rather of social virtue, in opposition to false morality.

Strauss: And what is this social virtue is Sittlichkeit in German. We have discussed this difference last time. Yes?

Reader: "...for the history of the world occupies a higher ground than that on which morality has properly its position, which is personal character, the conscience of individuals."

Strauss: Yes, there is this which is a Privatgesinnung, private moral sentiment, properly private not public. Because if it were public, then the content would come in, the content of the morality of the social order in which it takes place. Yes?

Reader: "their particular will and mode of action. These have a value imputation, reward or punishment proper to themselves. What the absolute aim of spirit requires and accomplishes--what Providence does--transcends the obligations, and the liability to imputation and the ascription of good or bad motives, which attach to individuality in virtue of its social relations. They who on moral

grounds , and consequently with noble intention, have resisted that which the advan of the spiritual idea makes necessary, stand higher in moral worth than those whose crimes have been turned into the means—under the direction of a superior principl of realizing the purposes of that principle. But in such revolutions, both parties generally stand within the limits of the same circle of transient and corruptible existence. Consequently, it is only a formal rectitudedeserted by the living spiri and by God—which those who stand on the ancient right and order maintain. The deeds of great men, who are the individuals of the world's history, must appear not only justified in view of that intrinsic result of which they were not conscious, bu also from the point of view occupied by the secular moralist. But looked at from th point, moral claims that are irrelevant must not be brought into collision with worl historical deeds and their accomplishment. The litany of private virtues—modesty, humility, philanthropy, and forbearance—must not be raised against them."

Strauss: And so on. I think we have discussed this last time. But we should read this passage. Now let us turn to page 69 in the 2nd paragraph, where he speaks of philosophy.

Reader: "Philosophy also must make its appearance where political life exists; since that in virtue of which any series of phenomena is reduced within the sphere of culture as above stated, is the form strictly proper to thought. And thu for philosophy, which is nothing other than the consciousness of this form itself-- the thinking of thinking—the material of which its edifice is to be constructed is already prepared by general culture. If in the development of the state itself periods are necessitated which impel the soul of nobler natures to seek refuge from the present in ideal regions—in order to find in them that harmony with itself which it can no longer enjoy in the discordant real world, where the reflective intelligence attacks all that is holy and deep, which had been spontaneously inwrov into the religion, laws and manners of nations, and brings them down and attenuates them to abstract godless generalities—thought will be compelled to become thinking reason, with the view of effecting in its own element the restoration of its princi from the ruin to which they had been brought."

Strauss: Ja, "to bring about in its own element the restoration or the healing of the corruption to which it has brought itself." Does this not strike yo as..does it not remind you of an earlier passage which we have discussed and which, but somehow at variance with it? Originally, thinking unconsciously produces these in laws and orders and religion, and then these gods are no longer worshipped. There were in the good old times corruption and thinking has something to do with that corruption. Thinking produces these gods, and yet thinki also endangers them. And then there is a third stage in which another kind of thin less abstract, less formal kind of thinking, which is stopped to that dissolving, disintegrating thinking, and therewith saves the old order on a higher level. This is what Hegel here suggests, and I mean, do you know of any historical phenomenon which Hegel would have, would particularly illustrate what Hegel means?

Student: The writing of history had that same sort of development.

Strauss: I see, but he said at the beginning—yes, that is absolutely true, but a specific historical phenomenon?

Student: The Bourbon restoration and the putting Europe back together after the French Revolution?

Strauss: Perhaps, but there is no philosophy involved. Yes?

Student: Greece and fifth century Athens at the time of Socrates.

Strauss: And what about the dissolving thought at that time?

Student: Well, I don't know who in society, but say that the Sophists would be the...

Strauss: Yes, and the restoring on a higher level?

Student: Well, the restoring on the higher level of thought would be Soc

Strauss: Yes, I'm sure that he thought of that when he wrote these lines. So we have read before that the sciences belong to the age of corruption. You remember when he almost literally restated Rousseau's famous thesis? But here there seems to be a difference between what he said before. And this is very important fo Hegel's own view of his own work. There was the European order, and this meant for Hegel not only Christianity in general, but Protestant Christianity in particular. And then there came the equivalence of the Sophists, who were they? I mean...pardon!

Student: The philosophes?

Strauss: No, they were obviously very inferior men compared to Hegel, to who Hegel has in mind.

Student: The Enlightenment.

Strauss: The Enlightenment, Voltaire was the greatest man surely. And then they destroyed, they destroyed the traditional belief, Christian belief in its Protestant version, and then what does Hegel do? He restores it, he restores i not indeed in the way which Luther and orthodoxy understood it--I mean, in other words, for Hegel's view that spiritual inspiration and miracles are of no interest whatever, but the central dogma--God having become man, speculatively understood-- that's what Hegel also says. Yes?

Student: In this paragraph do you view..is thought the corrupting element itself, or is it mere manifestation...

Strauss: No, it has a contribution of its own to make.

Student: Well, for example, the Sophists and perhaps the Enlightenment could be argued that at least they, if Not Hegel and Socrates, were in part, let's see, existent because of certain historical events in the state at the time.

Strauss: Sure, and therefore there was something apart from the Sophists, ancient or modern, which was responsible for the decay. Ja. I mean, let us say a certain..the consequence of revolutionary wars or whatever you might think of which brought about a corruption, and this corruption was continued in a different way by the writers of the Enlightenment who partly used this corruption as an argument against the old and established order. Ja? There is no difficulty whatsoever in that Good. But the question is this. If this is true, what Hegel suggests here, philosc true philosophy puts an end to corruption. Puts an end to corruption. And contrary to what seemed to be suggested in the earlier passage. Yes. But the question, but in another series of the same lectures, he says when he speaks of the corruptio of the people and he mentions together the sciences and philosophy; in other words, not only abstract thought, which is fundamentally what we mean by scientific thoug

but also philosophy. The times of instinct-like action of a nation are the times of its virtues, so that this--in other words, philosophy as philosophy cannot stop the corruption simply. It can show the impossible stupidity of the Enlightenment, but it cannot completely stop that. That has very much to do with the meaning of the owl of Minerva. That is the question. You know according to this passage here, there would be no owl of Minerve, but it would be a restoration with a new day beginning now. That is the difficulty. Yes?

Student: He says more specially later on, that this restoration is only in perfected form. Socrates and Plato produced the good city in thought...

Strauss: Yes, in that case he says it, but the question--yes, very well! So that Socrates and Plato could only as it were distill the highest and greatest Greekness and hand it over to the future, but they could not put a stop to the decay of the polis. This is clear; but the interesting question is, what about Hegel? I mean, in other words, is Hegel another Plato and Aristotle, as he in a way claimed to be, who arrives at the time when the West has arrived at its task? That's the question. Or is this the new dawn for the West? Could philosophy open up a new period for the same people or for the same culture, that is the question. Yes.

Student: Well, I mean, it's interesting to see that what I would take many of the things he would consider to be the corruption of the West--I mean, he talks about the Enlightenment and the abstract type of understanding, the formal understanding, that he would attribute to that. Now of things that have continued and that are forceful, I mean the idea of democracy itself as opposed to what should have been the true principle of our age, of a monarchy, so at least what has happened in fact has been the decay in a sense, has continued despite the restoration of the true principle.

Strauss: No, while it is perfectly legitimate to use facts which have happened after Hegel against Hegel, because this is philosophy of history, still, I do not deny that. But even if we take him only, take his doctrine only, and do not demand from him hindsight. Even then, this question which I raised arises you know--what does the full--the Enlightenment, one can say from Hegel's point of view is a caricature of Christianity. The Christianity, as attacked by Voltaire is a caricature to some degree. Hegel presents the true Christianity, the distilled essence of Christianity. The question is whether, what is the historical significance of this Hegelian work regarding the Christian world, from this point of view? I mean, is he, in other words, does he represent Christianity for the Christian world what Plato and Aristotle did for the Greek world, or is it radically different? It depends, that is, the implication of this phrase, this very pregnant phrase, "The owl of Minerve begins its flight in the dusk." We may perhaps take here right away a passage which occurs at the end of today's assignment, and which has very much to do with that. On page 85, well the--no, it is better to take page 86, the second paragraph.

Reader: "America is therefore the land of the future, where in the ages that lie before us, the burden of the world's history shall reveal itself -- perhaps in a contest between North and South America." (change tapes) ...it has no interest for us here, for as regards history, our concern must be with that which has been and that which is. In regard to philosophy, on the other hand, we have to do with that which (strictly speaking) is neither past nor future, but with that which is, which has an eternal existence, --with reason; and this is quite sufficient to occupy us."

Strauss: Now in the original there is also the sentence, "The philosopher has to do with prophesying," i.e., with the future. He has only to do with what is accessible to him, the present or the past, and hence one could say—and some people said—Hegel does not mean to say that this is the complete account of world history, as finished, but only as knowable now, say around 1825 or thereabouts. America is the land of the future", there are certain other remarks in a letter about Russia, to you know, reminding me of the famous statement by Tocqueville, about the American-Russian antagonism of the future. But the question is, was this of any importance to Hegel? I think one can definitely say no. A little bit later, unfortunately not in the translation, he says. "The totality consists in union of the three principles, and this union takes place in Europe [these principles of which we have spoken before the African, the Asiatic, and the European principles]. For America, only the principle of not being completed and not becoming completed would remain; i.e., no principle of any fundamental importance. So in other words, Hegel doesn't claim to predict or to foresee what will happen after his death, and especially in the United States, or for that matter in Russia, but no new principle of fundamental importance will emerge. I think there is no doubt that this was Hegel's view. Now, let us then return to the other point. Page 75, paragraph 3.

Reader: "It is not of the nature of the all-pervading spirit to die this merely natural death, it does not simply sink into the senile life of mere custom, but as being a national spirit belonging to universal history attains to the consciousness of what its work is, it attains to a conception of itself. In fact, it is world-historical only in so far as a universal principle has lain in its fundamental elements its grand aim: only so far is the work which such a spirit produces a moral, political organization. If it be mere desires that impel nations to activity, such deeds pass over without leaving a trace; or their traces are only ruin and destruction."

Strauss: He thinks of Genghis Khan here—Genghis Khan, or say, what has been going on for many centuries in Africa. There is no principle involved. It is not world-historical.

Reader: "Thus it was first Chronos—Time—that ruled; the Golden Age, without moral products, and what was produced, the offspring of that Chronos, was devoured by it. It was Jupiter from whose head Minerva sprung and to whose circle of divinities belong Apollo and the Muses—that first put a constraint upon Time, and set a bound to its principle of decrease. He is the political god, who produced a moral work—the state."

Strauss: He, namely Zeus, and this is an interpretation of the myth of Chronos and Zeus. Let us see the sequel of that myth on page 73, 2nd paragraph, when he speaks again of Zeus, ja? There.

Reader: On page 77. "Zeus therefore, who is represented as having put a limit to the devouring agency of Time, and stayed this transiency by having established something inherently and independently durable—Zeus and his race are swallowed up, and that by the very power that produced them—the principle of thought, perception, reasoning, insight derived from rational grounds, and the requirement of such grounds."

Strauss: Ja, "the demand for such grounds, the demanding of such grounds. So, in other words, Hegel has here the continuation of the myth, a continuation not taught by the Greeks. Chronos was succeeded by Zeus, and that is the order of the world now prevailing. That's what the Greeks thought. But what happened afterward Zeus himself has been swallowed up. Go on.

Reader: "Time is the negative element in the sensuous world. Thought is the same negativity, but it is the deepest, the infinite form of it, in which therefore all existence generally is dissolved, first finite existence--determinate, limited form: but existence generally, in its objective character, is limited, it appears therefore as a mere datum--something immediate--authority; and is either intrinsically finite and limited, or presents itself as a limit for the thinking subject, and its infinite reflection on itself."

Strauss: Now let us try to understand that. A world-historical people, say, like the Greeks, has a universal principle, mythically expressed in the Olympian gods. And this principle of a nation objectivates itself in the laws and in the thoughts of such a nation. These objectivations are not primarily known to be objectivations but to be simply absolute. And Antigone refers to these laws which she must obey or the gods; they are not objectivations of the Greek spirit, they are self-subsistent beings. But then these objectivations are corroded by thought; and the culmination this is that they are, as it were, taken back by the spirit into itself. The spirit becomes aware of having caused them, created them, and once this has taken place, a transition to another folk-mind happens. This is roughly Hegelism, Hegel's scheme. The question is, but does this go on and on forever, that every nation, every cultur in its spirit objectivates itself and then comes to realize the non-absoluteness of these objectivations, and new production takes its place? Does this go on indefinit Now, unfortunately this passage is not in the translation. I will try to translate as well as I can. "This going on, this sequence of stages, seems to be a process in infinity, according to the notion of perfectibility, a progress which remains eterna away from the goal. Nevertheless, while in the progress toward a new principle, the content of the previous stage is grasped in a more general manner, in a more thought manner. This much is certain, that the new Gestalt, the new shape, which this take on in a new notion, is nevertheless a determinate, a determinate; but against thoug against concept, no limited Gestalt, no limited shape, can remain firm. If there we anything which concept could not corrode, not digest, then there would be the hardness, thought confronted with an absolute irrationality, misery. Yet, even if that were so, it would be only thought which comprehends itself, i.e., the irrationa is thought, is understood. For only thought is that which is in itself limitless an determines..and all actuality is in it determined. And thus even the torpness would cease, and mind would be satisfied in itself." There is limitation...there is, ever culture has a specific character, and having a specific character means there is a limited character. Ja? Greece is not Mesopotamia, that is what he means by Gestalt as it were, visibly different and visibly opposed to the other. Can this go on and must there not be a definite shape which can no longer be corroded, and then this wo be the full externalization, the full actualization of the mind, the final culture, which from one point of view is just one culture
specific features--and you can from an external view, you can just enumerate n cultures, of which the final culture is one. But if you understand what is going on you see this is the final culture. Well, to give a somewhat more popular example, Spengler's book is very well known in our age, and I believe even those among you wh have never read it have been confronted with this famous image, this famous picture which Spengler draws: the n different (not many, seven or eight) high cultures whic ever existed--Eastern, what we call Western culture, and what he calls Faustian culture, is only one of these. And just as all these cultures have a cycle, moment, which pass away, corresponds in a sense to what Hegel says--there is a beginning, fl ing, and then a contraction, as it were, at the end. But yet there is a difference Spengler does not reflect on this as much as Hegel does. But there is one radical difference, between the Faustian culture and all other cultures, and that is that

only in the Faustian culture do you find such an understanding of history, such an understanding of culture. Only in the Faustian culture do you find the self-consciousness of culture, let us say, the unconsciously Hegelian thought in Spengler Therefore the Faustian culture is a final culture, and therefore, after all the cultures, which were, a new one emerged; and it is no longer possible, after the exhaustion the mind has found full satisfaction by becoming fully clear about itself Now in the sequel we must at least try to understand what this is about, what this discussion of geography has a very crucial meaning. Hegel has asserted that there i a connection, that there is such a thing as history, a rational history, because the are folk-minds. The rationality of history is guaranteed by the fact that the carri of history are minds, folk-minds, and therefore parts of the universal mind. But there is another side to that, there is an obvious connection between the visible—the nations—and nature. The very name "nation", derivate from nasce, from which also nature is derived, intimates that. For example, the connection between folk-mi and the climate, the nature of the territory, the nature or characteristics of the people (whether we call that race or not doesn't make any difference). Now let us assume according to a more common view that the folk-mind is to some extent at least the product of nature. The natural conditions...there would be no rationality of history, because nature does not have the rationality which the mind has. This is.. and therefore Hegel has to go into this, that is the importance of this discussion, to show, while admitting the connection between nations and nature, this does not m the nation simply a function of nature.. Did you want so say somethin?

Student: I understood earlier that Hegel had maintained that the rationalit would be shown in nature as well as in history.

Strauss: Ja, but still, that is not as simple, and wouldn't be helpful for the purpose. Now, how does Hegel show that? I mean, Hegel admits there is such a connection, and there are limited cases which are clear: If the climate is too hot or too cold, no development of the high faculties of man would take place—the old Aristotelian So only the of any importance here. But how does Hegel show in a very simple way the relative unimportance of climate or nature? Nature...the maximum which nature offers is opportunities, but it never exerts a compelling influence. So there couldn't be a high culture in Greenland or in equatorial Africa, for example. But there was a ver high culture, say, in Asia Minor, the coasts of Asia Minor, at the time of Homer. Is the climate of Asia Minor a sufficient explanation of the Homeric poems, to put it very simply? That is the question which Hegel discusses. How does the argument develop?

Student: Well, obviously not because there hasn't been that type of poetry since Homer's time..and the nature has remained the same.

Strauss: Yes, surely, this is the simple proof that there cannot be a determination. But nevertheless, Hegel says while there is no dependence of mind on nat there is a certain correspondence—that is so, and the example which he discusses especially is the valley-cultures, the river valley cultures and the coastland cult the difference between them. And the fact that the European culture in its original form comes from coastal countries around the Mediterranean, whereas the great Asiati cultures are river cultures, river valley cultures, is of some importance. Hegel, in other words, sees a certain correspondence between the greater flexibility, the gr freedom, of the European development in this maritime character of the geographic condition. Now regarding, well, the thing which is so strange to us has to do with

notion of correspondence. Hegel asserts that the New World, America, and of course also Australia, is new, not only in the sense that it is new to the Old World, the Europeans, but it is new in an absolute sense. Read this, it is very strong. Where is that? 81, top.

Reader. 'The geological antiquity we have nothing to do with. I will not deny the New World the honor of having emerged from the sea at the world's formation contemporaneously with the Old; yet the Archipelago between South America and Asia shows a physical immaturity.'

Strauss: And so on. Yes, and he speaks also about the weakness of American crocodiles and other beasts; and Alexander von Humboldt, who had seen them in the Amazon River and so forth, assured people in Germany that they are quite respectable. So, this is one of the famous weaknesses of Hegel. But there is one thing which is quite, the other point which he makes is of somewhat greater interest, but of course the interpretation is a long question: that the weakness of the American natives, the Indians, compared even with the Negroes, of whom Hegel had no high opinion, that they were, that the Indians were unable to coexist with the rights—that the Negroes at least learned to work, and so on. What is strange still, I mean in the case of such a great man as Hegel, one must wonder what the question is which he has in mind however inadequate his answer may be. One can perhaps say this: How does it come, the question which Hegel answers, how does it come that there was no phenomenon like Confucius or Buddha in America? There was no such cultural phenomenon of the highest order. Apparently Hegel didn't know anything of Aztec and Inca culture—that is what you understand—but still, in all fairness, this is not comparable to Hindu and Chinese culture; and this is a relative justification of Hegel's atrocious assertion that there is some..that the American continent and its native population would not have had any message for the older continent, whereas the older continent, and not only its Christian, even the Indian and Chinese part and perhaps some other one would have had a message for America—this is surely a fact which is not altogether unworthy of thought. And if you read Hegel, the statement from this point of view, and forget about the crocodile, we will look at it, I believe, more adequately. Good. So we will now, next time we will come to his discussion of Africa and begin his discussion of China. Is there any point which you would like to raise? Yes, Mr. _____.

Student: Hegel is an interpreter of history, and in so doing he understands himself to be rebuilding at a higher level Christianity, which in principle has been destroyed by the Enlightenment.

Strauss: Let me put it this way: Christianity understood by the orthodoxies or by the theologians. Yes.

Student: All right. Now, the difficulty is, for one who is not a that ortnodox Christianity is no longer of validity. How can he, a person like that approach the study of Hegel, because Hegel seems to be subversive of Christianity. You understand?

Strauss: Ja, that was the reason why he was attacked already in his life. You can find many references, explicit or implicit, to that fact...And he was called at that time a pantheist, that was the word they used; and after his death, the then Prussian government called a former friend of Hegel, a fellow philosopher, Schelling to the University of Berlin in order to counteract the dragon-seeds of the Hegelian pantheism. So, no, that was clear. But I believe, one can say that Hegel's philosophy of history is fantastic, and that this is not merely an accident, I mean due to certain defects of Hegel's representation, but the reason is probably that history

is not a rational process. This is very easy to say, it is very common-sensical to say, but the difficulty is this: If history is not, I mean Hegel had some empirical evidence for asserting that the historical process is rational and that empirical evidence is the fact of progress. Or is this not a fact? Because if there is progr then it has gone on rationally. I mean, maybe it was not so rational that we could figure out the superiority of Hindu religion to Chinese religion as Hegel thought, this kind of thing--but fundamentally there is a progressive process, and that seems to be a sign of rationality. Or is this not correct to say, that there was...I mean progress in a limited sense is obviously a fact. Ja? For example, man's ability to move quickly from one place to another. There is obviously enormous progress has be made in this and many other things. Above all, in science. Yes?

Student: But couldn't it be some fields of endeavor are by their very nature progressive in that...I mean, if you're just talking about the number of facts one knows, and as long as these things aren't lost, all you can do is add to the store; there's no way--in other words, when we know how to go ten miles an hour if we discover how to go fifteen miles an hour, that's addint to it and as long as this isn't forgotten, you're always adding to this. In these restrictive realms, there's no problem about progress. It's the only way the thing could go. You couldn't all of a sudden have to go slower than before.

Strauss: Ja, but what does belief in progress mean, in contradistinction to this restrictive progress of which you speak?

Student: Well, I mean a belief in the progress of the basic philosophic ide

Strauss: What about social progress, social-political progress?

Student: Well, that equally, that's in a way...that I mean can be questione and what was being questioned and what he was fighting against when you say you hav to look at the content of these societies, not merely the external things...

Strauss: Ja, but well, still, Hegel said, Look, well, the rights of man: they're formally recognized and became the basis of the legal system and the whole social order in the Western world. Is this not a great progress compared with the very humane societies, or relatively humane societies in earlier times which did no have a formal recognition of such rights of man? This is, I think, a major point in Hegel's reasoning. But what about that?

Student: I was going to ask you if there were principles that have bearing on politics which one could appeal to, and on the basis of those prefer a city as the best form of political life?

Strauss: Ja, but Hegel would simply say that the society which regarded it as a possible right to enslave human beings is morally inferior to a society which denies that right.

Student: Yes, but if that statement itself were questionable...

Strauss: Ja, but still who questions that? That's the point.

Student: But even not questioning that, it's true that there has been progr in the idea that the right of the individual has been made the basis of our society but maybe we pay a price for that....

Strauss: One simply has to say that happened after Hegel. I mean what happened after Hegel in Hegel's own country to the rights of man. And how do the rights of man look today, the prospects? That depends so much on whether the West has the capacity to survive. So, in other words, not only there are limited progresses, as you stated, technological and so on, but even if there were genuine progresses in important spheres, the question arises, will these progresses go on? Will they go on? And then there would be in retrospect, say 1000 years from now, a progressive period, say for two or three centuries in the West, followed by another night. How can we exclude that?

Student: Well, couldn't this be in a sense tied in with the fact that while there was certain obvious progress which was manifest and people could see, there was a decay that was more subtle, that people couldn't see.

Strauss: I do not want to go into...simply to see what is the basis of this optimism, as it were, was stated very clearly by Kant in one of his smaller, minor, writings when he, speaking of the French Revolution, says these things cannot be forgotten. In other words, say the destruction of the Bastille in 1789 cannot be forgotten. But the question is, is this true? I mean, it may still be written down in the histories and transmitted from generation to generation. But will it be a living memory, which makes it absolutely certain that there will be no Bastilles any more? That is a different proposition. And I believe this is
Hegel could assume that a substantial part, that the majority of his listeners and readers would have no doubt of the fact of progress, and progress in the decisive matters, of course. But we have not yet discussed the question of progress regarding philosophy. We must take this up at a proper occasion.

Strauss: Your last remark leads very far, and I suppose we postpone it. I shall also disregard your clear summary of the survey which Hegel gives in this lecture, because this will be repeated at much better length when he comes to the particular cultures, like China, India, and so on. Now, there is one point which we should clear up regarding Africa; and of course we must disregard entirely the present situation, or for that matter, any problems of the Negro in this country, of which... Now, for the Africans, you said there is nothing higher than man, and this is the natural man. And therefore this man has no sense of the dignity of man. How is the connection? I mean, if nothing is higher than man, that would be a very high sense of the dignity of men. How is the..how does Hegel explain this apparent difficulty?

Student: It seems to me his explanation is that man gains dignity only if he has something to look up to, that is, there has to be something higher than his own being; and in looking up to something, then he can have respect for his own being. But if he can't look up to a higher being, then he can have no respect for his own being.

Strauss: In other words, otherwise, if there is nothing higher than man, then man is just an animal species like any other, and we could speak of the dignity of dogs, monkeys, and so on, but.. of the dignity of man. Man needs..something, I mean, if man is not given the dignity by something higher than himself, then he has no dignity. Well, that is the Biblical formula, created in the image of God, and in Hegel's formula it would be reason. Reason is not something which is not merely a faculty of man, but which is, in a way, which rules the whole, and this--yes, that is indeed this point. Now, what Hegel says that the Negroes by slavery come to participate, well, in say, in Phoenician, or the culture of Islam and therefore they cease to be natural men as they were in Africa--is of course easy to understand. But still there is some difficulty, which came also out in the discussion of China. If it..if everything depends on man's recognizing something higher than man and bowing to it, is this what happened in China? How about it?

Student: Yes.

Strauss: But this is obviously not sufficient. There must be..what is, in other words, the ingredient which is also required?

Student. That part of that something be contained in man himself.

Strauss: Yes. In other words, there must be some reconciliation between this highest and man. And again, the Christian theological formula is, God has become man, which Hegel interprets in his manner. But one can, of course, also say..state it in this form. that the final man, so to speak, has a sense of the dignity of man because he is self-legislative. In other words, he is not merely subject to a law handed down to him from on high, but he legislates for himself, imposes a law upon himself. Whereas a natural man does not impose any law. I mean, we say in the [illegible] earlier stages, men obey laws as handed down, say, the laws of the Greeks, where Antigone speaks of these laws. Good. But eventually, man recognizes that these laws are in fact self-imposed, but not known to have been self-imposed; and the eventual stage is that man knows that he obeys laws which he knows, and then the full reconciliation is achieved. This is roughly what he has in mind. Yes. I think we leave it at that. What was it, I forget beyond what we can discuss today.

Student: China is somehow in history,and somehow it is not in history. It somehow doesn't participate, that is, it participates in the spiritual, and yet it doesn't participate in movement.

Strauss: What is the empirical basis for this statement? I mean, that is cl to what extent it belongs to history, because here man is subject and bows.

Student: Right.

Strauss: But there is the other side, which he expressed, that China in a wa does not belong to history...

Student: Well, there are a number of quotes. The first thing is, Africa is outside of history because it doesn't participate in movement. Then he makes several remarks about China to the same effect, that China and India lie, as it were still outside the world's history. That's on page 116.

Strauss: Ja, but what does he mean by that?

Student: I took him to mean that, it's a matter of fact that they're static, that is, they do participate in the spirit, they do participate in freedom in some but nonetheless there's no movement.

Strauss: Yes, but does he not..but what about, say, Persia is different in this respect. What empirical facts does he have in mind when he makes these distinctions?

Student: They have the same type of government now that they had when they began. There's been no change, the same type of regime.

Strauss: Ja, we know that, but on the other hand, I believe what he has in s also and very implicitly, there was no influence of China and India on the West, whereas there was some such influence of Persia, if only because of the rule of the Persians over the Jews, and which has created some unity. Whereas, on the other ha there was already to some extent in Hegel's time,in the case of India, there was so influence of the West on the East. And of course, this is now much more visible, a especially in China, because Marxism is still, as we all know, of Western origin; and therefore there is a difference between those cultures which in a way helped t bring about the West, and those which did not. And this is, I think, indicated by Hegel in this manner. Now, well, good. There are..we have a number of other passages which are also of great importance, which unfortunately are not in the translation. Here is the famous: As soon as man appears as man, he is in opposit to nature. Only by this fact does he become man. The Negro presents natural man, and so on. So, in other words, what does opposition to nature makes man. I mean, that is not true of any other being, even if that being, like a spid for example, creates edifices of some sort, yet there is no opposition to nature. The opposition to nature makes man man. Man is a being which transforms nature, a thing which plays a very great role in the Marxist doctrine. So what we have to d he transforms nature, and whatever we are concerned with, in every stage except the lowest, is that man transforms an earlier transformation. Say, if the Romans trans- formed their Greek heritage; but this Greek heritage is already a transformation o nature, or rather a transformation of an earlier culture, say Oriental culture; so on. And the peculiarity of the first cycle, lowest cycle, would be,is that the is not a preceeding earlier transformation. Some transformation starts here. And this is what Hegel has in mind when he said, "Reason is the form and the matter o

history, because matter is already a transformation of nature, and the beginning is indeed this, is the Negro. The Negro presents natural man in his whole wildness and uncontrolledness. There is nothing... He is the immediate man, meaning that here no mediation between nature has taken place. There is nothing in this character which reminds of the human. So we find in Africa altogether that which one has called the state of innocence, the unity of man with God and nature. Now this is a very strong stand, that cannibalism and is a state of innocence. For this is a state of unconsciousness of oneself; this f natural state is a bestial state. Paradise is in Greek the zoo, the animal garden where man has lived in a bestial state and was, is an innocent and man is not supposed to be innocent, but responsible. So now this whole present tion, the natural as natural man is the state of innocence. But now this is very m changed from the beginning. This is surely a radical transformation of the Biblica view, the perfect beginning—we spoke of that last time. But it is also, it is not only meant against, directed against the ordinary biblical view, it is also meant against a philosophic view. I mean, what is the natural man? Where do we hear of the natural man?

Student: Locke, Rousseau.

Strauss: Rousseau more obviously, in the Second Discourse, especially. And Rousseau had, of course, said that the natural man is a stupid animal, and man both pre-rational and pre-social, but that was all. Hegel gives a much more speci delineation of the natural man. This bestial state, this savage state, was a great theme of Hobbes, as you will remember. But what is the difference between Hegel's description of natural man, man in the state of nature, and Hobbes', for example?

Student. For Hobbes at least you have a sense that they can come together and form a contract.

Strauss: Yes, so in other words...

Student. ...not completely natural.

Strauss: Well, this is natural. But their naturalness enables them to act to bring about an artifice called the Leviathan. And why not the Negroes, accordi to Hegel's description? ....

Student: They lack reason and they lack freedom, I mean, the ability to for

Strauss: In other words, ja, but how did this state come about more concrete because I believe something depends on it. Yes?

Student: According to Hobbes, man in the state of nature was not conscious of himself, therefore he could not...

Strauss: Very well, this very simple calculation: my life is threatened by the war of everybody against everybody, and that is true of everybody else, so we all have a common interest. that is a thought absolutely beyond the people concerned. Man in the state of nature, Hegel as it were replies to Hobbes, is wholly incapable of leaving it. He must undergo a very long civilizing process before he could do what Hobbes says he does: establish a state and especially a reasonable state. Or in the words of Marx, the educator himself must be educated, and that cannot be done by any educator, but must be done by some historical proce because the educator would already have been educated by, in a rational processs— here, say, in a department of education or something like this—which could not be

taken place here. Yes. Now let us turn to page 93 in the translation, towards the bottom of the page. Five lines from bottom.

Reader: "Religion begins with the consciousness that there is something higher than man. But even Herodotus called the Negroes sorcerers."

Strauss: Now here there is something omitted which is of some importance. "This form of thinking is not present with the Negroes. The character of the Afric shows the first opposition of man to nature." There is such an opposition because otherwise they would not be human. "In this state he has this notion: He and natur being opposed to each other, but he as ruling over the natural--this is the basic religion of which we have the first relation, the oldest testament, from Herodotus. Yes. We can express their religious principle in the proposition which Herodotus stated:in Africa, all are sorcerers. Yes?

Reader: "Now in sorcery, we have not the idea of a God, of a moral fate. It exhibits man as the highest power, regarding him as alone occupying a position o command over the power of nature."

Strauss: In other words, this crudest form of religion, or pre-religion rat sorcery, has of course one crucial character. It is something that is distinctly human. Monkeys have no sorcerers. And therefore the opposition between man and nature, which according to Hegel is of the essence of man, shows itself at this stage. They do not have any religion because they do not know of anything higher than man. And when he speaks of sorcery later on, explaining that,(I believe these passages are not in the translation) he says, "they do not call on God in the sorcery activity. There is no higher power they address, but the men concerned believe that they cause this effect by themselves. In a word, man regards himself for the highest which here can command." By the way, but I cannot of course go into this question, the main reason being my incompetence, of whether Hegel's notic of African religion is true or not. I remember having read a book by Professor Eliade of our Divinity School, which suggests an entirely different notion of the Negro pantheon, and I mean, very different from this notion of Hegel. I cannot go into it... but that goes, of course, of all the..he speaks of China and India and so on. We would have to ask people who know this subject matter whether Hegel, whether the information which Hegel had was in any way sufficient.

Student: Would you comment on these different editions--Hegel's preface to edition says that this is the second edition based on Hegel's manuscripts, and this is corrected and revised somewhat by lecture notes. This is not the first edition.

Strauss: But, well, the main point is this: I do not know the whole history I could read to you here the statement,which would take too much time. But the mos important event I know is this: about 10-20 years ago, a German scholar, Hoffmeist went over the whole material of new lecture notes which have been discovered since and revised the whole edition, but unforunately he did this only for the first part of the Philosophy of History. Then he died. So for this first part, we have a mu better and richer edition, but not for the whole; and I mean, this unfortunate accident is of use to us only today, because next time I have to fall back on the older edition, which has a more literal translation than the edition which you use.

Student: Your edition has never been translated then.

Strauss: No. Oh, no. So, well, what by the way..in order to understand wha Hegel means by sorcery--what is the difference between..I mean, sorcery is the

control of nature. Technology is control of nature. What is the difference between sorcery and technology? Don't answer, technology works and sorcery doesn't. I mean, as far as possibility goes. the working of the one and not working of the other is a consequence of a more fundamental defect. What does technologies do which sorcery does not?

Student: To be possible, that has to know what the laws are which the things effect.

Strauss: Both vanquish nature. Ja. Sorcery and technology. But, as Francis Bacon put it, the scientist vanquishes nature by obeying her in the first place, and this obedience, this recognition of something objective, that is according to Hegel's analysis, lacking in sorcery. So there is, and this is probably the reason why the one works and the other doesn't work. And if sorcery works, it may be due to entirely different things, especially if it has an effect on wide-eyed human beings. There is however an objection to this interpretation of Negro religion, on page 94, second paragraph.

Reader: Just above the middle. "The second element in their religion consis. in their giving an outward form to this supernatural power, projecting their hidden human might into the world of phenomena by means of images."

Strauss: Ja, I would like to say here there is not the word "supernatural" in the German original, but it may have occured a bit before. I am not, I mean, I wonder whether it was there because if it is supernatural, it would be a recognition of something higher. Ja?

Student: I have a German edition from which this is translated, and it's just here Macht.

Strauss: Macht. You see, so it's even...look, I have found another thing in the translation. There is also in this translation, it's such a crucial point, ja, page 81 in your translation at the top; I noticed this by accident. Can you show me I'm sorry, I can't find it. But surely, here, we have cleared it up now. So there is nothing about supernatural, that would run counter to everything Hegel said. So how do we read it then?

Reader: "...an outward form to this power, projecting their hidden might into the world of phenomena by means of images. What they conceive of as the power in question is therefore nothing really objective, having a substantial being and different from themselves, but the first thing that comes in their way. This, taken quite indiscriminately, they exalt to the dignity of a "genius"; it may be an animal, a tree, a stone, or a wooden figure. This is their fetish--a word to which the Portuguese first gave currency, and which is derived from feitizo, magic. Here, in the fetish, a kind of objective independence, as contrasted with the arbitrary fancy of the individual..."

Strauss: In other words, here is another being, fetish, and to which the sorcerer seems to bow, which he seems to recognize. Yes?

Reader: "...seems to manifest itself; but as the objectivity is nothing other than the fancy of the individual projecting itself into space, the human individual remains master of the image it has adopted."

Strauss: More literally translated, "the individual arbitrariness objectivat in the fetish," and so on, therefore it never reaches the independent. As he puts a bit later, their god always remains within their power, establishing and opposing h arbitrarily, and therefore they are never raised above their arbitrariness. In a word, there is no relation of dependence in this religion, and therefore, it is not, in any real sense of the word, religion. The objectivity always remains subject to arbitrariness. The substantial always remains within the power of the subject. This is a religion of the Africans, it doesn't go further. There is indeed here a superio of man above nature --this is somehow recognized, you know--which a dumb animal could never have; but in the matter of arbitrariness, namely, you say that it is arbitrary and accidental will of man which is higher than the natural, the phenomena, and this by the fact that they are human and not monkeys. And that..yes. Now let us turn to page 95, the second paragraph: as regards the relation of man to man.

Reader: "But from the fact that man is regarded as the highest, it follows that he has no respect for himself; for only with the consciousness of a higher being does he reach a point of view which inspires him with real reverance."

Strauss. Let me see. This would require a higher and absolute value which man would... and this absolute value man could not simply give himself, it must have been given to him; and this, therefore there can be no dignity of man. Yes?

Reader: "For if arbitrary choice is the absolute, the only substantial objectivity that is realized, the mind cannot in such be conscious of any universality. The Negroes indulge therefore that perfect contempt for humanity, which in its bearin on justice and morality is the fundamental characteristic of the race. They have, moreover, no knowledge of the immortality of the soul, although spectres are suppos to appear. The undervaluing of humanity among them reaches an incredible degree of intensity. Tyranny is regarded as no wrong, and cannibalism is looked upon as quite customary and proper."

Strauss: And then he gives examples of cannibalism
So, in other words, we do not have to read the daily papers: we can find it already here. But then he makes the very same statement, which is not in the translation: "human flesh is used not so much as food, but on the occasion of festivals, many hund. prisoners are tortured, decapitated, and the body is returned to him who has captured him; and this capturer divides the corpse up." Now this is here this in the translation; and because it is quite interesting that in spite of their savagery they know that man is not like any brute, and that he means, by the way, they do not eat human flesh in the way they eat the meat of cows or goats or something. The peculiar chara that the eating of human flesh is part of the celebration and also the other things to which he refers later, that the eating of the heart of an enemy is meant to give powers which they do not expect after eating the heart of a chicken or of a lion. In a way they are aware that man is something special; but of course this awareness can never reach solidity because of the reason given. Yes?

Student: But isn't this something of purely animal characteristic, too? I mean, a certain awareness of a difference between...lions do not attack each other.

Strauss: Ja, but lions do not eat lions, the higher animals, let us say. And man is this fantastic beast, while being higher, can also be so much lower than the animals. In other words, because he has this wider range. I mean, he is not re lated by instinct and so on, in the way in which the animals... Yes.
Again a passage which is not in the translation. When he speaks about slavery among the

the Negroes, which of course follows when there is no recognition of the dignity of man, and therefore there is no objection whatever to slavery: "The lesson which we draw from this condition of slavery with the Negroes, and which is only of side interest to us, which we know from the idea that the state of nature is the state of absolute and universal injustice." Well. This formula is from Kant, but it is of course one can impute it to Hobbes as well. "Every intermediate stage between the state of nature and the actuality of the reasonable state, has still facets of injustice." So we begin—that is another formulation for, characterization of, the historical pro Beginning with absolute injustice and ending with the complete absence of injustice, called by Hegel the reasonable state. I mean, there can be acts of private injustice. of course, murder and so on, all the time; but they have no legs to stand upon. Ther are laws forbidding them, and law-courts which take care of them. Crime has not the possibility to show its face in broad daylight. I mean, Hegel does not go so far as Marx does in his notion, where there would be a notion that in the end state there would not be any crimes in fact any more— hardly Hegel —Lenin has some great discussion about some unpleasantness which might happen in a factory: I mean, some slack you know, who doesn't work like the others work in the factory; and so...and since th state has withered away, there can of course be no court to take cognizance of it. Well, and then the other factory workers will take care of him. You can call this lynching or use some other words. But the key point is this, this must be remembered that in the reasonable state there is no longer any injustice, i.e., there is no long any need to recognize by the law any injustice as inevitable, as long as we have slav for example, or serfdom—as long as this is the case, there is objective injustice recognized and regarded by justice. The complete coincidence of law and justice, i.e there are only just laws: this is the reasonable state, and that is the end of the historical process. And the way in which Hegel talks here when he speaks of the inter mediate stage between the state of nature and the actuality of the reasonable state, implies that this history can come to an end, because the reasonable state, as is im here, can become actual. As a matter of fact, in Hegel's view it has become actual.Y

Student: Isn't the state of nature somewhat outside of history, that is, it is in contrast to history, universal slavery?.

Strauss: Sure, you can say that, but nevertheless, state of nature as a stat of mankind has always the fundamental human characteristic... there is some opposition between man and nature, that is clear — and I think indicated by what Hege says here about the practice of cannibalism, that people as a matter of fact, that pe do not eat human food as a matter of course, in which they would eat the food of oth beings, and there is something in man which objects to that, or which creates a probl at least,which can be overcome only by special ceremonies, and so on.

Student: Would all reach the reasonable state simultaneously, or would some get there before others?

Strauss: The state, it wouldn't be of any help. Say you have a perfectly wi man, let us assume for one moment, and a perfectly just man—also substantively just, you know: in other words, not only that he has a good will, but that he knows what is just. That wouldn't make a just state. I mean, assume that Socrates—let us assume that Socrates regarded slavery as fundamentally unjust and had more or less the just views—what would be the consequence? It would never have become the law of the land there would be always a conflict between justice and the law, you know? The opinions of any individuals, however wise opinions may be, are irrelevant if they have not bee embodied in institutions; only by this embodiment does the reasonable state emerge. But Hegel would of course say that Socrates could not have seen that. I mean, he mig have disliked the institution of slavery, but he could not have understood the deep

principles which is possible according to Hegel, only on the basis of the Bible, more specifically of the [illegible]e come to that later. Yes?

Student: When Hegel speaks about China, and about the earlier reaches of, before recorded history, there he describes how they lived in the mountains and clothe themselves with furs and so on, he never says, though, that this was a natural state too, out of which they came by individuals giving them laws and pointing out their...

Strauss: You mean these tribes in the north prior to the establishment of the state, is that it?

Student: Yes.

Strauss: Then Hegel would simply say that is not the natural state in the full sense, because since cannibalism, for example, and other things are not of the essence of this condition.

Student: But we don't know. Hegel must admit he doesn't know.

Strauss: I do not know whether Hegel had read a lot about the...

Student: But he admits there are no records...proceeds into the problem..

Strauss: But he would still say...let us assume you are right, with your factor hypothesis. This would create a minor difficulty, but what Hegel would say, nevertheless, it is there, it was possible, even if there was such a fetishistic stage also in Asia or maybe even in Europe for all we know.

Student: What is the difference, it makes it possible in one state that the process of history begins and in another it doesn't.

Strauss: But the point is that in Africa there was never any indigenous progress beyond that. In China, there was also stability, to that extent the same as in Africa, but on a much higher level. This, I think, is the only important point. And therefore Hegel regards Africa and China in different ways as typical, and the things, more or less hypothetical things, to which you refer as, even if true, as not typical, not fundamentally interesting.

Student: I think Mr. _____ is stressing the point, especially as we get on in the book, we come into these grinding inevitabilities of the advance--till finally it's surprising that the Counter-Reformation should succeed. Yet it just so happened, in effect, that China did raise itself after savagery and establish a central kingdom, and it also so happened that Africa did not take the steps;and he does not give a compelling account why did it come about that...

Strauss: I mean, he at least gives part of the account.

Student: Part of the account is in the earlier section, where he says in the torrid zones and the frigid zones, civilizations simply can't arise. So that explains in part why Africa could never have gotten beyond where it got. So the real question, I suppose, is,. and you raise the question...

Strauss: There are other questions, for instance, the time span, and how do the pre-historic times(Hegel doesn't speak about them, but they are somehow implied) are so much longer than the historical times? But I think the indication is that

this was an infinitely long process leading from the very beginnings of mankind, but Hegel doesn't say a word about that—I mean, we on the basis of some theory of evolution would think of some pagan or what not, until these reach the state of people who possess a language. When he speaks of the origin of language, he says these very long time spans are quiet so these transformations could develop.

Student: He is also somewhat prepared for the first civilization in China, because he has described the geography of the Asian highlands as lending itself to this tribal, nomadic life which would produce patriarchy.

Strauss: There is, of course, precisely from this point of view that these are only opportunities or conditions, not sufficient causes—I mean, some spark had to come in, and this can no longer be explained except in retrospect that this star, this particular mind or Weltanschauung, is intelligible as the fundamental part of the whole, comprehensive system of Weltanschauung, which is, you can see, history as it appears in man. There is also another point which, well, we can read ourselves somewhat later when he begins to speak on Asia; I think that must be in the translation, page 100 or so. Asia...

Reader: The bottom of 99...

Strauss: No, where is this passage where he speaks of "Asia is the continent the Orient." That's 99. Good.

Reader: "Asia is characteristically the Orient quarter of the globe, the region of origination. It is the Western world for America. But as Europe present on the whole the center and end of the Old World, and is absolutely the West, so Asia is absolutely the East."

Strauss: Ja, so in other words, from the purely geographical point of view, East and West are very relative considerations. The European continent, which is externally just one among n points of view, is nevertheless the absolute point of view, because Europe is the center and the end of the Old World and absolutely the West, meaning the Occident. Therefore..yes. But Hegel of course implies that this is not an arbitrary Europe-centric point of view, but Europe is in fact the place where history has reached its culmination, where the reasonable state has come into being with all its implications. Page 103, paragraph 1 and..yes.

Reader: "In the geographical survey, the course of the world's history has been marked out in its general features. The sun, the light, rises in the East. Light is a simply self-involved existence: but though possessing thus in itself universality it exists at the same time as an individuality in the sun. Imagination has often pictured to itself the emotions of a blind man suddenly becoming possessed with sight, beholding the bright glimmers of the dawn, the growing light, and the flaming glory of the ascending sun. The boundless forgetfulness of his individuality in this pure splendor is his first feeling: utter astonishment."

Strauss: This forgetting of himself in looking at the sun, that is the first stage. The unawareness of self, and only seeing the objective, the absolute, or whatever you call it, that is Asia. Yes. No awareness, no self-knowledge strictly speaking, no self-consciousness.

Reader: "But when the sun is risen, this astonishment is diminished. Objects around are perceived, and from them the individual proceeds to the contemplation of his own inner being, and thereby the advance is made to the perception of the

relation between the two. When inactive contemplation is quitted for activity. By the close of day, man has erected a building constructed from his own inner sum...

Strauss: No, which he has brought about by his labor. This is the man's product become more important than the things that he finds. His world, the man-created world, becomes more important than the given world. Also something which Marx took over. Yes.

Reader: '...when in the evening he contemplates this, he esteems it more highly than the original external sun. For now he stands in a conscious relation to his spirit, and therefore a free relation. If we hold this image fast in mind, shall find it symbolizing the course of history, the great day's work of Spirit.'

Strauss: Yes. And go on. The beginning of the next paragraph.

Reader: 'The history of the world travels from east to west...'

Strauss: No, it travels from the mere, the self-forgetting, in looking at the absolute, towards the awareness of man's creativity in producing his own world. Y.

Reader: 'For Europe is absolutely the end of history, Asia the beginning.'

Strauss: There can be no doubt that, sorry as I am that I have to mention it, there is no place for America. In other words, he doesn't deny that there will be all kinds of developments in America, of which he doesn't claim to prophesy as we have seen, but there will be nothing fundamentally new, beyond that reasonable stay existing in the early nineteenth century in Europe. Yes. Now on page 104 in the second paragraph, there is this distinction which is very important between substantial freedom and subjective freedom. That is one problem which we have mention on an earlier occasion. Yes?

Student: May I ask a question about the myth?

Strauss: Yes. Well, it's not really a myth. But go ahead. It is an image.

Student: Do you feel any significance could be drawn from the fact that the first step of the sun and then the turn to the objects does remind of the story of the cave, and from there on the story is quite otherwise?

Strauss: No, but I think, I believe, whether he thought of the story of the c whose writing that I do not know. I do not see any necessity to assume that. But what astonishes us is this. We ordinarily speak of the Orient, in German Morgenland the land of the morning, and Occident, Abendland, land of the evening, and now the —what is—that the sun rises we are filled with admiration for this magnificent s and completely inactive. Is? We just have to wait. Let us assume this as an example. And then gradually we don't look any more at the sun, but we look at the things on which the sun shines, in other words, we contemplate the terrestrial things, trees, animals, etc., etc., and when...however, but we also work (although Hegel doesn't mention it at this stage. But then when the evening comes, we become aware of the fact that we have done a day's work, and in the simplest case, we have made something—a shoe, a table, whatever it may be; and then Hegel says this: what a man has produced by his produced himself, of which he is fully the cause, this understood in the large sense—I mean, not thinking merely of the pair of shoes and the table, and so on, but everything created by man—think not only of works of art and so on, but of the institutions and states— this whole world is infinitely higher in dignity than the natural world. So in other words, he starts from the simple thing, you know, that we look at the sun, and then we gradually see

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to work and so forth—he enlarges that. I believe there is nothing further here. But the most important indication of this passage is of course the Occident, Europe — this is the highest stage. There is no . . .

Student: Is there no reference to man's ...?

Strauss: No, well, he speaks of the sum of his consciousness, which he has produced by his labor. So this sum is, as he said, could not be without his producti Yes. In other words, this sum is not something coeternal with man, like conscience o something of this kind, but is something which itself comes into being through man's work. Surely there must be some germ, but developed, say like Greek morality or Roma morality, Biblical morality. These are, wouldn't exist without the human production, the human development of this germ. Yes. Page 104, paragraph 3.

Reader: "To understand this division, [namely into despotism, democracy, aristocracy and monarchy] to understand this division, we must remark that as the state for the universal spiritual life to which individuals by birth sustain a relationship of confidence and habit, in which they have their existence and reality, the first question whether their actual life is an unreflecting use and habit combining them in this uni or whether its constituent individuals are reflective and personal beings, having a properly subjective and independent existence. In view of this, substantial freedom must be distinguished from subjective freedom. Substantial freedom is the abstract, undeveloped reason implicit in volition proceeding to develop itself in the state. But in this phase of reason there is still wanting personal insight and will, that is subjective freedom, which is realized only in the individual and which constitutes the reflection of the individual in his own conscience. Where there is merely substantial freedom, commands and laws are regarded as something fixed and abstract, to which the subject bows himself in absolute servitude. These laws need not concur wit the desire of the individual...

Strauss: The will...

Reader: "...the will of the individual, and the subjects are consequently like children, who obey their parents without will or insight of their own. But as subjective freedom arises, and man descends from the contemplation of external realit into his own soul, the contrast suggested by reflection arises involving the negatic of reality."

Strauss: In other words, here the objective institutions, laws and so on, are questioned because they are merely authoritative, and this in itself leads to the destruction, their corrosion, and only if they are truly rational, i.e., they are of such a nature that the reasonable individual legislating himself, for himself, would established them, then they resist the corrosion and then they remain. Well, substantive, substantial freedom and subjective freedom correspond like obeying blindly rational order and obeying it knowingly, knowing that is is rational. The question o course which Hegel does not develop here is this: Can an order be rational if it is simply obeyed blindly? In other words, can the Chinese order which has this substant freedom in a way—can it be rational because it is not transformable into subjective freedom? There is another passage on the bottom of page 107.

Reader: The German...

Strauss: No. "The realm of subjective freedom is derived of the actual spiri At that stage the fourth realm begins, if we look only at its natural side, it is the senility of the mind. However," yes?

Reader: "The German world appears at this point of development--the fourth phase of world history. This ...would answer in the comparison with the periods of human life to its old age. The old age of nature is weakness; but that of spirit is its perfect maturity and strength, in which it returns to unity with itself, but in its fully developed character."

Strauss: Of history...if it is taken as--if the end of history is taken as the senile stage of the human mind, this is obviously not true; but if we make a distinction between the old age of the body, let us say, and the old age of the mind, where it could go together with the highest wisdom, it might be different. Yes. I think these are the passages here...

(Change tape)

Reader: "...on the contrary nothing remains, except at most a heap of bricks for the Persian Kingdom, as that of transition, is by nature perishable, and the Kingdoms of the Caspian Sea are given up to the ancient struggle of Iran and Turan. The Empire of the solitary Will is only present beneath the ground, in its speechless dead, ever and anon stolen away to all quarters of the globe, and in their majestic habitations; for what remains above ground is nothing else but such splendid tombs."

Strauss: In other words, the problem which Hegel is trying to solve is, how come that China and also England are the only worlds or cultures which have remained, whereas others like Persia and Egypt and so on, and Mesopotamia, have been destroyed. Hegel denies implicitly that this can be understood merely in terms of geography or location. China, say, was so far away and therefore, from the West, and could not be conquered by it. He tries to trace this amazing survival to the principle of China. It is clear from the context that this fact does not prove in itself that China is higher than Persia or Egypt, but on the contrary. And the simple proof is that Hegel surely regarded Greece as higher than China, and Greece has not survived, as we saw a long time ago. Yes. On page 117, line 2ff.

Reader. "Comparing this with the history of the Old Testament..."

Strauss: He is speaking of the Chinese chronological dates...

Reader: "...a space of 2450 years, according to the common acceptation, intervened between the Noachian-Deluge and the Christian era. But Johannes von Muller has adduced weighty objections to this number. He places the Deluge in the year 3473 before Christ- thus about 1000 years earlier--supporting his view by the Septuagint. I remark this only with the view of obviating a difficulty that may appear to arise when we meet with dates of a higher age than 2400 years before Christ, and yet find nothing about the Flood."

Strauss: Yes, what do you say to this statement? I mean about its character?

Student: I think he's smiling.

Strauss: Yes. I thought that the first ironical remark which I have come across at my reading of these ... Yes?

Student: Would he call this a myth?

Strauss: No for Hegel it is a matter of course that these chronological statements of the Old Testament are not in any way obligatory, and that was settled for people like him long before his birth. But it is obvious. Now the funny thing is that he s

I have observed this only that with a view to the fact that someone could become doubtful of the date of the flood. Yes. Now when he comes to speak about the surv of Chinese history in chronological terms, because only to contemplate the spirit o. China's constitution, which has always remained the same, and he says this spirit o. the constitution follows immediately from the principle of China. So you have that.

Reader: Yes. Page 129, paragraph 2, second sentence. "a can deduce it[that the constitution] from the general principle, which is the immediate unity of the substantial spirit and the individual. But this is equivalent to the spirit of the family, which is here extended over the most populous of countries.
The element of subjectivity, that is to say, the reflection upon itself of the indi vidual will in antithesis to the substantial (as the power in which it is absorbed) or the recognition of this power as one with its own essential being, in which it knows itself free, is not found on this grade of development.

Strauss: "Not yet found."

Reader: "The universal will displays its activity immediately through that of the individual: the latter has no self-cognizance at all in antithesis to substanti positive being, which it does not yet regard as a power standing over against it--as, e.g., in Judaism, the 'Jealous God' is known as the negation of the individual. In China, the universal will immediately commands what the individual is to do, and the latter complies and obeys with proportionate renunciation of reflection and personal independence."

Strauss: You know, there is no consciousness of conflict, of sin as a fundamental fact; these are simple commands and they are obeyed as a matter of course. And if a rare instance it would not be obeyed, then that would be taken care of, but there is no fundamental problem there. Yes.

Reader. "If he does not obey, if he thus virtually separates himself from the substance of his being, inasmuch as this separation is not mediated by a retreat within a personality of his own, the punishment he undergoes does not affect his subjective and internal, but simply his outward existence. The element of subjecti vity is therefore as much wanting to this political totality as the latter is on it side altogether destitute of a foundation in the moral disposition of the subject. For the substance is simply an individual--the emperor--whose law constitutes all disposition. Nevertheless, this ignoring of inclination does not imply caprice, which would itself indicate inclination--that is, subjectivity and mobility. Here we have the one being of the state supremely dominant--the substance, which, still hard and inflexibl-, resembles nothing but itself--includes no other element."

Strauss: Yes. Well, "inclination" is a translation for the German word Gesinnung which is a very bad translation, an impossible translation; but on the other hand, I wouldn't know how to translate it properly, Gesinnung. Mr. _____?
Well, let us say "an inner sense, a thing pointing in the right direction," not merely inclination. Yes.

Student: The other translation that he uses in most places is "disposition," and in the sense, I mean in the etymological sense...

Strauss: How do they translate it when Weber speaks of the two kinds of ethic the ethic of responsibility and the other ethic, of intent. What did he say?

Reader: He called it inclination.

Strauss: Well, "intention" would be better, surely better than "inclination."

Reader. We have an American colloquialism that might come close: "I am of a mind to do something."

Student: Disposition.

Strauss: ...and also in the direct sense, a bit more. Yes.

Student: In this stage, what is the basis of custom, which has a very great role. But what can be the substantial basis of custom?

Strauss: It is...well, you grow into custom, I mean, the state is like that of children, all are children, and there is one father--the emperor--and this is to a considerable extent reasonable in China, but it is not, it is only substantial, substantive freedom, substantive rationality, but not subjective. I mean, it is not understood in its reasonableness. They are handed down and accepted as if by children. Mr. ___?

Student: But there seems to be the indication in this first passage that somehow the emperor, being the one parent among all his children, somehow rises to a different level. But that would be more or less impossible, wouldn't it?

Strauss: No, he does, but this is exactly the point, that only he--and this is what Hegel means by despotism. Despotism is a state in which only one man is free. And this is, of course, then for that very reason a defective freedom, even for that

Student: Later on he seems to give the impression that the emperor is so much controlled by the traditions represented by his father, that in a way he is as much of a child as all the others.

Strauss: Yes. Because from Hegel's point of view, one cannot be fully free if not all are. Let us see some examples that may make this a little bit clearer. On page 123, second paragraph, where he says that the paternal care of the emperor and the spirit of his subjects as children don't leave the moral level of the fami

Reader. Middle of the second paragraph, page 123. "This paternal care on the part of the emperor, and the spirit of his subjects--who like children do not advance beyond the ethical principle of the family circle, and can gain for themselves no independent and civil freedom--makes the whole an empire, administration and social code, which is at the same time moral and thoroughly prosaic--that is, a product of the understanding without free reason and imagination."

Strauss: So here Hegel explains what he understands by "prosaic," I mean, reasonable, without free reason and fancy or imagination. In other words, calculated out plausibly. That is what he means by that: in this sense rational, but with no freedom of the imagination, only unpoetic. In the sequel he makes clear why he disapproves of the admiration for China which was very common in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. You know the Europeans were quite impressed by the reasonableness and the emperor who is plowing the field once a year. Compare this with Louis XIV, who would never have done that, and so on. And Hegel makes it quite clear why he disapproves of it. What is the reason? What is the fundamental reason why Hegel disapproves, regards the Chinese order as lower than the European? There is equality, this is what impressed some, especially of but no freedom. In other words, everything is run by administration. People are fully wisely administered, justly administered, but administered. And that is the fundamental defect. The paternalism. And he develops this thema by giving a considerable variety of examples--let me see where this is--and he explains how everything does actually on the character and the assiduity of the individual emperor. There is life to speak of in that state. It all depends on the man at the top. Let us

see as another example, I do not know where, it should be on page 128 or 129: the punishment is mostly corporeal.

Reader. Paragraph 2 page 128. "A third point is that punishment is general chastisement. Among us this would be an insult to honor; not so in China, where the feeling of honor has not yet developed itself. A dose of cudgelling is the most easily forgotten; yet it is the severest punishment for a man of honor, who desires not to be esteemed physically assailable, but who is vulnerable in directions imply a more refined sensibility. But the Chinese do not recognize a subjectivity in honor; they are the subjects rather of corrective than retributive punishment, as are children among us, for corrective punishment aims at improvement, that which is retributive implies veritable imputation of guilt.

Strauss: Perhaps one should translate this word by "discipline." "They are subject to discipline rather than to punishment, as the children with us." It is not strictly speaking punishment if the child is spanked, but he is simply brought back into the realm of proper conduct. No sense of honor, in the Western sense of the word, which is of course something important: honor has no meaning—
But there is a story told about Themistocles before the battle of Salamis in the council of war, and the Spartan commander got very angry at a proposal of Themistocles and he hit him with a whip, and then Themistocles said, "Whip me, but listen to me." And a modern officer, a modern Western officer, especially of the last century, would never of course tolerate, be able to say, "You may whip me, but only listen to me." This complete indifference to personal honor which Themistocles had, strictly objective (in German, sachlich), forgetting about this nonsense and let us go on with our business—this, in other words, this concept of honor is somehow a heritage of the Puritan tradition, and which we cannot suppose to be present in other cultures. I mean, I have no notion of whether this is—correct, whether Hegel is entirely correct, but the fact is probably true that bodily punishment played a greater role in China, also of course applied to the highest officials in the state. You know, bodily punishment was also very important in the West; but it was not applied to the nobility or the highest class of society.

Student: But later on he says that the Chinese were very sensitive about insult and I, and this is not a very revengeful...

Strauss: But these are of course, these are strictly private things, ja?

Student. Doesn't offend one's sense of honor to be insulted?

Strauss: Not quite, that one regards one's body as something sacred, as it were, so that its being spanked—25 was the common number—times, would be an insult to the dignity of man is one thing; but to be sensitive to human relations is entirely different. You know, people are sensitive to insults, and so that has nothing in itself to do with the dignity of man, but with their own dignity, with their own ego. Whereas, what Hegel has in mind is the sense that corporeal punishment is incompatible with the dignity of man. That is an entirely different propositition. Do you not see that? The more ego, and it is not I who am insulted if I am publicly spanked by some executioner, but the dignity of man is insulted. Does it not make great difference? Because in the case of a punishment, it is understood that a court of law has found me guilty of a crime, for which I am punishable with spanking. That is wholly outside of the sphere of personal sensitivity, which may come in accidently but which is unimportant.

Student: We use the term 'a sense of honor' to cover both.

Strauss. Yes, sure. Therefore, one must distinguish. In other words, is his sensitivity the same as sense of honor. There is some objectivity involved. I mean this sense of humiliation we frequently have if we have been deservedly humiliated, I mean, told some unpleasant truth, is something very different from where it is... this sensitivity is something fundamentally different from the sense of the dignity of man, where you do not think primarily of yourself, but of some fundamental impropriety. Let me see. Here on page 130, line 3 from the bottom.

Reader: In China, however, the distinction between slavery and freedom is necessarily not great, since all are equal before the emperor; that is, all are alike degraded, as no honor exists and no one has an individual right in respect of others. The consciousness of debasement predominates, and this easily passes into that of utter abandonment. With this abandonment...

Strauss: Reprobation.

Reader: "...with this reprobation is connected the great immorality of the Chinese."

Strauss: And so on. Ja. And here we would have to go into the background of the facts and therefore whether Hegel's judgment was correct. Now next time we will continue the discussion of China, and then go over to India. Is there any point you would like to raise now? Yes?

Student: I was wondering what difference between obedience and substantial being, which is confined by traditions and customs, and respect for law, which is viewed as above and indifferent?

Strauss: Yes. Well, in the case of obedience, I mean, or as Hegel calls it, substantial freedom, and subjective freedom. In the case of substantial freedom you simply bow to customs, to the customary law, and comply with it. In the case of subjective freedom, you know that if the laws are not reasonable, they cannot command respect, except that you externally comply with them, because you know the breach of the law is always unwise, or almost always unwise; but that you know you can demand from the laws to which you are subject that they are reasonable. In other words, the principle of criticism of the law to which you are subject is admitted in the second case and not admitted in the first case. Is this clear enough?

Student: Yes, but there are so many [illegible] in China and which have been mentioned by Hegel...

Strauss: Yes.

Student:...which constantly demonstrates to the emperor that such and such a law or ordinance is not good and therefore advises him to change it.

Strauss: Yes, but the question arises, would this apply to the fundamental laws or would this apply to something of the character of ordinances and so on? That would be the question. Because from Hegel's point of view, it would never—such things I mean, the mere presence of something like slavery or serfdom would already show that a large part of the population is by law excluded from having any claim to reason. I'm sure that Hegel has done injustice to China because, and that was the reason why I referred to the seventeenth and eighteenth century, the repeated admiration of China. The key point is this: paternalism. Paternalism is the....
in other words, a rational government, wise and just, is fundamentally wrong if there is not freedom, political freedom, there in the first place. This is, without this

very powerful approach in the literature of the eighteenth century, Voltaire and other people, Hegel's statement is not imperishable. Yes...and aren't you Chinese, may I ask?

Student: Yes.

Strauss: I see. Yes. I of course have no responsibility for what Hegel says.

Student: Of course. Hegel has relied on secondary...

Strauss: Yes, surely, naturally, entirely, sure. Ja. Well, it's very good you brought that up.

Strauss: Yes, well, I think we must take up this question, which came up a l' bit last time, towards the end of the meeting. You spoke of the harsh judgment of Hegel on China and India. Now let us first get rid of one possibility of any sensitivities which anyone must have. I mean I am not thinking only of our Chinese friend, but almost—I mean, all among you who don't happen to be Protestants will be hurt sooner or later. I mean, I happen to be a Jew, and we are treated not very muc better than the Chinese or Hindus and of course Catholicism as Christianity is treat much better but not altogether very unsatisfactory. Now the question is—we must face that, and stated in the case of Hegel, I suppose no one would assume for one moment that this was simply a prejudice of the German of the early nineteer century—I mean, that is a hopeless way of handling this question. Now, I mean, what—but still disregarding all sensitivities which anyone of us might have, when h is speaking—no one today would write in this manner about China and India. Why? W. Let us start from there. Why is this now regarded as somehow fundamentally wrong t write in this manner, to look at foreign cultures in this manner? Yes.

Student: I can suggest there are probably several reasons, one of course bei the relativity of cultures, this idea that cultures ought not to be judged in harsh terms, or especially good terms either for that matter.

Strauss: Yes, but is this not the consequence of a deeper view than relativism In other words, is relativism not the consequence rather than the predecessor? I mean, yes?

Student: Do you understand these cultures as they understand themselves.

Strauss: Yes, but, sure that is true. If you write a review of a book, you have a harsh or a very favorable judgment—first you must have understood the book. Ja, that goes without saying.

Student: But that's all you can do.

Strauss: You cannot judge. In other words you cannot judge. Yes, this if of course not necessarily the mark of wisdom, so you cannot blame Heg for having believed that it is possible to judge. The only question would be whether his standards of judgment are sufficient. Did you want to say something, Mr. R.?

R: Well, nothing big, but it seems to me that the only solid ground is a rath shallow ground, and that it, say in the case of China, we have discovered that Sung paintings and a few things from the T'ang are very good, and this corrects the but not much more can be said.

Strauss: Hegel knew that, as we shall see, knew it in a way, yes, he knew abo mountains and what—you know this beautiful landscape, he knew of that, but what.. if we try to state Hegel's standard of judgment without any abbreviation, indicatio Hegel judges all these worlds, as he calls them, with a view to two things, which a highly regarded even today by many people in the West and also by many people in t East. The one let us call science, because what—that he means something differen from science by his philosophy, that goes without saying, but there is something fu damentally in common with science; and the other let us call it political liberty. Now if he looks at China or India or ancient Judea, he would say, Is there science political liberty? NO? Then they are fundamentally defective. That they are h than, say, Africa, that he of course admits without reservation; but his concern w science and political freedom is paramount; and therefore he says if people produc beautiful paintings, for example, in China, that doesn't come into comparison with

these essential things. This is, I think, what he means, and I believe that for th. among us who have, are concerned with science and with political freedom cannot blm him on this ground. Where then, in other words, this is not an arbitrary standard. Now where does the blame come in, in which way? Well, I suppose if you replace Hegel's science, this all-comprehensive thing,, by present-day science, which has a much narrower scope, then certain human needs are not satisfied by science, which must be satisfied elsewhere, in other ways; and from this point of view, perhaps Chi- perhaps Zen Buddhism, perhaps India--you know Zen Buddhism has great attractions to- as I have heard--so, in other words, what has happened since Hegel is a profound change in the West, by virtue of which the Western standards or the western values, as some people say, have lost this manifest evidence and superiority which they had in the past. And I am not speaking now of political freedom because this, I think, has not fundamentally changed or, but in the other respect. Yes?

Student: I was going to say that political freedom falls a little differently on our ear.

Strauss: You mean what Hegel regarded as political freedom would be regarded as absence of freedom.

R: Yes, I think in the vulgar ear, and our ears have been vulgarized by the change in freedom as much as the change in science, people think now that freedom is liberty to stretch the itch and to ride around in a Cadillac, whereas Hegel has a definition of freedom that makes John Knox sound like a softy: that to will the law to yourself--but the will is the wrong idea of morality.

Strauss: Yes, let me say a word about the first thing you said, which is of course very helpful. If we take the most undesirable characteristics of Western civilization--I think in French they call it Coca-cola,--then of course compared wi that, I think some aspects of central African cannibalism could be considered highe I mean, I make that point. Now surely this is part of the story, now a certain dec of the West has taken place which compels us, not only persuades us but compels us, to have a much greater respect of what many peoples in the past have produced, even if that does not live up to what is highest in the Western tradition. Surely that is one important point. but still you must not forget the survival of certain thin in Hegel, in the notions of the underdeveloped countries, which means of course the are less developed, less developed--and people think then chiefly of the industry a so on--that doesn't contradict at all Hegel's notions: industry must require scien. and so on. If people believe that by replacing "underdeveloped" by "emergent," they have changed the situation radically, I think they are mistaken; because an emerging nation is not an actual nation. There is in this sense a becoming, a defe a simple defectiveness; just as a colt is not a horse proper, an emerging nation is not a nation proper. So. This will not help. Let me see, you were quite right in repeating again that for Hegel the religion and not the political things, and still less the economic things, are the fundamental ones. There is no question about the We must take this up somewhat later. Chinese history is not true history, Hegel sa

Student: He doesn't really say that.

Strauss: I'm sorry, you said "is not true history, we may suppose." Why are you so hesitant, only to suppose and not to say definitely?

Student: No, I said I thought we could infer it, but it is still too weak...

Strauss: You read also the preceding parts of the Philosophy of History?

Well, how does the work begin?

Student. It begins with a discourse on the three kinds of history. The beginni of the Introduction, you mean?

Strauss: The whole book.

Student. It begins with a discourse on three kinds of history.

Strauss: exactly. And is there, I mean, does this not imply his judgment on Chinese history?

Student: Yes, it does.

Strauss: I mean, this would be a kind of chronicles, I mean not on the level of Thucydides or a Caesar. Sure. So that would seem to settle that. Good. So, well, generally speaking one must say that the change toward the Eastern cultures is a consequence of the self-criticism of the West-ja? is it not true?--to the extent to which the West had its old certainty of being on the right track, to that extent it is superior. In order to explain at least to some extent what Hegel means by the element lacking in the East, generally speaking, I mean, and Hegel uses very sophisticated and sometimes obtuse expressions. One can use a very simple expression which occurs, for example, in Aristotle, and which is in a way the beginning of freedom in the full--inner freedom in this sense. In all these old cultures, and of course in much simpler ones, there is an equation which is not necessarily explicitly made, because it is a matter of course, namely, of the good with the ancestral--the good old times, as people say today and--the good with the ancestral; and freedom begins freedom of the mind begins the moment this equation is questioned. And I think what Hegel implies is that according to the best of his knowledge no such questioning existed or was possible in China and India. It surely took place, I mean we have evidence for that, it took place in Greece; and therefore from this point of view, Greece plays a very great role; and Hegel tries to show how this is connected, how the emergence of this kind of thinking is connected with the Greek religion, with the way in which the Greeks understood their gods. So, is there any other general point you wanted to discuss? Mr. ____?

Student: In answer to the general question of the bad taste of Hegel's judgment today....

Strauss: That is, I mean we must--let us put it this way: the same fairness to which China and India have claim., Hegel too has claim. Ja? Good.

Student: I wondered if this isn't almost built in in Hegel's method itself: that by saying that spirit is something individual and a property of the individual and that history is a development of spirit, ultimately the development of the individual, doesn't that in effect render all racial and national characteristics as characteristics of a human being as more or less accidental?

Strauss: Ja, in one sense yes, we become--we come to the place later when he speaks of the modern state. According to Hegel's view, the modern state, the reasonable state, necessarily emerged in Protestant countries. But, and only Protestantism is in fundamental harmony with it--but, and Catholicism, to say nothing of Judaism, is. But Hegel did not draw the inference, hence Catholics and Jews can never be members a reasonable state. I mean, that would be the consequence which you would seem to imply. The Chinese for no reason, from Hegel's point of view, precisely because no

was not a racialist in any sense, there is no reason whatever why Chinese or Hindus could not become members of the rational state. But they have to cease to be Chinese or Hindus, in spirit, not race; as long as they believe in the--Chinese believe in their emperor and the Hindus believe in their caste system, they are wholly unfit for becoming members of a reasonable state. But this is what Mao would be the first to admit that. You know, that is clear, but. . . This is where there is no difference between Marx and Hegel.
At most what Hegel would say is that geographical conditions give a slight edge to the development of this way of thinking rather than to another--the racial conditions might do, ultimately uninteresting. There is nothing interesting here. Good. How little Hegel had to do with racialism was stated very clearly by a famous constitutional lawyer in Germany who became a Nazi himself for secondary reasons, deplorable reasons, when he said, In the moment Hitler came to power (I think it was the 31st of January, 1933) on this day Hegel died. Up to this point Hegel, modified of course, was still the teacher of politics in Germany and, but this was something incompatible. And this is simply a stupid statement to say that, based on vague notions of authoritarianism--of course Hegel was in favor of authority, but of course quite a few people are.

Student. What I meant to suggest was that for a nation or for a person who is himself racist, let us say, in order to try to improve, let us say, some backward country, then since that person's culture is regarded as more or less accidental to--I mean, this is not any morally relevant consideration, then any improvement of the country would have to take place along individual lines. The culture to which he belongs no longer becomes an object of something he's got to change, something he's got to alter. We don't improve country X by having them get rid of their culture. There seems to be something contradictory....

Strauss. Yes, sure. There is a great difficulty in that and a lot of hypocrisy. But apart from all of these things, how--I mean, if you abolish or make the Hindus abolish the caste system, don't you interfere with their culture? You can't help it. I mean, in all these cases that takes place; if we take the simpler case, that of what the Communists do, they of course also are in a way in favor of cultural pluralism as it is called; but it means that you say and think exactly the same things in various languages. You know, all these various central African languages which they have transformed into written languages, and you can also have all sorts of pottery and folk dances as you like, but the interesting things, the important things, are of course abolished. I mean, you cannot have progress and at the same time preservation of the old cultures; the old cultures become the victims of the progress, more or less. The case is somewhat different in the countries where the progress is at home originally, where the progress stems from--that is somewhat different. But in the other cases, there is no doubt that this is, that these cultures are sacrificed, in one way or another. I mean, if that takes place, what I think on the occasion of the baptism of Clodwig, king of the Franks, the bishop baptizing him said, "Burn what you have worshipped (your evil idols) and worship what you have burned (the cross). In other words, there is no simple, such a radical change is not possible without discontinuities. This cannot take place without discontinuities and so on; and the people, perhaps for some reasons of tactics underplay that element, that is a purely technical question in fact radical change takes place. I mean, think of such a simple thing--an old tribal organization based on slavery. You abolish slavery. You in a way destroy that culture, you modify it truly very radically. Yes?

Student: What I was going to say is it possible to interpret progress in a very narrow and limited way, purely technological, and save the essential things; but

apparently these are so bound up with what prevents technological....

Strauss: I believe there is a certain truth of Marxism comes in: if people produce and distribute in a radically different way, this is bound to have consequenc and unexpected consequences. That I believe is true. Now let us begin and turn to page 131 in the translation. He is speaking about the religious side of the Chines state.

Reader: "We come, then, to the consideration of the religious side of the Chinese polity. In the patriarchal condition the religious exaltation of man has not a human reference--simple morality and right-doing."

Strauss: No, simple Moralität, in German. In other words, there is no particu religious fervor in it. Religion, I mean the sentiment going with it is limited to o ordinary honesty and decency. Yes?

Reader: "The Absolute itself is regarded partly as the abstract, simple rule of this right-doing--eternal rectitude--partly as the power which is its sanction. Except in these simple aspects, all the relations of the natural world, the postulat of subjectivity--of heart and soul--are entirely ignored."

Strauss: Ja, and this is somewhat later in this paragraph: "In China, the ind vidual has no aspect of this independence; he is therefore dependent also in religio And namely, dependent namely on natural things, of which the highest is heaven." Ja. Now what does this.... He speaks here first that in the Chinese world, relation the natural world are ignored in the passage we have read; and yet the importance heaven. But, so there seems to be a flat contradiction, ja? How is this solved? A bit later--"that heaven"--ja?--"That heaven in the sense of our God."

Reader: " This heaven might be taken in the sense of our term 'God,' as the Lord of Nature (we say, for example, 'Heaven protect us!')..."

Strauss: And not meaning heaven. But go on. Yes?

Reader: "...but such a relation is beyond the scope of Chinese thought, for h the one isolated self-consciousness is substantial being, the Emperor himself, the supreme power. Heaven has therefore no higher meaning than nature."

Strauss: Not nature, "the law of nature." But this doesn't solve our questic does it, that the Chinese ignore the relation to the natural world? And yet they, heaven, i.e. nature, is so important to them. How does it...read on.

Reader: "The Jesuits indeed yielded to Chinese notions so far as to call the Christian God 'Heaven' (Tien); but they were on that account accused to the Pope by Christian orders. The Pope consequently sent a cardinal to China, who died there. bishop who was subsequently despatched, enacted that instead of 'Heaven,' the term 'Lord of Heaven' should be adopted. The relation to Tien is supposed to be such, th the good conduct of individuals and of the Emperor brings blessing: their transgressa on the other hand cause want and evil of all kinds."

Strauss: Now we come to that later to the point. Ja?

Reader: "The Chinese religion involves that primitive element of magical infl ence over nature, inasmuch as human conduct absolutely determines the course of ever

If the Emperor behaves well, prosperity cannot but ensue; Heaven must ordain prosper

Strauss: And so on. And then a little bit later he says, "Hence the emperor becomes the true legislator for heaven," i.e., nature does not have that independen which it must have in order to be nature. And there is something in common with sor cery, i.e. with the African principle, as he has it here. So this is the solution c the difficulty. Formerly I had a student who--a Westerner--who was a student of Chinese things, and I pumped him at that time about matters Chinese, and especially regarding the question of whether there is a Chinese word, or rather symbol, for nature. I forgot entirely what I had learned on that occasion. Is there a Chinese symbol which can properly be read, be translated, 'nature?'

Student: ...very often, but the translation must have been in existence afte the seventeenth century.

Strauss: I.e., after Europeans had already come there.

Student: Yes. ....translated as....but this is new.

Strauss: I see; and not in the old texts? No, this is, in other words, by the way a minor criticism of Hegel himself, that Hegel doesn't hesitate to ascribe to the Chinese a notion of nature--Heaven is nature--and without having answered t question, Did the Chinese have any notion of nature? Or to state it still more crudely, is there any Chinese word or symbol for nature? And one can perhaps say, also, what Hegel has in mind is that this freedom, the freedom of the mind, devel ment of subjectivity, or whatever you , is connected with the emergence of concept of nature. That would be, I think, somewhat more exact, historically exac than Hegel's own statements, but I think in line with what he intends. Now, previ ly I had said the key point is the distinction between the ancestral and the good. i.e., the ancestral is not for this reason the good. A fantastic thought. I mean are so accustomed to it; but if we study older things, we see immediately that thi was the greatest change. Now how is this connected with nature, this distinction between the ancestral and the good and the emergence of nature? Mr. B.?

Student: What is natural can be opposed to what is ancestral

Strauss: So what is good, that is, what is good by nature, and the ancestra is that which is good by tradition. So in other words, the two things truly belong together. At the end of the paragraph, bottom, on page 133, he gives a further example of that.

Reader: "In the Y-King certain lines are given which supply fundamental forms and categories--on account of which this book is called the Book of Fates A certain meaning is ascribed to the combination of such lines, and prophetic announcements are deduced from this groundwork. Or a number of little sticks are th into the air, and the fate in question is prognosticated from the way in which the fall. What we regard as chance, as natural connection, the Chinese seek to deduce or attain by magical arts; and in this particular also, their want of spiritual religion is manifested."

Strauss: Yes, you see, in other words what we spoke before about magic, and especially in the section on Africa, this is still of great importance within China, and that is the reason why he mentions it here directly. Now then, he spea on page 134 about the absence of genuine science. Now, science does not mean that there is a doctrine or law available, handed down from generation to generation;

science requires the development of free subjectivity; i.e., that you are, that th next generation is able to question what is handed down by the preceeding generati If this is absent, science proper is absent; although there may be a law that's a very valuable law, or as he states it on page 135, bottom:

Reader: "As to the sciences themselves, History among the Chinese comprehens the bare and definite facts, without any opinion or reasoning upon them."

Strauss: Now, well, "any judgment or reasoning." In other words, at most, chronicles. Yes?

Reader: "In the same way, their Jurisprudence gives only fixed laws, and their Ethics only determinate duties, without raising the question of a subjective foundation for them."

Strauss: Ja, "without being concerned with an innere Begründung, without finding a reason, reasons, within this particular duty, why it should be a duty, or this law, why it should be a law. The absence of questioning and of doubt, th absolute preponderance of tradition is crucial here. On page 137, line 10 from bottom, I believe it is.

Reader: "The Chinese have as a general characteristic, a remarkable skill imitation, which is exercised not merely in daily life, but also in art. They hav not yet succeeded in representing the beautiful as beautiful; for in their paintin perspective and shadow are wanting. And although a Chinese painter copies Eur pictures (as the Chinese do everything else) correctly; although he observes acc ly how many scales a carp has; how many indentations there are in the leaves of a tree; what is the form of various trees, and how the branches bend--the Exalted, the Ideal and Beautiful is not the domain of his art and skill. The Chinese are, on the other hand, too proud to learn anything from Europeans, although they must often recognize their superiority."

Strauss: This sounds very strange at the end. Originally when the West emerged in Greece, one could say that of the Greeks was that they are willing to learn from everyone, and the barbarians are those who refuse to learn from anyon And Hegel seems to fall into the same defect of which he accuses the Chinese. B here the point to which the lady referred in her paper, the great beauty of Chin paintings and you also , Hegel seems to be simply unfair. But he takes up this question later on, on page 158 in the center. We should re

Reader: "But we must reflect that in nations utterly corrupt..."

Strauss: No, it must be before.

Reader: Where it goes into Chinese poetry?

Strauss: No, where he said before that all Englishmen agree to that.

Reader: "Thus the moral condition of the Hindus (as already observed) sh most abandoned. In this all Englishmen agree. Our judgment of the morality Hindus is apt to be warped by representations of their mildness, tenderness, beautiful and sentimental fancy. But we must reflect that in nations utterly c there are sides of character which may be called tender and noble. We have Sui poems in which the tenderest relations of love are depicted; in which delineations deep emotion, humility, modesty, propriety are to be found; and which may be co with the best that European literature contains."

Strauss: In other words, he knows that. Yes?

Reader: "The same characteristics meet us in many Hindu poems; but rectitude, morality..."

Strauss: No, Sittlichkait, he says. Rectitude is too immoral. Read the next versa.

Reader: "...freedom of soul, consciousness of individual right..."

Strauss: "Of one's own right," i.e., of one's own dignity as a human being, w therefore leads to a recognition of the same dignity in every other human being, are wholly separate. In other words, he doesn't deny that there are very fine and gr things in China and India, but ye says somehow the soul is missing, the core is missing: awareness of the rights of man is missing, and Hegel must be judged on this ground and on no lesser ground. Yes. Now let us, we come now to the section on India, and we might perhaps begin at the beginning, page 139.

Reader: "India, like China, is a phenomenon antique as well as modern: one which has remained stationary and fixed, and has received a most perfect home-spun development."

Strauss: Did he say, "like China" in the translation?

Reader: Yes.

Strauss: I'm sorry. Yes.

Reader: "It has always been the land of imaginative aspiration, and appears to us still as a fairy region, an enchanted world. In contrast with the Chinese state, which presents only the most prosaic understanding, India is the region of fantasy and sensibility."

Strauss: So, in other words, Hegel starts here from the first impressions as a European would get them when confronted with them, either as a traveller or as reading the literature--or in translation of course. And this implies that India is higher than China, because the prosaic understanding is lower than fancy and sentiment. Yes?

Reader: "The point of advance in principle which it exhibits to us may be generally stated as follows: In China, the patriarchal principle rules a people in a condition of nonage, the part of whose moral resolution is occupied by the regulation, law, and the moral oversight of the Emperor."

Strauss: Hence there is no difference in China, according to Hegel, between a breach of the moral law, as we would call it, and the breach of a rule of etiquette because there is no inner principle of distinction: just it is the custom and you have to act with propriety. What is the substance of these things, it doesn't make any difference. Needless to say, there exists of course also in the West, but it is not you know that some people regard a false move at table as perhaps worse than a crime But still that is not of course the considered view of the West, but to be found amo some snobs, however. Yes.

Reader: "Now it is the interest of Spirit that external conditions should become internal ones:"

Strauss: Je, not conditions, "externally posed determinations" like what custom prescribes regarding parents and children, regarding guests at dinner tab and so on. Yes?

Reader: "...that the natural and the spiritual world should be recognized the subjective aspect belonging to intelligence; by which process the unity of subjectivity and positive being generally--or the idealism of existence--is established."

Strauss: In simple language, that we understand why we act in the manner we do and not merely because it is equally prescribed by custom or tradition; or i it is not, in the case of truly irrelevant external rules of politeness, why shou you take off your hat or put it on, this kind of thing, that we know that is indifferent, but one has to as a nice person comply with custom in different matters, which of course means not being late, this kind of thing. Yes?

Reader: "This idealism, then, is found in India, but only as an idealism o imagination, without distinct conceptions--one which does indeed free existence fr beginning and matter, but changes everything into the merely imaginative; for although the latter appears interwoven with definite conceptions..."

Strauss: "With concepts" in other words, not merely imaginary. Yes?

Reader: "...and thought presents itself as an occasional concomitant, this happens only through accidental combination."

Strauss: Yes. and somewhat later on, page 140 toward the end of the paragraph, he makes the point, one must--I mean, there are wonderfully beautiful th in India; but they cease to be so beautiful, in the moment we approach them from point of view of the worthiness or dignity of man and of freedom--i.e., if we are simply captivated by beauty, but keep a cool head and think of the most important things. This is always to be understood. This he makes clear on page 141 in the first paragraph, 12 lines from the end.

Reader: "In this universal deification..."?

Strauss: Yes.

Reader: "...of all finite existence, and consequent degradation of the Di the idea of theanthropy, the incarnation of God, is not a particularly important ception. The parrot, the cow, the ape, etc.. are likewise incarnations of God, T are not therefore elevated above their nature."

Strauss: Ja. Now in other words, this is what he calls this Hindu panthe God is in everything and, but not in a fanciful manner; and therefore no, as it w is incarnated in any kind of being and not particularly in man. Therefore, no awareness of the dignity of man with all these consequences. On page 142, line 7 from bottom.

Reader: "The English, or rather the East India Company, are the lords of land; for it is the necessary fate of Asiatic empires to be subjected to European and China will some day or other be obliged to submit to this fate."

Strauss: Ja. Now that's interesting, isn't it? Now does Hegel not hel what he knows to do when we prophesy and in addition prophesy wrongly? How would Hegel, if he could be resuscitated, defend this statement? Mr. S.?

Student: Well, he would say that the only way that China avoided being taken over by a Western nation was to adopt the Western principles.

Strauss: Ja, that is true.

Student: But whether that is a sufficient argument really depends on the extent to which Chinese Marxism is just simply Marxism and the extent to which it is something Chinese or the extent to which it requires....

Strauss: Yes, but I think probably Hegel would accept the first--you know--point, still.

Reader: Not only does China exist only because she's taken on a Western character, but if it were not for the impasse between the two great European powers (because America is part of Europe) on its account, China could be put in her place very quickly.

Strauss: That is a question; I mean, that is a question. I mean, let us assume that the situation is somewhat different, as this country wouldn't have any interest in putting down China together with Soviet Russia. I mean, there is a simple axiom of foreign politics: the neighbor of your neighbor is my friend--ja?--because the neighbor is likely to be an enemy of that country. Ja? Just like De Gaulle's parleying: France, Germany, and to the east of Germany there is Russia, so and examples from history. So that would--let us not prophesy, engage in prophecie more in his defense than Hegel. So one could also say Hegel, when he admits he doe prophesy regarding the unessential accidents which cannot possibly be predicted, bu could. Yes?

Student: A general question about the difference between India and China. Hegel told us that the development of the Oriental world were roughly concomitant.

Strauss: Pardon?

Student: ...temporally placed together in time, that they all started arour 2300 and they took place roughly in the same span of years. I was just wondering how it's possible to look at various things that took place at the same time, and say one represents the progress of the other and that Spirit moves from one to the other.

Strauss: You know,he does not mean that the Indian spirit came into being through transformation of the Chinese spirit. He doesn't say that; he doesn't mean

Student: Not that Indians as opposed to Chinese, but that...

Strauss: No, looking at these two spirits--ja?--looking at these two spirit the Chinese and Hindu, Hegel finds that the Hindu spirit is superior to the Chinese spirit. I mean, in this sense later, whether that is chronologically later is not terribly important. But it is characteristic of both that indeed, that they are v very old, you know, compared with any Western figure. Mr. S.?

Student: In the comparison of the four Oriental civilizations, he says tha India and China are in a certain sense eternal, presumably because of the natures their spirits.

Strauss: No inter...in the jargon of our time, no dynamism.

Student: Yes, and this was contrasted with Persia and with Egypt, which pass away in time. Well, now he seems to be saying that the survival of India and C is just sort of accidental, but that the Chinese principle as principle can and wil in fact be destroyed, and the same with the Indian principle.

Strauss: Ja, but still that they survived so long until the West was able to assert its military superiority against them, whereas the West came much too late in the case of Persia and Egypt, is nevertheless true.

Student: Well, does he mean then that these spirits that survived were themselves eternal and that the nations passed out of existence or will pass out of existence only because of some foreign power, or does he mean that somehow...?

Strauss: No, look, to begin with, one could say that it is mere accident, bu Hegel believes there is more to that, that in different ways and for somewhat differ reasons, the Chinese order could last forever and ever--until Europe had changed and therefore able to conquer. But Rome couldn't because this kind of changes which too place in Rome, say, the altercation between the patricians and the plebeians is different from the taking over of India by Marchus and many others. Hegel pointed out because they were all absorbed by China (do you remember that?) they are absorbed, so that there was no change in the spirit of China, whereas the spirit of Rome, say, between early Rome and Rome of the first century, had changed very radically.

Student: And that raises, I think, a question because in the beginning of t Introduction he said something about the fact that a nation cannot die a violent death, you know, by invasion or simply someone taking over, unless it has already died a natural death--i.e., somehow a death of the spirit. Which somehow seems to contradicted by, you know, the tradition that China will be invaded and sort of die a violent death: the spirit somehow...

Strauss: Ja, but Hegel could say that this kind of eternity is, in a way, a kind of death, you know, the absence of change and so on. Yes. On page 144 in the second paragraph when he discusses the political life of the Hindus.

Reader: "With regard to the political life of the Indians, we must first consider the advance it presents in contrast with China. In China there prevailed an equality among all the individuals composing the Empire; consequently, all government was absorbed in its center, the Emperor, so that individual members could not attain to independence and subjective freedom. The next degree in advance..."

Strauss: You see this is the answer to your question, why India is more advanced than China or superior to China. Here they all are equally the children of the Emperor; that is not so in India. In India there is a certain independence on the part of the subjects, and he will explain that in the sequel. Yes?

Student: My idea is maybe we shouldn't take the idea of the spirit moving, a super spirit, more or less, moving through the various stages of history.

Strauss: No, that is true only from a certain moment on, from when we come t Western nations, that is to say to Greece, that there is such a movement. In other words, that Rome comes after Greece, Christianity comes after Rome, this is necessar An analysis of Christianity or an analysis of Rome would show that some this is post script--ja?--whereas (postscript historically) this is not meant in the literal historical sense. Yes?

Student: I wondered if in principle means the fact that one culture exists

at the same time that one superior to the other--in other words, further development of the spirit--would not suggest in principle the possibility that spirit only realiz could protect itself in an area where it did not have a historical development that germinatee in the past--in other words that history isn't absolutely in principle necessary to the realization of Spirit. It only happens to....

Strauss: Then history wouldn't be rational; if it only has happened to have happened. Where is necessity? But no, that Hegel would say that the coexistence of India and China imply no serious attempt on either side to conquer the other and is of the essence of China and India, whereas the subjugation, say, of the Medean and Assyrian Empires by Persia has to do something with the Persian principle which made it possible to conquer and to integrate and the same, of course, was also true of Greece and Rome. Yes. Where were we now? Continue please.

Reader: "The next degree in advance of this unity is difference, maintaining its independence against the all-subduing power of unity. An organic life requires in the first place one soul, and in the second place, a divergence into differences, which become organic members and in their several offices develop themselves to a complete system; in such a way, however, that their activity reconstitutes that one soul. This freedom of separation is wanting in..."

Strauss: "of particularization.."yes.

Reader: "...freedom of particularization is wanting in China. The deficien is that diversities cannot attain to independent existence. In this respect, the essential advance is made in India, viz: that independent members ramify from the unity of despotic power. Yet the distinctions which these imply are referred to Nat

Strauss: The "relapse into nature" would be a better translation.

Reader: "...relapse into nature. Instead of stimulating the activity of a soul as their center of union and spontaneously realizing that soul, as is the case in organic life, they petrify and become rigid and by their stereotyped character condemn the Indian people to the most degrading spiritual serfdom. The distinctions in question are the castes. In every rational state there are distinctions which ma manifest themselves. Individuals must arrive at subjective freedom and in doing so, give an objective form to these diversities. But Indian culture has not attained to a recognition of freedom and inward morality; the distinctions which prevail are only those of occupations and civil conditions."

Strauss: Ja, let us leave it here for the moment. Is the point, the fundamental point of the difference between China and India clear, as Hegel sees it? Articulation is necessary. There is no articulation in the mass of subjects, even o kindly treated subjects, of children, opposed to the single emperor. There must be an articulation within the people. Such articulation we find in India, but it is a very imperfect articulation, because articulation takes the form of castes. And caste means--what is wrong with the caste system from Hegel's point of view? Hegel makes a distinction later on between castes and estates. Either in the medieval sen or in the sense in which one could still speak in the nineteenth century of estates. not merely in the political but also in the social sense of the term. What is wrong with the caste system according to Hegel?

Student: The individual is absolutely fixed in the caste; there's no, except as an exception, there is no way one man can pass from one caste to another.

Strauss: Yes, and estate is not the best translation of the German word Stände. For example, a German would say "the estate" of a physician, of a lawyer, of an artisan or whatever it may be; where you would probably say "profession." In German it has a somewhat broader meaning. So of course if one is a physician or a lawyer that depends on his choice, at least formally. Whether you belong to this or that caste does not depend on your choice, but entirely on birth. Good. Now what about the medieval system, the system, they are not castes or estates, but were these estates not literally?

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: Ja, but that is not what Hegel regards as decisive. Yes?

Student: Well, it wasn't so much your being the son of the baron, but you had to be educated as a baron, to think, you had to play the part...

Strauss: That is not decisive, the simple difference.

Student: The fundamental humanity of all castes in medieval times.

Strauss: But what is the simple empirical proof of that?

Student: Religion?

Strauss: Ja, sure, the simple serf's son could enter a monastery and then, in other words, he could belong to the highest estate; whereas in India no one could become a Brahmin under any conditions. So this, and Hegel sees in this fact, in this freedom of entering the spiritual state the foreshadowing the modern freedom of choosing estate entirely. Yes?

Student: What about the objection raised in the paper about the subjective choice involved in the theory or idea of reincarnation?

Strauss: We come to that later, we come to that. That's a very important question. But first of all, regarding the estates, the articulation of a society, this is in a way anti-democratic because it means inequality. On page 145, line 17 from bottom, if you can count quickly.

(change tapes)

Strauss: ...all are equal before the law and such a distinction implies a certain inequality, and so on. How does Hegel answer that?

Reader: "But equality in civil life is something absolutely impossible for individual distinctions of sex and age will always assert themselves; and even if an equal share in the government is accorded to all citizens, women and children are immediately passed by, and remain excluded."

Strauss: Ja, that is to say, the objection regarding women has been happily disposed of in the meantime, even in France, and the children, that is I think a matter of the future. I remember that profound remark of General Eisenhower when he was President: if the man is old enough to carry arms, he is old enough to vote. Which is I think, doesn't go to the root of the question. Yes?

Student: A few years ago a study was done here in the Sociology Department

about the voting behavior of pre-schoolers.

Strauss: Of what?

Student: Of first and second-graders.

Strauss: Yes. I see. In other words, why not extend the voting age to infa and at the next stage, of rats. If rats can solve problems, as we have learned, and sometimes more difficult than that of voting, why not? Yes, sure. Yes, go on.

Reader: "The distinction between poverty and riches, the influence of skill and talent, can be as little ignored--utterly refuting those abstract assertions. But while this principle leads us to put up with variety of occupations, and distinction of the classes to which they are entrusted, we are not here in India by the peculiar circumstance that the individual belongs to such a class essentially by birth, and is bound to it for life. All the concrete vitality that makes its appearance sinks back into death."

Strauss: Yes, and in death he becomes fossilized. It has no...the sound principle that everyone should have the occupation for which he is fitted and which he likes is replaced by a blind assignment. This leads however to a difficulty which is taken up on page 147, where Hegel says, line 4, that these differences...

Reader: "But that these distinctions are here attributed to nature, is a necessary result of the idea which the East embodies. For while the individual ought properly to be empowered to choose his occupation, in the East, on the contrary, internal subjectivity is not yet recognised as independent; and if distinctions obtr themselves, their recognition is accompanied by the belief that the individual does not choose his particular position for himself, but receives it from nature."

Strauss: Ja, you see the connection between this defect and the absence of of man. Good. Now, but there is another difficulty in the sequel. In the sentence after the next, "Plato in his Republic..."

Reader: "Plato in his Republic, assigns the arrangement in different classe with a view to various occupations, to the choice of the governing body. Here, there fore, a moral, a spiritual power is the arbiter. In India, Nature is this governing power."

Strauss: Well, is there not something misleading in what Hegel says about Plato, and so I think a very characteristically misleading remark? What is the difference between Plato's system in the Republic and the Indian caste system?

Student: The Indian caste system has nothing to do with merit, objective me:

Strauss: Ja, but in Plato this is also not so quite clear. Mr. ___?

Student: He recognises the possibility that a golden child could be born t: bronze or parents.

Strauss: So, in other words, the individual...what Hegel does not say is that according to Plato the classes are distinguished according to nature, just as in India, but in a different way. The individuals are picked, wholly regardless of what their birth is, their parents are. Yes?

Student: (inaudible) fundamental distinction?

Strauss: No, I'm sorry, that Hegel is silent about Plato's reference to nature: this is, I think, quite characteristic. Yes?

Student: He is also seems to be silent about the fact that Plato is talking about that a man should do what he is best suited for in this life, and the Indian is to do the best you can and your next life will be better off, and there's no worry about the present life.

Strauss: Yes, in a way that is what he means when he says the highest is destruction or death in India. He says it on page 148 in the first paragraph. Now let us turn to, let us read this paragraph on page 142. "Each caste..."

Reader; "...has its especial duties and rights. Duties and rights, therefore are not recognized as pertaining to mankind generally, but as those of a particular caste. While we

Strauss: No, "to man as man." There are no rights and duties of man. There are none because they differ from class to class; there is nothing in common. T

Reader: "...but as those of a particular caste. While we say "Bravery is a virtue," the Hindus say, on the contrary, "Bravery is the virtue of the Kshatryas." Humanity generally, human duty and human feeling do not manifest themselves; we find only duties assigned to the several castes. Everything is petrified into these distinctions, and over this petrifaction a capricious destiny holds sway. Morality and human dignity are unknown; evil passions have their full swing; the Spirit wanders i. the dream-world, and the highest state is annihilation."

Strauss: "Destruction." What this means we will see in the sequel. Now at the beginning of the next paragraph, he says and this was most properly emphasized in the paper, the key to this whole Indian system, as well as to any other system, i religion. And while Hegel knows some of the, say, of economic factors we would say, which are of importance, he regards them not, he does not regard them as the key. The key is religion, and not the relations of production. Why...what is beyind that difference between Hegel and Marx? What is the Marxian argument, the simple Marxian argument, why the relations of production are the key? Yes?

Student: Well, man basically, first has to provide for his immediate needs, his physical needs, and in doing so, whatever relations, certain relations grow up immediately; they develop from the most basic needs and they structure everything el

Strauss: In other words, the most urgent is ultimately the key. And food is obviously more urgent for mere survival than any profound thoughts. Very good. And how is..how could one say Hegel explains that?

Student: Well, simply that man is determined by what he thinks as being not basic thing in the sense of the most urgent, but what one thinks about as the most important thing; and this gives you the key to the...

Strauss: So the highest. So in the one case, the most urgent; in the other, case, the highest. So one could say Marx primarily understands man as primarily a needy being--ja?--the bodily needs, and Hegel as the deferential man. This is the issue. And I think the details where Marx or Hegel give right or wrong interpretat in different cases are much less interesting because they can more easily be correct than this fundamental issue. This is indeed a crucial question. Now with what righ

can Hegel say the highest is destruction for the Hindu? Well, he makes this clear on page 148 in the translation, in the center of the second paragraph.

Reader: "The highest..."

Strauss: No, when he says "the abstract unity."

Reader: "Abstract unity with God is realized in this abstraction from humanity."

Strauss: What it literally is: "destruction is the disappearance, as it were of everything, " including even God, complete abnegation of oneself, and not love God with all their heart and all their soul, where the being of the individual is maintained, but the destruction. And then he gives a very vivid expression, and this was a question which was alluded to by some of you earlier regarding the caste system: the justification of the caste system. Now on page 149, toward the end of the first paragraph, when he speaks of Englishmen...

Reader: "present at an act of this kind, say that in half an hour the blood streamed forth from every part of the devotee's body; he was taken down and presently died. If this trial is also surmounted, the aspirant is finally buried alive, that i put into the ground in an upright position and quite covered over with soil; after three hours and three-quarters he is drawn out, and if he lives, he is supposed to have at last attained the spiritual power of a Brahmin."

Strauss: Now what is the point here, which he also makes clear on page 151, when he describes the day of the Brahmin. "The business of the Brahmins consists chiefly in the reading of the Vedas," ja? Page 151.

Reader: "He has also to read in the Vedas, in various ways: each word separately, or doubling them alternately, or backwards. He may not look to the sun.. Oh, it's at the bottom of 150; he says, "The employment of the Brahmins consists principally in the reading of the Vedas: they only have a right to read them. Were a Sudra to read the Vedas, or to hear them read, he would be severly punished, and burning oil must be poured into his ears."

Strauss: Go on.

Reader: "The external observances binding on the Brahmins are prodigiously numerous, and the Laws of Manu treat of them as the most essential part of duty. The Brahmin must rest on one particular foot in rising, then wash in a river; his hair and nails must be cuttin neat acurves, his whole body purified, his garments white; in his hand must be a staff of a specified kind; in his ears a golden earring. If the Brahmin meets a man of an inferior caste, he must turn back and purify himself. He has also to read in the Vedas, in various ways: each word separately, or doubling them alternetely, or backwards. He may not look to the sun when rising or setting, or when overcast by clouds or reflected in the water. He is forbidden to step over a rope to which a calf is fastened, or to go out when it rains. He may not look at his wife when she eats, sneezes, gapes, or is quietly seated."

Strauss: And so on, and so on. Well. Good. Well, what Hegel describes here are the innumerable burdens on the Brahmins, and he explains later that all these burdens are absent from the lower castes, especially the lowest. Hegel doesn't speak of this without reason, I mean, not only in order to show how foolish this is because there is no solid ground for them--not only that--but he has something deeper in mind, it seems to me. In a word....yes?

Student: This earlier passage you read about a man becoming a Brahmin is in a sense a qualification in the caste system....

Strauss: Yes, I read it that way. But you see, the difficulties are immense! Good. Now what Hegel has in mind, I believe, is this: might is not right, might is never sufficient, or to use our present-day jargon, ideologies require a justificatio because man has a sense of right, or I'm sorry, I misstated that. Ideologies are needed, are needed, because men have a sense of right. Even the Nazi's racial doctrir must ultimately be understood with this view in mind. No rights without duties. Unreasonable rights, as in the case of the Brahmins, are of course based on unreasonable duties; but there is no possibility of any rights without duties. He explains later on, for example on page 152, the second paragraph somewhere, when he speaks--ja, of the interest rates.

Reader: "Although in the case of a Warrior, the rate of interest may be as high as three per cent, in that of a Vaisya four per cent, a Brahmin is never required to pay more than two percent."

Strauss: Ja. So you see, so in other words, it is wonderful to be a Brahmin, surely good, but again the price which one has to pay for being a Brahmin. If there were only advantages, if they were not deserved advantages, the caste syste would break down. Of course it is sufficient that it is deserved in the view of those subject to them; I mean, on the basis, and I believe this is the answer to you question regarding their former lives--you know that whether a man belongs to this caste or that is due to his actual former life; that means that the caste system is just.

Student: Yes, exactly, from the Hindu point of view.

Strauss: No, but I mean, this doctrine, this ideology, is the justification of the caste system in the sense that it shows if X is a Brahmin, he deserves to be a Brahmin, and if he belongs to the Chandala, he deserves to be a Chandala. Men need that; I mean, it is not a mere appeasement of the subject races that they be ob It is much more than that. Ja. On page 153, line 6 from bottom.

Reader: "Thus every caste has its own duties; the lower the caste, the less it has to observe."

Strauss: Yes. You see, in other words, the number of duties increase with the . Indeed that is true regarding property: Brahmins have the advantage, they don't pay any taxes. Now it is of course very easy to separate out these economic advantages and say, well, that is the meaning of the whole religious system but that's of course, while appealing to a certain nastiness or cynicism, you know it is of course by no means evident, by no means evident. But today the inclination to do that is of course very great.

R: Could one draw something from the fact that the English first tried the Sudras, because they had fewer of those unreasonable duties, but the Sudras turned out not to be militarily useful, so the English were forced to use the Kshatriyas, whose distinction from the Sudras is in terms of obligations of a ceremonial nature, yet these certain obligations are bound up with real military usefulness, as it so strangely happens.

Strauss: Yes, but the questions with which we are always confronted in such a system: should one, to take the most obvious, what we can seem immediately is of course is that it is good not to pay taxes and it is good to perhaps to pay

the lowest interest rate. These are obvious advantages. And of course it is very good to be highly esteemed and respected, regarded as belonging to the highest caste. So why not these things, these manifest advantages, high social position plus economic advantages, regard this as the key to the whole thing that seems to explain most of it. And these fancy things which we do not understand, the theories you know, regarding God and so on and also the wholly unintelligible, the ceremonial, why not regard this as mere opium for the people? It is very plausible. But the question is whether this is wise, whether this is true. And this cannot be settled only on the ground that this one segment, the economic segment, is immediately intelligible to us, whereas the other is not--that is obviously a merely subjective and external distinction which has no basis in the subject matter. Well, then he comes on page 154 to religion. And I think we should discuss this coherently next time. Is there any...yes?

Student: On the difficulty with reincarnation, wouldn't the Indian say that his station in life is determined by merit? and in that respect it is similar to the European estates?

Strauss: Yes, but still the point is only that this is not evident--je? I mean, we may say that if he is now a Brahmin, he has lived very well in his preceding life, and if he is now a Chandela, he has behaved very badly in his former l: but he doesn't know that, and we do not know it. Whereas in the rational state, a man's belonging to an estate would be due to knowable facts: a man went through college and medical school and so on, and so on; and therefore he is a physician. And because he made some particularly important medical observations, he is very famous. These are knowable things, but what has happened between the previous incarnation and the present one is not knowable, is only supposed.

Student: But he seems to understand better than we that they don't understand themselves at all. I mean, when he says that they refer to these distinctions to nature....

Strauss: No, sure, that is true. I mean, this would be the most simple objection on the part of the present-day historian, that Hegel doesn't take the historian's duty to understand these people as they understand themselves--obviously not--but this would not necessarily make his points, his chief points with which he is concerned, irrelevant, because a closer and more exact study could very well interpret this exactly the same. But I agree with that, I think that one should study. Well. So we'll meet again next Tuesday.

Seminar on Hegel, Philosophy of History

Session VII, January 25, 1965

Thank you, Mr. _____, but I have not quite succeeded in understanding you. You refer to a fundamental difficulty at the beginning and then you try to state it at the end, and somewhere in the middle you gave an argument which I do not remember at this moment, the argument which seemed to call into question the rationality of history.

Student: The inevitability of history which is the rationality.

Strauss: But let us first take the main point. There is no change in Asia - in China and India. And if they had been alone there never would have come any development. But let us also think of Africa where the same thing would be true in a different way. But is this variety for us as beholders not an indication of the fundamental inadequacy of the non-Western development?

These three entirely different ways of living - disregarding for now the differences between Buddhism and Hinduism - well, which is the truly human way of life?

By implication, the Negroes the Chinese and the Hindus say, "This is the good life." I once talked to a Hindu about the meaning of dharma which is ordinarily translated as "religion," but this has a much broader meaning I learned. "Dharma" means something like a way. There is a way of dharma, a way of life, and also of course a way of man. And the way of man is, naturally, the Hindu religion. All others are barbarians in one way or another.

All these ways, then, claim to be the true way of life and, therefore, they force the beholder beyond that variety. It is characteristic in these societies that only the beholder is forced into that and not the Hindus or Negroes themselves. The reason is that there cannot be beholders there. Why can there not be beholders? Why can there not be people in China and India (of course we are speaking of pre-modern times) or in Africa who behold it?

Student: Because they have the misfortune of living before the absolute moment.

Strauss: No. No.

Student 2: Because nobody has told them about there being a different way. Unless a group of travellers come . . .

Strauss: Yes, it has to do with travellers, but a certain kind of traveller. Not the kind of travellers who have run away from home because they have committed murder or who

want to engage in trade, but travellers who want to do what?

Student: To reform them.

Strauss: No.

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: Yes. Like Herodotus. Did you want to say something?

Student: I was going to blame it on the Himalayas and the Red Sea.

Strauss: No. These are for Hegel necessary, but not sufficient conditions.

So let us say, "No awakening of the questioning mind." In Hegel's words, "Subjectivity is dominant." And Hegel's contention is that since the awakened subjectivity is necessarily later than the dormant subjectivity, not only in individuals (we all know that we have to be babied before we are awake to the world), but also for the human race as a whole. Therefore, there must have been a long stretch of nations and cultures - rather a long stretch of time in which there was no possibility of such beholders.

The other point is that the awakening of subjectivity is preceded first of all by simple barbarism. That goes without saying. But by more than that. There can be culture as distinguished from barbarism. There must be culture within which individuality is not yet possible.

I read yesterday to my lecture the speech of Zarathustra on One Thousand and One Goals where Nietzsche says that primarily nations only were creators of what would be called value systems and that the individual as creator is a very late creation. This is in fundamental agreement with what Hegel says.

So there had to be cultures. There had to be objectivations - religions, states, etc. - within which individuality was as yet impossible.

The Chinese or Hindus could not possibly raise the questions which Hegel raises. Therefore, the question of which of the two is prior and which is the second could not arise for them. Only from a reasonable point of view which could not develop there could this question be raised.

Student: This is not my point.

Strauss: What is your point?

Student: When you compare the histories of the peoples of the world with individual life, there is in the individual life a continuity. This continuity is lacking as between the Orient and the West. The West somehow starts out - well there may somehow have been culture before history, too. But what I meant to say is that the possibility that spirit can alienate itself under less than prohibitive conditions as in the Arctic, or in Africa or in Asia - this same could not have been possible in the West unless the idea already accounted for this in that it developed that kind of nature . . .

Strauss: Alright. These were conditions. But the most important condition is that Europe came into being on the basis of Western Asia, including Egypt. Only on the basis of the Persian and the Egyptian Empire was it possible as a response to it.

But I think that you make a mistake in the way in which you use the word "continuity." Continuity and discontinuity do not exclude each other in the way in which you presuppose that they do.

Let us start from very simple examples. Someone is sick and gets sicker and sicker and dies. Continuity. And then he is dead, and at this moment - discontinuity. Whereaas formerly he was defectively alive being sick, he is now something qualitatively different. That is what Hegel means when he speaks of the change from quantity into quality which is familiar to everyone of you from Marx's propaganda if not from himself - I mean Hegel. So continuity and discontinuity do not exclude each other.

There are continuities which are discontinuities. Think of the freezing of water. Small temperature changes. One centigrade and then another and another, and with one more you have ice. So this is no problem for Hegel. There is at a certain moment by the mere additive quantitative changes something new which can no longer be understood in terms of the old. So that you have even to reinterpret the quantitative change as a preparation for the new. And that is no longer a merely quantitative change. Yes?

Student: Does it not seem strange, though, that there should be an element of chance at the beginning of a necessary process?

Strauss: What is chance here?

Student: There is an element of chance that the Western spirit began this development whereas the Asian spirit didn't.

Strauss: But it couln't. There could not be a rational state, as Hegel calls it, without a preparation. Man at the beginning was wholly incapable of a national state.

Because he was not capable of reasoning. He could not distinguish between the good and the anti-West as you might call it. Now if this is so there must have been complete unreason at the beginning, of course unreason of a being that was potentially rational. But in a state of fully dormant reason.

Furthermore, it was necessary that there be rational order, let us just say order, social order incompatible with the awakening of the individual and then the next stage was the development of orders in which the individuals could imperfectly develop, let us say Greece. And then, finally, the order in which it was possible for the individual to fully develop and be confronted by an objectively rational order, an order where awake individuals are subject to laws while knowing them to be rational in principle. Do you see that? Only if there could be a perfect beginning would Hegel be wrong. Otherwise, something of this kind must be said.

Hegel's whole philosophy is based on that. In Biblical terms, "the creation of non-man precedes the creation of man." Therefore, there must be nature before there is man. But men at the beginning must be as close to Nature as man can possibly be. That is, his reason must be absolutely dormant just as reason is more than dormant in stones, trees and animals.

Student: . . . if you look at the Western world now you can trace it back step by step saying that there could not have been have been a Greece if there had not been an Egypt and not Egypt if there had not been Persia. So it can be traced back to Persia. Now, the problem is that if you say that there could not have been a Persia unless there had been an India or a China before, you are faced with a problem because Persia, apparently, developed out of a stock of people who were in a primitive condition and had no knowledge of India or China.

Strauss: That is the way in which Hegel understood it. But what does Hegel mean? He says that if we go back in a strictly remembering manner, what we have in our tradition, we would still be driven back to Persia and Egypt and also to Judea. This is a minor difficulty for Hegel.

But then we understand the principle of Persia and then we see that this is already something very high compared with the state of Nature. Does this not imply, by negating it, earlier stages. And these earlier stages we find, as a matter of fact, in India and China. That is, I think, what he means.

Student: There is a big difference, though, because India and China are there as a matter of fact, but had they not been there . . . In other words a knowledge of India and China wasn't necessary for the development of Persia, but the knowledge of Persia was necessary to the development of Greece.

Strauss: That has to do with a higher development. The Persians were capable of having an empire which did not absorb the conquered nations, did not Persianize them as China Sinofied the conquerors. You see, this presupposes already a qualitative difference. This is the way in which Hegel argued. And Hegel would say, "You say that it is a mere accident that there is China and India, but I just proved to you that it is no accident because the principle of Persia is complex and implies the negation of earlier principles. This I know still from logic. I look around and see that these principles are, in fact, embodied in China and in India and now you say that it is an accident after I have proven to you that it is reasonable."

Student 2: May I draw a distinction for Mr. _____? In our own tradition we have the doctrine of the Great Chain of Being which, in particular, includes such things as angels between man and God, things which are logically necessary and so, in the fullness of time or whatever, these come to be. Now man need not necessarily communicate with God through the angels, it is merely that there are angels as well as men. It is another possibility to be provided for. So the things which necessarily exist here are not necessarily a chain of cause and effect, but just a chain of being, but everything that can happen happens.

Strauss: You mean that Hegel's argument would be logically equivalent to a proof of the existence of angels. But how would Hegel apply this to India and China. You cannot prove to me empirically the existance of angels, but I can prove to you empirically the existence of Indian children. So that is not so simple. Yes?

Student 1: I'm not sure that I quite understood. Is is the case that India and China are, so to speak, previous states (inaudible) fortuitously frozen in time.

Strauss: Not fortuitously. That is what Hegel says. These are forms of society which were -to use present-day jargon-necessarily started and could not possibly change. The only end which they could find would be subjugation by a dynamic culture of universalist claim - the West.

Student: But in them we also see what the primary state in Persia would have been like before development began?

Strauss: That would have been an uninteresting thing except for the moment that the spirit awoke there.

Student: What I am saying is, "The moment before the spirit awoke, is that what China was like?"

Strauss: No. No. This is something which Hegel doesn't explain very much, but it is something like a pre-historic life - the formation of tribes. Of course, there is a certain difficulty about that because he should have said

something about it. But Hegel would probably say that there is no distinctive principle there, whereas in Africa you have a distinctive principle however low it may be. It is still a principle. The same is, of course, true in China and India.

Well, I am not a Hegelian and I do not believe that one can say that history is rational. But, on the other hand, one must not underestimate the immense intellectual power which was Hegel's and by virtue of which he brought to light many very interesting things. The improbability that this should all be rational - that doubt which you are expressing I understand very well.

Student: But do we, then, rest at the point that Zarathustra and his complex principle emerge not upon an immediate support in causing structure of simple principles, but there was a jump from tribal with no principles all the way up to . . .

Strauss: Yes. And only we, the beholders, can see that it marks the progress beyond India and China. The fundamental question, again, is "Why were there no beholders there?" And to that Hegel has a very good answer. There couldn't be beholders because that requires the development of individuals.

Student: How could the central principle of the Orient reappear in Persia if the absolute idea works itself out in history and is not conscious of itself?

Strauss: Of course it is not conscious. Consciousness would presuppose the beholder, the subject, the individual. Let me use the word "emancipated." The emancipated man who can look in wonder. And that is, of course, in the clearest case Greece. Mr._____?

Student: To say that there cannot be any beholders in these times because the spirit has not yet awakened seems to be saying that there cannot be any beholders because there are not any beholders.

Strauss: It means that what we take for granted is the fact that there are, to use the simplest expression, scientific men. But man as man is not scientific and it required an enormous labor, as Hegel says, of the spirit until there could be scientific men. And this, as a matter of fact, happens in Greece and Hegel must how, of course, how it happened, the connection between the emergence of science in Greece and this particular pantheon - Zeus, Hera, etc. compared with the pantheon that you find in Egypt and elsewhere. What is the connection between the Olympian gods which are as much products of the human imagination as those of Egypt - nevertheless, how come

the people worshipping the Olympian gods produced science and philosophy. I think that that is still a necessary question.

Student: But couldn't an answer to that be that, as Hegel indicated, science presupposes a certain rejection of authority. He has spoken of it in terms of (inaudible) The political analogy would seem to be merely that there were no successful rebels. There were no successful political rebels.

Strauss: But Hegel would say, "Was this an accident? Were not the cards stacked against any rebels unless they would do exactly what the prince did - slitting throats and then someone else comes to the throne and does exactly the same thing?" Where is the interest in the spirit in such idiotic repetitions of humanity? But in Greece it was possible to get rid of tyrants - say, of the early kings. Why is this? How is this connected with Zeus and Hera? Just as the emergence of science. That is the last question for now.

Student: What does Hegel answer to the argument (inaudible) . . . that the principles, the contradictions seem to have a force, a power in themselves which is greater than the whole of which they are the parts.

Strauss: I believe that I understand your question and it is a very important question because one way in which Hegel presents his doctrine is exactly the actualization of a potentiality. Just as you have a germ, finally you have the disease. And to some extent history has this character according to Hegel. The full actualization of the potentiality.

But this is also misleading. Why is that so? There is something true in that comparison. It is an unconscious process. The actors have no inkling of the end. No inkling. Neither the Chinese nor the Persians nor the Greeks have any notion that what they did and produced was necessary in order to bring about the reasonable state of the 19th century. That is true.

But what is implied? So they do not know - the actors do not know - that is what he means in saying that the rules of reason rule individuals. (?)

I do not know whether this will be of any immediate help. But if we start from that simple schema - teleological and nonteleological. The Hegelian doctrine is both teleological - all towards the end - and nonteleological. And this is, I think, the meaning of dialectic in Hegel's sense. That you do not know in any given stage (speaking now of dialectic as also used in his logic) . . . if you view the ends and say that you want to arrive there and say, "How do I go about it?" that is not dialectic. You take each stage as it is, and as it presents itself without squinting at the end,

and then you are driven by looking at it and by penetrating it you are compelled to go beyond that to a next stage, and so on until you arrive at a stage where the whole is completed.

What was your question?

Student: In your example, the reason why the mind is driven from one stage to another is because there is also actually in our minds the realization. In other words, with regard to the dialectics of our mind, there is already a realized ideal which forces us to move through the stages. But in a historical process, the absolute spirit isn't realized so how can it bring about anything?

Strauss: This potentiality of man actualizes itself under favorable circumstances and in a certain manner. It is essential that in some of these actualizations, the actualization will be a dead end, necessarily so. That it should not be a dead end. That it should not be a dead end and a possibility should exist for going beyond it - that is already a higher stage. That is also another way of answering your question. This is necessary that there should be such dead ends. And from Hegel's point of view there are at least three of these - Africa, China and India.

Student: Isn't modern Europe a dead end?

Strauss: No. A live end because it is manifestly reasonable. The Chinese or the Hindus would be wholly unable to give a reasonable account of their order. Hegel, speaking from modern Europe, can give you a perfectly reasonable account even of hereditary monarchy and hereditary nobility and what have you.

Now I will try to take up the whole question of Hegel's position which might be of some help and make my answers a bit clearer.

Let us return to the simplest and most obvious things. Hegel starts, of course, from his knowledge, his alleged knowledge of the reasonable state which is, of course, understood in contradistinction to the more or less unreasonable states in the immediate past - the feudal states - and Greece and so on. But Hegel adds, naturally, that these more or less unreasonable states, including China and India, are indispensable not only for the emergence of the reasonable state, but for the emergence of the conception of the reasonable state. People could not have understood and striven for the reasonable state in former times. All this development was needed so that man could become aware of what the reasonable state is.

Let us contrast this with the classics. They would not speak of the reasonable state. They would speak of the city or the best polity which is according to Nature.

Here we see, of course, the opposition with Hegel very clearly. We could translate the expression "the state according to Nature" literally into Latin _____, the natural state. For Hegel, as we know, the natural state is a state of absolute barbarism. For the classics the natural state would be the state of perfection, if they would use that term.

The classics also would say, and here there is an agreement with Hegel, that it is essential to realize that the good is not the ancestral. It may happen that in a given society the ancestral is good, but there is no necessity for that. There is a great variety of ancestrals - of ancestral orders - and the classics saw that. But they did not make an attempt to arrange these ancestral orders in an order of a progressive kind. For example, Egypt has this rank and Persia that and so on. Because they regarded these ancestral orders as infinite, as one would say. I mean, there is no principle of ordering them. To express it in an exaggerated manner, vagaries of the imagination, what follies and crazy things human beings can hit on and you want us to see here a rational order. From the classical point of view there is no possibility of a philosophy of history. Or if you want to stretch the expression, "philosophy of history," you must say that the philosophy of history is reduced here to one simple proposition, confusion, confusion, confusion. Always this.

There is one great man who expressed that, at least for readers who can read such books. Namely, Xenophon's Greek History. It is the only book in the world which begins with the word "thereafter." Have you ever heard such a crazy idea? I had heard once of a preacher who began his sermon with the word "but," which is much more easy to understand. But to begin a book with "thereafter. . ." The traditional explanation is that Xenophon's history is a continuation of Thucydides. At least that is the tradition, that Thucydides daughter after the death of her father (inaudible) And, so, Xenophon, at any rate, wrote a continuation of that and, therefore, it simply began with "thereafter," an expression which occurs many times within Thucydides naturally. Say, "in this summer the people of X made this expedition and thereafter the people of Y did this." But the funny thing is that Xenophon begins, not after Thucydides, but the first few pages are covered by Thucydides. This is a strange overlap. But the most strange thing is that the book ends with "thereafter." This could not be literally true.

It is this. He describes the battle of _____, page 362. And then he says that people have looked forward to that battle because Greece was in a great confusion and they thought that if the war would be finished, then there will be order and everyone knows where he stands. The battle. The Spartans were defeated and after the battle there was as much confusion as before. In this connection the word "thereafter." So the book may be said to begin with

"thereafter" and ends with "thereafter." And this is a defensible philosophy of history surely worth considering. That is what the classics fundamentally meant. They didn't deny that there are certain rhythms. For instance, there are states which emerge, which develop, have a peak, a decline and are destroyed. This happens. But this wouldn't do away with the fundamentals. There is always something wrong.

And if you do not believe Xenophon, believe Shakespeare. I believe that it is in Henry VI, third part, the War of the Roses. That was confusion.

Student: The Tempest. A tale told by an idiot full of sound and fury.

Strauss: That is something else. That is said by the mad MacBeth.

But here Richard at the end of Henry VI (inaudible) Everything is fine. The usurpation of the Lancasters. And there are some beautiful verses which I unfortunately do not remember. All is over. Those of you who have lived through a war and especially through an end of a war know this wonderful feeling. And there is only one little fly in the ointment and that is Richard III. There is always such a Richard III. And that is the older view. There is no possibility of a final solution. And that is the fundamental difference.

Therefore chance, which Hegel also recognizes of course (that this man happened to be Alexander, the son of Phillip who conquered the East and was not a man called Phillip, the son of Alexander - that is absolute chance. That goes without saying) but for the classics chance is controlling the whole thing. For Hegel the chance has its place only in a subordinate manner.

Another point which I should mention. Hegel speaks of dialectic. That we know, but this goes back to Plato more than to any other individual. Here the difference is quite clear. Hegel's dialectic is very potent in history and in Hegel's understanding of it. Plato's dialectics has nothing whatever to do with history. Plato's use was, rather, this. Men have opinions and I am now speaking now of opinions about uninteresting things, but opinions about important matters, authoritative opinions. For Plato all opinions presuppose intellect. A brute cannot have opinions. All opinions presuppose intelligence, more or less dormant intelligence, more or less awake. This is indicated by his doctrine of recollection which is a deliberate myth. The human souls are the only souls which have seen the ideas prior to birth and then they had to forget it. And without that men would not be men. And by virtue of that men have opinions which are dim reflections of the ideas - distilled, distorted, soiled reflections of the ideas.

Therefore, whenever you take up any opinion and have a reasonably good mind, then you will see that this opinion does not hold water just as Hegel says. And that it will point beyond itself. And it will point eventually to the idea.

So the only way to recover this original sight or vision of the idea is dialectics, by looking at and examining opinions. This has no direct application to history, of course. In history, as it were, the way from lower opinion to higher opinion to full knowledge would take place. That is the peculiarity of Hegel. I thought that we should at least remind ourselves of these fundamental differences.

We have not yet discussed everything in last time's assignment. Let us turn to page 154, bottom.

Reader: "The view given of the relation of caste leads directly to the subject of religion. For the claims of caste are, as already remarked, not merely secular, but essentially religious. The Brahmins, in their exalted dignity, are the very gods bodily present. In the Laws of Manu, it is said, 'Let the King even in extreme necessity beware of exciting the Brahmins against him for they can destroy him with their power, they who create fire, sun, moon, etc.' They are servants neither of God nor of his people . . ."

Strauss: Of his community. He uses the Christian expression in German, "_____" - of his congregation.

Reader: " . . . but are God himself to the other Castes - a position of things which constitutes the perverted character of the Hindu mind. The dreaming Unity of Spirit and nature, which involves a monstrous bewilderment in regard to all phenomena and relations, we have already recognized as the principle of the Hindu Spirit. The Hindu Mythology is therefore only a wild extravagance of Fancy . . ."

Strauss: We can leave it at that. But did he not say, "But what is wrong with that?" After all, here human beings are regarded as gods. Is not the dignity of man recognized to some extent? Well, Hegel had said before on page 141 of your edition that they recognized also what kind of beings? Monkeys and cows and so on. So, in other words, it is not based on a sense of the dignity of man. The Brahmins are not gods qua the best men. This would be connected with the fact that they do not have a clear grasp of the superhuman. That is what he is now going to explain. Without some awareness of the superhuman, man cannot have dignity as we have seen in the section on Africa.

On page 155.

Reader: "If you ask a Hindu whether he worships Idols, every one says "Yes!" but to the question, "Do you worship the Supreme Being?" everyone answers, "No."

Strauss: Yes. That is the point. So there is a highest being. That they know or are aware of it. But this is completely separate from the object of their worship. And that is the fundamental defect of Hindu religion. And this is what they call Brahm.

There is some ground of everything including of the gods which is dimly divine, but there is no clarity regarding the relation of this ground of grounds indistinguishable from nothingness because of its indeterminacy. And because of the lack of connection, therefore the fundamental defects of the Hindu religion.

There is one difficulty which I sensed again in listening to Mr. _____'s paper. Did you not have the feeling, Mr. _____, from time to time that from some points of view China seemed to be superior to India? How did you solve this difficulty?

Student: I didn't solve it, nor do I see that Hegel solved it. In the beginning of the section on China he refers briefly to the fact that Buddhism is a factor in China, but the section on Buddhism follows after the section on India.

Strauss: I think that he would say that India is characterized by both, the original Hindu religion and Buddhism. This combination is higher than China itself. Yes?

Student 2: I thought that the reconciliation was that although China, in its good order, is for practical purposes more like good, sober Prussia than is India.

Strauss: You mean an administrative paternalistic state?

Student: Yes. Good order.

Strauss: But paternalistic. That is important.

Student: From the point of view of spirit developing itself it is undifferentiated in China and it has made a step, albeit a faltering misstep in India.

Strauss: Now let us look at page 161.

Reader: "The proper basis of the State, the principle of freedom is altogether absent: there cannot therefore be any State in the true sense of the term. This is the first point to be observed: if China may be regarded as nothing else but a State, Hindu political existence presents us with a people, but no State. Secondly, while we found a moral despotism in China, whatever may be called a relic of political life in India is a despotism without a principle, without any rule of morality and religion: for morality and religion (as far as the latter has a reference to human action) have as their indispensable condition and basis

the freedom of the Will. In India, therefore, the most arbitrary, wicked, degrading despotism has its full swing. China, Persia, Turkey - in fact Asia generally, is the scene of despotism, and, in a bad sense, of tyranny; but it is regarded as contrary to the due order of things, and is disapproved by religion and the moral consciousness of individuals. In those countries, tyranny rouses men to resentment; they detest it and groan under it as a burden. To them it is an accident and an irregularity, not a necessity: it ought not to exist. But in India it is normal."

Strauss: So this seems to show a clear superiority of China to India and also in the next paragraph the fact that the Chinese have history and that there is no history in India, is also in favor of China. These were the points which you observed.

Student: On the other hand, in the original account of China he says that China cannot be described as having a religion properly socalled. That comes in only with the Buddhist principle it seems.

Strauss: But I believe that the point which Mr. _____made is more important - the articulation, however, perverse, in India - the caste system compared with the absence of articulation - all are equally children of the Emperor.

But there is more to that. Let us pursue it and see. Let us turn to page 166, second paragraph.

Reader: "If then, in conclusion, we once more take a general view of the comparative condition of India and China, we shall see that China was characterized by a thoroughly unimaginative Understanding; a prosaic life amid firm and definite reality; while in the Indian world there is, so to speak, no object that can be regarded as real, and firmly defined."

Strauss: An object in order to be an object must be of a determinate and definite character. Where everything flows one into the other that is imagination, not the prosaic understanding.

Reader: " . . . none that was not at its first apprehension perverted by the imagination to the very opposite of what it presents to an intelligent consciousness."

Strauss: "Reasonable" in the sense of prosaic reason. In other words, a pot for cooking is a pot for cooking, and if some imaginative individual sees something grand or terrible in that, that is his business, and it has nothing to do with sober, prosaic understanding of the pot.

Reader: "In China it is the Moral which constitutes the substance of the laws, and which is embodied in external strictly determinate relations; while over all hovers the patriarchal

providence of the Emperor, who like a Father cares impartially for the interest of his subjects. Among the Hindus, on the contrary - instead of this Unity - Diversity is the fundamental characteristic. Religion, War Handicraft, Trade . . ."

Strauss: Let us stop there. What is the point? Unity in China, Diversity in India. Now let us see a bit further on.

Reader: "The Chinese, in their prosaic rationality, reverence as the Highest only the abstract supreme lord; and they exhibit a contemptibly superstitious respect for the fixed and definite."

Strauss: In other words, they cannot help making distinctions, but they do not make rational distinctions, but only superstitious ones.

Reader: "Among the Hindus there is no superstition so far as it presents an antithesis to understanding; rather their whole life and ideas are one unbroken superstition, because among them all is revery and consequent enslavement."

Strauss: So we are back where we were. Therefore, you must never forget that these are lecture notes and not a book by Hegel. And we have to do our best to liberate ourselves from the abbreviations made by purely intelligent, but very fallible listeners.

Turn to page 168, line 13.

Reader: "As the Substantial form of Spirit which characterizes China, develops itself only to a unity of secular national life, which degrades individuals to a position of constant dependence, religion also remains in a state of dependence."

Strauss: That is, of course, a question, whether Hegel has any right to make this identification of heaven, Nature, Universal Matter. But we cannot go into that.

Reader: "But the compensating truth of this alienated form of Spirit is ideal Unity; the elevation above the limitation of Nature and of existence at large; - the return of consciousness into the soul."

Strauss: Go on to the next paragraph.

Reader: "The negative form of this elevation is the concentration of Spirit to the Infinite, and must first present itself under theological conditions. It is contained in the fundamental dogma, that Nothingness is the principle of all things - that all proceeded from and returns to Nothingness."

Strauss: That is the key of the superiority. I repeat only what Hegel says without saying anything about India or China about which I know nothing. That in China the highest is a visible heaven. The Hindus go beyond that. They peer

through heaven, as it were, and discover a spiritual (inaudible) nothingness as a ground of everything. And this is an act of liberation. In Hegel's view the philosophic life has to begin with that nothingness, with the pure ether as he sometimes calls it. So ultimately the Hindus are superior. Transcending everything finite and determinate. Heaven, too, of course, is finite and determinate. Heaven is not the earth. That is sufficient proof of the finiteness of heaven. Therefore, the nonfinite is, to begin with, only the infinite, undefined. That which has no distinction. And that is the beginning. This beginning is understood somehow by the Hindus.

As he says on page 169, paragraph 2, "the abstract nothingness is the beyond of finiteness and of what we mean by the highest being." The Hindus come closer to that.

On page 170 in the second paragraph he speaks of the spirituality of Buddhism. But the implication always is that Buddhism, while it was much more successful outside India than within India, nevertheless stems from India and is a development of that.

(Break in tape)

Strauss: . . . in this individual, this Dalai-Lama - not the mere empirical Dalai-Lama, but something for which he stands. And he says a little bit later that what is important in this conception is the distinction from nature. The Chinese emperor a power over the natural forces which he controlled. But here in the case of the Lama the spiritual power is distinguished from the natural power. This only to show that Hegel in his way tries to show the superiority of India to China.

A few more points. On page 173 in the second paragraph.

Reader: "With the Persian Empire we first enter on continuous History. The Persians are the first Historical People; Persia was the first Empire that passed away."

Strauss: "Passed away" quite superficially because when we call something historical we mean that it belongs to the past. China and India are not in this sense historical, but this has deeper meaning as we have seen before.

Reader: " While China and India remain stationary, and perpetuate a natural vegetative existence even to the present time, this land has been subject to those developments and revolutions which alone manifest a historical condition. The Chinese and the Indian Empire assert a place in the historical series only on their own account and for us not for neighbors and successors."

Strauss: No. That has been misunderstood. "Not for neighbors" you may delete. That is the commentory by the translator.

They are in itself, as we would say, objective things. And for us, the beholders, not for them, not for the Chinese. That is what I tried to explain before. They cannot possibly see themselves. As for their understanding, they do not belong in any context officially. The very notion is wholly unintelligible to them.

For the Persians, they have some inkling because they view the whole historical process as a fight between _____ and _____. And, so, this is a fundamentally different situation.

The principle of Persia, then, is the light. Of course, opposed to darkness. But the light, the principle of goodness. Human life is understood as taking the side of life and the good and purity. This against darkness. And this ends in the victory of the good.

In Hegel's view this is a higher form of understanding than was reached in the nothingness of the Indians to say nothing of the heaven of the Southeast. And the point is that this highest, the light, does not absorb the individual things or human beings, but lets them be what they are. Whereas for the Hindu nothingness leads to the negation of the individual striving for Nirvana. And yet it transcends Nature, whereas the Chinese principle does not.

In addition, which is also interesting, it has an opposite of the same kind. Let us look at page 174, second paragraph.

Reader: "Thus the transition which we have to make is only in the sphere of the Idea, not in the external . . ."

Strauss: Is only in the concept.

Reader: " . . . not in the concept, not in the external historical connection."

Strauss: That is what we discussed. Hegel doesn't claim that there was any conscious reaction to India and China which gave rise to the Persian religion.

Reader: "The principle of this transition is that the Universal Essence, which we recognized in Brahm, now becomes perceptible to consciousness - becomes an object and acquires a positive import for man. . . We found only a unity of the Spiritual and the Natural."

Strauss: He makes the point in the sequel that there is no principle there for the division into castes nor for a simple paternalism as in China because every man has to take part in that fight for the good against the evil which gives man a fundamental freedom. And he develops this.

Now on page 178.

Reader: "Ormuzd is the Lord of the kingdom of Light - of Good; Ahriman that of Darkness - of Evil. But there is a still higher being from whom both proceeded - a Universal Being not affected by this antithesis . . ."

Strauss: Literally translated, "an oppositionless."

Reader: " . . . called Zeruane-Akerene - the Unlimited All. . . the Unity is only the absolutely Primal existence, and does not reduce the contradictory elements to harmony in itself."

Strauss: Now what do these dark sentences mean? This dualism which lived on in a greatly modified manner and came to be called Manichaeanism. There are two principles, the good and the evil principle. In Western Christianity God and Devil. But whereas according to the Christian or Jewish view the devil is the creature of God who has sinned and thus become in that form, here these two forces are of equal status not regarding goodness, but regarding being. They are independent of each other. Still, it is very good to know that the good will vanquish the evil in the end. But still there should be some clearer basis for that if they have the same status that victory seems to be an accident unless one would say that if most men side with the good they will make him win and the Devil lose which is, perhaps, open to other objections.

But the Persians were aware of the difficulty and, therefore, they understood and assumed that both had proceeded from something general or universal which is oppositionless, which is beyond the opposition of good and evil. There is, as it were, a neutral ground of good and evil, something like the nothingness of the Hindus here (drawing on blackboard), and out of that emerged good and evil. And Hegel says, without speaking of God and Devil, that without it (Buddhism) we cannot understand life, we cannot understand history.

But what would Hegel wish? That they must come from the same root. It is necessary for him. But what is necessary in addition? Some bringing back, as he puts it, of the evil. Does it mean some ultimate conversion of the Devil, some insight into its sin, and restoration? It is hard to say. But it is one of these dark remarks by Hegel about evil.

We have heard a bit about evil before. What was it?

Student: Hegel had to justify the existence of evil in the world in order to make acceptable the fact that history is reasonable.

Strauss: So evil is necessary. How does he stand to the traditional view? Evil is, of course, not necessary. And this is now connected with the fact that man is created perfect and it was man's fault, his sin, which brought

about evil. And for Hegel it is the opposite. The beginning is evil, absolutely evil. The state of Nature. And man is not responsible for that. And out of that and only because the beginning is evil, can perfection be decisively due to human freedom. The reasonable state is the creation of man because his starting point was the most unreasonable. And a certain justification, vindication of evil is not a central part of Hegel's doctrine and there is here, I believe, an illusion to that.

When he speaks towards the end of this section on page 181 . . .

Reader: "The ritual observances of the religion of Ormuzd import that men should conduct themselves in harmony with the Kingdom of Light. . . Thus Xerxes, when the sea broke in pieces his bridges, had chains laid upon it as the wicked and pernicious being, Ahriman."

Strauss: That was not, as the Greeks thought, an act of insolent pride, but of divine worship. This is, I think what he means by that.

Seminar on Hegel

The Philosophy of History

Session 8, January 28, 1965

Thank you, Mr. _____. Your paper has shown considerable progress over your earlier papers. I like particularly your initial statement which I found very good.

I would like to take up only two points you made in your paper. You say that the Persian Empire in a way foreshadowed a kind of world empire embracing reasonable states, but of course it could only foreshadow it as was clear to you.

What is the obvious difference between the Persian Empire and such a rational world state? There is a variety of states in both cases.

Student: The Persian Empire was taken in conquest, was it not? And it seems that a world state or rational state would be taken through mutual recognition.

Strauss: Yes, but we don't know enough to exclude the possibility that a world empire might be established by conquest and, nevertheless, be a rational order of rational states.

I think that the main point is that the Persian principle - the principle of the imperial state - tolerates the variety of cultures; but it does not in any way affect them. Whereas, in a rational empire - think of the British Empire according to the best interpretation which one could make. It would affect, transform say, India. It wouldn't permit the continuation of certain practices incompatible with what the British regard as civilization. The Persians left them alone. And, according to their principles, the sun which shines on everything - all its varieties - does not transform it.

Therefore, I do not think that you were right in assuming that the parts of the Persian Empire were equal according to Hegel. In other words, especially Babylonia is equal in rank to Persia or, for that matter to Phoenicia and Judea. I do not believe that he means that.

Student: The reason I said that was in order to try to explain how these nations could conquer one another back and forth without transforming the national character of the conquered nation.

Strauss: But, still, the Persians conquered the Babylonians, not the other way around.

Student: I don't think that they actually conquered them in a spiritual sense.

Strauss: Alright. But, still, politically they did.

Now one other point. It did not become clear from your paper what constitutes the superiority of Egypt to Persia and to all ingredients of the Persian Empire.

Student: Well, Egypt in a sense represents a kind of progress.

Strauss: Why?

Student: Because several parts of the Persian Empire taken as several parts present no opportunity for advance. Whereas in Egypt there is a kind of union of all these (inaudible) and a struggle results because of this peculiar combination. This, then, foments a kind of transition from Egypt to other states.

Strauss: But is not the precise variety within the Persian Empire - think only of the difference between Phoenicia and Judea - does this contradiction not point beyond these two ingredients?

Student: No, sir. Because there does not appear to be a spiritual contradiction. There is no spiritual union in the empire.

Strauss: But, still, between these two ingredients there perhaps would have been question of Hegel's premise that Phoenicia and Judea can be understood simply as ingredients of the Persian Empire.

What, for Hegel, is the clearest sign of the superiority of Egypt? What is the symbol of Egypt?

Student: The Sphynx.

Strauss: The Sphynx, i.e. what does that mean?

Student: The head of a man and the body of a brute.

Strauss: Yes. But more primarily. What does a Sphynx do?

Student: Ask Greeks questions?

Strauss: Yes. The riddle. A conscious riddle. That is the progress. There is nothing in the earlier stages which is a conscious riddle. That is my point. Thank you very much.

Now let us turn to our reading. There is one minor point which I happen to be able to clear up on page 182 when he speaks of this era . He mentions Alexander the Great in his "_____". That is very simple. _____ is simply Eastern Rome. Then, therefore, the Muslims call it _____ meaning Rome, i.e. Istanbul. That is trivial.

Now let us turn to page 187. The end of the paragraph. Then he speaks of Cyrus's death.

Reader: "He led an expedition against and gave to them the steps between the but sustained the defeat and died the death of a warrior and a conqueror. The death of heroes who have formed an epic in the history of the world is stamped with the character of their mission. Cyrus thus died in his mission which was the union of anterior Asia into one solid entity without an ulterior object."

Strauss: We have seen last time that there are dead-end developments in cultures. China and India. So there can be empires which have no further prospect. Persia itself points beyond itself. Therefore, it is historical in a way in which China and India are not historical, but its empire does not have this function.

Hegel probably has in mind if you compare the death of Cyrus with that of Alexander the Great and that of Caesar this corresponds in each case - that Caesar was assassinated by the Republic in opposition. And Napoleon was sent to St. Helena by the British. This is all in agreement with the peculiarity of their mission.

Then he speaks at the beginning of the next chapter of the peculiarity of the Persian Empire. Namely, that it leaves its ingredients undisturbed and that has to do with the principle of light.

Reader: "As light illuminates everything imparting to each object a peculiar vitality, so the Persian Empire extends over a multitude of nations and leaves to each one its particular character. Some have even kings of its own, each one its distinct . . .

Strauss: And so on. This all persists quietly under the general light, ultimately under the light of the Persian principle, of course.

Let us turn to the section on Phoenicia which is particularly interesting. Page 191, bottom. He had spoken of the Phoenician's travels to Britain and to the Baltic. In this way a new principle emerges.

Reader: "This opens to us an entirely new principle. Inactivity ceases as also mere rude valor. In their place appears the activity of industry and that considerable courage which, while it bears the perils of the deep, rationally bethinks itself of the means of safety. Here everything depends on man's activity, his courage, his intelligence while the objects aimed at are also pursued in the interest of man. Human will and activity occupy the foreground, not Nature and its bounties.

Babylonia had its determinate share of territory and human subsistence was there dependent on the course of the sun

and the process of Nature generally. But the sailor relies upon himself amid the fluctuations of the waves, and eye and heart must be always open. In like manner, the principle of industry involves the very opposite of what is received from Nature, for natural objects are worked up for use and ornament. In industry, man is an object to himself and treats Nature as something subject to him upon which he impresses the seal of his activities. Intelligence is the valor needed here and ingenuity is better than mere natural courage. At this point we see the nations freed from the fear of Nature and its slavish visage."

Strauss: Yes. You see how little reactionary Hegel is because he asserts the superiority of industry to agriculture, the intellectual superiority. A crucial point in Marxism, but not only in Marxism. Human will and activity are here the first, not Nature and its bounty. Agriculture depends much more on Nature and its bounty. This revolt against Nature (that is the great principle of industry) and whether one can ascribe it to the Phoenicians is a very uninteresting question compared with the fundamental point which Hegel makes here.

One can say that this is one of the most important differences between modern political philosophy since the 17th century and classical. The denial of the bounty, the goodness of Nature. Whereas for Aristotle or Plato that is taken for granted. You only have to read the first book of Aristotle's Politics where he speaks about Nature supplying the most important things. The very simple case that for every baby human or brutish Nature provides milk. In other words, that is not done by any human activity. This difference has infinite implications.

Now, then, in the sequel he speaks of the sensuality and cruely of Babylonians, Syrians, and how they belong together. That is quite interesting. Page 192 bottom.

Reader: "With the merely sensuous life - this being a form of consciousness which does not attain to general conceptions - cruely is connected because Nature itself is the highest so that man has no value or only the most trifling."

Strauss: That is crucial. Cruely comes out not directly, but through the unawareness of the dignity of man. Whether this cruely takes a so-called sadist or masochist form is fundamentally uninteresting.

This is not so in Phoenicia which is, of course, quite questionable because the sacrifice of first-born children was an important institution of the Phoenician
But Hegel is not interested in that. He finds in Phoenicia a much higher religious principle. Namely, in the worship of Adonis. The key point is this. What is the key point in the worship of Adonis according to Hegel? This high

point which makes him forget about any
which the Phoenicians might have worshipped? What is the key point here. I do not know whether it comes out in the translation clearly enough. It must be in the second paragraph of page 193 or 194. Life regains its value.

Reader: "Life here regains its value. A universality of pain is established for death becomes imminent in the divine and the deity dies. Among the Persians we saw light and darkness struggling with each other, but here both principles are united in one, the absolute. The negative is here too, the merely natural. But as the death of a god it is not a limitation attaching to an individual object, but is pure negativity itself."

Strauss: So let us leave it at this point. The death of God is the highest point of Phoenicia. And Hegel sees some connection or implies some connection between the concept of the death of God, that the negativity belongs to the spirit itself, and what he had said about the industrial character of Phoenicia before.

A bit later. Here the negativity belongs to the spirit itself, and what he had said about the industrial character of Phoenicia before. Here the negative itself - this is a bit later - is an element of God.

Reader: "But here the negative itself is a phase of deity, the natural, death, the worship appropriate to which is grief."

Strauss: This is a key point. And the death of God - that is for Hegel in Christianity - the death of Christ as the son of God.

This is important because it implies an important superiority of Phoenicia to Judea in Hegel's eyes because in the Old Testament there is, indeed, for the first time the primacy of the spirit, as he says. The light is now Jehovah, the pure one. By this very fact the break between East and West occurs. Do you have that?

Reader: "This forms the point of separation between the East and the West. Spirit descends into the depths of its own being and recognizes the abstract fundamental principle as the spiritual. Nature, which in the East is the primary and fundamental existence, is now depressed to the condition of a mere patron, and spirit now occupies the first place."

Strauss: This is the great advance made by the Jews, but what is the defect of that?

He speaks in the sequel of the exclusiveness of the Old Testament God which is connected with the exclusiveness and intolerance of the Jewish people. No recognition of the truth in the false God. Let us read that on page 195.

Reader: "Before him all other gods are false. Moreover, the distinction between true and false is quite abstract for, as regards the false gods, not a ray of the divine is supposed to shine into them."

Strauss: In other words, they are unqualifiedly rejected and the divination of the divine - that policy is not understood.

Reader: "But every form of spiritual force and a fortiori every religion is of such a nature that whatever be its peculiar character an affirmative element is necessarily contained in it. However erroneous a religion may be, it possesses truth although in a mutilated phase. In every religion there is a divine presence, a divine relation and a philosophy of history has to seek out the spiritual element even in the most imperfect forms. But it does not follow that, because it is a religion, it is therefore good. We must not fall into the lax conception that content is of no importance, but only the form."

Strauss: Meaning that it is religion. Go on.

Reader: "This (inaudible) the Jewish religion does not admit being absolutely exclusive."

Strauss: In other words, Hegel reminds the reader that, while he is very understanding of every form of religion, he is not possessed of a lax tolerance of everything. That is the difference. In other words, he is perfectly willing to see even in the lowest some divination, without forgetting for a moment that it is very low. Whereas a typical liberal of our age would say that all these things are equal because they have such a spark of light.

So it is clear that this quite extraordinary thesis shocking to the whole tradition - that in an important respect Phoenicia should be higher than Judea. After that statement he makes clear a few other points.

Let us turn to page 196, the second paragraph.

Reader: "The spiritual speaks itself here absolutely free of the sensuous, and Nature is reduced to something merely external and undivine."

Strauss: Namely, a mere creature. It is merely created and has no divinity in itself. Yes?

Reader: "This is the true and proper estimate of Nature at this stage for only at a more advanced stage can the idea attain a reconciliation in this its alien form."

Strauss: Namely, in Nature.

Reader: "Its first utterances will be in opposition to Nature for spirit which had been hitherto dishonored now

first attains its due dignity while Nature resumes its proper position.

"Nature is conceived as having the ground of its existence within another as something positive, created. And this idea - that God is the lord and creator of Nature - leads men to regard God as the exalted one while the whole of Nature is only the throne of his glory and is expended in his service.

"In contrast with this kind of exaltation, that which the Hindu religion . . ."

Strauss: "Sublimity" is the right word.

Reader: " . . . sublimity, that which the Hindu religion presents it only that of indefinitude. In virtue of the prevailing spirituality, the sensuous and immoral are no longer privileged, but disparaged as ungodliness. Only the one, spirit, the nonsensuous, is the truth. Thought exists free for itself and true morality and righteousness can now make their appearance for God is honored by righteousness, and right-doing is walking in the way of the Lord. With this is conjoined happiness. Life and temporal prosperity are its reward for it is said, 'That thou mayest live long in the land.'

Here too, also, we have the possibility of the historical view for the understanding has become prosaic putting the limited and circumscribed in its proper place and comprehending it as the form proper to finite existence. Men are regarded as individuals and not as incarnations of God. Sun as sun. Mountains as mountains, not as possessing spirit and will."

Strauss: In other words, this sobriety is the necessary consequence of the spirituality of the Biblical God. Things are seen as they are - mountains as mountains, human beings as human beings and so on. One can say that Nature was discovered here because it was seen and understood in its inferiority to the spirit or to the mind. But is this true? Is this true from Hegel's point of view?

He speaks of it a bit later on page 197, the first paragraph where he speaks about this history, the Jewish history and its greatness and its defects. Miracles, too, disturb us in that history. So you have that?

Reader: "Miracles, too, form a disturbing feature in this history as history for as far as concrete consciousness is not free, concrete perception is also not free. Nature is undeified . . ."

Strauss: And that is the great progress.

Reader: " . . . but not yet understood."

Strauss: That is the point. It is very strange the way Hegel regards the belief in miracles as manifestly impossible. That was for him settled by the Enlightenment. But the historical question - in that I think that Hegel is right. Because, as I have said on more than one occasion, there is no Old Testament expression for Nature. And, therefore, when people speak of the Psalms speaking of Nature, it is - in a strict sense - incorrect. By the way, it is also important that there is no Old Testament word for history. This is equally important. There is one old Hebrew word which could lead to Nature, on the one hand, and history, on the other. It means (literally translated) "generation." "These are the generations of . . ." and so on. This was used in Hellenistic times for Nature and so forth. But it means more immediately "what happened to these generations." I.e., it means more history. But the concept itself is alien. And Hegel is somehow is aware of that as we see.

And connected with the abstractness of the Old Testament God, with the lack of articulation which Hegel finds in the Christian trinity, is the abstractness of the service of the God. In traditional Christian language, the "carnal" character of Judaism. The seed of Abraham. The seed (literally understood) of Abraham - not in a spiritual sense. On page 198 in the first paragraph.

Reader: "However spiritual may be the conception of God as object, the subjective side - the honor rendered to Him - is still very limited and unspiritual in character."

Strauss: And by this he means both the national character and the importance of the ceremonial law.

So, from Hegel's point of view, the Old Testament prepares the New Testament to no higher degree than Phoenicia does, in a very different way. That is settled.

Now let us turn to the section on Egypt. What is the peculiarity of that? Let us turn to page 198 in the third paragraph.

Reader: "In Egypt we see united the elements which in the Persian monarchy appeared singly. We found among the Persians the adoration of light regarded as the essence of universal nature. This principle then develops itself in phases which hold the position of indifference towards each other."

Strauss: Not as equal, Mr. _____, but as indifferent to each other.

Reader: "The one is the immersion in the sensuous among the Babylonians and Syrians. The other is the spiritual phase which is twofold. First is the incipient consciousness of the common creed spirit in the worship of Adonis and then as pure and abstract thought among the Jews. In the former, the concrete is deficient in unity. In the latter the concrete is altogether wanting."

Strauss: Because of the simple transcendence, the unqualified transcendence of the Old Testament God.

Reader: "The next problem is, then, to harmonize these contradictory elements. And this problem presents itself in Egypt."

Strauss: To harmonize or unite these opposing elements is the task and it is present as task in Egypt. I.e., the Egyptians are themselves aware of the task, and at the end of this paragraph he explains it a bit more, what he means by saying that it is present as a task.

Reader: "Thus the memorials of Egypt themselves give us a multitude of forms and images that express its character. We recognize a spirit in them which feels itself compressed, which offers itself, but only in a sensuous mode."

Strauss: This indicates the fact that the task is present to the Egyptians. They can express the problem although they cannot solve it.

Let us turn to page 199, bottom.

Reader: "In their architecture and hieroglyphics, the thoughts and conceptions of the Egyptians are expressed. A national work in the department of language is wanting, and that not only to us, but to the Egyptians themselves. They could not have any because they had not advanced to an understanding of themselves."

Strauss: But did the Hindus and Persians or the Chinese have such an understanding of themselves? And yet they had national works like the vedas. What do you say?

Student: Doesn't the Book of the Dead which we now have go against this?

Strauss: Yes. But the question is whether it is a national book in the sense in which the vedas are national? That I do not know.

Hegel would say that we must see this presence or absence of national books within the content, and here within the content of the fact that Egypt presents a higher principle than does Persia or India. All the more striking the absence of such a book.

Now let us turn to page 206 at the end of the first paragraph.

Reader: "Their vast edifices such as no other nation has to exhibit and which excel all others in solidity and size sufficiently prove their artistic skill to whose cultivation they could largely devote themselves because the inferior castes did not trouble themselves with political matters. says that Egypt was the only country in which the citizens did not trouble themselves about the state, but gave their whole attention to their private

business. Greeks and Romans must have been especially astonished at such a state of things."

Strauss: In other words, were the Babylonians more concerned with politics, or the low class Hindus? That is the question. The Egyptians - the people - are unpolitical as are all other Orientals. Hegel emphasizes this fact here because this fact is emphasized in his sources. In Greece there was a connection between the arts and citizenship, active citizenship. Not so in Egypt. And all the more, of course, in India and other places.

Now let us continue in the next paragraph.

Reader: "On account of its judicious economy, Egypt was regarded by the ancients as the pattern of a morally regulated condition of things. As an ideal such as Pythagoras realized in a limited, select society and Plato's sketch on a larger scale."

Strauss: This is first a statement of fact which Hegel turns into a value judgement. Namely, there is something anticipating Plato in the Egyptian order. Is there any basis for this assertion? That there is a connection between the Egyptian order and the order which Plato praised?

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: By the beginning of it is said that the order described by Socrates in the Republic reminded of Egypt. So this is not an invention of Hegel.

Hegel uses this opportunity because it is his duty as a professor of philosophy to prevent and fight misconceptions, especially politically dangerous misconceptions all the time. Now what does he say about it in the immediate sequel?

Reader: "But in such ideals no account is taken of passion."

Strauss: Of passion. Go on.

Reader: "A plan of society that is to be adopted and acted upon as an absolutely complete one in which everything has been considered and especially . . ."

Strauss: No. "Calculated." Everything has been figured out. Go on.

Reader: " . . . everything has been calculated and especially the education and habituation to it necessary to its becoming a second nature if altogether opposed to the nature of spirit which makes contemporary life . . ."

Strauss: No. The present life.

Reader: " . . . the present life the object on which it acts, itself being the infinite impulsive activity to alter its forms."

Strauss: No. "To change it." Namely, the present life. It is of the essence of the nature of the mind to make the present life its object, meaning to look at it, to make it conscious and to change it. Now you see, this point here is quite remarkable. First he spoke of passion. Such a final order established in every detail is incompatible with passion. Naturally, passion would disturb it. It is incompatible with passion. Does this remind you of something?

Student: Such as, so often as reason is against man, so often will man be against reason?

Strauss: Yes. This connects with the same individual. Who was that?

Student: Hobbes.

Strauss: But what Hobbes says is somewhat more decisive - speaking of passion itself. He wants to revise the teaching regarding natural law and lays such principles down for a foundation as: Passion not mistrusting will not seek to misplace - or displace. In this respect Hegel agrees. It must be in harmony with passion.

But Hegel then replaces passion by spirit as you see in the immediate sequel. What is the connection between passion and spirit and from what point of view can they be identified?

Student: The only way in which a change suggested by spiritual reflection would actually cause practical change in the political order would be through someone's passion to become a great man.

Strauss: Oh, I see. This point. Yes. But both passion and spirit would protest against the platonic or Egyptian order using the same word. No freedom. Passion claims freedom. The mind claims freedom. And there is a certain connection between them according to Hegel.

This freedom both of passion and of the mind is provided for in the reasonable state as Hegel understands it. How? How is the freedom of passion provided for in the reasonable state? These are things which are very familiar to all of us from daily life, but we have only to see how they appear in theoretical formulation. Yes?

Student: Through self-legislation?

Strauss: Passion is not self-legislating. That is the trouble with it. Yes?

Student: Through wealth? Property?

Strauss: Yes. But that is too general. You come closer. Well, the reasonable state in Hegel's understanding includes the relative freedom of what he calls _____ which is the translation both of civil society and of _____ society.

He means the economic sphere in the sense of Adam Smith. Here you have them. I mean the businessmen who are concerned with enriching themselves are not necessarily reasonable men, self-legislating men, but they are surely prompted by the passion of self-enrichment. Private vices are public benefits. This is accepted by Hegel. But not only the free economy and free choice of professions. Professions also belong to a higher realm. You know, there is no free choice of professions in Plato's Republic. You have to take the job which the wise man assigns to you because they believe that they know better what is good for you than you do. Yes?

Student: Could a question be raised by the fact that the passion of wealth or property that is exercised in the economic sphere is relatively a low passion compared with . . .

Strauss: That was settled for Hegel somehow. That this kind of paternalistic regulation which is the alternative is degrading to the dignity of man. That was already settled before Hegel. At least by Kant.

Let us call this kind of thing going on in daily life and especially in economic life "the pursuit of happiness." That is the key point in Kant's teaching. To dictate to another man what kind of happiness he should pursue means to assert the role of his tutor. And this is incompatible with his freedom. Everyone must be free to pursue happiness as he sees it provided that he doesn't pursue happiness in a way that is wholly incompatible with living together. Then he must be stopped. But in matters which are compatible with living together and with a wealthy and prosperous society, by all means. Yes?

Student: Do I understand Hegel correctly to say that passions made compatible with the rational state by allowing the existence of something within the rational state which is not rational - the unregulated market, for example.

Strauss: Well there are, of course, limits. That is clear. But, yes. In this respect he accepts the whole Locke-Smithian view. He makes it a part of the rational state. That is settled.

Student: It is very difficult for me to . . .

Strauss: Well, are you a socialist by any chance?

Student: Hardly.

Strauss: So, then, you should not have any difficulty understanding it.

Student: What I meant was it is hard to believe that the rational state . . .

Strauss: Perhaps you are a victim of those people who call Hegel a deifier of the state and a precursor of totalitarianism

which is simply not true. Hegel accepted the constitutional monarchy of the 19th century which was quite authoritarian, but the opposite of totalitarian. The freedom of the economic sphere was taken for granted. That would be protected, of course, by prohibitions against fraud, the protection of property and so on. But that was clear. In this sense, Hegel is a liberal.

Student: I was wondering why in this long introductory paragraph with reference to passion and reason he did not bring it up then. I don't want to make a long point out of this. It may not be worth it, but on page 23 he gives this long paragraph.

Strauss: There he is thinking primarily of the passion of the world historical heroes which is not meant here. But there is, of course, a connection between, say, Adam Smith and the world historical heroes. Namely, in both cases, a man brings about an order which he does not intend. Let me state it more precisely. In the economic sphere, the man is concerned with his profit and only with his profit and yet this anarchy, this disorder, leads to the best order. Is this clear? Something similar happens in history. Men are not concerned - what did the Persians or Phoenicians think about the reasonable state? They did not have any inkling of that. But they pursued their goals as they understood them and, yet, through that passionate pursuit of their goals the rational state came into being. So you know what happens in the economic sphere. At any given time wherever there is freedom of enterprise, happens historically the whole stage of history. That the best order is brought about by people who do not think of that order. The traditional view, of course, was that this is altogether impossible. Someone has to think about order in order for it to come about, be it the government in the case of society or be it God in the case of religion. Yes?

Student: Does this assume, then, that once the rational state is realised that the passions of the world historical figures will be able to be turned somehow into simple economic passions? That there will be simple pursuit of happiness within the established order?

Strauss: No. In the first place, the economic passions must retain their freedom - of course, within the reasonable state. Otherwise it wouldn't be a reasonable state. Now, as for the world historical individuals. They are no longer necessary.

Student: So what happens to these people who, in other times, had passions which would have made them world historical?

Strauss: They cannot be, strictly speaking, world historical anymore, i.e. in an epoch of a new and higher level. But what they can do is - think of a man like Churchill. He protects the reasonable state, for example, against insanity which is, of course, always possible. But Churchill did not intro-

duce a new principle as, in a way, Napoleon or Alexander the Great did. In other words, this is still possible naturally.

For example, say some Englishman who would civilise India beyond what Hastings and other people had done. That is a good example from Hegel's point of view. He thought very highly of Hastings. This would apply, too, to China. We have seen that it is necessary that Europe conquers China and Europeanises China. That would be great deeds, but, still, no new principle, only expansion. Yes?

Student: Is this principle - the replacing of passions with spirit - does it have any connection with a metaphysical or theoretical proxy of practice over theory?

Strauss: Yes. But that is complicated. Let us leave it for the time being only at this fact. Today we use the word "passion" very frequently in a favorable sense very far removed from the sense which it had, say, in stoicism, but not only in stoicism. The traditional view was that the passions must be controlled by reason. But sometimes we speak of a man as a "passionate soul" praising him, not thinking of any control of passion by his reason. And I would say that a great change has taken place. A kind of emancipation and glorification of that. That is never an ingredient of Hegel.

Student: Without explaining it, then, you are saying that behind Hegel's thought there is a notion of a superiority as we might understand it of practice over theory.

Strauss: No. Ultimately, Hegel retains the supremacy of theory. But it comes out rather in this way. What is the object of theory? In Aristotle, the object of theory is the cosmos and the mind governing the cosmos. But for Hegel the highest object of theory is, one can say, what man has done in the whole course of history. So that practice and its products are the state. From Aristotle's point of view it would be absurd to say that the state has a higher philosophic status as an object than the cosmos. For Hegel it is elemental. For Aristotle these are subordinate subjects. For Hegel these are the highest objects of theory.

So theory we can say is, for Hegel, much more theory. It deals with the products of practice, the products of human actions much more than with the natural. This is entirely contrary to the original, Aristotelian scheme.

Student: Why, then, if this is so - that theory is higher than practice - would (inaudible) decide to work with the common market than to study theory. Presumably for Hegel it would be a higher thing to write because, by writing, other people would come to see the rational order. But if theory were higher in itself then wouldn't the person who understood Hegel merely sit back and contemplate the state rather than . . .

Strauss: You are referring to ?

Student: Yes.

Strauss: Well. I certainly do not know what would say, but I guess that he would say that since the truth has been discovered and laid bare by Hegel, and he has learned it from Hegel, sitting at his feet, the best that he can do is - after he has presented it to the world in a book - is to act according to it.

Student: (inaudible) contemplating the truth. It is hard to bring it into effect. That is the point.

Strauss: That I do not know. But I think that he would say that he is free to do it and he is in a much better position than any other practitioner because he has the best theoretical vantage. Or let us say simple human decency because if people like him would not go into politics, what would happen? He must do his duty.

Student: Another point. You mentioned a thread of Spinoza coming into Hegel - that the highest form of contemplation was of the universal in the concrete particular. And if Hegel and have worked out the rational state, what better way of contemplating it than by making it the common market so that . . .

Strauss: But for Hegel it is clear that the absolute mind, the highest form is philosophy, and that is meant as purely theoretical philosophy. Whereas the state belongs to the objective mind, lower than the absolute mind. Yes?

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: You mean because of the passion in the sense of the passion of Christ?

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: Not in this one. But the great difficulty and difference among Christians exists between Catholics and Protestants whether the perfect happiness of man does not consist in the beatific vision which is a form of contemplation. But certainly we are exposed to much better knowers of these things than I am, but as far as I understand, there was understood that there is an ingredient of the practical necessarily in beatific vision because of the element of law. Is this not so? You wouldn't say so?

Student: No.

Strauss: What about you?

Student: I don't know.

Strauss: Well, you are obliged to know it and not with a view to your prelims in the political science department.

Now let us continue where we left off because there is something else which is important.

In other words, the opposition of the mind to this kind of systems like the Platonic Republic or the Egyptian order.

Reader: "This impulse also expressed itself in Egypt in a peculiar way. It would appear at first as if the condition of things so regular, so determinate in every particular contained nothing which had a peculiarity entirely its own. The introduction of a religious element would seem to be an affair of no critical moment provided the higher necessities of men were satisfied. We should, in fact, rather expect that these would be introduced in a peaceful way."

Strauss: Let us stop here for one moment. So this is a crucial argument against Egypt. What we have seen before - this finality of the order. Yet the highest requirement is that of religion. And religion seems to go well with a determined, detailed order of life. For example, in Judaism. What about the Egyptian religion? And now we get the answer.

Reader: "But in contemplating the religion of the Egyptians (interruption in tape) . . . to do entirely with a spirit entirely different, one full of stirring and urgent impulses."

Strauss: In other words, the Egyptian religion is in no way static. And that shows the great superiority of Egypt. Then, in the sequel, he speaks of the Egyptian religion. Let us read the beginning of the next paragraph.

Reader: "The fundamental conception of that which the Egyptians regard as the essence of being rests on the determinate character of the natural world in which they live. And, more particularly, of the physical circle which the Nile and the sun mark out."

Strauss: He explains this more fully in the next paragraph. The Egyptain myth.

Reader: This basis of the life of the Egyptians determines, moreover, the particular tenor of the religious views. The controversy has long been waged respecting the sense of meaning of the Egyptian religion as early as the reign of "

Strauss: We do not have to go on. But, at any rate, he tries to explain how these two ingredients, the sun and the Nile, are understood by the Egyptian myth and ingredients of it, and then he brings in the story of in the second half of that paragraph. What is the peculiarity? Here, again, suffering is seen as something divine.

Reader: "Here, again, pain is regarded as something as divine and the same honor is assigned to it here as among the Phoenicians."

Strauss: In other words, this highest element apart from Judea which existed. Phoenicia is preserved in the Egyptian order. Yes?

Reader: Hermes then (inaudible) his grave is shown in various places. Osiris is now judge of the dead and lord of the kingdom of the shades. Osiris, the sun, the Nile. This triplicity of being is united in one knot. The sun is the symbol in which Osiris and the history of that god are recognized. The sun is likewise such a symbol. The concrete Egyptian imagination also ascribed to Osiris and Isis the introduction of agriculture, the invention of the plow, the hoe, etc. for Osiris gives not only the useful itself - the fertility of the earth - but, moreover, the means of making use of it. He also gives men laws, a civil order, and a religious ritual. He thus places in mens hands the means of labor and secures its results. Osiris is also the symbol of the seed which is placed in the earth and then springs up as also with the course of life. Thus we find this heterogenous duality the phenomenon of nature and of the spiritual woven together into one knot."

Strauss: And this means something higher than anything he did before. And in the next paragraph he makes clear that Egypt is characterized by radical symbolism much more than any earlier or later nation. Everything is meaning. Everything is symbol. This has to do with the fact that Egypt is the riddle, knowing itself as riddle and unable to solve itself. This is symbolized by the Sphynx. He develops it more fully in the sequel. We cannot go into that.

Let us turn to another point which is interesting. Page 211 in the second paragraph.

Reader: "Egyptian religion is chiefly zoolatry"

Strauss: Animal worship.

Reader: "We have observed the union here presented between the spiritual and the natural. The more advanced and elevated side of this conception is the fact that the Egyptians observed the spiritual as manifested in the Nile, the sun and the sowing of seeds, took the same view of the life of animals. To us, animal worship is repulsive. We may reconcile ourselves to the adoration of the material heaven . . ."

Strauss: Why "material?" "Material" is an addition of the translator.

Reader: " . . . but the worship of brutes is alien to us. For the abstract natural element . . ."

Strauss: He means the heavens or the sun.

Reader: " . . . seems to us more generic and, therefore, more worthy of veneration. Yet it is certain that the nations who worship the sun and the stars by no means occupy a higher grade than those who adore brutes, but contrariwise."

Strauss: Because otherwise Egypt would be much lower than those who worshipped only heaven.

Reader: "For in the brute world the Egyptians contemplate a hidden and incomprehensible principle. We also, when we contemplate the life and action of brutes, are astonished at their instincts, the adaptation of their movements to the object intended, their restlessness, exacerbility and liveliness for they are exceedingly quick and discerning in pursuing the ends of their existence while they are at the same time silent and shut up within themselves. We cannot make out what it is that possesses these creatures."

Strauss: These beasts.

Reader: " . . , these beasts, and cannot rely on them. A black tomcat with its glowing eyes its now gliding, now quick and darting movement has been deemed the presence of a malignant being, a mysterious, reserved spector. The dog, the canary bird, to the contrary, appear friendly and sympathizing. The lower animals are the truly incomprehensible. A man cannot by imagination or conception enter into the nature of the dog whatever resemblance he himself might have to it."

Strauss: "Might wish to have." Apparently there were some dog worshippers already in Hegel's Germany.

Reader: "It remains something altogether alien to him. It is in two departments that the so-called incomprehensible meets us. In living nature and in spirit. But it is only in nature that we have to encounter the incomprehensible for the being manifest to itself is the essence of spirit. Spirit understands and comprehends spirit."

Strauss: And, therefore, it is quite consistent if we wish to land eventually in the incomprehensible, in the mere mystery that we should worship brutes. The purpose of the statement is here clear. Namely, to defend the Egyptians against the criticism that their animal worshipping might show a lower level. On the contrary, Hegel says.

In Herodotus who is Hegel's chief source for what he says about Egypt and also Persia the Egyptians are presented as exaggeratedly pious in worshipping everything everything. And Socrates swears by the dog, the god of the Egyptians which is another sign of this universality.

Now the final formulation of that on page 213 in the second paragraph in the center.

Reader: "The hidden meaning, the spiritual, emerges as a human face from the brute. The multiform sphynxs with lion's bodies and virgins' heads or at male sphynxs with beards are evidence supporting the view that the meaning of the spiritual is the problem which the Egyptians proposed to themselves and the enigma generally is not the utterance of something unknown, but is a challenge to discover it implying a wish to be revealed. But, conversely, the human form is also disfigured by a brute face with a view of giving it a specific and definite expression. The refined art of Greece is able to attain a specific expression through the spiritual character given to an image in the form of beauty and does not need to deform the human face in order to be understood.

The Egyptians appended an explanation to the human forms even of the gods by means of heads and masks of brutes. e.g., has a dog's head, a lion's head with bull's horns and so forth."

Strauss: Now let us see page 214, paragraph 2. That is the summary of this point.

Reader: "We thus see Egypt intellectually confined by a narrow, involved, close view of nature. But breaking through this, impelling it to self-contradiction. and proposing to itself that problem which the contradiction implies."

Strauss: The abandonment of that contradiction. So, in other words, the contradiction is not sufficient. People can live in a contradiction without being bothered by it. Most of us most of the time do exactly that. But to become aware of that is a higher stage. Still another stage is to try to overcome that.

In other words, the sphynx is the formula for Egypt. The riddle, enigma, is the formula for Egypt. And, therefore, it points to the overcoming of the enigma and that is, then, Greece.

In other words, the pre-Egyptian cultures have not reached that stage where they see an enigma as enigma - as something which must be solved. They see mysteries. They do not see them as enigmas which must be solved. That is the peculiarity.

By the way, does any of you know (I don't) whether this mixture of human and brutish things - either human head, animal body or visa versa - is a peculiarity of Egypt? I remember that the Assyrian sphynxes are different animals. There are no human heads as far as I remember.

Student: Human heads on wolves.

Strauss: Where?

Student: In Assyria.

Strauss: I see. I haven't been there for a long time. You don't know whether this was already under Egyptian influence.

Well, Hegel, of course, made all of these statements on the basis of the knowledge available at his time.

Is there any one point which you would like to bring up?

Student: Hegel criticised Persia. I think that the criticism was of being self-contained. In other words, it is not pointing to any principle outside of itself. Do you recall?

Strauss: Yes. That was, of course, still true of India and China.

Student: Xenophon presents that same criticism of Cyrus to whom Hegel refers many times in the discussion of Persia. Xenophon brings it out that Cyrus has this fundamental defect. For example, when he counseled his troops to moderation it was only for the sake of future opportunity they would get to more completely indulge their passions. Now the question is, can we see in one world historical figures the fundamental defect which later characterized the world historical epoch which they introduced.

Strauss: Hegel does use Xenophon's work. When Herodotus presents the Persians, he means the Persians, but Xenophon uses Cyrus as a kind of peg to hang on his reflections on the fundamentals of politics without caring whether this is Persian or not. The only remarks of Xenophon about Persia which can be taken to be historical are those which occur in _____ - in the expedition about Cyrus that he discusses there. This much about the purely historical.

What Xenophon means by saying that people control their desires for sensual pleasures in order to enjoy sensual pleasures - this is a much larger and very important phenomenon discussed by Plato, for example, in the Phaedo regarding Socrates' death. Here he says that most people are courageous out of cowardice, and they are moderate out of lack of self-control. That is his point. In other words, pseudo-virtue. And that is the broader thing which Xenophon has in mind. And what he wants to convey by this is that that is what Cyrus stands for altogether - this great empire built.

Student: The empire he built . . .

Strauss: . . . collapsing immediately after his death, according to Xenophon.

Student: But, at least according to Hegel, the Persian Empire was characterised by a similar if not identical defect.

Strauss: I don't believe that there is any connection between Xenophon's criticism of "Persia" which is really not Persia, but which is man - everyone, non-philosophic man - there is no connection there.

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: I think, of course, that Hegel thinks that Oedipus the Greek solved the riddle of the sphynx. Hegel, in this respect, I think means that this old story has a very profound historical truth. That is what he means. Whether Hegel uses that for the understanding of the Oedipus drama - I don't think that he does that. In other words, the connection between Oedipus solving the riddle and the riddle - you know what the answer to the question of the sphynx is. Man. I do not know whether Hegel tries to connect the fact that Oedipus solved the riddle with the fact that he killed his father and committed incest with his mother. I don't remember. He does?

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: Yes. I believe that that belongs to the old story at least to the story as it was used by the dramatic poets.

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: Yes. You may do that. Tell the class what you are about to do.

Student: This is a poem of Yeats called "Second Coming" which compares with the of Hegel.

Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the center cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.

Surely some revelation is at hand;
Surely the Second Coming is at hand.
The Second Coming! Hardly are those words out
When a vast image out of Spiritus Mundi
Troubles my sight: somewhere in the sands of the desert
A shape with lion body and the head of a man,
A gaze blank and pitiless as the sun,
Is moving its slow thighs, while all about it
Reel shadows of the indignant desert birds.
The darkness drops again; but now I know
That twenty centuries of stony sleep
Were vexed to nightmare by a rocking cradle,
And what rough beast, its hour come round at last,
Slouches toward Bethlehem to be born?

Strauss: Can you say a few words about what you see to be the connection between this poem and what Hegel suggests?

Student: I think that the most immediate thing has to do with the reference to this figure with the shape of a lion and head of a man. He seems to attribute the same signi-

ficance to this symbol of Egypt as Hegel does. That is a possibility, I think.

Secondly, this figure has been somehow passed by Christianity. And this compares in just the opposite way to what Hegel is talking about.

Strauss: Well, in an ultimate way, of course, it would agree with Hegel insofar as Greece itself, which immediately solves the riddle of the Sphynx, becomes entangled in a dialectic of its own which it finally solves only by Christianity or, rather, by the secularisation of Christianity.

We will take this up next time.

Seminar on Hegel
The Philosophy of History
Session 9, February 2, 1965

Thank you very much. That was a very fine paper. Can I see your last page because I didn't quite understand something.

Let me try to state your criticism more generally and then we may come to the peculiarities which you mention. Hegel had said earlier when speaking about his philosophy of history that it presupposes philosophy, that is Hegel's philosophy. But it is not entirely dependent on that. In a certain way, Hegel's philosophy of history is empirical. And you raised the question, "How empirical is it?" Now if you say that Hegel disregards certain features which are manifest, Hegel could, of course, answer you immediately, "These are not essential." That is the point which he made. That the purely empirical which is not selective and doesn't make the distinction between the essential and the unessential is sheer stupidity. That is clear. That is, I believe, today generally admitted in various forms in positivistic epistemology.

But how does Hegel perceive in a general way (we must be liberal in the good sense of the word, of course - giving the individual the opportunity to have his say, without as it were preventing him from finishing his sentence when he says something which we do not like or do not understand) - we have now read half of his work and we should be able to say something about this. You can take the example of Persia or Egypt or India or Greece in all cases. What does he do? There is an infinite variety of facts. Of course, more facts were accessible to him in the case of Greece than in the other cases, but still . . . How does he proceed? You gave the example (inaudible)

and he speaks only of the Olympian gods. You are correct. This is an incomplete picture of Greek religion. How would Hegel argue?

Student: Well, he throughout has been looking at what each particular person sees as highest.

Strauss: Even more superficially. What is peculiar to that? Where do we find gods of human shape and beautiful gods and they are the chief gods. However important may be, Zeus is more important. He would say that the specifically Greek are the beautiful gods, and that is what he says. How do we know that? How do we know that they were beautiful? Well, our chief source, our most direct source is what?

Student: The statues.

Strauss: The plastic art. So Greek divinity is inseparable from art. So he calls it the religion of art. This is one point.

Now let us take another example regarding Egypt where he also selects arbitrarily. Why does he select the Pyramids in the first place?

Student: My argument is that he had two reasons for doing it. They were the first to consider the soul immortal. They considered the death very important. And, further, I think that there was a symbolic reason.

Strauss: But I think that the first, superficial, and very powerful reason that is most striking - where else do you have pyramids? These peculiar forms of buildings prove to be tombs of kings. Therefore, this peculiar concern with death which shows itself in the embalming of bodies, is the peculiarity of Egypt.

Similar considerations apply to the Sphynx especially since, in this case, the link between Greece and Egypt is so clear. A Greek here well known to us through still present tragedies was the one who solved the riddle of the Sphynx. And Hegel believes that this was a direct precentation of the Greek self-conscience. The Greeks knew themselves as people who had solved the riddle which the Egyptians had not solved, and which the other oriental nations had not even raised. So here that is solid evidence. And if someone says, "But Oedipus was a mere myth" and so forth and Hegel would say, "Are not such myths much more revealing about human beings than chronicles about the revenues of kings or maybe of victories and defeats?" That is not a bad point.

Now Hegel takes the story of Oedipus very literally. What was the riddle which he fought?

Student: He was asked the question, "What has this nature?" And the answer is, "Man."

Strauss: So, in other words, the Egyptians still did not know that the solution to the riddle was man. And now Hegel reminds himself of another notorious fact surely known to every schoolboy at that time. Namely, that one of the most famous Greek gods, Apollo, had an orator in Delphi and from there one of the great advices or counsel is given. In a way, the most famous of all was, "Know thyself." That does not mean to know thyself as Mr. Smith with such and such banking account and so and so many cars. But it means to know thyself as a human being. For example, one symbolisation is the skeleton. No immortality.

So the Greeks were concerned with self-knowledge, i.e. knowledge of man, what man is. And this is only the other side of the Oedipus story.

Now what did you say, on the basis of Hegel of course, about Oedipus's crime or sin?

Student: Hegel uses the idea that Oedipus's knowledge of man was connected with the crimes.

Strauss: Yes.

Student: What I took that to mean was that his particular sort of understanding of man was such that it was merely an ideal or an abstract (I don't know how Hegel would describe it) understanding of the universal form and it was connected with knowing that the species of universal man had a spirit, but not that the particular men in the civil society or that particular people were free and, similarly, Oedipus's crime was connected with the fact that he didn't know the particular facts about himself and about his own relationship to his own civil society.

Strauss: In any case, the knowledge remained abstract. Hegel does not suggest that this might be an essential part of the Greek story - that solving the riddle of the Sphynx is - in itself - having committed the most terrible crime. That he does not suggest. In other words, the most terrible crimes being killing one's father and incest with one's mother. And to know the truth about man - which in a way includes all truth - is only possible for a man who has committed crimes. In other words, that Oedipus is not fully self-conscious, that he doesn't know what it means to solve the riddle of the Sphynx - that he does not suggest.

Student: If he does suggest it, I missed it.

Strauss: No. No. Last time we spoke of it briefly and one of you said that he does suggest it, but after having reread it I see again that he does not suggest it. The thought would not be completely alien to Hegel, although he does not use it, as is shown by something which we will discuss next time. But perhaps the gentleman who reads the paper next time can help us in that matter.

Mr. _____, is there some awareness in Hegel that seeking the most important truth is, in a way, the greatest crime?

Socrates. Socrates. Socrates was just to be condemned. Of course, the atrocities of Oedipus are not mentioned in the case of Socrates, but this is only a matter of a more massive or less massive presentation of the same fundamental problem.

Now which of the particular difficulties or objections to Hegel did I not discuss which you think should be discussed?

Student: At the end there was something about the question: How conscious were the Greeks of poetry (inaudible)

Strauss: Yes. It was implied. How would you reply to Mr. _____'s question?

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: But how did I answer that question implicitly?

(laughter) Now you shouldn't laugh about that. Sometimes I make jokes voluntary or involuntary, but that was not.

The point is this. Hegel demands two things. Empirical procedure. Let's look at the Greeks intelligently - not forgetting the woods for the trees. But, on the other hand, we must bring with us philosophy. Hegel's philosophy. Therefore, he interprets the empirical data without any shame, so to speak, from the Hegelian point of view. And, therefore, he doesn't take seriously for one moment the Greek notion of art as imitation.

Student: Why is it that he doesn't take that seriously, but does take the Egyptian awareness of death and not the Hindu awareness of death seriously?

Strauss: First let us see the main point. Hegel takes the massive facts - say the Homeric documents - and as presented to us especially most visibly in Greek (inaudible). And he says, "Look around. Where else do you find that?" That is one thing. And, of course, we will add immediately the polis of which he speaks later. You know, free small states with this high development of public speech etc. The things which are surely known to every one of you who has taken any course in general civilisation.

Then Hegel says, "Of course, that must be interpreted." And the interpretation - the categories underlying the interpretation - are supplied by Hegel himself - naturally. By Hegel's philosophy.

There are certain problems here. I am aware of that. And these concern both the soundness of Hegel's historical interpretation and (inaudible)

Now we come to the specific point. In the case of the Hindu death he did not consider the concern (inaudible)

Student: And the reason that I thought that he didn't was that the Hindus were not aware that their own theory might apply to mortality, whereas the Egyptians were explicitly aware of that.

Strauss: Does anyone know how Hegel would defend himself regarding India? What is the most peculiar thing regarding Indian religion as Hegel saw it?

Student: Indefinite nothingness.

Strauss: Nirvana. The complete absorption of the individual into the one absolute. Now, compared with that the things which play around, as it were, and come from a less high inspiration are dismissed. The Greeks had no nirvana. Instead of that they had the Olympus. Similar considerations would apply to Egypt. Yes?

Student: (inaudible) on the point of whether Greek thinking is concrete and looking at things which are or fanciful. The last sentence that he has about Mantaya is on the bottom of page 236. "Mantaya, in fact, is poesy. Not a capricious indulgence of fancy, but an imagination which introduces the spiritual into the natural. In short, a richly intelligent perception." Now I think that this is Hegel's formula for that mean that the Greek spirit has between the merely submitting to nature of the Oriental and of the consciously fictitious . . .

Strauss: No. What he has in mind is that in _____ you have the two elements. First, the wholly unintelligible (to you or me) things - the sounds and noises or whatever it may be). Then there is someone elses's (inaudible) called the interpreter. And this to which he refers here. Oracle is meaningless without the clearly distinguished interpretation. The natureal - the noises which the _____ produces when sitting on the tripod, on the one hand. In itself, merely natural. One can even say that it is nonsensical. Or take the intestines of some animal. And then there is something interpreted clearly distinguished here the natural, the spiritual.

Student: And this is the character of Greek poesy.

Strauss: No. On the contrary. Greek religion is poetry. You cannot turn it around and say that Greek poetry is always religion. You know that there was some poetry which was not religion. I wanted to speak about that anyway. The Greek gods. Everyone has seen some of these statues. But we know something else from literary sources and from great authorities. One is one that Hegel quotes more than once. Namely, Herodotus's statement. Who gave the Greeks their gods? For the ordinary Greek understands only that the gods are there. That goes without saying. But Herodotus, reflecting, raises the question, "Where do they come from?" And what did he say?

Student: Homer and Hesiod.

Strauss: Yes. And everyone would call Homer and Hesiod poets. The Greeks called them already poets, although Homer himself didn't call himself a poet.

Student: My point was, didn't Hegel's understanding of the Greeks was not really so far different from some of the Greek's understanding of themselves? In other words, Herodotus implies to a certain extent that the recognition of the gods was as much an act of creation as of perceiving what was already there.

Strauss: Well, of course Hegel knew Greek philosophy quite well, but what he is concerned with, at least in the part that we discussed today,(and in a way in the whole presentation) is the pre-philosophic understanding of Greekness by the Greeks. About the philosophers he wrote in his history of

philosophy. But this he wanted to understand and, therefore, he took the naive, philosophically unreflective (inaudible) as the most important.

Student: But my question would be: Is his final understanding of Greek poetry so different from the understanding of the Greeks. Is there a common ground between the two understandings, that it was as much creation as it was simple possession. It was an activity of the individual, and not simply passive . . .

Strauss: I would say that the understanding must be profoundly different, although there are important points of agreement, for this reason: Which part of philosophy, according to the now prevailing view and to the view of Hegel, deals with poetry and culture and this kind ofthing?

Student: Aesthetics.

Strauss: Yes. There is a very large and very beautiful aesthetics lecture available. Now what is the theme of aesthetics? The term was coined only in the 18th century, but what was the theme of aesthetics in a general way?

Student: The way in which works of art affect us.

Strauss: No. That is not . . .

Student 2: The beauty.

Strauss: The beautiful. And Hegel is, perhaps, more responsible than anyone else for this change. That aesthetics is concerned with the beautiful in art and not with the beautiful simply. Hegel does discuss what he calls the natural beautiful, say, a beautiful human body. And primarily for the Greeks the beautiful human body or even that of a horse - for a living horse is more beautiful than a beautifully sculptured horse which does not have life. And in this respect, for Hegel it is opposite. The sculptured horse is higher in rank than the living horse. We will come to that later. So this is a radical difference which has to do with the posture towards Nature.

When Hegel speaks about these matters he uses the term "nature" from his point of view, i.e. in connection with matters in which the Greeks would not have spoken of Nature. We will come accross some of these passeges.

Student: (inaudible)
. . . It has to do with the potencies found in Nature, an idealizing for Aristotle. The idealizing is a spiritual activity and putting it into concrete matter and produce a beautiful work of art.

Strauss: Up to this point, yes. But would there not still be a difference coming out of the question of Nature? For Aristotle the beautiful - of which he speaks also in his

Metaphysics, perhaps more than in his Poetics. For Aristotle the most beautiful is not the works of art. The beautiful order of the cosmos. A living being. The order of numbers and such things. Yes?

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: No. Not more beautiful.

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: No. You cannot possibly use some pigeon holes and administrative arrangements. For Hegel, the true is radically distinguished from the beautiful and higher than it. And for Plato and Aristotle, somehow, the true and the beautiful are both inside of the highest level - the ideas. Whether we can immediately understand it or not is an entirely different matter.

Student: But isn't the beautiful somehow an anticipation of the true? Hegel doesn't say that they are not related.

Strauss: No. I would agree with that. I believe that this will become clearer when we turn to specific questions.

Now let us begin unless there is an urgent question about that which we just discussed. Then we turn to page 215 in the first paragraph where he says that for other people history consists of a series of events.

Reader: "While among other nations history consists of a series of events as, for example, that of the Romans who century after century lived only with a view to conquest and to accomplish the subjugation of the world, the Egyptians raised an empire equally mighty of achievement in works of art whose rulers proved their indestructability and which are greater and more worthy of astonishment than all other works of ancient or modern times."

Strauss: So the deeds of the Egyptians are works of art, not political deeds. This is one of the observations of an empirical type out of which Hegel weaves his construction.

Now let us turn to the third paragraph on the same page. There are a few passages here. I will read to you how they are translated literally.

"As a nation views the essential man so is that nation itself, so is its character."

And then, speaking a bit later of the immortality of the soul, "That the soul is immortal should mean that the soul is something else than nature. Mind is independent for itself." The thought that the mind is immortal - that is in paragraph 4, page 215. Read this

Reader: "But this proposition - that the soul is immortal - "

Strauss: "The mind is immortal," he says here.

Reader: "That the mind is immortal is intended to mean that it is something other than nature, that spirit is inherently independent. The _____ of blessedness among the Hindus was the passing over into abstract unity, into nothingness.

On the other hand, subjectivity - when free - is inherently infinite. The kingdom of free spirit is, therefore, the kingdom of the invisible, such as Hades was conceived by the Greeks. This presents itself to men first as the empire of death - to the Egyptians as the realm of the dead."

Strauss: A nation is what it is by virtue of what it looks up to, of what it regards as the highest, as the divine. The highest is this mind. Therefore, the rank of a culture depends upon the extent to which it has understood mind in its peculiarity.

There is here a difficulty which stems from the German word which I translated here as "mind." _____ It means also "spirit." The "mind" points to the philosophic tradition. The "spirit" points to the theological tradition. This is indistinguishable in the German word. The Holy Ghost as you have it in English. So you could, in other words, translate the same word both by "mind" and "ghost" which would be very awkward in a translation, but you must keep this in mind.

The Egyptians discovered the immortality of the soul. The Jews did not know of it. We have seen that in the chapter on Judaism. That is axiomatic for Hegel - that there is no immortality of the soul in the Old Testament.

Most so-called critical scholars today agree with Hegel, but it is by no means universally admitted.

Hegel later explains that the embalming of the dead and the doctrine of metempsychosis is below the level of the belief in the immortality of the soul. Yet this habit of embalming bespeaks a respect of the human body and, as such, it is something noble. Regarding the body as the abode of the mind.

On page 218, paragraph 1.

Reader: "If death thus haunted the minds of the Egyptians during life it might be supposed that their disposition was melancholy. But the thought of death by no means occasioned depression. At banquets they had representations of the dead as Herodotus relates with the admonition, "Eat, drink, for such a one will Thou become when thou art dead." Death was thus to them rather a call to enjoy life."

Strauss: The respect of the body which we find in the process of embalming is connected with their enjoyment of life - a certain joining of the mortal (the human) and the immortal divine has been achieved in Egypt.

In the sequel Hegel speaks of the relation of Egypt to the Orient in general and to Greece in particular where he uses the Oedipus story. We have spoken of that before. But there are a few more points. On page 221 at the beginning of the second paragraph.

Reader: "The inward or ideal transition from Egypt to Greece is as just exhibited. But Egypt became a province of the great Persian kingdom and the historical transition takes place when the Persian world comes in contact with the Greek."

Strauss: Do you see the use of the word "historical" here? What does this mean?

Student: Empirical in contradistinction to . . .

Strauss: Well . . . Yes?

Student 2: Doesn't is simply mean outward?

Strauss: Yes, but I think that it means more clearly the political. And it wouldn't be surprising because, after all, even today if someone tells you that he is an historian, you take it for granted that he is a political historian. Otherwise he would say, "an art historian, an economic historian" or something like that.. In other words, historian qualified. But a historian simply is a political historian. I note this only as an interesting reminder of the state of things.

By the way, in the sequel it becomes perfectly clear. Read on.

Reader: "Here, for the first time, an historical transition meets us. This in the fall of an empire. China and India, as already mentioned, have remained. Persia has not. The transition to Greece is, indeed, internal, but here it shows itself also externally as a transmission of sovereignty, an occurrence which, from this time forward is ever an anon repeated."

Strauss: In the sequel he makes clear that - as we know already - permanance as we find it in India and China is not in itself a sign of superiority. We have discussed this at great length. He gives here an example. He says . . .

Reader: "Unperishable mountains are not superior to the quickly dismantled rose exhaling its life and fragrance."

Strauss: In other words, permanence is not as such superior to the ineternal thought which has very crucial implications and is, in a way, underlying the more recent development whereby the notion of eternity has been abandoned.

I have here a more recent edition which has some passages which are not in the older edition in the English translation. Let me see what he says here about the peculiarities of the Greeks.

"In the Oriental world the moral substance and the subject are opposed to each other. The moral substance is known as natural or abstract. The moral is despot for the subject and shows itself done by the will of a single one who is opposed by the unfree subjects."

This is changed radically in Greece. You must not forget that here Hegel speaks of the Orientals in general. Therefore, of the Old Testament in particular too. How is this intelligible?

Here in Greece, he says, is the realm of the Occident, of the human mind, of the self-awareness of the human mind. How is this possible? How can he say this about the Bible? Oriental despotism. That is the famous formula. All are subjects except one who, according to Hegel, cannot himself be truly free because of the unfreedom of everyone else. How could this possibly be applied to the Old Testament? How can we understand that?

Student: Would he mean the despotism, as it were, of God.

Strauss: Exactly. Therefore he uses the phrase, "of the unique." So what you find in the Orient is a fear of the lord with a small "l" or with a capital and this is fundamentally changed in the Occident and, especially, in Greece. That is his point.

Now on page 223 in the second paragraph you find one of these statements of Hegel which one can perhaps blame him for.

Reader: "The highest form that floated before Greek imagination was Achilles, the son of the poet, the Homeric youth of the Trojan wars."

Strauss: By the way, that is a very fine reproduction of Hegel. I do not know whether he did it consciously. Somewhere Plato says, "the Achilles of Homer" in the Greek phrase where you say, for example, "Solomon of David" meaning the son of David.

Reader: "Homer is the element in which the Greek world lives, as man does in the air. The Greek life is a truly youthful achievement. Achilles, the ideal youth of poetry. Alexander the Great, the ideal youth of reality concluded it. Both appear in contest with Asia."

Strauss: That is enough. So, in other words, the youthfulness of Greece is symbolized in the fact of Achilles at the beginning and Alexander the Great at the end. Here, of course, what would we say about these assertions?

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: No. Something very simple. In the case of Alexander the historical figure, the necessity of Alexander having died young. You know, the Homeric gods and these things are obviously essential to Greece. But that Alexander should have died young cannot have this essential character. This is the difficulty which I find when he makes such remarks.

Now the Greeks are the first who did not begin their formation of culture only with Nature, starting from scratch as we would say. Rather, by presupposing and transforming a foreign culture. This is higher from his point of view.

Let us turn to page 226, line 3.

Reader: "At the origin of their national unity separation as a generic feature, inherent distinctness of character, is the distinct point that has to be considered. The first phase in the subjugation of this constitutes the primary period of Greek culture. And only through such distinctness of character and such a subjugation of it would the beautiful free Greek spirit produce. Of this principle we must have a clear conception. It is a superficial and absurd idea that the beautiful and truly free life can be produced by a process so incomplex as the development of a race keeping within the limits of blood relationship and friendship. Even the plant which supplies the nearest analogy to such a calm, homogenous unfolding lives and grows only by means of the antithetic activities of light, air and water. The only real antithesis that spirit can have is itself spiritual, its inherent heterogeneity through which alone it acquires the power of realizing itself as spirit.

The history of Greece exhibits at its commencement this interchange and mixture of partly homesprung, partly quite foreign stock."

Strauss: And so on. So this passage shows quite clearly that Hegel had nothing to do with any racism. He says that heterogeneity is essential for the higher levels and the defect of the Orientals would be, from this point of view, that they have not been sufficiently mixed with one another. But this I say only in passing lest there be a misunderstanding of Hegel altogether.

The more interesting point, I think, is this: By the way, the questioning of the value of autochthony goes together with the questioning of the supremacy of agriculture compared with industry of which we have spoken before. The sea and living on the sea is, in a way, superior to a merely landlocked life. But for those of you who know a bit of the classics of Greek political philosophy must be quite impressed here by this Hegelian remark.

Student: The best city that the Athenian stranger suggests- well, of course, you build it way back from the sea.

Strauss: That is clear. But this point here is regarding the heterogeneity of the population.

Student 2: He mentions that Attica was especially mixed racially, but that they were the people who could claim to be autochtonous.

Strauss: In other words, here he appeals from a lesser (inaudible)
But in the philosophic texts, does he not speak about the homogeneity and heterogeneity of the population? Mr. _____?

Student: The Greeks are considered homogeneous in comparison to (inaudible)

Strauss: But more specifically . . .

Student 2: The city is preferred to the diverse empire because there is the homogeneity. Aristotle speaks of _____ and Plato tells us that the great unifying myth of the society is that the men are all brothers.

Strauss: But the mere fact that it is a myth does not mean that it must be literally true. That is not the point.

There is a discussion in Plato's Laws. I only looked up my reference to it in my discussion of Plato in The History of Political Philosophy on page 36. Plato suggests that a certain heterogeneity of the settlers of the new city is good for it, but only a certain amount. This only in passing.

But the more important and more obvious remark on this subject is found right at the beginning of the Politics. How is the polis there presented?

Student: Is that the discussion of unity and diversity - the degree of unity that is good for the polis?

Strauss: No. That is in the second book.

Student 2: It is the natural expansion of the family.

Strauss: Exactly. The family, the village. So, in other words, the great land farmer who has ten or fifteen sons and each has his own household. A small village. When they unite with other villages there is the polis.

Now what does--this difference between Aristotle and Hegel mean? What Aristotle says there is not necessarily crucial for this question. Yes?

Student: Isn't this really a part of Aristotle's question of the natural development of the polis as opposed to the totally created nature of the polis?

Strauss: Exactly. In other words, but Aristotle wants to show here at least is that the city is natural. He wants to show, therefore, that it could have come into being even this coming into being could have been perfectly natural via the village as he here describes it. That is indeed true. He wants to counter the point of view that the city is altogether conventional, i.e. has come into being necessarily by nothing but contract. Yes?

Student: Well, that wouldn't be Aristotle's final view, would it? It is not just a natural expansion of the family.

Strauss: Surely not. The coming into being is one thing and the being or essence is another thing.

But the difference truly is this: For Aristotle the fundamental distinction which is underlying this discussion is that between nature and convention. And for Hegel it is that between nature and mind. This affects everything including the question of art.

Now here is another point - a remark which appears also in the translation when he speaks of the tools which man makes. He says that it is a rule of reason by which nature is turned against nature. In other words, certain natural qualities - say of a hammer - are turned against natural qualities - say, of wood. But both qualities are natural. But when one becomes a tool it is no longer merely natural. It is a work of the mind. And Hegel goes on to say that these human inventions belong to the mind and such a tool which a man invents is a higher thing than a natural thing for it is a mental, spiritual thing. So the artifacts have a higher status than the natural facts. None of the Greek philosophers would have said that. That is the key difference and it affects also the relation of the works of art to natural beauty.

Now there are many more passages. Page 227, bottom. Hegel says here in passing that the natural nationality is a very obscure matter. In German _____

_____.

But the spiritual, intellectual difference between nations has nothing to do - or is not identical with - the natural nationality, with the merely ethnic one.

Now on page 227, bottom.

Reader: "We have just spoken of heterogeneity as an element of the Greek spirit and it is well known that the rudiments of Greek civilization are connected with the advent of foreigners. This origin of their moral life . . ."

Strauss: No, here he says that one can compare Greece in this respect with North America. Do you have that? Also a land of immigrants and heterogeneous origins.

Reader: Page 228. "We thus observe a colonization by civilized peoples who were in advance of the Greeks in point of culture, though we cannot compare this colonization with that of the English in North America for the latter have not been blended with the aborigines, but have dispossessed them."

Strauss: Read this passage again.

Reader: "Therefore one cannot compare this colonization with that of the English in North American for the latter have not been blended with the aborigines, but have dispossessed them."

Strauss: This is not altogether irrelevant. Hegel doesn't mean this in the sense of a moral judgement. We know that Hegel was not an anti-colonialist. But it is interesting regarding the question of America. Remember we discussed the question of an American principle which might emerege in the future - if there is one. America is an offspring of Europe and, whereas the Greeks - by creating a synthesis, as it were, of their own and of something foreign, created something new, the same cannot be said of America as Hegel saw it.

Student: What about the melting pot? We would now claim that America is not England all over again.

Strauss: Hegel does not say that - considering the preponderance of the European element in America. Unless you were to say that the Negro element has such a profound effect - something which James Baldwin wishes to suggest. But whether that is a defensible thesis is controversial.

Student: But merely within the European mixtures have taken place that never took place on the continent of Europe. One never found English and Hungarians in such proximity and that makes a difference.

Strauss: Yes, but I know some Hungarians living in England and making a very good go of it.

Now on page 231, end of the first paragraph. He compares the Crusades to the Trojan wars.

Reader: "So, likewise, in the Middle Ages we see the whole of Christendom united to attain one object - the conquest of the Holy Sepulchre. But in spite of all the victories achieved, with just as little permanent results. The Crusades are the Trojan War of newly awakened Christendom waged against the simple, homogeneous clarity of Mohammedanism."

Strauss: What struck me here - some of you will have read Spengler. This is the kind of thing which Spengler does all the time. This parallels in different cultures, especially in the medieval, modern world on the one hand, and in the Greek world on the other hand. This is very striking, to say that the Trojan War is the Crusades of Greeks or visa versa.

Let us turn to page 235, line 9 from bottom when he comes to Greek mythology.

Reader: "That Nature answered the questions which the Greek put to her is in this converse sense true. That he obtained the answer to the questions of Nature from his own spirit. The insight of the seer becomes, thereby, purely poetical. The spirit supplies the signification which the natural image expresses. Everywhere the Greeks desire to clear presentation and interpretation of the natural. Homer tells us in the last book of the Odyssey that while the Greeks were overwhelmed with sorrow for Achilles, a violent agitation came over the sea. The Greeks were at the point of dispersing in terror when the experienced Nestor arose to interpret the phenomenon to them. Thetis , he said, was coming with her nymphs to lament the death of her son.

When a pestilence broke out in the camp of the Greeks the priest Calchas explained that Apollo was incensed at their not having restored the daughter of his priest Chryses when a ransom had been offered. The Oracle was originally interpreted exactly in this way."

Strauss: Let us drop this and go on to a bit later when he speaks about the Iliad.

Reader: "When Ulysses, among the Pheacians, has thrown his discus further than the rest, and one of the Pheacians shows a friendly disposition toward him, the Poet recognizes in him Pallas-Athene. Such an explanation denotes the perception of the inner meaning, the sense, the underlying truth; and the poets were in this way the teachers of the Greeks - especially Homer. Mention in fact is Poesy - not a capricious indulgence of fancy, but an imagination which introduces the Spiritual into the Natural - in short, a richly intelligent perception. The Greek Spirit, on the whole, therefore, is free from superstition, since it changes the sensuous into the sensible."

Strauss: That is the key point. Greek religion is poetry, not superstition. That is its peculiar greatness and freedom.

Now he comes to the core of the problem. And one point which Hegel constantly makes and defensively, is that there were all kinds of superstitions in Greece, but that these are, simply, archaic and foreign relics. This is not the essence of the Greek religion, although it is there. What justifies Hegel in making this distinction? Why is this distinction justified by Greek religion itself? Hegel has a reason.

I do not know whether it came out in your assignment for today, Mr. _____. What is the reason why Hegel is entitled to make such a distinction between the Greek proper and the archaic and/or foreign?

Student: I think that I know what you are referring to. I think that it is in the next section - (inaudible)

Strauss: The simple distinction, the Greeks themselves make in their stories. There were the old gods who ruled originally and then the rule of Zeus and the new generation of gods. Therefore, the Greeks had an awareness that there was an older stratum of gods and, subjectively, of beliefs which played a role until the end, but which were no longer ruling, no longer predominant. That is, I think, his justification.

On page 238, in the second paragraph.

Reader: "In summing up the constituents of the Greek Spirit, we find its fundamental characteristic to be, that the freedom of Spirit is conditioned by and has an essential relation to some stimulus supplied by Nature. Greek freedom of thought is excited by an alien existence; but it is free because it transforms and virtually reproduces the stimulus by its own operation."

Strauss: For Hegel it does not make such a great difference whether this external thing which stimulates the creative action, comes from Nature or from other nations. It is not their own. And to that extent it has its origin in something alien. And, therefore, that is the limited character of Greek freedom compared with modern freedom. Yes?

Reader: "This phase of Spirit is the medium between the loss of individuality on the part of man (such as we observe in the Asiatic principle, in which the Spiritual and Divine exists only under a Natural form), and Infinite Subjectivity as pure certainty of itself - the position that the Ego is the ground of all that can lay claim to substantial existence."

Strauss: In other words, that is alien to the Greek mind, the infinite subjectivity as the pure certainty of itself. The thought that the ego is the soil for everything that claims to be valid. Therefore, dependence on things alien to the ego - nature. But, nevertheless, within these limits the freedom of the mind is recognized within these limits and, therefore, Greece is higher than the Orient.

Student: This second principle which he takes to be the principle of modern (inaudible)

Strauss: Yes. And of Christianity altogether. Only the modern philosophy gives the adequate interpretation of what Christianity means.

Reader: "The Greek Spirit as the medium between these two . . ."

Strauss: "As the mean"

Reader: " . . . as the mean between these two, begins with Nature, but transforms it into a mere objective form of its (Spirit's) own existence; Spirituality is therefore not yet absolutely free; not yet absolutely self-produced - is not self-stimulation. Setting out from surmise and wonder, the Greek

Spirit advances to definite conceptions of the hidden meanings of Nature. In the subject itself too, the same harmony is produced. In Man, the side of his subjective existence which he owes to Nature is the Heart, the Disposition, Passion, and Variety of Temperament: this side is then developed in a spiritual direction to free individuality; so that the character is not placed in a relation to universally valid moral authorities, assuming the form of duties, but the Moral appears as a nature peculiar to the individual - an exertion of will, the result of disposition and individual constitution. This stamps the Greek character as that of Individuality conditioned by Beauty . . ."

Strauss: Why not "beautiful individuality?" And we will see that, while it is the beautiful individuality as shown in the Greek gods, it is nevertheless fundamentally deficient. But this is the great progress made by the Greeks beyond the Orient, according to Hegel. Yes?

Reader: " . . . beautiful individuality, which is produced by Spirit, transforming the merely Natural into an expression of its own being."

Strauss: In other words needs the natural as means of expression.

Reader: "The activity of Spirit does not yet possess in itself the material and organ of expression, but needs the excitement of Nature and the matter which Nature supplies: it is not free, self-determining Spirituality, but mere naturalness formed to Spirituality - Spiritual Individuality. The Greek Spirit is the plastic artist, forming the stone into a work of art."

Strauss: And that, of course, is the limit of it also. It is beautiful individuality, but not yet spiritual individuality.

Student: Does he mean this only as the character of the Greek gods and the Greek poetry, or does he mean it to apply to the philosophy as well.

Strauss: He speaks about that later. But it did not ever even there lead to an understanding of spiritual individuality. That will come clear.

Student: But it wasn't simply a question guided by considerations of beauty?

Strauss: No. Socrates was ugly as you know. Hegel knows that. Nevertheless the Greeks - even the philosophers - did not yet understand spirituality in the radical way. They don't know anything of the cogito ergo sum. Or, as Hegel also put it, the conscience did not exist for the Greeks. We will come to that later.

Then, of course, the question is whether Socrates' _____, that demonic thing in which he trusted, is not the conscience. But here he does not yet speak of the philosophers.

Strauss: Now let us turn to page 329, second paragraph.

Reader: "It must be added, that while the Greek Spirit is a transforming artist of this kind, it knows itself free in its productions: for it is their creator, and they are what is called the 'work of man'"

Strauss: Using the Biblical expression in the German terms _____. They are only idols of Zeus and Hera and so on. Now he goes on correcting the ordinary religious view.

Reader: "They are, however, not merely this: but Eternal Truth - the energizing of Spirit in its innate essence, and quite as really not created as created by man."

Strauss: That is the point which, I believe, you had in mind. In a way, they merely reproduce. When presents Zeus and (inaudible) as having seen and heard Pericles speaking so that even some peculiarities of Pericles' head are ascribed to Zeus, even that, nevertheless, is a sincere attempt to present visibly Zeus. That he used the help supplied by this Zeus-like man, Pericles, is perfectly legitimate. Yes?

Reader: "He has a respect and veneration for these conceptions and images - this Olympian Zeus - this Pallas of the Acropolis - and in the same way for the laws, political and ethical, that guide his actions. But He, the human being, is the womb that conceived them, he the breast that suckled them, he the Spiritual to which their grandeur and purity is owing. Thus he feels himself calm in contemplating them, and not only free in himself, but possessing the consciousness of his freedom; thus the honor of the Human is swallowed up in the worship of the Divine. Men honor the Divine in and for itself, but at the same time as their deed, their production, their phenomenal existence; thus the Divine received its honor through the respect paid to the Human, and the Human in virtue of the honor paid to the Divine."

Strauss: What more do you want? The complete reconciliation of the human and the divine. And what is wrong with that? Speaking quite simply of facts which anyone knows from the Western Civilization course.

Student: Well, first of all, they were aware that this applied to every individual.

Strauss: But in terms of this point - the complete reconciliation of the human and the divine. How did the Greeks call the gods?

Student 2: They were afraid of the gods.

Strauss: No. As Hegel understood them, not so much.

Student 3: Well there was some thought that gods had control over worldly things. They asked the gods' help in battles and so on.

Student 4: Gods were called the immortals.

Strauss: Exactly. Men were the mortals; gods the immortals or rather the deathless ones. So there was no full reconciliation between the divine and the human because there was no awareness of the god who died. That is the peculiarity of Christianity out of which came the true reconciliation. And the crucifixion is not beautiful in the same way as Zeus or Hera are beautiful, the reason being that there is a fundamental difference between truth and beauty, and truth is higher than beauty. We may, therefore, say that the ugly belongs, in a way to the truth. The ugly - pain, suffering, death. The almighty gods are living easily. They have also their kinds of worries about ridiculous things, but they live fundamentally at ease watching their favorites, like people set upon horses. They are not truly involved and, therefore, there is no true reconciliation. There is a beautiful reconciliation and if beauty were the highest consideration, the Greeks would be wholly right.

How much of the so-called aestheticism of the 19th century is implied in this sentence that from the point of view of beauty Greekness is unsurpassable. Much of the bad classicism of the 19th century also belongs to that.

So the Greeks have, indeed, understood this. That is why Hegel prefers the to the Old Testament. The humane gods. But the higher thought, according to Hegel, is that the one god has become man and died as man. True god and true man. Whether Hegel understands that in the Christian orthodox manner is very doubtful. Hegel sees it, at least, as an expression of the speculative truth.

In the sequel he gives a clear plan of what he wants to discuss at the end.

Reader: "Such are the qualities of that Beautiful Individuality, which constitutes the centre of the Greek character. We must now consider the several radiations which this idea throws out in realizing itself. All issue in works of art, and we may arrange under three heads: the subjective work of art, that is, the culture of the man himself; the objective work of art, i.e. the shaping of the world of divinities; and lastly, the political work of art - the form of the Constitution, and the relations of the Individuals who compose it."

Strauss: Philosophy does not occur here, as you see. That comes in only in the discussion of the political work of art, the polis, in its decay. And that is the place of Greek philosophy in Hegel's philosophy of history.

There is an unintentional, though not unconscious, criticism of Greek philosophy throughout as we will see while we go.

Student: Isn't there a passage later on in the Greek section about the gods dying?

Strauss: He may do that, but meaning by that that the belief in the gods has died. But in themselves they were meant to be deathless.

Student 2: Does Hegel later on make anything of the connection between his point on Oedipus discovering truth through his own (inaudible) and the idea of Christian realization of truth through self (inaudible)

Strauss: No. In his Aesthetics where he speaks of tragedy he is likely to speak of that, but not here.

We will be particularly interested next time in the Greek polis and how he understands it. It is explicitly based on Montesquieu's famous saying that virtue is the principle of democracy. Democracy, of course, is a polis. Modern, representative democracy would not be a polis and would not need virtue.

Those of you who would like to understand this better might very well read this in Montesquieu's Spirit of Laws. It is near the beginning of the book which deals with democracy where you will find the matrix out of which Hegel's ideas grew. If you do that you will be confronted with many surprises. Hegel's somewhat strange notion of democracy is already somewhat Montesquieu's.

Seminar on Hegel

Session X: February 4, 1965

One point you did not make clear. I remind you of what we discussed last time - the empirical character of Hegel's procedure. He starts from very massive facts, the beautiful gods and the polis, some sort of political freedom also peculiar to Greece, and public deliberations. And then there is also Socrates and all which that implies. Now how does Hegel understand the connection between original Greekness and Socrates? This did not become clear.

Student: I see. Well I think that he believes that the freedom which exists in Greece is the germ of the Socratic questioning of the customary.

Strauss: Any historical evidence, empirical evidence? Is this used by Hegel to show the connection between original Greekness and Socrates?

Student: I didn't see how he spelled out that point.

Strauss: Does anyone? Mr. _____?

Student: Through the sophists . . .

Strauss: No. That was already corruption. But prior to the corruption? The democratic polis as he calls it using democracy in a very large sense. What is the connection between Greek democracy as understood by Hegel - I mean the healthy democracy prior to the Peloponnesian War a and Socrates?

How does a democracy proceed? Debate. There was debate and you could even make something technical out of the debate. That is an art.

Student: Well, that accounts for the sophistry.

Strauss: But, still, originally there was a kind of native oratory. Public speeches, public debate. And there is a connection between public debate about public matters and Socrates.

Student: I had the impression, though, from the texts that when the sophists talked - that sophistry originated from some independent source and that the sophists came along and saw the debates and taught the people how to debate.

Strauss: Yes, but what does this mean? It is sophistry and - more radically - Socrates is the opposite of original Greekness. But since it is the negation - the antithesis - of original Greekness it must be understood as stemming from

Greekness. In other words, original Greekness is the matrix- the necessary matrix - of Socrates.

Now if wee look at the Greek gods, what is the connection between the Greek gods and Socrates, taking Socrates now for a general term designating this unheard of thing. What is the peculiar character of the Greek gods.

Student: Well, they weren't there originally. They were there by overthrowing the original order of things. They established a certain possibility by questioning the existing order.

Strauss: In other words, they were emphatically not the oldest gods. Yes, that is also true. So the simple equation of the good and the ancient could not be maintained.

But there is another point. How does he call the Greek religion?

Student: The religion of art.

Strauss: Yes. So the artists, the artisans, whether sculptors of poets, make the Greek gods. They make them and at the same time they did not make them, as he said somewhere. But they also make them. And, therewith, there is the element of human spontaneity, of human creativity implied. This can then lead to a more radical assertion of human (inaudible).

You remind us of the fact that, according to Hegel, there is no conscience in the Greek religion

Student: There is also no conscience in their constitution generally.

Strauss: Yes. Does this make sense?

Student: One thing that I thought of when I read that statement is the conflict between the democratic concept of justice and the oligarchic concept of justice. This indicates a difference of opinion within the polis about the nature of political right.

Strauss: But what should Hegel say to this objection?

Student: I think that he would have to admit that it existed in the Athenian polis from very early times.

Strauss: You base your critique of Hegel on Aristotle. Hegel says that the Greek commonwealth is a democracy which is flatly contradicted by Aristotle and also by Thucydides and so on. This is an untenable thesis at first glance. Therefore, Hegel must understand the word "democracy" in a very different sense than Aristotle and Thucydides or the ordinary Greeks.

Student: He understands it, as he says, as a regime where there is a kind of equity and moral basis.

Strauss: An equality.

Student: Yes. An equality is recognized and this requires, in Hegel's view, a very basic equality of the citizens.

Strauss: One can say - which is a very poor answer, but which is to begin with an answer - that Hegel simply accepted this description of the classical city from Montesquieu. His most fantastic statement is when he tries to describe what democracy meant and means. One of the most powerful documents, according to Montesquieu, is - of all things - Plato's Republic. So he must have meant something very different from what everyone else understood by democracy. But this a very long question in Montesquieu himself. We must see later on what the precise reasons of Hegel himself really are.

But what about the conscience? Do Plato and Aristotle speak of the conscience?

Student: As I said, the only reason I can see that Hegel collapses the Platonic and Aristotelian, and Greek distinction between nature and convention is that he sees morality as not grounded upon nature. Therefore, the Greek standard of natural justice appears to him to be just a custom, and there is no fundamental distinction between that and a particular law.

Strauss: But the simple question: Do Plato and Aristotle ever mention the conscience? Never. The term comes up later, but not with our meaning, in some stoic texts. But to this there is an obvious objection. Someone can say that it is very pedantic to stick to the word "conscience." Do we not have a very clear case of the conscience in classical Greek literature, in Plato, as a matter of fact.

Student: The Apology.

Strauss: Yes. But what thing?

Student: (Inaudible) [the daimon]

Strauss: But of Socrates. Hegel would say that that is already the disintegration. In addition this is a question - whether Hegel believes that the daimon is something like the conscience is the question. Whether Socrates himself understood the daimon is something which can be called with some propriety the conscience. You were quite right in also pointing out that Hegel is silent about the heterogeneity within the Greek city, namely the rich and the poor and this kind of thing. He is not entirely silent about it, but he seems to present the Greek polis as perfectly consisting only of virtuous men, at least in the good time which cannot be literally true. You must see that later. Yes?

Student: Isn't there a clear case in Plato of a man passing a dead body - I think that it is in your article?

Strauss: Well it is, as a matter of fact, in Plato's Republic. He tries to make clear that there is a difference between spiritedness and desire. The man had the desire to look at these corpses - a very morbid desire - and then he got angry at himself on account of this low desire. Here you see that anger is noble and desire is base. That is the context. But the same man, of course, eventually succumbs and says, "You cursed eyes." I forget the exact words. "Have you taken your fill?"

But what is there of conscience? There is a conflict within man between desire and reason, but also between desire and anger - desire and spiritedness. Spiritedness is not conscience. Reason as reason is not conscience.

The expression, "I am conscious of something" - this occurs, of course. I know together with myself literally translated. There is a certain dualism within me. I can know something together with somebody else. Foreexample - surely not you - but somebody else can be conscious of a fellow-knower of a criminal. And you can be a fellow-knower of your own criminal inclinations. That is, I think, the most simple rule. But the development of that into a concept of a conscience is a long step.

Is there any other point which you want to bring up at this point?

Well, then, let us turn to our text: On page 241 in the first paragraph.

Reader: "Man with his necessities sustains a practical relation to external Nature, and in making it satisfy his desires, and thus using it up, has recourse to a system of means. For natural objects are powerful, and offer resistance in various ways. In order to subdue them, man introduces other natural agents; thus turns Nature against itself . . ."

Strauss: Alright. Literally, "uses natural things against natural things." For example, uses iron against wood. Yes?

Reader: " . . . uses natural things against natural things, and invents instruments for this purpose. These human inventions belong to Spirit, and such an instrument is to be respected more than a mere natural object."

Strauss: Yes. That is the point. I think that we have mentioned this before. The artifacts are of a higher rank than natural things because they are of spiritual-mental origin, direct spiritual-mental origin.

In the next paragraph he speaks of "ornament" which is a common desire for adornment. It is a common human trait, but which was changed in Greece and, therefore, this throws light on Greekness. We cannot read everything. The key point is this: The barbarians adorned themselves with

things outside of themselves - gold, silver, ivory. The Greeks, too, did that. But for the Greeks the most important way of adorning themselves was the perfection of their bodies. Center of page 242.

Reader: "But while on the one side they have too much independent personality to be subjugated by superstition, that sentiment has not gone to the extent of making them vain; on the contrary, essential conditions must be first satisfied before this can become a matter of vanity with them. The exhilarating sense of personality. In contrast with sensuous subjection to nature, and the need not of mere pleasure, but of the display of individual powers, in order thereby to gain special distinction and consequent enjoyment, constitute therefore the chief characteristic and principal occupation of the Greeks. Free as the bird singing in the sky, the individual only expresses what lies in his untrammelled human nature - to have his importance recognized. This is the subjective beginning of Greek Art - in which the human being elaborates his physical being, in free, beautiful movement and agile vigor, to a work of art."

Strauss: And later on page 242, center, where he says that the dependence of Nature is put aside, but something natural which man can use in order to show himself and others - to exhibit himself, is close to him and is fit to be made to serve as a sign of his aptitude (inaudible) And this natural thing is his body. This he has immediately, i.e. by Nature. And he finds himself in it in a natural manner without having done anything to bring this about. And, therefore, this is more directly human if the adornment consists in improving the body and in making it as beautiful as possible without cosmetics. Yes?

Student: In the paragraph which we just read he says that the individual only expresses what lies in his untrammelled human nature in developing his body. This would seem to imply that there is a natural, developed state of the body and the spiritual force is only that which leads man to this stage. But it would seem more consistent with Hegel's whole philosophy to say that the spiritual element is just a transforming of the body without guidance from nature. As he goes on he says that it is a spiritual thing.

Strauss: Still, Hegel says that the dependence on Nature is less if the adornment is this improvement of the body than if the adornments are taken from outside - gold and so on.

Student: The improvements themselves - what is the good state of the body - couldn't be, according to Hegel, simply a natural conception. There couldn't be a naturally good body which man would strive . . .

Strauss: Well, in a limited sense. There is the difference between health and sickness and that is, of course, acceptable. But we will come to that question you have in mind very soon.

Student 2: Mustn't we say that for the Greeks, in contradistinction to the barbarians, Nature - the natural - restricts them much more severely as an end? Barbaric display can have an almost (inaudible) variety, but the notion of the (inaudible) They haven't that barbarous freedom.

Strauss: I think that this will be cleared up later. Hegel would put the emphasis on this. Whether you depend on externals or whether you transform something which is in a way external - the body - but is, on the other hand, not simply external. It is one's own body.

Student 3: Is it important that the instrument is a means, but the work of art is not a means, that it is an end in itself? He begins by talking about instruments as informed objects. Then he gets to a work of art which is also an informed object, but is not a means.

Strauss: Yes. It is not ultimately in the service of satisfying the bodily needs. Therefore, art is higher than craft.

Student: Perhaps this would have some bearing on the question of the different factions within the state because the state as a work of art is not anmeans. It is an end in itself. Although there would be these factions they have to be seen in the context of the state.

Strauss: Yes. Let us wait until we come to that.

Now let us turn to page 244. I believe that that is the beginning of the section on Greek religion.

Reader: "If the subject of Song as thus developed among the Greeks is made a question, we should say that its essential and absolute purport is religious. . . . We cannot, therefore, regard the Greek divinity as similar to the Indian - some Power of Nature for which the human shape supplies only an outward form."

Strauss: And in other forms, we may add, as well.

Student: "The essence is the Spiritual itself, and the Natural is only the point of departure. But on the other hand, it must be observed that the divinity of the Greeks is not yet the absolute, free Spirit, but Spirit in a particular mode, fettered by the limitations of humanity - still dependent as a determinate individuality on external conditions."

Strauss: He doesn't bring out in the translation the following sentence. "This essential thing the Greeks have no longer found in the natural, the external, but in the internal." And that means that the spiritual is not nature, natural, but freedom and, hence, human. Therefore, Greek religion is the religion of art, of beauty.

Now there is a section here which unfortunately is not in the translation because it is not in the earlier edition. I would like to state this as follows: The Greeks gods, these beautiful figures of more than human perfection but still of human shape. This means that for the Greeks only the perfected man is divine or - to use a Biblical expression - only the perfected man is in the image of God, not man as man. And this is decisive for the later development. What we would call the non-democratic character of the Greeks, even of Greek democracy. That is implied. Only men of a certain perfection are truly human beings, not man as such. And, therefore, this leads to the fact which Hegel points out, that the famous anthropomorphism of Greek religion is imperfect because it abstracts from the imperfect, suffering, pain, death. And this, according to Hegel, is the superiority of Christianity because God has become a man who suffered and died.

God appears in produces of human imagination and not in the flesh. That is the limitation of Greek anthropomorphism.

On page 249 in the second half. This is only one side. That the mind is that which it makes out of itself. The mind is that into which it makes itself. To use a Greek term, the human is virtue and this means, of course, politically, that the polis should consist of virtuous men only, if possible. That is the starting point of Montesquieu. And this is what Hegel objects to.

The other side is that the mind is that which is originally free, not merely by our making ourselves into free men. That freedom is its nature. You have the word "nature" in a very crucial context. Freedom is the nature of the mind. Therefore, all men are by nature free. In more practical terms, potentially free and cannot be treated as slaves. And this side the Greeks have not yet understood precisely because they have not understood themselves, meaning as human beings.

In still more simple terms, the Greeks had not an inkling of the rights of man. The Greeks knew of the rights of the virtuous men and this was very important compared with oriental despotism. But it was also a severe limitation.

Now let us turn to - oh, one more point. The Greeks have not deified Nature. But they have transformed the natural into something spiritual. It is a defect of the Greek gods that they are not anthropomorphistic enough. They are idealized human beings, fleshless human beings.

In the Christian religion it is said that God has appeared in the flesh and this is the fundamental defect of Greekness.

Now let us turn to page 249, second half.

Reader: "If God himself is to be manifested in a corresponding expression, that can only be the human form: for

from this the spiritual beams forth. . . But the Greeks, since they had not attained an intellectual conception of themselves, did not yet realize Spirit in its Universality - had not the idea of man and the essential unity of the divine and human nature according to the Christian view." i.e. mortal

Strauss: This is the translation of the passage which I read before. The Greeks did not know that freedom is the nature of the mind. They knew only freedom of the kind that is man's work. Man makes himself free, say, by controlling his passions. This is virtue in Greek language. But the more fundamental freedom by virtue of which every man is by nature free and, therefore, also the vicious man is responsible for his vice. But man is fundamentally free and, therefore, an object of respect, of human respect. This, according to Hegel, they did not see.

Now what is the theological equivalent of that? The beautiful gods - idealized human beings - are absolutist. They are not seen to be a phase (as he translates it) among many phases. He thinks, of course, of the trinity. God as father and God having become man as the son. That is the theological equivalent, according to Hegel, of the Greeks unawareness of that fundamental freedom which he calls the freedom of his nature which antedates any possible freeing liberating virtue.

Hegel also puts it this way: The Greek gods are too subjective because they are too objective and visa versa. They are too subjective - they are too much the work of the human imagination because they are too objective, they are not seen as part of the whole.

Let us turn to the second paragraph on page 244.

Reader: "The second point is, that the new divinities retain natural elements, and consequently in themselves . . ."

Strauss: No. I am very sorry. We have to consider briefly what he said before. We have found in the concept of the Greek mind the two elements: nature and mind.

Reader: "In the Idea of the Greek Spirit we found the two elements, Nature and Spirit, in such a relation to each other that Nature forms merely the point of departure."

Strauss: In other words, they don't remain completely within the natural as the Orientals do.

Reader: "This degradation of Nature is in the Greek mythology the turning point of the whole - expressed as the War of the Gods, the overthrow of the Titans by the race of Zeus."

Strauss: In other words, this is the empirical basis for Hegel's assertion. The notion that the younger gods are the ruling gods and that there was originally another kind of gods who have been overcome. And Hegel interprets this as the victory of the mind or the spirit over Nature.

He develops in the sequel the point that the Greek gods are not symbols. There were attempts made so frequently in later antiquity to say that Zeus stands for, say, kingly power and so on. This is impossible because the gods are true individuals and, while one may see the preponderance of one spiritual element in god number one and of another in god number two, it is impossible to reduce them to any such formula. This has to do with the fact that the natural elements while being overcome by the spiritual elements are still present. This which cannot be reduced to any purely spiritual meaning.

On page 247, line 15 from bottom.

Reader: "The preservation of the original myths brings us to the famous chapter of the "Mysteries," already mentioned. These mysteries of the Greeks present something which, as unknown, has attracted the curiosity of all times, under the supposition of profound wisdom. It must first be remarked that their antique and primary character, in virtue of its very antiquity, shows their destitution of excellence - their inferiority."

Strauss: The oldest is not the most venerable, but the lowest. In Hegel's time there were still quite a few people who believed that the oldest strata of Greek religion (and some people thought the mystery religions were the oldest) were for this very reason the most profound. This is clearly contradicted by Hegel.

We have to turn also to a number of other passages which are not in our translation.

When he comes to speak of the Greek state, he mentions a number of points which I will read to you.

"For oriental despotism there was no place in Greece. Here the individuals as mixed" meaning of mixed origin "are strangers to each other, not connected with each other by nature."

In the Orient, he implies, there was always this natural bond which was decisive. In China the whole land understood as a family. And, of course, in Judaism the seed of Abraham. Here in Greece, according to Hegel just as in Rome according to the old description of Rome as a kind of asylum for all kinds of criminals in the neighborhood. But this made the glory of Rome. They were not of one stock. Therefore, according to Hegel, there could not be despotism, the natural root of despotism being the paternal power indefinitely enlarged.

The thought which Hegel develops here is that he speaks all the time of the democratic character of the Greek polis. With the Greeks the dignity of man depends on the good use of his freedom or - to use the Greek term -

on his virtue (his virtuous activity), not on his quasi-innate freedom.

In the Orient there is no awareness of the dignity of man. Nothing but fear of the lord with a small or a capital "l".

In Christianity or modernity the freedom of man as a subject who calls everything before the tribunal of his conscience or reason. That does not exist in Greece.

Therefore, in Greece we have only the dignity of the citizen, not the dignity of man. And who is and who is not a citizen is determined practically by the law, but the law is here custom, something which is not known to be the work of reason. That is the decisive point. Age-old, sacred custom, but not known to be the work of reason. This is the limitation of Greek rationality.

There is not yet in Greece awareness of the right of subjectivity. Right means here simply the common good and there is not visualized even the possibility of a conflict with the private good. To be truly a human being means to be dedicated absolutely to the polis, to be a good citizen. That is virtue.

On page 252 at the top there is something which we should discuss.

Reader: "The Greeks occupy the middle ground of Beauty and have not yet attained the higher standpoint of Truth."

Strauss: In other words, this position which the Greeks take is the intermediate position between Oriental unawareness of the freedom of man and Christian, modern full awareness of freedom. This is the standpoint of beauty as distinguished from the point of view of truth which we may take to mean that truth includes ugliness and the recognition of the rights of ugly men, of the morally ugly men.

Later he speaks of Montesquieu.

Reader: "The main point in Democracy is moral disposition. Virtue is the basis of Democracy, remarks Montesquieu: and this sentiment is as important as it is true in reference to the idea of Democracy commonly entertained. The Substance of Justice, the common weal, the general interest, is the main consideration."

Strauss: Here you understand why Montesquieu can say that Plato's Republic is a democratic book because here everything is sacrificed to the common good.

Reader: "But it is so only as custom, in the form of Objective Will, so that morality properly so called - subjective conviction and intention - has not yet manifested

itself. Law exists, and is, in point of substance, the Law of Freedom - rational and valid because it is Law, i.e. without ulterior sanction. As in Beauty the Natural element - its sensuous coefficient - remains, so also, in this customary morality, laws assume the form of a necessity of Nature. The Greeks occupy the middle ground of Beauty and have not yet attained the higher standpoint of Truth."

Strauss: In other words, the subjective basis of the laws has not yet been seen and there is, therefore, something reminding of Nature, of the sub-spiritual, sub-mental and this is what we mean by beauty where the spiritual/mental appears in sensual appearance and, therefore, not as itself.

The principle of democracy is virtue. This famous statement of Montesquieu which Hegel simply accepts. It would be a long story which we cannot possibly go into how Montesquieu meant it in the first place. That is a very long question. But let us leave it here simply so. Democracy's principle is virtue, i.e., only among virtuous men. Virtuous means here that their humanity is identical with their citizenship. There is no higher consideration that the fatherland. To use the modern phrase, "right or wrong my country." There is nothing to which you can appeal or in the light of which you can judge your country. This is what is meant here.

But we must also taken this in a broader sense and this was partly intended, at least, by Montesquieu if not by Hegel. But for Hegel, too, it is understood that the principle of the reasonable state is not virtue. Because, then, only virtuous persons could be citizens or at least have full citizenship rights, and imagine how difficult that is. You can limit citizen rights from the point of view of property qualifications or education qualifications or race or whatever, but visible features. But you cannot limit citizenship on the basis of virtue in any serious sense of the word. Why?

Student: Who will judge?

Strauss: Yes. If there are very great rewards connected with virtue, actions in agreement with virtue will be forthcoming. Nobody can make himself richer than he is because there are easy ways of measuring. Or size or any other visible things. But virtue cannot be the basis.

Hegel's point was - and we will speak of that later - is that when you make the attempt to base democracy on virtue you arrive at Robbespiere's Terror because merely external actions do not make a man virtuous. You have to look into his heart. He must have the right moral intention and, therefore, here there is only one possibility. You trust or do not trust. And if you do not trust, the guillotine is the only way of getting rid of the citizens lacking virtue.

But is there not something more immediately relevant for us today in this assertion that the principle of democracy is virtue? What about Marxism? Marxism claims to be fundamentally democratic as you know, although not in the transitional stage, but eventually. But must not Marxism in one way or another assert that the principle of democracy is virtue? That in this final democracy all men will be virtuous?

Rousseau who has a lot to say about democracy especially in the modern meaning of the term, made this distinction. What is vice? There is one source in man - the fundamental source - which is self-love. Hobbes calls this self-preservation. This is based on the natural needs of men.

What happens to the natural needs of men in the final Marxist society? They are satisfied. Economy of plenty as they say.

Rousseau, however, did not believe that a perfectly virtuous society is possible because he held that society is "evil with a kind of vice rooted in the desire for superiority and recognition of one's superiority." This grows up as soon as we have society and lasts as long as there is society. Therefore, this self-love would also prevail in a Marxist society. There is administration of things but it makes a great difference whether you are at the top of the administration of things or in a lower echelon. That is inevitable. Also the wives of these outstanding administrators will be affected and, as wise men of old said, they will be even more affected than their husbands.

So the desire for distinction, for surpassing others. What is the Marxist view of that? What is the view of the role of this ... in the final society?

Student: In the more modern interpretations this is more or less done away with by psychological methods.

Strauss: That is very un-Marxist. That is the famous combination of Marx and Freud which is so popular in this country but which is not Marxist.

Student: I take it that the Marxists hold that the desire for distinction is a distinction of men of one class against men of another class. That pride is not the competing arrogance of nobility, but of the noble riding peasants down in his coach. Since in the future society there will be only one class, strange to say there ought not to be any emulation among the equals.

Strauss: Yes. Equality and fraternity takes away this point. This I thought that we should mention in passing.

Now let us go on with Hegel. The Greeks did not know the conscience or the good will, i.e. bowing only to the law which one has given to oneself and only on that basis

bowing to the law of the land. Differently stated, the polis did not rest on any notion of a natural law. The polis for its own consciousness did not rest on any notion of the natural law.

There was immediate identity of the particular will - the will of the individual - with the general will. That is virtue. If I will without any effort what is good for the community and my private interest is stifled by this, then I am 100% patriotic.

Hegel comes to speak somewhat later, on page 252, line 11 of the radical difference between ancient and modern democracy. He must, of course, do that because his contemporaries had gotten an inkling of democracy through the French Revolution and some of what they have heard about America.

(lapse in tape)

Reader: "The above is the true position of the democratic polity, its justification-an absolute necessity-rest on this still imminent objective morality. For the modern conceptions of democracy this justification cannot be pleaded."

Strauss: I.e., virtue as a dependable principle cannot possibly be the basis of democracy in modern times. Yes?

Reader: "These provide that the interest to the community, the affairs of state, shall be discussed and decided by the people. That the individual members of the community shall deliberate, urge their respective opinions and give their votes; and this on the ground that the interests of the State and its concerns are the interests of such individual members. All this is very well; but the essential condition and distinction in regard to various phases of Democracy is, What is the character of these individual members?"

Strauss: Who are these individuals, meaning what kind of people are they?

Reader: "They are absolutely authorized to assume their position, only in as far as their will is still Objective Will - not one that wishes this or that, not mere 'good' will."

Strauss: In other words, you can have two people who may have equally good will, and have very different notions of what is the common good. So the mere good will doesn't help. They must also have the same objective will, they must (inaudible) virtuously the same things.

Reader: "For good will is something particular - rests on the morality of individuals, on their conviction and subjective feeling. That very subjective Freedom which constitutes the principle and determines the peculiar form of Freedom in our world - which forms the absolute basis of our political and religious life, could not manifest itself in Greece otherwise than as a destructive element."

Strauss: As corruption. The radical difference between ancient and modern democracy - modern democracy is based on the error that the multitude of emancipated individuals can govern. The Greek individuals in a Greek democracy are not emancipated. They were nothing but citizens and, therefore, there was fundamental harmony. There was not merely consensus in the sense in which the word is now used, but fundamental unanimity. What Hegel has in mind here is the distinction to which Rousseau had referred and which he takes up between the citizen and the bourgeois, the man chiefly concerned with his private interest. In the sense in which Hegel and Rousseau use the words all citizens of a modern democracy are bourgeoisie. They all have a clearly defined private interest with which they are primarily concerned.

To state this all in a language with which you are perhaps more familiar, the modern democracy is based on the distinction between state and society. And there is no such distinction in the polis. So society means variety of interest - conflict, competition, heterogeneity. And these people of conflicting interests cannot be virtuous in the classical sense.

In the moment in which the emancipation of the individual occurs - of every individual, when it has in principle been achieved (and this emancipation has its good and its bad side as we shall see) - in that moment virtue can no longer be the principle. Yes?

Student: This notion would go against Rousseau's notion of the general will. The fact that each individual is required to think in terms of the general will isn't sufficient to - well, they would have to come to the conclusion themselves.

Strauss: You must not forget that in The Social Contract Rousseau states the ideal conditions of just order. He states them there and there there would be this fundamental homogeneity, i.e., in the most important respects there is unanimity. The difference of opinion can concern only particular measures which cannot be of great importance. But very complicated other things are needed as appears more and more and in Rousseau that is a very long question.

But Hegel, of course, thinks not only of Montesquieu, but also of Rousseau. That is quite true.

Student: In other words, Hegel is saying that Rousseau's idea of the state governed by the general will would meet the requirements of classical antiquity, but couldn't actually exist in the modern world.

Strauss: Yes. Absolutely. To that extent, Rousseau's Social Contract was an impossible proposal. You cannot have small states anymore, to state it in practical terms, like the polis.

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Now here is a passage which I didn't find in the translation.

"In the Greek city there is not yet a right of the abstract universal, i.e. not yet a government as a particular organization under which the particular interest is both restrained and also satisfied."

In other words, the distinction between the government and the people does not exist there. In modern times the independence of the government as a particular organization is essential. Every citizen as such is a part of the government. If you take government in the narrowest sense, i.e. only the executive then, of course, not everyone is a member of the government. You have to be elected for an office. But since the fundamental governmental activity is not executive, but the legislature - the deliberative - according to Hegel and Aristotle, and this is the work of the whole citizen body. There is, therefore, not yet a distinction between the people and the government. In modern times this distinction is essential.

There are quite a few other things which are not in the translation and which I must try to read to you.

"The constitution itself cannot be an object for the Greek democracy. There cannot be deliberations and decisions about the constitution. But the constitution is exactly this: that the citizens deliberate and make decisions."

Do you understand this? Particular laws referring to the constitution can, of course, be made. But the constitution proper is presupposed in any deliberation, in any legislative act and, therefore, the constitution itself cannot be an object for the Greek democracy because democracy means that the citizens deliberate and make decisions. Can we still understand that?

Student: In Athens there were many important changes of the constitution or what we could call the constitution . . .

Strauss: To what extent were they an act of deliberation?

Student: They did away with the powers of the _____. That was a deliberative decision.

Strauss: There is something to what you say, but let us take the simplest example. The American constitution, a product of deliberation as everybody knows. But Hegel thinks of something more profound than the detailed provisions of the constitution. Namely, the very beginning. What is the very beginning of the constitution? The People. This simple thing was not the subject of deliberation. The people or their representatives deliberated about the peculiar structure of the legislative, executive and judicial, but that the people had to decide-the most fundamental thing upon which everything else depends, not a king ruling by divine grace,

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nor a society divided into a hereditary nobility and something else. The fundamental thing underlying everything else - to some extent even the nonviolent changes taking place - they are based on the premise that the last word is with the people. And this could not be the subject of deliberation.

In other words, what Hegel has in mind is this. Whereas according to the modern doctrines, especially of French origin, the fundamental act was the constituent assembly where the people established the constitution and, therewith, become truly members of the civil society. No such thing in Greece. And the constituent assembly - if you take the doctrine literally- presupposes that these individuals who assemble and then deliberate (as Hobbes and other present it): Shall we have a kingship, shall we have an aristocracy, shall we have a democracy or some mixture of them? These people are not yet citizens. These are the emancipated individuals of which the Greeks did not know and of which we know. In this respect, Hegel goes fully with the moderns.

Hegel is very critical of many of the theories of the 18th century, but he has this point in mind. You must assert a fundamental sovereignty of the individual, i.e. of every individual, if there are to be politically relevant rights of man. That is the point. Because if the polis is first, then the rights of man cannot be the first thing. They may come in, but in a secondary manner. Yes?

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: How did Hegel speak of this before when he spoke of the same thing? This peculiar in between position, in between Nature and man. What he also means by the point of view of beauty.

Therefore, there is no absolute beginning with the free individual, be it the passionate individual or be it the conscientious individual. And that is the essential defect, according to Hegel.

Student 2: (inaudible)

Strauss: Hegel speaks about this only in a very general way. He says that they had ceased to have any function and they disappeared partly by self-destruction.

Student: It seems that there was a change whereby people who were not citizens overthrew royal houses and chose tyrants . . .

Strauss: That was later.

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: That belongs to the pre-history in which Greece was not yet Greece.

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Student: The main point would simply be that there was never a deliberate forming of a polis with an (inaudible) which could then somehow get the power to establish rules. This was never deliberately done. It just sort of happened.

Strauss: Yes. Even that would not be of interest to Hegel. The key point is the way in which the polis understood itself and there it did not look back. There were some memories of founding acts and in these founding acts kings played a role. In Athens _____ who put together a variety of villages. But this is obviously not a constituent assembly according to the strict revolutionary doctrine.

Student: How does Hegel take it that Aristotle simply says that the city is first?

Strauss: In the sense in which Aristotle means that - first not in time, but in rank, Hegel accepts that. This will become clearer later on.

He discusses in the immediate sequel the conditions of the Greek polis and this is very empirical and without any great difficulty. For example, the smallness of the Greek polis. The institution of slavery and, lastly, the oracles. On page 254 bottom.

Reader: "Another circumstance that demands special attention here is the element of Slavery. This was a necessary condition of an aesthetic democracy, where it was the right and duty of every citizen to deliver or to listen to orations respecting the management of the State in the place of public assembly, to take part in the exercises of the Gymnasia, and to join in the celebration of festivals. It was a necessary condition of such occupations, that the citizens should be freed from handicraft occupations; consequently, that what among us is performed by free citizens - the work of daily life - should be done by slaves. Slavery does not cease until the Will has been infinitely self-reflected - until Right is conceived as appertaining to every freeman, and the term freeman is regarded as a synonym for man in his generic nature as endowed with Reason. But here we still occupy the standpoint of Morality as mere Wont and Custom, and therefore known only as a peculiarity attaching to a certain kind of existence."

Strauss: The consciousness - that is the abstract man. Man in general is free, has not been possessed by either Socrates or Plato or Aristotle. This emerges with Christianity according to Hegel. Of course, this is surely an exagerration that there were no artisan citizens in the Greek cities, especially in Athens. But the key point in Hegel is simply that the radical distinction between man and citizen - we, of course, also make this distinction as not every living man is an American citizen - but for the Greeks there is, so to speak, no possibility of becoming a citizen unless you are the son of a citizen father and a citizen mother.

There are various other crucial implications of that as discussed by Aristotle when he talks of the relation between the virtue of man to the virtue of the citizen.

Then in the sequel he speaks - and this is particularly important - of Athens and of Sparta, the peaks of Greek political life, and Hegel has, on the whole, the judgement which, I think, most of us had today: that altogether Athens was infinitely superior to Sparta. This creates a minor difficulty for Hegel because - not exactly a difficulty - Aristotle and Plato seem to prefer Sparta to Athens. We might, perhaps, look at page 261, line 9.

Reader: "The blame with which we find them visited in Xenophon and Plato, attaches rather to that later period when misfortune and the corruption of the democracy had already supervened. But if we would have the verdict of the Ancients on the political life of Athens, we must turn, not to Xenophon, nor even to Plato, but to those who had a thorough acquaintance with the state in its full vigor - who managed its affairs and have been esteemed its greatest leaders - i.e. to its Statesmen. Among these, Pericles is the Zeus of the human Pantheon of Athens."

Strauss: Pericles, the greatest of all statesmen that have ever been. Whether Hegel only said it once after a good breakfast or not, I do not know. At any rate, the funeral speech in Thucydides, he makes clear, is the key to Athens, not Socrates. And that is very important. And one could draw a conclusion from this which is not sufficient, but I think that one would have to argue it out - that Hegel was more democratic in a way than Socrates, Xenophon, Plato and Aristotle.

Here: Later on - and it is not in your translation - he says, "Pericles, the greatest statesman of ancient and modern times." So there is no doubt that Hegel meant it.

Then, he says, according to the great stories - not only in Thucydides but also in Plutarch and other places - he mentions the signs of his absolute dedication to his fatherland. He mentions one thing here which he probably found in Plutarch (I have never looked it up) that Pericles never laughed. In other words, he was so deadly serious in his dedication to the city that he never laughed. And he went to no banquet after he had become a statesman.

The question is: Can there be a statesman like Pericles in any later age? from Hegel's point of view. And I think not. This perfect harmony of the citizen and man belongs to the standpoint of beauty which has been destroyed by the opening up of the abyss of individuality, that abyss for good or for ill. In this connection, when he speaks of Athens, he says, "Art and science are the ideal manners in which the spirit of a nation becomes conscious of itself. And the highest which

a state can achieve is that art and science are developed within it and reach a height which corresponds to the spirit of the nation." This is the highest purpose of the state but he must not try to produce this end as his own work, but it must generate itself by itself.

In other words, the state must not try to organize science and art. A state must give science and art a possibility to develop and, to some extent, of course, stimulated by proper recognition.

The key point which he develops in the sequel is this. The corruption of the Greekness means the emancipation of the individual. And this takes place on two levels. On the low level, the selfish desires - the passions - Alcibiades is the greatest specimen. And then the other, thinking, the conscience. That is represented by Socrates. The limitation of the Greeks was the immediacy of the validity of the gods and the law. They were simply there. No question. Think of _____. The laws appear to Socrates. They are there and nobody asks where they come from. They have not gone through the universal doubt of modern times and the deepening of that by Kant.

On page 268, second paragraph, line 11 following.

Reader: "With the Sophists began the process of reflection on the existing state of things, and of ratiocination."

Strauss: In German _____ which has a very negative meaning, almost of griping.

Reader: "That very diligence and activity which we observed among the Greeks in their practical life, and in the achievement of works of art, showed itself also in the turns and windings which these ideas took; so that, as material things are changed, worked up and used for other than their original purposes, similarly the essential being of Spirit - what is thought and known - is variously handled; it is made an object about which the mind can employ itself, and this occupation becomes an interest in and for itself. The movement of Thought - that which goes on within its sphere without reference to an extrinsic object - a process which had formerly no interest - acquires attractiveness on its own account. The cultivated Sophists, who were not erudite or scientific men, but masters of subtle turns of thought, excited the admiration of the Greeks."

Strauss: Amazed the Greeks.

Reader: "For all questions they had an answer; for all interests of a political or religious order they had general points of view; and in the ultimate development of their art they claimed the ability to prove everything, to discover a justifiable side in every position."

X

Strauss: In other words, what they did, we can say, was this. The immediacy, the quite unquestioned acceptance of the gods and the laws, was replaced by the demand for proof. How do you know? And Socrates who opposes Sophists, nevertheless accepts the principle that you cannot leave it at the immediacy and that you have to find a basis for that.

Somewhat later on page 269 Hegel goes so far as to call Socrates "the inventor of morality," not merely the discoverer of morality, but the inventor. This doesn't mean that Hegel doesn't regard morality as self-susisting in a sense, but nevertheless, without being known, morality is not proof. To that extent, one can speak of an invention.

Then he develops the thought that the fate of Socrates is a true tragedy because both the city of Athens and Socrates - each was right. This collision perfectly justified on both sides made it highly tragic.

We have to leave it at that.

Seminar on Hegel
Session XI, February 9, 1965

Thank you very much. I was very glad that you raised this necessary question towards the end of your paper since Rome is so unpleasant compared with Greece that it must constitute a progress.

What you said points in the right direction although your use of the terms "objectivity" and "subjectivity" is probably in need of some revision. But if I limit myself to a term which you used before which is more easily intelligible - Rome is emphatically prosaic contrasted with the poetry of Greece.

The question would, then, be this: In what sense does prosaification, if we may say so, constitute a progress?

Student: The poetry which had marked the previous period was a consequence of the closeness to Nature that the spirit was involved in. So the spirit, as it withdraws from Nature, becomes more prosaic.

Strauss: Yes. Which is the language of truth? Poetry or prose?

Student: Prose.

Strauss: Definitely according to Hegel. He quotes poets from time to time, sometimes from memory and, therefore, involuntarily changing the text, but he says definitely that the language of philosophy is prose.

Another question which must occur and must be raised, although I am unable to answer it, is that we have already found an example of prosaicness in Hegel's philosophy of history before. Do you remember that?

Student: China.

Strauss: Yes. Now the question would be that it is necessary to understand precisely the difference between Chinese prose and Roman prose. What are the most striking differences?

Student: Perhaps the Roman emperor was much more prosaic. Rome culminates in a very prosaic notion of the law which has little reference to the son of heaven.

Strauss: It is, in a way, even independent of the emperor. In addition, Rome is, of course, in spite of the deplorable character the heir to Greece. All the goods the Greeks brought forth were transported bodily to Rome and became an ingredient.

I think that we can leave it at that. I thank you again for your paper which was very good.

I have to say a word about the paper of Mr. _____ which I have read in the meantime and which I liked very much. I would like to say a word about your epilogue where you raise to great heights and which is, therefore, the most exciting part of your paper.

"At the stage of Greek history which we have just considered the dissolution of the beautiful was essentially complete. And, although in the next section Hegel will call upon Alexander to justify philosophy, and though its dissolution was necessary for the emergence of pure spirit, I think that it is clear that Hegel looks back upon the political work of art and customary morality (meaning Greekness) with a sigh, a sigh which, perhaps, gave rise to this quotation from Nietzsche: 'All of morality is a continuous forgery without which the sight of man's soul would be impossible.' From this point of view the concept of art may be much more comprehensive than one commonly believes.' Could it be, then, that Hegel's demand for an absolutely rational world order has something in common with Nietzsche's extreme anti-rationalistic reaction?"

What is the thing in common according to you between Hegel and Nietzsche?

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: In other words, you hesitated to write it down or what? If you had known that I would read it to the class you would have refrained from writing it down?

Student: (inaudible) What I had in mind was Hegel's idea that he was going to rescue Western civilization from the Enlightenment. (inaudible)

Strauss: Alright. Let us leave it at that? And?

Student: In doing that he is rejecting the notion of reason (inaudible)

Strauss: Hegel? Oh, no. According to Hegel's claim he is much more rigorous than the Enlightenment was.

Student: Sure. But in a different way.

Strauss: But what is the position of art in Hegel's system? Let us never forget what we have read. The distinction between beauty and truth. Beauty is lower than truth. And Nietzsche says, one can say, just the opposite. Nietzsche says that he looks at science in the perspective of art and at art in the perspective of art. But this turning around of the order of art and science is the crucial difference between Hegel and Nietzsche.

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: But here in this point regarding the pure spirit related to the impure spirit which underlies art, Nietzsche again takes the opposite view of Hegel. There is no pure spirit from Nietzsche's point of view.

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: No. They are radically different. Even in this remark - in the enlargement of the term art which Nietzsche here presupposes - that the old morality is the product of art in the wider sense, the product of human creativity and of the creativity which does not obey any rational order. The opposite of Hegel. Hegel could also speak of such creativity, but he would say that these creative acts form in hindsight a rational order. From Nietzsche's point of view there is no such rational order.

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: But the order - the sequence, Greece, Rome and then Christianity - is for Hegel a rational order, i.e. a progressive order. Nietzsche denies that. From Nietzsche's point of view Greece is the peak of things and it goes down then towards modernity. He hopes, then, for a new peak - what he calls the superman - but it is an entirely different notion. This was misleading. Yes?

Student: In Hegel's criticism of Greece doesn't he imply that with the full development of the rational spirit the entire concepts including those of truth and falsity will be essentially created by man. And if that is so . . .

Strauss: Not created by man. Created, perhaps, in man by a superhuman logical necessity. Never forget that Hegel has to do with the mind or spirit which is in man, but it is not mere man. For Nietzsche it is entirely different. It is man and not pure spirit

Student: Creations of spirit do not have an outside standard to look to to see whether or not they are true creations.

Strauss: In Hegel. No. Hegel wrote his Logic. This is meant to be as universally and objectively valid as any other system could be, perhaps even more. If you have understood the Logic you will see that the Greeks were wrong, simply wrong in the decisive points. There can be no doubt, I think, about that.

But I would like to take up a point which came up at the end of last time's assignment and which we did not have time to get to. And this is the question of very great bearing for the whole of Hegel's teaching. I remind you of the fact that Hegel asserts more than once what we can call the primacy of religion. In other words, the core of a culture is religion.

Now we have seen that something which has never happened before happened in Greece. In Greece, too, religion is primary, but in Greece, for the first time, religion is questioned. The corruption of Greece consists precisely in this question of religion.

This corruption has, however, a different side as we have seen last time or at least those of us have seen who have read that passage in Hegel. I don't think that we have been able to discuss it in class. What is this question of religion positively speaking in Greece? What is the corruption of Greekness in the positive sense. It has also a positive side. Who corrupted the Greeks?

Student: The Sophists?

Strauss: The Sophists were only a prelude. The true corruption was . . .?

Student: Socrates.

Strauss: Yes. In other words, the corruption of Greekness means the transformation of Greek religion into Greek philosophy. On page 270 this remarkable sentence occurs: "Now the question was raised whether gods are and what they are." This is the fundamental change.

This is something that we have never seen before. That the corruption of a nation or a culture has at the same time a positive meaning.

Now let us put this on a somewhat broader basis, Hegel's interpretation of Greekness altogether. Man awakens from his subjection to Nature in which he is by Nature. He becomes aware of his tutelage to Nature as something to be overcome. He becomes aware of his unawareness of himself as a free and spiritual being. I do not have to repeat that Hegel's interpretation of Greekness is not identical with that of the Greeks' interpretation of Greekness by which I mean the philosophic interpretation. According to that interpretation natural man is a part. One can say this: The Greek is, from the point of view of Aristotle, the natural man as part of the natural world. The natural man because he is aware of his situation whereas other men are enthralled by conventions. And this is connected with the fact that Hegel replaces the distinction between _____ and nomos by that between Nature and mind.

Now let us come back to the Socrates question. Here the awakening of subjectivity which contradicts Greekness and Greek religion. Now what does this mean? The subjectivity is awake if it can question all objectivity, even the most venerable one, and raise the question, "Is it?" or "What is its cause?" or, as he stated here, "Now the question is raised whether gods are and what they are," And in this question, of course, the question of morality is implied.

To see that this is not without foundation I will read to you a passage from a Platonic dialogue called _____. Here we have this point. He has given an account of what we can call the cosmic gods, the gods connected with the stars. "Concerning the other divinities, to discover and declare their origins is too great a task for us and we must trust to those who have declared it aforetimes, they being, as they affirm, descendents of gods or knowing well, no doubt, their own ancestors. It is, as I say, impossible to disbelieve the children of gods even though their statements lack either probable or necessary demonstration. And, inasmuch as they profess to speak of family matters, we must follow custom and believe them. Therefore, let the generation of these gods - the non-cosmic gods - be stated by us following their account in this way._____

_____. (inaudible)
Now when all the gods, both those who revolt manifestly and those who manifest themselves as far as they chose, have come to birth" and so on and so forth.

So here we have a distinction between the cosmic gods and the Olympian gods. Only the cosmic gods are taken seriously. I believe that you see the irony of the remark about the other gods that only their children would know about them, that is the poets. And no proof there is possible because of the arbitrariness of their manifesting themselves.

To repeat this point, in Greece religion is for the first time questioned and not merely by criminals who accept nothing but their own advantage, but by men of a very high order. And this meant the transformation of Greek religion into Greek philosophy. This had to do with the awakening of subjectivity for the first time in Greece. But this was only a provisional and insufficient awakening and awareness of subjectivity.

The final awakening is that which we find in modern times and which reveals itself in the possibility of the reasonable state in contradistinction to the beautiful polis. The polis is not reasonable, it is beautiful. The modern state is not beautiful. Noone will say that however much he may be enamored of it. Think only of bureaucracy and who could ever call that beautiful? But it may very well be reasonable.

This reasonable state in its turn has also religious foundation. It has been rendered possible and demanded by the questioned religion in contradistinction to Greek, to say nothing of Roman, religion. Thus the question arises: Is, then, the reasonable state, built as it is on Christianity, essentially Christian?

What Hegel means by this is something that you have heard n times in German civilization courses. From this point of view it is nothing farfetched. The modern state based on the recognition of the rights of man. The rights of man

have been recognized for the first time in Christianity, according to Hegel. Today the usual view, for example the American tradition, goes back to the Judeo-Christian heritage.

Is there here a supposition that the reasonable state is essentially Christian or do we find here also an equivalent of what we have seen in Greece, namely a transformation of Christian religion into philosophy? This is the question.

In a passage which I believe does not occur in your translation but which I have here in Hegel's Philosophy of History Socrates has not died innocently. This reminds me of the sole joke that Socrates made with a laugh. Ordinarily he joked with a poker face. When he was condemned one of his most touching disciples said to him, "How terrible, Socrates, that you have been condemned to death unjustly" whereupon Socrates said, "Would you prefer me to have been condemned to death justly?"

So Socrates did not die innocently. This would not be tragic, but only touching. His fate, however, is tragic in the true sense.

Our commonwealth, our state, is entirely different than that of the Athenian people since our state can be altogether indifferent toward the inner lives of individuals, even towards religion. The Athenian state had to be concerned with the faith and belief of the individuals. Therefore, Socrates was justly accused and condemned. But the modern state can be altogether indifferent to the religion and beliefs of its members. That is very strange.

I will read to you a few more passages, one from Hegel's Philosophy of Right paragraph 270. This paragraph is the paragraph dealing with religion and church.

"The state can demand from all its members that they belong to an ecclesiastical community, to a religious congregation, but to any of them for the content of religion is no concern of the state." It only can demand that every citizen belong to some religious association. That is one remark.

"People say that individuals must have religion, but if they mean by it that their minds should be pressed down in the state this would be a very bad meaning of the proposition. But if the people mean that men should have respect of the state, of this whole of which they are branches, then this takes place in the best way. They respect the state through the philosophic insight into the essence of the state. But, failing that insight, religious feeling can also lead to that. In this sense the state may need religion," i.e. it does not necessarily need it. This is the fundamental view of Hegel and if there is some contradiction between his saying that everyone must be a member of a religious community and the other that the state is indifferent to it, it would be our task (Hegel doesn't do it for us) to resolve that contradiction.

Hegel takes up this question also in a number of passages in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. I haven't seen an English translation of it. If anyone would like to have the references from the German I will gladly give them. Yes? The Philosophy of Religion, Volume 15 of his collected works, pages 256, 263-64, 266-67. Volume 16, page 344, 354-56.

He speaks of the way in which people know the religious truth, the truth of Christianity in the final stage. There are three stages in this respect. The first stage is that of immediate, naive religion and faith; the second that of the so-called educated class, the enlightened part; and, finally, the third - the stage of philosophy.

Then he tries to make clear that the more religion is understood in its philosophic school, the less is it powerful as mere naive religion and faith. To that extent one can speak of a decline of religion. And this is, as Hegel calls it, a disharmony and he doesn't wish to end his lectures in a disharmonious manner. But what is the use of it? This disharmony is actual in reality just as in the time of the Roman Empire, since the unity of religion had disappeared and the divine was profaned and, furthermore, the whole political life was chaotic and without trust and reason fled into the form of private law. The particular good and evil of the individual became the purpose. So even now, since a similar change has occurred, in the naive conscience, i.e. in the actuality, the unity of the inner and outer does no longer exist and is not justified in faith. This disharmony has been dissolved for us - philosophic knowledge. But this reconciliation of mind, thought with religion is only a partial one since there are only a few philosophers. What becomes of the non-philosophers in this final stage? This is, more or less, the end of the Lectures of the Philosophy of Religion.

For the time being we can say that the people at large are still religious. Hegel does not raise the question, but he forces us to raise it. How long will this last? Now we don't need Hegel to become aware of this problem. But Hegel was aware of it and this was of crucial importance in understanding Hegel's notion of the end of history, the end in the old sense of the word. The peak of history, the completion of history has been achieved in Hegel's time.

But, as we have heard him say before - is not the state of religion namely that the philosophers transform the religious truths into philosophic truths. This means, of course, that the religious truths are considerably changed. But what becomes of the mass of the people?

In practical terms, in one of the most advanced parts of Germany_____ the man in charge of the Protestant clergy was Herder who was also a philosopher and poet of sorts. Things such as what kind of answers were expected of the young clergymen there. It was, naturally,

no longer orthodox Lutheranism. And all kinds of difficulties showed themselves there on a practical level.

Now how can we understand this transformation of pre-philosophic religion into philosophy? Hegel has developed this at great length especially in his Phenomenology of the Mind in his section dealing with the Enlightenment. One can roughly state it as follows: The traditional view was that there is a difference between faith and reason. Faith is suprarational and has suprarational insights. Faith, since it is not rational either in itself or in its object, needs external credentials - tradition and miracles. At any rate, its content it suprarational, but its suprarationality is, of course, not evident to reason. From the point of view of reason, it is unable to distinguish as reason between the suprarational and the infrarational. The suprarational cannot be evident to reason.

Now what Hegel claims to have done is that he has shown that the substance of Christianity is rational. This required considerable sacrifices. For example, the belief in miracles and in the sacredness or quasi-sacredness of the Biblical text. This was, of course, sacrificed. But we will see later what Hegel means by the Christianity which he believes to have transformed into philosophic insight and in this way is saved.

Student: Was Hegel aware of the Averroist tendencies?

Strauss: I doubt that. Of course, in a general way, he knew of that. You know, there are always various kinds of knowledge around and there were some historians of philosophy - at least in Germany and Thomas Stanley in England in the 17th century. But much more importantly, of course, Pierre Bale. But it doesn't play any role. You know, a man may know of something without its playing any role for him and I don't believe that it affected Hegel. Hegel knew in a general way that the Greek philosophers, for example, tried to interpret the Greek, pagan religion in (inaudible) terms. He knew of that and spoke of it. But the true character of Averroes I believe he did not know.

There is even some indirect evidence of that. He rejects the whole notion - at least in his History of Philosophy - of a distinction between esoteric and exoteric teaching.

Student 2: (inaudible) regarding Rousseau

Strauss: No. That philosophy, science is destructive of society - that is what Rousseau clearly said in the First Discourse and other places. Hegel repeats this, as we have seen. But the difficulty is whether he means that it is peculiar to Greece or that it is a human necessity, an eternal one so that it would apply to the modern world as well. I believe that Hegel meant it as applying also to the modern world. The fundamental problems

of men are solved. We know what the reasonable state is. Where there are all kinds of little troubles you have here and there an old-fashioned dictator like Franco. The other thing we have seen in the meantime and he did not in any way anticipate. He thought that there were no longer any fundamental tasks for man. All fundamental questions, theoretical and practical, were solved. Enjoy that. But the trouble is that when you are at such a peak there is also at least the possibility of a going down indicated or intimated by Hegel more than once and broadcast by Stengler in our age and some other people.

So let us turn, then, to page 271 in the third paragraph

Reader: "After the fall of Athens, Sparta took upon herself the Hegemony; but misused it - as already mentioned so selfishly, that she was universally hated. Thebes could not long sustain the part of humiliating Sparta, and was at last exhausted in the war with Phocians. The Spartans and the Phocians - the former because they had surprised the citadel of Thebes, the latter because they had tilled a piece of land belonging to the Delphian Apollo - had been sentenced to pay considerable sums of money. Both states, however, refused payment; for the Amphictyonic Council had not much more authority than the old German Diet."

Strauss: Or the new United Nations.

Reader: " . . . which the German princes obeyed only so far as suited their inclination. The Phocians were then to be punished by the Thebans; but by an egregious piece of violence - by desecrating and plundering the temple at Delphi - the former attained momentary superiority. This deed completes the ruin of Greece; the sanctuary was desecrated, the god, so to speak, killed."

Strauss: Let us go on to a bit later.

Reader: "The next step in advance is then that quite simple one, that the place of the dethroned oracle should be taken by another deciding will - a <u>real</u> authoritative <u>royalty</u>."

Strauss: Yes. A <u>real</u> royalty, an actual royalty, not the royalty of the god of Delphi. So, in other words, you need ultimately a recourse to a will. The highest will ruling the Greeks was, in fact, the Delphi oracle, the will of Apollo. But the powerlessness of Apollo was revealed by the act of the Phocians. And now an actual, a human will. Namely, that of Phillip. Read on here.

Reader: "The foreign Macedonian King - Philip - undertook to avenge the violation of the oracle, and forthwith took its place, by making himself lord of Greece. Philip reduced under his dominion the Hellenic States, and convinced them that it was all over with their independence, and that they could no longer maintain their own footing. The charge of littleness, harshness, violence, and political treachery - all those hateful characteristics with which Philip has

been reproached so often - did not extend to the young Alexander, when he placed himself at the head of the Greeks. He had no need to incur such reproaches."

Strauss: What does this mean? The difference between Philip and Alexander? Could Alexander have made himself the master of Greece without these hateful things? It seems that he was lucky. His father had done the dirty jobs so that he did not have to do them.

So evil is a necessary ingredient of world history and Alexander could afford to be noble.

He speaks here immediately afterwards about Aristotle who was, after all, Alexander's tacher. And he calls Aristotle "The deepest and also the most comprehensive thinker of antiquity . . . the deepest thinker, perhaps, also in comparison with the modern times." So not Plato. Who he regards as possibly competing with Aristotle in modern times with Aristotle it is hard to say. Possibly, himself. And he has frequently been compared with Aristotle.

Here he says at the end of this paragraph which is not in your translation. "Plato has not educated a statesman. Aristotle, however, a true king." This is a sign - not a proof, but a sign of the superiority of Aristotle.

On page 272, bottom, he speaks of Alexander.

Reader: "The grandeur and the interest of this work were proportioned to his genius - to his peculiar youthful individuality - the like of which in so beautiful a form we have not seen a second time at the head of such an undertaking. For not only were the genius of a commander, the greatest spirit, and consummate bravery united in him, but all these qualities were dignified by the beauty of his character as a man and an individual."

Strauss: This reminds of his judgement on Pericles who he had, however, praised more highly.

On page 273, the third paragraph.

Reader: "Alexander had the good fortune to die at the proper time, i.e. it may be called good fortune, but it is rather a necessity. That he may stand before the eyes of posterity as a youth, an early death must hurry him away. Achilles, as remarked above, begins the Greek World, and his antitype Alexander concludes it: and these youths not only supply a picture of the fairest kind in their own persons, but at the same time afford a complete and perfect type of Hellenic existence."

Strauss: So, in other words, that we shall have a beautiful picture of beautiful Greekness, Alexander had to die so early. This is a strange implication of Hegel's rationalism. Everything has to be reasonable.

He defends here Alexander against the modern philistines who judge historical heroes in moral terms. Here he says, among other things, that one must not blame him for having brought blood and war into the world. One must be finished with blood and war when one begins to study world history. In other words, one must be through with this kind of weak nerves, shuddering at war and blood. This, I think, is a quite characteristic remark.

In the sequel he mentions Plato's Republic again and says that, rightful understood. Plato's Republic is not something which Plato figured out for himself, but the true nature of Greek morality. Namely, the complete subordination of the individual to the polis. If this is the principle of Greekness then, of course, Plato drew all of his conclusions from that.

Now we turn to the Roman section. Let us look at page 278.

Reader: "Napoleon, in a conversation which he once had with Goethe on the nature of Tragedy, expressed the opinion that its modern phase differed from the ancient, . . . Yet only from this feeling could arise the supersensuous, the free Spirit in Christianity."

Strauss: In other words, the natural had to be not only overcome, but transcended as it was, to some extent, in Greece. But the natural had to be completely depreciated, to be deprived of all intrinsic charm so that the complete break with natural, the complete otherworldliness in Christianity would follow.

There is another point which we have to consider. There is one term which he uses on page 279, top.

Reader: "Here in Rome, then, we find that free universality, that abstract freedom which, on the one hand, sets an abstract state, a political constitution and power over concrete individuality. On the other side, it creates a personality in opposition to that universality - the inherent freedom of the abstract Ego, which must be distinguished from individual idiosyncrasy."

Strauss: From the individuality. Personality is not individuality. That is his point. And the Romans are the discoverers of personality. What Hegel has in mind is the concept of the person as a legal concept and the recognition of man, first of some one man, but eventually of all men, as legal persons which is something very narrow compared with the full individuality, but which is of great importance because of its potential universality out of the legal person of formal law there will grow the fuller individuality later on.

Hegel makes clear that Rome was from the outset not natural in any way nor did it have the originality going together with naturalness. From the very beginning it was something

made, something arbitrary and violently made, fabricated. He develops this at considerable length.

One of the examples of this is the story of the Sabine women which shows an all-male society of robbers and other rabble. No true human unity. And what does he say regarding this argument? Hegel alludes to it.

He also gives another example, the foundation of Rome. What is the foundation of Rome? Which act?

Student: Romulus and Remus

Strauss: Yes. The foundation of Rome was not only in crime but in fratricide. Ordinarily when we read that story we think of the Biblical story of Cain and Abel. Cain murdered his brother, Abel, and was the first founder of a city. It is, to that extent, the same story.

Hegel, however, saw something which I did not see. Namely, that the story of Romulus and Remus is told by the Romans about their own city. Therefore, it is true historical evidence. Whether these fables are true stories is of no interest to Hegel, but a nation which can tell this story about its own origin reveals its soul by that. That is Hegel's argument against all historical critics as they had arisen especially in the 19th century. But Hegel is not concerned with whether this is a historical fact. Hegel's main objection to the historical critics is, of course, that many things which they think are the true facts are merely plausible hypotheses. They are no more demonstrable than the old stories, but the old stories have the great advantage that reveal the thinking of the people themselves.

If you look at this, where in the world do you find a nation which has given such a terrible account of its own origins. Hegel said, and I think that he was right, that this is most important for understanding them. And, of course, also the story of the Sabine women who were originally outcastes. Did you have a comment?

Student: Romulus killed Remus for the sake of the city, but Cain founded his city after he had been turned away by God.

Strauss: But, still, the story of Cain is not told by the citizens of the city founded by him. That is the crucial poing.

Hegel does not proceed like a modern historian. He refuses to recognizes this approach. He says, "Look at this kind of account which reveal the character of the people." Or take another thing for which Rome was quite famous to which he alludes all the time. The immense legal power of the father and husband in Rome which was much farther beyond

what you found in any other nation at least at that time known. Hegel could have added other evidence in order to show the superiority of the Greeks to the Romans. And he was, I take it, aware of that. And that is what some of the greatest Romans thought about Rome in comparison to Greece. This would only confirm it. They expressed themselves with some reticence. There was no perfect freedom of expression in Rome.

Plutarch was a Greek and he had no inner obligation to think more highly of the Romans, but when you read his Parallel Lives in each case he compares a great Greek to a great Roman. The apparent emphasis is on how similar these Greeks and these Romans were especially at the end of such comparisons where he gives explicit comparisons. He married his aunt, and he married his aunt. Usually something more relevant. But what he never brings out in the explicit comparisons and what comes out when you read the book is the very great differences between the Greeks and the Romans, differences as a rule speaking in favor of the Greeks.

But, of course, even Romans like Lucretius and Cicero make it quite clear that in the most important respects the Greeks are their true teachers.

So, in other words, the general assertion of Hegel is with very good foundations

(Lapse in tape)

You refer to what Cicero says about the origin of the word "religio" in Rome and Hegel says, "Yes. This is very characteristic of the Romans. This narrow, ritualistic, ceremonial understanding of religion." Rome lacks religious freedom, both the freedom of beauty of the Greeks and the freedom of spirit of the Christians. Roman religion is found limited, serving particular purposes, used as an instrument of government, for example. Yet this has an important implication, according to Hegel. This means that it recognizes the particular, the worldly particular in its secular character.

Let us turn to page 292, line 4. He speaks of the Roman gods.

Reader: "The divinities peculiar to them are entirely prosaic."

Strauss: That is sufficient for showing Hegel's method. Hegel knew and he speaks of the fact that the Olympian Pantheon is, in a way, also the Roman Pantheon. Zeus is Jupiter, Hera is Juno and so on and so on.

But he asks, "What are the gods peculiar to the Romans, the gods which do not have a parallel in the Greek pantheon? They reveal the peculiarity of the Romans.

Reader: "The divinities peculiar to them are entirely prosaic; they are conditions of mind or body, sensations, or useful arts, to which their dry fancy, having elevated them to independent power, gave objectivity; they are partly abstractions, which could only become frigid allegories - partly conditions of being which appear as bringing advantage or injury, and which were presented as objects of worship in their original bare and limited form. We can but briefly notice a few examples. The Romans worshipped 'Pax' 'Tranquillitas,' 'Vacuna' (Repose), 'Angeronia' (Sorrow and grief), as divinities; they consecrated altars to the Plague, to Hunger, to Mildew (Robigo), to Fever, and to the Dea Cloacina."

Strauss: And he would simply say: "Show me the parallels of that in Greece." He develops that in the sequel. The Roman gods are not the works of love of the beautiful as the Greek gods at their highest were.

A further point which I believe that he does not make in this edition, but which I believe is here is about the games - the Greek games and the Roman games. The contests. The greatest form of the Greek contest is the contest of the tragedies. What is the place of these contests in Rome? What contests in Rome have the same popularity as tragedy has in Athens? The gladiators. The lions and gladiators for the Romans took the place of the tragedies. If this doesn't show it, what should?

Let us turn to page 294 in the center of the paragraph.

Reader: "In place of human sufferings in the depths of the soul and spirit, occasioned by the contradictions of life, and which find their solution in Destiny, the Romans instituted a cruel reality of corporeal sufferings: blood in streams, the rattle in the throat which signals death, and the expiring gasp were the scenes that delighted them. - This cold negativity of naked murder exhibits at the same time that murder of all spiritual objective aim which had taken place in the soul."

Strauss: And the next paragraph.

Reader: "The distinct elements of Roman religion are, according to what has been said, subjective religiosity and a ritualism having for its object purely superficial external aims."

Strauss: The subjective, the inner religiosity meaning a religiosity which remains only within a feeling and does not come to fulfillment in actions, gestures and so on.

Reader: "Secular aims are left entirely free, instead of being limited by religion - in fact they are rather justified by it. The Romans are invariably pious, whatever may be the substantial character of their actions. But as the sacred

principle here is nothing but an empty form, it is exactly of such a kind that it can be an instrument in the power of the devotee; it is taken possession of by the individual, who seeks his private objects and interests; whereas the truly Divine possesses on the contrary a concrete power in itself. But where there is only a powerless form, the individual - the Will, possessing an independent concreteness able to make that form its own, and render it subservient to its views - stands above it."

Strauss: One can say that the mere prose of life, without any reference to the non-prosaic, is the discovery of the Romans. This is not the same as the discovery of the productive arts which also are emphatically prosaic - shoemaker, carpenter and so on.

What is the difference? In the arts the emphasis is on the knowledge, the ability and the skill of the producer. And here the concern is not with any skills, but with the mere ends, say property. What Hegel tries to convey here is that Rome was manifestly superior to Greece. There cannot be any doubt about it. Yet in the decisive respect Rome constitutes a progress beyond Greece. No longer the tutelage of Nature which was in Greece. But also no longer the charming union of Nature and mind. Charming and, therefore, also deceptive, untrue. Instead, an external union which cannot fool anyone of religious formalism, mere ceremonialism, and finite prosaic content, the finite ends of the property owner.

Implied in all this is that the Roman was simply citizen in the way in which the Spartan was a citizen and, to some extent, also the Athenians. A sphere of privacy is recognized, according to Hegel, for the first time. And that is crucial.

In Greece, Hegel would say, whereas it was in fact recognized in Greek cities, in principle it was not. Therefore, Plato's Republic is the true story of the Greek polis.

Let us see one more passage. On page 281, in the second paragraph.

Reader: "We observed subjective inwardness as the general principle of the Roman World. The course of Roman History, therefore, involves the expansion of undeveloped subjectivity - inward conviction of existence - the the visibility of the real world. The principle of subjective inwardness receives positive application in the first place only from without - through the particular volition of the sovereignty, the government, etc. The development consists in the purification of inwardness to abstract personality, which gives itself reality in the existence of private property; the mutually repellent social units can then be held together only by despotic power."

XI

Strauss: The mutually repellent persons, he says, and this is used advisedly. There is no bond between these property owners as property owners. Each has the right to use and misuse his property and, therefore, the only power which can eventually hold them together is despotic power. Yes?

Reader: "The general course of the Roman World may be defined as this: the transition from the inner sanctum of subjectivity to its direct opposite. The development is here not of the same kind as that in Greece - the unfolding and expanding of its own substance on the part of the principle; but it is the transition to its opposite, which latter does not appear as an element of corruption, but is demanded and posited by the principle itself."

Strauss: What does he mean by that? In Rome, in contradistinction to Greece, the final state is not corruption but the fulfillment. This terrible condition under the Roman emperors is, in a way, that which Rome always was. The complete unholiness of this present life. This is the truth of Rome which comes out. And this unholiness was there from the very beginning because the religion was an instrument of government, an instrument of narrow, finite purposes.

This points to the opposite in modern times - the reconciliation of this life and the other life in modernity.

One more point on page 296.

Reader: "As regards the accounts of the first Roman kings, every datum has met with flat contradiction as the result of criticism; but it is going too far to deny them all credibility. Seven kings in all are mentioned by tradition; and even the 'Higher Criticism' is obliged to recognize the last links in the series as perfectly historical. Romulus is called the founder of this union of freebooters; he organized it into a military state. Although the traditions respecting him appear fabulous, they only contain what is in accordance with the Roman Spirit as above described. To the second king, Numa, is ascribed the introduction of the religious ceremonies. This trait is very remarkable from its implying that religion was introduced later than political union, while among other peoples religious traditions make their appearance in the remotest periods and before all civil institutions."

Strauss: Yes, indeed. Very remarkable. But I wonder whether this is literally true because there were all kinds of oracles and things going with Romulus. This statement occurs somewhere in Livy. This is, rather, the interpretation given in Machiavelli and one has to wonder to what extent Hegel has not seen Rome (inaudible). He had, of course, access to the ancient sources, but he also had read Machiavelli. To what extent he had seen Rome through the eyes of Machiavelli is very tough.

XI

But the principle which he states is, I think, a sensible one. The fables of a nation and especially the fables of a nation about its own origin are as important in order to understand that nation as the most massive facts demonstrated by excavations, etc.

We will stop here.

Seminar on Hegel

Session XII, February 11, 1965

You had a difficult task. I am aware of that. But could you restate to us briefly the crucial points.

Since history is rational, the fact that Christianity emerged within the Roman Empire must be understood in the light of the fundamental agreement and, also, antithesis of the Roman principle and the Christian principle. What is that which they have in common?

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: Yes. But what is the situation of the individual under the Roman Emperor.

Student: It is a condition of absolute slavery.

Strauss: Yes. But not quite because, otherwise, it would be oriental despotism.

Student: He is recognized through his legal rights.

Strauss: This may be precarious, but there it is still. That is very important. So the individual is recognized, although not all. But, still, since the distinction between free men and slaves becomes more irrelevant, one can even speak of the recognition of all men in the late Roman Empire. But what is the situation of the individual under the Roman Emperors?

Student: He has no spiritual self.

Strauss: An empty life. It is a life of misery. But how does Christianity transform that? I mean in the first step. How does the Trinity interpret that emptiness or misery?

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: How is this emptiness or misery called?

Student: Sin.

Strauss: Sin. And this gives the emptiness a totally different meaning. Therewith it points to the possibility of forgiveness or reconciliation.

Or, differently stated, what is the peculiarity of Rome, pagan Rome compared with everything which comes before, either the Orient or Greece?

Student: The government of some subjectivity.

Strauss: Yes. But Rome was the first culture, the first society, which was not natural according to Hegel.

So while the Greeks increased the overcoming of Nature by mind or spirit, at the same time they were more in the union of the two. In Greece, the beautiful. In Rome there is no longer such a union. There is mere non-nature, the mere assertion of will or force, especially what he says about the foundation of Rome. This transcending of Nature in the Roman principle links it up with Christianity where this is found in a much more radical way.

Now I would like to return these papers. Mr. _____. There is only one point which I would like to make. You say that the Roman state was founded on military art, not on Nature. "In Rome the spirit first became independent of Nature for its stimulation. Nature is no longer the matter of spirit. Spirit is its own matter. But Rome was also founded . . ."

I think that that is correct, what you say there. "But was also founded before its religion. Apparently religion supplies in Rome a connection between Nature and spirit. Spirit is not yet completely independent of Nature."

This is, in a way, true, but I don't think that Hegel emphasizes it.

"In view of the difference between Roman religion and the previous religions we have seen it seems questionable to me whether Hegel any longer views religion as the most fundamental manifestation of the peoples' spirit."

Here I am also somewhat doubtful, but it is surely a consideration worthy of being made. Thank you.

Here is another paper. Mr. _____. "The real difficulty in Hegel's statement of Alexander is not his abstraction from Alexander's life (meaning from certain unsavory aspects of that life), but the actual character of the advance he seems to represent. The subjugation of Asia is not an advance of the idea, but, as such, merely a working out of the Greek destiny. But the subjugation of Asia is an advance for the higher Greek spirit was impressed on the East. Still this was not an advance of the idea, but a diffusion of one stage of it - the Greek stage."

But still is this not a very important change which made possible the Roman.

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: Surely. Alexander still belongs to Greece, but this is a changed Greece, the Alexandrian Greece. And this particular change makes intelligible, to some extent, the next stage, namely Rome.

Then you say, "The emancipation from Nature begun by the Greeks is completed by the Romans." I believe that one can say that. Completed, of course, only in the sense of the emancipation, not in the sense that it is fulfilled.

Let us turn to page 298, paragraph 3.

Reader: "The Kings were expelled by the patricians, not by the plebeians; if therefore the patricians are to be regarded as possessed of 'divine right' as being a sacred race, it is worthy of note that we find them here contravening such legitimation; for the King was their High Priest."

Strauss: Literally, they acted against legitimacy.

Reader: "We observe on this occasion with what dignity the sanctity of marriage was invested in the eyes of the Romans. The principle of subjectivity and piety (pudor) was with them the religious and guarded element; and its violation becomes the occasion of the expulsion of the Kings, and later on of the Decemvirs too."

Strauss: Hegel adds the word "pudor" to make quite clear the point which he has in mind. "Pudor" - sense of shame - this existed and was especially powerful in Rome within certain limits. This is not the conscience. This is the implication.

When we read the passages in Greek or Latin texts they speak of the sense of shame. The nearest modern equivalent would be the conscience. But it is not the conscience. And the most simple proof of that is the most elaborate statement about the sense of shame which we have in the Greek literature towards the end of the fourth book of Aristotle's Ethics. Do you remember Aristotle's teaching about sense of shame?

Student: It is good for the young, but not for mature men.

Strauss: It is not a virtue. A gentleman would never do anything of which he is ashamed and, therefore, we don't have it. Young people should have it because they can't help still making mistakes. And this shows clearly how different it is from what we understand as the conscience.

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: Yes. But you must not forget that when he discusses subjects in the Rhetoric - the various passions - in the first place it is the passions. We must never forget that. To that extent there is no contradiction, of course, to the Ethics. But apart from that or implied in that, the level which Aristotle discusses in his Rhetoric is definitely lower, a much more popular view, than he takes in the Ethics. True courage would not be based on a sense of shame. But in thinking of younger people there it would be based on a sense of shame, what the others would think if he ran away and so on.

This is a passage which is not in your edition. "The plebians haven't gained anything by the expulsion of the kings. The kings had protected the plebs against the patricians, and prevented them from oppressing the plebs. In this way, the people owe everywhere also in modern times to the king their liberation from the suppression by the aristocracy." He draws this as a general conclusion.

"There is aristocracy in England" (that was more or less before the reform bill) "because the royal power is insignificant. This is the eternal relation. That ordinarily the lower class people are protected by the king, but they are fooled and against their advantage they unite themselves with the middle class by which they are suppressed." This is the reform bill situation, more or less, and I think that this is an interesting insight into Hegel's political views in this time.

He says somewhat later, "In considering the Roman constitution one cannot help feeling that aristocracy is the worst constitution although Aristotle think that they should rule. The Roman aristocracy in itself was not as dead as that of Venice, for example. They had their laws and their inner vitality and, thus, in Rome two extremes were united which established somehow an equilibrium among themselves meaning the patricians and the plebs. But this is the worst because even the equilibrium itself would have to be as a definite power, as a means and point of support and would have to be as such actual. But this was not the case in Rome," meaning that this would have to be supplied by a third element, the monarchy as Hegel thought would be the case in the constitutional monarchy of the 19th century.

This criticism of Aristotle is something which we must keep in mind.

Let us turn to page 304, second paragraph.

Reader: "It would be a wearisome task to pursue the wars of the Romans in Italy; partly because they are in themselves unimportant - even the often empty rhetoric of the generals in Livy cannot very much increase the interest - partly on account of the unintelligent character of the Roman annalists in whose pages we see the Romans carrying on war only with 'enemies' without learning anything further of their individuality - e.g. the Etruscans, the Samnites, the Ligurians, with whom they carried on wars during many hundred years."

Strauss: In other words, in contrast to Thucydides where the individuality of Athens and Sparta is clear or in Herodotus where the individuality of the Persians and the Egyptians and so on comes out so vividly. And, indeed, in Livy the old story has little interest in who was who. I believe that when Machiavelli makes some of his changes in the reports of early Roman history replacing the _____'s by the _____'s he does this with the intention to bring this out. Go on.

Reader: "It is singular in regard to these transactions that the Romans, who have the justification conceded by World History on their side, should also claim for themselves the minor justification . . ."

Strauss: He speaks first of the "great right, the grand right of world history" and that they are also concerned with the "little right."

Reader: " . . . in respect to manifestoes and treaties on occasion of minor infringements of them, and maintain it as it were after the fashion of advocates. But in political complications of this kind, either party make take offence at the conduct of the other, if it pleases, and deems it expedient to be offended."

Strauss: In other words, the only right which is truly respected and which is a world historical right and not the little right - positive international law, treaties and so on where interpretations have always a great possibility of showing its virtues and vices.

Now page 308, center

Reader: "The relation to other nations was purely that of force. The national individuality of peoples did not, as early as the time of the Romans, excite respect as is the case in modern times. The various peoples were not yet recognized as legitimated. The various states had not yet acknowledged each other as real, essential existences. Equal right to existence entails the union of states such as exists in modern Europe or a condition like that of Greece in which the states had an equal right to existence under the protection of the Delphic gods. The Romans do not enter into such a relation to other nations, for thier god is only the Jupiter Capitolinus; neither do they respect the sacra of the other nations (any more than the plebeians those of the patricians); but, as conquerors in the striot sense of the term, they plunder the Palladia of the nations."

Strauss: They key point - that the Romans do not respect the national individuality of other nations - is habitually the case today. He means, of course, in modern Europe:

The Romans are, in a sense, monotheists although they are for all practical purposes polytheists. Their god is only the Jupiter Capitolinus and, therefore, they do not respect the other nations. The Roman state is a universal state, therefore, in principle. But, nevertheless. a universal state of which only Romans can be citizens.

I think that what Hegel implies here is that just as in Greece the recognition by all cities of the Delphic god led to a recognition of one by the other, the Christian character of the modern states makes it possible and necessay for the individual Christian state to recognize the others.

Page 309, line 5.

Reader: "From Asia, luxury and debauchery were brought to Rome. Riches flowed in after the fashion of spoils in war, and were not the fruit of industry and honest activity; in the same way as the marine had arisen, not from the necessities of commerce, but with a warlike object."

Strauss: Yes. For the purpose of war. In other words, industry and commerce are morally superior to war. In this respect Hegel is in entire agreement with English development represented especially by Locke.

Now page 310, paragraph 3.

Reader: "We thus see the most terrible and dangerous powers rising against Rome; yet the military force of this state is victorious over all. Great individuals now appear on the stage as during the times of the fall of Greece."

Strauss: The development, the emancipation of the individual belongs to a time of decay. Pericles and Alcibiades. And the same is true of Rome, he says. Prior to the decay there is a prevalence of types, families and so on. The individuals as individuals were not important.

Reader: "The biographies of Plutarch are here also of the deepest interest. It was from the disruption of the state, which had no longer any consistency or firmness in itself, that these colossal individualities arose, instinctively impelled to restore that political unity which was no longer to be found in men's dispositions. It is their misfortune that they cannot maintain a pure morality, for their course of action contravenes things as they are, and is a series of transgressions."

Strauss: Crimes. Let us be quite clear. Crimes.

Reader: "Even the noblest - the Gracchi - were not merely the victims of injustice and violence from without, but were themselves involved in the corruption and wrong that universally prevailed. But in that which these individuals purpose and accomplish there is on its side the higher sanction of the World-Spirit, and must eventually triumph."

Strauss: World history has a tragic character to the extent that crimes are necessary, noble crimes. Yes, of course, ultimately world history is not tragic because there is a final reconciliation, a final victory of right.

Let us turn to page 311, second paragraph.

Reader: "In this way the world-wide sovereignty of Rome became the property of a single possessor. . .The nature of the state, and of the Roman State in particular, transcends his comprehension."

Strauss: This is a very interesting criticism and very characteristic of Hegel. What do you say of this criticism which, later on in the 19th century was presented in a much more radical form by the famous German historian of Rome, M_____. Cicero is presented as a man without any understanding of what was going on.

Student: I would say that that was a problem stemming from an unfamiliarity with the Republic. Is that so?

Strauss: No. Cicero's Republic was discovered in 1825. Hegel may not have known it but . . .

Student: Because I think that there Cicero takes a much more pessimistic view . . .

Strauss: But I don't think that this goes to the root of the matter. Cicero surely took the side of the Senate, of the old order against Caesar's revolutionary action. There is no doubt about that.

Student 2: The difference between Cicero and Plato is that Cicero was in the active business of saving the state. He did that at least twice.

Strauss: Yes. That is a good point. Plato knew - he says so somewhere - that he has come late in Athens. Late so that there was no longer any possiblity of a restoration. But there is, of course, a difference because what was in Athens in Plato's time and what he regarded as a decay was democracy, but Plato knew that this democracy - however low it might seem to him - was nevertheless a golden age compared with the attempt at restoring the old which had been attempted by his kinsmen - what now would be called a brutal fascist reaction. After all, Plato was twenty when this happened and was for a moment attracted by the fine words of justice. Then, after he had seen how they acted, the old despised democracy appeared like the golden age in retrospect. But Plato knew that certain things were no longer possible in his own times.

But in Cicero's case. things were somewhat different. Plato accepts the democracy. Cicero tries to preserve some freedom which he was sure would be endangered by the rule of a single man. That is the very great difference.

Hegel, looking at the thing in hindsight, sees what wonderful things came out of this terrible Caesarism, the emergence of Christianity and the modern world. Therefore, Cicero did not see and understand the wave of the future.

Student: I would say that Hegel's views are clouded by his views of necessity in history, whereas Cicero wouldn't have that view.

Strauss: Yes, but is this not connected with the fact that in the situation you cannot tell what will happen?

Student: That is probably true, but I could never imagine Cicero having a notion of necessary causes in history. He would say that there is a chance to preserve this order. Let us try.

Strauss: In practice, everyone must do this no matter what theory he may have because he does not know the future. But what is the difference here? First, if we take Marxism for example, the assumed knowledge of the future. You know that the stronger force is the wave of the future. Therefore, it is foolish to resist. This was, indeed, absent. It was clear for him that the preservation of the republican institutions is the best that you can have. Mr. _____?

Student: This is about the earlier quote about Roman universalism and the modern state. "I don't understand why the modern state would be more tolerant of other national principles than Rome was and why the modern states shouldn't try somehow to work towards a universal world state based on the rational order of a monarchy, according to Hegel.

Strauss: There was a time when Hegel sympathized very much with Napoleon's attempts to unify Europe, at least continental Europe. This would be the closest thing to a universal state possible under the circumstances then. At this time, he had abandoned that obviously. And he saw that the recognition of what DeGaulle now calls "the Europe of the fatherlands"; a number of free and equal and independent states, this is characteristic of Europe and should be preserved.

Student: He mentions something like that China couldn't take over the West, but the West might take over China through her ideas. If every state merely had to work out the Western European ideas of freedom then, supposedly, all the national characteristic differences would be worked out and there would be no reason for national differences then.

Strauss: If we limit ourselves to what he says in the passage he indicates a reason. None of these European states claims that its god - the god which it respects - is the universal god. The Germans in Hegels time didn't say that the god is a German god and the god of the Germans more than of any other nation, whereas the Romans said that their god was, as the Roman god, destined to rule over the whole area according to Hegel's statement there.

That is a great question - to what extent Hegel can oppose, say, at least the unification of Europe. That is true. But I think that he took it for granted later. The maximum that we find in his later writings is that

he feels that a war among the European nations is now senseless. In other words, all the wars that came later especially those under which Germany was unified under Bismarck, are not provided for by Hegel. I don't believe that there is anything which we can say beyond that. Or one must rewrite Hegel completely as was done by _____ who, synthesizing Hegel and Marx, speaks of the homogeneous and universal state, not merely society which is that towards which all modern movements are leading. But this is clearly no longer Hegel himself. Hegel corrected in the light of Marx or Marx corrected in the light of Hegel. The correction of Marx is obvious. Not a stateless society, but a state, a government.

Let us turn to page 315, second paragraph, the second half.

Reader: "In the person of the Emperor isolated subjectivity has gained a perfectly unlimited realization. . . The springs of action are none other than desire, lust, passion, fancy - in short, caprice absolutely unfettered."

Strauss: Which includes the possiblity that an individual emperor might be virtuous, but seen in the light of the principle of government, it is a mere accident. It is a mere caprice of Marcus Aurelius that he wants to be virtuous as it is a caprice of D_____ to be appeased.

Student: Is he saying that, in general, whenever there is no spiritual struggle there wouldn't be any spiritual life? That the Emperor, in a sense, has it too easy. He gets everything.

Strauss: No. I think that it is more than that. There is the of every moral substance which is essential to the Roman order based on being freed from Nature. The simple, natural affections, for example, in the family which play a role in all other previous nations are from the very beginning weakened, not to say destroyed - in principle destroyed. And, therefore, nothing remains but arbitrary will and force. The natural result after all restraint - external restraint - was taken away by the universal conquest, that had to come that way. Yes?

Student: Isn't this a somewhat similar situation to what would happen in the modern world. There would be no further development. There would be a spirit entirely wrapped up in itself with no contact with Nature. You would get the same type of degeneration.

Strauss: You mean at the end.

Student: Well, at this time.

Strauss: No, for the very simple reason that modernity is based on the recognition of the modern state and the recognition of the rights of man and everything that it

entails necessarily is characterized by what we can call the rule of law in contradistinction to any arbitrary will. In Hegel's notion of monarchy, the monarch is only the individual who signs on the dotted line. The documents are prepared by the higher officials, supposedly men of high education and probably trained for their job. I think that the difficulty to which Hegel's notion of the final state is concerned has nothing to do with his concept of the state itself except in that he believed that it is possible to preserve the hereditary monarchy and hereditary nobility which is a part of his scheme against the enormous power of the democratic movement of which he was somehow aware but before which he somehow closes his eyes. This, of course, is a very great change.

Apart from that, the reasonable state - the state based on the rights of man and issuing reasonable laws assuming that the laws are framed by competent people and not merely under popular pressure. That is the meaning of his concern with government ruling in its own right and not merely by popular delegation.

Student: I wasn't thinking so much of the modern monarch, but of the private citizen in the modern state where . . .

Strauss: This is a different story. You are thinking of the passage from the Philosophy of Religion? The passage which I read last time about the fact that the state has fundamentally a religious basis, but it also has not.

Student: Yes. But also from here where the only connection of the individual with a spiritual struggle is done away with in connection with any material struggle being done away with.

Strauss: Let us assume that such a thing is possible. A new kind of emptiness, a thought with which Max Weber dealt. But this emptiness would be of a radically different kind from the emptiness which you find, according to Hegel, in the Roman Empire.

Student: Well, it wouldn't be this complete playing out of the desires. It would be different in that sense. But it would result in the same complete lack of contact with anything substantial, wouldn't it? The only legitimate principle which the individual could look up to would be his freedom. He knows that he is free and independent, but he has nothing to do, no activity that is a goal.

Strauss: Do you mean something like what Nietzsche spoke of in the section on the last man?

Student: In a sense.

Strauss: Yes. This woukd, indeed, be something very different from the Roman Empire. This is precisely not misery but apparent happiness. The Roman citizens, constantly hearing another outrage of the government are not in this state.

Student: I was comparing more the modern citizen with the Roman emperor who was apparently happy, too.

Strauss: Yes. But he is very much in danger all the time.

Student 2: If you are looking for parallels perhaps our juvenile delinquents and our unhappy college students are a little like this.

Strauss: Yes. I thought of this. Nevertheless, I believe that there is a fundamental difference. I say this not because I am very sanguine, but because we must not overlook fundamental differences. And the mere awareness of these dangers is something which we have to be grateful for.

Now in the sequel he develops a further point that this organism of the state is dissolved into the atoms of private persons. What he means by private persons could also be called the bourgeois in contradistinction to the citizen. Rousseau's distinction was taken up by Hegel and then transformed by Marx. The man who does not fight for his country, who is not a citizen and has no participation in government, is a mere subject and devoid of all public spirit. That is what Rousseau meant by the bourgeois and Hegel accepted that to some extent.

But here, of course, in the Roman world that would be as true of the rich as of the poor because the poor would be actually propertyless, but eager to own property. The same would be true of the slaves. They can be emancipated any day and given a legacy and they would be already free property holders.

On page 317, line 12 from bottom.

Reader: "That, therefore, which was abidingly present to the minds of men was not their country or such a moral unity as that supplies. The whole estate of things urged them to yield themselves to fate and to strive for a perfect indifference to life."

Strauss: This was necessary because of the radically immoral character, not bound by any law, of the government.

Reader: " . . . an indifference which they sought either in freedom of thought of in directly sensuous enjoyment. He either recognized his destiny in the task of acquiring the means of enjoyment through the favor of the Emperor, or through violence, testamentary frauds, and cunning; or he sought repose in philosophy, which alone was still able to supply something firm and independent."

Strauss: It is important here to recognize that he is not speaking of philosophy in general. Such a philosophy which belongs to a period of public misery according to Hegel.

Reader: "For the systems of that time - Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Scepticism - although within their common sphere opposed to each other, had the same general purport, viz. rendering the soul absolutely indifferent to everything which the real world had to offer."

Strauss: Escapism, as we would say today. Yes?

Reader: "These philosophies were therefore widely extended among the cultivated: they produced in man a self-reliant immobility as the result of Thought, i.e. of the activity which produces the Universal. But the inward reconciliation by means of philosophy was itself only an abstract one - in the pure principle of personality; for Thought, which, as perfectly refined . . ."

Strauss: No. "which as pure."

Reader: ". . . which as pure, made itself its own object, and thus harmonized itself, was entirely destitute of a real object, and the immorbility of Scepticism made aimlessness itself the object of the Will. This philosophy knew nothing but the negativity of all that assumed to be real, and was the counsel of despair to a world which no longer possessed anything stable. It could not satisfy the living Spirit, which longed after a higher reconciliation."

Strauss: Anything stable objectively. He doesn't say objectively. So this was, then, in a way the peak of the Roman Empire. These philosophies which supply abstract reconciliation. The individual philosopher finds a refuge entirely within. He does not find a reconciliation with the object - with life - because life is sheer misery from which you have to escape. This reflection here which we find also in other writings of Hegel is, in a way, the starting point of the Marxist critique of Hegel. In his doctoral dissertation which is devoted to Epicureanism this is not merely meant as a historical study, but as a philosophic critique of Hegel. Is the reconciliation with reality which Hegel claimed to have achieved in his philosophy not also such an abstract reconciliation and, therefore, in need of a supplement.

Now this supplement could, of course, no longer be philosophy. The supplementation to Hegel could not be given in a philosophic manner because this would still be an abstract reconciliation. Therefore, political action and ultimately revolution will bring about the reconciliation.

Here we come to the section on Christianity which is, in a way, the most important part of the whole work. Perhaps we should first read the beginning of this section.

Reader: "It has been remarked that Caesar inaugurated the Modern World on the side of reality, while its spiritual and inward existence was unfolded under Augustus."

Strauss: What does he mean by that? By "Caesar's opening of the New World?" Well, the conquest of and, to some extent, of Germany and Britain, i.e. these nations which were the bearers of the further development. Ther Germanic nations as Hegel usually calls it.

Reader: "At the beginning of that empire, whose principle we have recognized as finiteness and particular subjectivity exaggerated to infinitude, the salvation of the World had its birth in the same principle of subjectivity."

Strauss: This is a fundamental agreement between Romanism and Christianity.

Reader: " . . . viz. as a particular person, in abstract subjectivity; but in such a way that, conversely finiteness is only the form of his appearance, while infinity and absolutely independent existence constitute the essence and substantial being which it embodies. The Roman World, as it has been described - in its desperate condition and the pain of abandonment by God - came to an open rupture with reality, and made prominent the general desire for a satisfaction such as can only be attained in 'the inner man,' the Soul - thus preparing the ground for a higher Spiritual World.. Rome was the Fate that crushed down the gods. . ."

Strauss: Rome is probably not the subject. Oh, yes. Go on. I am sorry.

Reader: Rome was the Fate that crushed down the gods and all genial life in its hard service, while it was the power that purified the human heart from all speciality. . . so that the alien element may be destroyed, and the reconciliation of Spirit be accomplished."

Strauss: Here Hegel alludes to his general assertion that Nature is, in itself, spirit. Spirit in an alienated form, however. Spirit which is not aware of itself. And this destruction of the ideal nation is the true reconciliation.

The Roman world has purified the human mind and heart from all particularity because it recognized the individual only as an abstract, legal person. All men are actually or potentially persons. Potentially the slaves, for example, but they can be emancipated by any arbitrary action of their master. All are equally subjects to a particular subjectivity. Namely, of the Emperor. And with no bond uniting subjects and rulers, rulers and ruled. No genuine bond between them. And this is so since the ruler is only a particular subjectivity - this individual - no satisfaction in the subjection to him. Hence, purification from all particularity.

Page 319, line 7 from bottom.

Reader: "The element of subjectivity that was wanting to the Greeks we found among the Romans, but as it was merely formal and in itself indefinite it took its material form from passion and caprice: - even the most shameful degradations could be here connected with a divine dread."

Strauss: So, in spite of this very low form in which it was found in Rome, the principle itself implies an advance, a progress beyond Greekness. This is in accordance with what we have seen before.

In the sequel on page 220 following, Hegel takes up the issue of Judaism again. You know he spoke of it before when he spoke of the oriental nations. But here he brings out what was not proper for him to bring out in speaking of the Orientals and that is the story of the God of sin and the radicalization of that strong dissatisfaction characteristic of the Roman Empire - an essential dissatisfaction.

Page 220, line 10 from bottom.

(lapse in tape)

Reader: " . . . what has been reflection on our part . . ."

Strauss: What has been only reflection on our part. In other words, we looking at the subject of the Roman Empire see that, but they did not see it. What was only our reflection . . . Yes?

Reader: " . . . what has been only reflection on our part must arise in the minds of the subjects of this discipline in the consciousness that in himself he is miserable and null. Outward suffering must, as already said, be merged in a sorrow of the inner man. He must feel himself as the negation of himself. He must see that his misery is the misery of his nature, that he is in himself a divided and discordant being."

Strauss: And later he talks about the Jewish books.

Reader: "Of this Spirit we have the mythical representation at the very beginning of the Jewish canonical books, in the account of the Fall. Man, created in the image of God, lost, it is said, his state of absolute contentment, by eating of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil. Sin consists here only in Knowledge: this is the sinful element, and by it man is stated to have trifled away his Natural happiness."

Strauss: Hegel cannot, of course, accept that literally. That is why he calls it "mythical." Because there cannot have been a perfect beginning. That we know.

Now let us see how he interprets this.

Reader: "This is a deep truth, that evil lies in consciousness: for the brutes are neither evil nor good; the merely Natural Man quite as little. Consciousness occasions the separation of the Ego, in its boundless freedom as arbitrary choice, from the pure essence of the Will - i.e. from the Good. Knowledge, as the disannulling of the unity of mere Nature, is the 'Fall,' which is no casual conception . . ."

Strauss: No. "Which is not a contingent fact, but the eternal history of the spirit." So, in other words, he doesn't take the story literally.

Here he comes to the point.

Reader: "For the state of innocence, the paradisiacal condition, is that of the brute. Paradise is a park, where only brutes, not men, can remain."

Strauss: Going back to the original meaning of _____ (the word for paradise in Greek) where it means a kind of zoo.

Reader: "For the brute is one with God only implicitly. Only Man's Spirit (that is) has a self-cognizant existence. This existence for self- this consciousness - is at the same time separation from the Universal and Divine Spirit. If I hold to my abstract Freedom, in contrapcsition to the Good, I adopt the standpoint of Evil. The Fall is therefore the eternal Mythus of Man - in fact, the very transition by which he becomes man."

Strauss: So it is not simply bad. Very far from it. That is already the interpretation of the Fall taken by Kant and accepted by Hegel.

So, in other words, man becomes man only by virtue of this separation, by this knowledge of his subjectivity.

Reader: "Persistence in this standpoint is, however, Evil, and the feeling of pain at such a condition, and of longing to transcend it, we find in David, when he says: 'Lord, create for me a pure heart, a new steadfast spirit."

Strauss: The "create" must be taken very literally here. It is truly a creation in the sense of the first sentence of the Bible which comes out clearer in the English translation than in the German.

Reader: "This feeling we observe even in the account of the Fall; though an announcement of Reconciliation is not made there, but rather one of continuance in misery. Yet we have in this narrative the prediction of reconciliation in the sentence, 'The serpent's head shall be bruised'; but still more profoundly expressed where it is stated that when God saw that Adam had eaten of that tree, he said, 'Behold Adam is become as one of us, knowing Good and Evil.' God confirms the words of the Serpent."

Strauss: In other words, by the Fall man has become divine.

Reader: "Implicitly and explicitly, then, we have the truth, that man through Spirit - through cognition of the Universal and the Particular - comprehends God Himself."

Strauss: Split. Man is not God. And, yet, in a way he is divine.

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: Hegel would say that this is the decisive respect. Knowledge.

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: But, still, the question is whether knowledge is not more important than immortality.

Reader: "But it is only God that declares this - not man: the latter remains, on the contrary, in a state of internal discord."

Strauss: In other words, man - Adam - does not know that he has become like God by knowledge.

Reader: "The joy of reconciliation is still distant from humanity; the absolute and final repose of his whole being is not yet discovered to man. It exists, in the first instance, only for God."

Strauss: In other words, this points to Christianity, according to Hegel because what was not so in the Old Testament becomes so in Christianity, in the first place in Jesus as a Christ who is divine - who is God - and then eventually in all human beings insofar as they are Christians.

Judaism has seen - and this is a great step - that man as man is a sinner, wholly alienated from God and yet to be redeemed by God. The carrying through of this is not to be found in Judaism, according to Hegel, but in Christianity.

Hegel develops this more fully in the sequel. There is the truth of Christianity as a speculative truth which is the identity of the subject - i.e., of man - and God. The awareness of this identity is an awareness of God in His truth. The content of truth is the mind or spirit itself. The living movement within itself. The nature of God - to be pure spirit - becomes manifest to man in the Christian religion.

But this speculative truth is not sufficient. The speculative truth must also become visual, sensual certainty. So the second person of God - God's son - must become incarnated as man.

And what happens later is just the opposite. The liberation from the acceptance of the visible Jesus Christ as merely carnal, and the spiritual understanding of Jesus Christ which leads eventually to what Hegel regards as the speculative truth fully understood in his doctrine.

That is the key point which he makes in the immediate sequel. The spiritual understanding of Christ as opposed to the carnal understanding which implies the disregard of the miracles and the sacredness of the mere text of the Gospels as a matter of course.

Particularly important is one passage which we surely should consider on page 326, third paragraph.

Reader: "We have next to consider how the Christian view resulted in the formation of the Church. To pursue the rationale of its development from the Idea of Christianity would lead us too far, and we have here to indicate only the general phases which the process assumed. The first phase is the founding of the Christian religion, in which its principle is expressed with unrestrained energy, but in the first instance abstractly. This we find in the Gospels, where the infinity of Spirit - its elevation into the spiritual world - is the main theme. With transcendent boldness does Christ stand forth among the Jewish people. 'Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God,' he proclaims in the Sermon on the Mount - a dictum of the noblest simplicity, and pregnant with an elastic energy of rebound against all the adventitious appliances with which the human soul can be burdened."

Strauss: Let us go down half a page further on.

Reader: "Further on, this doctrine, as the natural consequence of its appearing in an abstract form, assumes a polemical direction."

Strauss: More literally, "becomes polemical."

Reader: "'If thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out and cast it from thee: if thy right hand offend thee, cut it off and cast it from thee. It is better that one of thy members should perish, and not that thy whole body should be cast into hell.' Whatever might disturb the purity of the soul should be destroyed."

Strauss: There are similar remarks about property and acquisition.

Reader: "Labor for subsistence is thus reprobated: 'Wilt thou be perfect, go and sell what thou hast, and give it to the poor, so shalt thou have a treasure in heaven, and come, follow me.' Were this precept directly complied with, a social revolution must take place: the poor would become the rich. Of such supreme moment, it is implied, is the doctrine of Christ, that all duties and moral bonds are unimportant as compared with it."

Strauss: Now read the end of this paragraph.

Reader: "Here then is an abstraction from all that belongs to reality, even from moral ties. We may say that nowhere are to be found such revolutionary utterances as in the Gospels; for everything that had been respected is treated as a matter of indifference - as worthy of no regard."

Strauss: So the break with Nature is with everyting (inaudible) even with all natural reality - it is unqualified. And on this basis a new understanding of morality in particular becomes possible, but this takes the whole course of the history of Christianity until Hegel's time.

We cannot read this all. The main points will become clearer. Page 335.

Reader: "From time immemorial it has been customary to assume an opposition between Reason and Religion, as also between Religion and the World; but on investigation this turns out to be only a distinction. Reason in general is the Positive Existence of Spirit, divine as well as human. The distinction between Religion and the World is only this - that Religion, as such, is Reason in the soul and heart - that it is a temple in which Truth and Freedom in God are presented to the conceptive faculty."

Strauss: Meaning, not to reason. Sub-rational.

Reader: "The State, on the other hand, regulated by the self-same Reason, is a temple of Human Freedom concerned with the perception and volition of a reality . . ."

Strauss: No. " . . . is a temple of human freedom in the element of knowledge and the willing of reality."

Reader: " . . . whose purport may itself be called divine. Thus Freedom in the State is preserved and established by Religion, since moral rectitude in the State is only the carrying out of that which constitutes the fundamental principle of Religion."

Strauss: But that is, of course, not merely "only". It is a higher stage.

Reader: "The process displayed in History is only the manifestation of Religion as Human Reason - the production of religious principle which dwells in the heart of man, under the form of Secular Freedom".

Strauss: You remember the passage which we discussed last time or the time before last which is not in your edition. Our form of state is something radically different from that of the Athenian people since our form of state can be altogether indifferent towards the inner lives, even towards

religion. The actualization, the fulfillment, of religion - in this case, of the Christian religion - is that religion becomes visible as human reason. That is to say that what was traditionally thought to be supra-rational becomes fully evident to the fully developed human reason. Correspondingly, that the religious principle which dwells in the heart of man is produced also as worldly freedom. That this inner freedom of the mind, of the soul, becomes externalized and, therewith, comes into its own as worldly freedom, that is political freedom.

Student: What does it mean to say that the state is indifferent towards the inner life? It seems that there is no longer any specifically inner life that is specifically inner because it is, so to speak, incorporated into the state.

Strauss: The modern state, as Hegel sees it, demands, according to him, that everyone be a member of a religious association. But the state is not interested in which. Take the most famous case, in Prussia for example. The Catholic subjects as well as the Protestants, although, according to Hegel, Protestantism, as opposed to Catholicism, comes closer to the full truth of Christianity. But Hegel also included the Jews. The modern state is tolerant. That is absolutely essential. And, therefore, in this sense, the state is indifferent to the inner life.

Whether a man is a philosopher hence having a peculiar philosophy of religion or religious philosophy which Hegel presents, or whether he is a nonphilosophic Protestant, Catholic or Jew or whatever, this doesn't make any difference to the State. That is what he means.

The recognizing of the rights of man, the recognition of the infinite value of the individual - this is much more important than the other things. Because, according to Hegel, this is the full realization of Christianity.

Student: In the sense that this is the full realization, the inner life is irrelevant because there is no possible internal truth that couldn't be externalized.

Strauss: This externalization, this recognition in deed, of the humanity of every other human being is the truth, the full truth of Christianity. But it cannot be theoretically stated except in the form in which Hegel states it in his speculative philosophy.

Student: According to this philosophy, then, which is somehow at the basis of the state, there isn't any inner life. It's not the same tolerance towards religion as we would think of now in this country where the state doesn't claim to . . .

Strauss: Hegel knew this although he didn't know it in its American special form. The view that God cannot be known

rationally. The maximum that we can say is that God is. Nothing else. And Hegel rejects this. If this is so then, necessarily, the emphasis would be concentrated on revered religion in contradistinction to human reason because the full truth about God is not accessible to reason. It is only accessible through revelation.

Hegel wishes to make Jesus someone and, therefore, the full knowledge of God - the perfect knowledge of God,-must be accessible to reason.

There is a sentence in Spinoza's Ethics. I will say it only from recollection. "We know the essence of God." Simply that. That is Hegel's philosophy. I mean, at least Hegel knows it. And Hegel believes that anyone who takes sufficient trouble and is not ill-suited for this kind of study will also know the essence of God after he has studied Hegel's work. And, therefore, there is no longer any claim of revealed religion to be the guide for the highest form of the state. Reason can and must do it because it is seeing what faith only hope for. And seeing must admitedly be superior - other things being equal - merely to seeing through a glass darkly.

Student: This tolerance is whatever is necessary for these non-philosophers to have some glimpse of the truth and fulfill themselves in some way. In other words, it allows people to be religious because, essentially, their religion can't do any harm.

Strauss: It is more. Hegel surely rejects this view. But the difficulty from Hegel's point of view is that the alleged philosophic insight cannot but affect more and more also the mass of people. And this is the discord of which he speaks also at the end of his Philosophy of Religion. Hegel would never be as cynical as Voltaire: After the deluge. But, in a way, he closed his eyes.

Kant, before him, did not believe that irreligion would ever become socially powerful. Hegel apparently had some feelings that this was too sanguine. Yes?

Student: Didn't Kant think that the essential points of moral philosophy were easy to understand for the common man? Did Hegel have the same view that everyone could really become a philosopher?

Strauss: No. Hegel was sure that there was something much more needed to know one's duties properly. I mean, not externally, because then you only have to ask someone versed in the laws of the land. What you may or may not do. But to see the irrationality or rationality, this is not open to everybody. That requires study.

Student: Do you think that the Philosophy of History is Hegel's attempt to give a philosophy to the masses?

Strauss: No. There is a difference between all lectures of Hegel whether they are on the history of philosophy, on aesthetics, on religion or on whichever subject from the books he published. They are not elaborated to the same extent. What we, in fact, read is a composite made from the lecture notes of different hearers. That is, of course, a difference of some importance. It would seem that Hegel had some reticence, but much less than earlier philosophers. And he, in a way, rejects the principle of reticence. When he discusses the traditional distinction which was still well known in his time between esoteric and exoteric teaching - he does this in his lectures on the history of philosophy - he simply rejects that. He doesn't have anything to do with it. And I think that Hegel and his contemporary, Schreiermacher, were more responsible than any other individuals for the fact that the distinction between esoteric and exoteric has ceased to be of any importance. I mean, also for the historians.

Seminar on Hegel

Session XIII, March 2, 1965

Thank you very much. You had - as in a way did everyone before you - a difficult assignment. In your particular subject there was one difficulty due to the translation. The translator always speaks of "Germany" things, whereas Hegel mostly speaks of Germanic which is not the same as Germany especially in German itself. _____ and _____ are clearly distinguishable things. Any impression that anyone might have gotten that Hegel is a kind of Germanic nationalist would be wholly wrong. Nothing is further from Hegel's mind. He means the old Germans when he speaks of the original strata. And for this he refers, as you said, to Tacitus. And he accepts, to some extent, Tacitus's very flattering description, but this description was made by Tacitus for intraRoman purposes to remind these corrupt Romans of a people which was not corrupt.

There is one word which Hegel uses to describe the thing which he believes is peculiar to the Germanic people and, therefore, also to the Germans proper and that is also not translatable. In one example which you quoted, the English translation was "heart." The German word is _____. Absolutely untranslatable.

This is something of which many Germans are very proud, especially Germans who came to other countries where they did not find that _____.

It is very hard. I cannot translate it, but I will give you one illustration at the lowest level. Something at which you are perfectly at your ease and everyone is friendly and outspoken. That is very important. That is another part of the German understanding. That the Germans are honest people.

Goethe has said the harshest word about _____. He said that it is the indulgence of one's own and other peoples' weaknesses. A very easygoing posture.

Hegel tries to interpret in this way in a language which is translatable. It has to do with the inner man as distinguished from external things including, of course, also manners. I have often heard from people who came from Germany especially to this country and Great Britain that they couldn't understand that people were very friendly and courteous, i.e. they behaved in a way which in Germany friends would behave towards each other. And then they saw that this friendliness was very superficial and deceptive because there was no indication of friendship. This is a very simple illustration of the negative side of _____.

We will perhaps say something more when we come to that passage.

In this assignment Hegel contrasts two radically different forms of Christianity. One seemed to be much more promising because it emerged within the Roman Empire itself - Byzantium. The other seemed to be much less promising, that of the Northern barbarians. And yet Hegel's view is that the latter was, in fact, pregnant with a great future, whereas Byzantium was a kind of dead end. How can you restate this point? What the reason for that was? That nothing came out of Byzantium and the whole development came out of Europe?

Student: (inaudible)
You put it into Byzantium - he emphasizes that they had a very good system of government. He mentions the Justinian Code.

Strauss: But what kind of government was it?

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: In the coincidence of power spiritual and power temporal. And this was the rule. In the West among these barbarians there was a possibility of a development towards freedom, although this was not genuine freedom as long as they remained at the tribal stage and this was for many centuries to come. Or, as Hegel put it more precisely, in the old culture of the East (Byzantium) Christianity was superimposed on an old culture of a wholly non-Christian character. Therefore, this higher strata could not restore and enliven the lower. Whereas among the Germanic tribes there was nothing of any high character. There was simply barbarism. There was nothing to oppose the acceptance. The Germans had no culture whatsoever. The old tribes and, therefore, they were open to this possibility of accepting Christianity, of course, originally in a very crude manner. But they had no heritage of their own, no specifically Germanic inheritance which hampered the possible development of Christian thought. I believe that that is one of the crucial points.

What was the other alternative which Hegel discusses? Islam. Of course Islam is not Christianity. But if we state it in very general terms today as ordinary historians how come this Islamic world which in a great many ways much more civilized than Christianity in the Early Middle Ages. In Islam the Renaissance predated the Middle Ages. The acceptance of Greek science and philosophy took place in the 9th century. And later on came the Dark Ages. Why? Without speculating why did Islam lose its great power, not only of expansion, relatively soon. Whereas, in contrast, it took longer time in the Christian world and lasted much longer. After all, what is happening now is the westernization of the whole world taking place in spite of communism.

This is a work of the West, i.e. of an originally Christian world and surely not the work of an Islamic world. The Islamic nations are as much emerging nations as the other emerging nations. How come?

Student: First, I think that you have to look at the country in which they live. On the desert it is a roaming life primarily.

Strauss: Yes. But they conquered the Fertile Crescent very soon and Egypt and Northern Africa and they went very deep into Europe, into Spain, France, and so on. It was touch and go. Gibbons plays with the notion that they might have conquered Europe and then today, as he puts it in the 18th century, in Oxford the Koran might be expounded upon instead of the New Testament. How come the opposite took place?

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: Yes. Well this would lead into very subtle things. But for the very superficial, you said something about location. The core of Islamic power was in Asia, i.e. close to those devastators, the Turks and their kind who were not permitted to enter Europe. They were very close and it was also sometimes touch and go, but in the main they were defeated whereas the Turks defeated the Arab nations. But beyond that, speaking first of the external things without going into the principles of religions.

The tremendous achievements of modern Europe were made possible through such things as astronomy, the invention of the compass and all this kind of thing. And in all these matters the Arabs were much more advanced say, around 900. For some time the Arabs were the leading discoverers. That was completely changed by the 15th century. Why?

How come the development of the sciences, of these sciences which are so important for human power, collapse there more or less and develop in the West?

What were the centers of study in Christian Europe?

Student: The monasteries and universities.

Strauss: Yes. And the corresponding things in Islam did not give the same leeway to the secular sciences. That was one very important point. And Hegel would say that there is, of course, a necessary connection between Islam not making use of science to the degree to which Christianity made use of it. He quotes a famous leader of the Muslims - Omar the conqueror of Alexandria - Yes?

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: If they say what the Koran says they are superfluous. If they say something else they are detrimental. I do not know whether that is a true story or not.

At any rate, in Christianity the sciences, the worldly sciences, were accepted and integrated into the teaching.

But there is something else which is not directly connected but which also has some bearing. This is the development of cities in the West, first in Italy and then in Germany and France. The cities in the East were residences and not an affair of the citizen body. Max Weber has discussed this question quite well and put all the evidence together about the difference between the Western cities which in a way continue the old city tradition of Greece and Rome, and the Eastern cities - I am talking not only of the Islamic world, but also India and China which were primary residences where the ruler and his court were the core of the city.

Hegel mentions all these things and tries to link them up with the fundamental difference, the radical difference between Christianity on the one hand and Islam on the other.

We have to interrupt this course in order to remind ourselves now of the context, the whole context. The very notion of a philosophy of history.

If we go back to the very notion of political philosophy it was based from the very beginning on the difference between the good and the ancestral; the _____ and _____. You will find this in the second book of Aristotle's Politics.

We can say with some justice that the good means the rational. That is surely the way in which Hegel understands it. But what about the ancestral? - the many various forms of the ancestral. One could say that they are divinations of the good, fragments of the good. There is an infinite variety in this respect, at least possibly. No rhyme and reason. One can say that this was the Platonic view of this problem.

Hegel says, "No. There is an order among these ancestrals." I hope that you have no difficulty in understanding the word. It is meant to be a literal translation of the Greek patrium - the ancestral institutions, thoughts, etc. There is an order among them and an ascending order. Not only is the end towards which they point rational. The way towards the end is itself rational. It could not have been different.

Therefore one can also say, turning it around, the rational is the final ancestral. So there is always some harmony between the rational and the ancestral. At the end there is complete reconciliation of tradition and reason.

The proof of this is allegedly given in Hegel's philosophy of history. Now philosophy of history, to remind you of that again and again, is a characteristically modern thing, but there is nothing which one can properly call philosophy of history in premodern times. But even in modern times we do not yet find it in the founding stage, that is in the stage of Machiavelli or Hobbes or Locke or Descartes. Ther term was coined in 1750 - that is to say almost yesterday as these things go - by Voltaire. I do not go into what Voltaire meant by it, but we are, of course, not concerned merely with the term. But as for the matter, one can say that it emerged - and that has often been said - in Vico's New Science, earlier than Voltaire.

Vico tries to present an ideal, eternal history. It is interesting that it is an ideal history, therefore, not history pure and simple. ...

In Rousseau's Second Discourse he gives explicitly a history of man which is truly philosophic in inspiration. No proper names occur.

Now what leads to this development of which Vico and Rousseau are, perhaps, the two outstanding writers first appearing. In the case of Vico it is the question of natural law, natural law in the sense of the moral law. Here the question arises that natural law cannot be, it cannot exist, it cannot have obligatory power and a law which has no obligatory power is no law. If it is not duly promulgated. And the natural law is not duly promulgated among all the peoples in the world which are not sufficiently developed, as people would say today. In other words, the basis of this development is the connection between the notion of natural law and the origins of mankind.

The Christian natural law teaching, in particular, was of course based on the notion of divine creation. A first couple. When this was questioned and a very imperfect beginning was assumed, then the question arose, "How could these very imperfect beings have had any inkling of any rational provisions or commands?" The natural law which is the law of reason cannot have been known as obligatory at the beginning, but only after a long development.

This all means that the root of the development leading to history is not historical discoveries of some as it is presented sometimes in popular presentations. People suddenly heard of the Indians in America or other people who were in no way provided for by the Biblical account. These historical discoveries come only in subsidiary fashion. The fundamental question will concern the questions of the beginnings of mankind, questions which could have been raised and were raised prior to the discovery of America and surely wholly independently of it.

I do not deny that this evidence is taken from fact, say, from the American Indians and other people hitherto unknown, (the Chinese, for example) and that they did play a certain role. You can see that when you read Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding, the first part and the fact is referred to. There is even an older tradition of this kind connected with the Sauc[illegible]nians. They are those people who now are called Unitarians. They were called after an Italian Saucino who founded them.

The view that men's beginnings were imperfect, barbaric, savage, cannibalistic was, of course, not new. It was the view of the ancient philosophers, as you can see most clearly from Plato's Laws if you read it carefully and from Lucretius' ____, Book V.

But, very strangely, this view in antiquity did not lead to anything like a philosophy of history.

Lucretius' fifth book is particularly interesting in this respect. Lucretius gives what now would be called a history of man from the cannibalistic beginnings up to the foundation of cities and so on. But what is the difference between Lucretius' account and the apparently similar account which Rousseau gave of it in the Second Discourse? Rousseau's Second Discourse is based on Lucretius. Therefore, the question is particularly pertinent. It is very simple. For Lucretius this process; the earth comes into being, later on man, and then there are these various stages from simple-minded men at the beginning, and also an end of mankin. This takes place infinitely often. In the modern view - in all of these writings whether Hegel, Rousseau or whoever - this is only one historical process. The Marxist naturally are included. This is crucial.

Even in Vico one can find some traces of this infinite repetition. The reason is this. Classical philosophy - whether Platonic or Epicurean - was, we can say, cosmological. It was concerned with the cosmos and saw men within the cosmos and saw, therefore, something like the changes in human thought and in human society within the cosmic context.

In modern philosophy this is no longer the case. Therefore, in order to understand the genesis of this modern notion of history one would have to understand what it means that this preponderantly cosmological approach was replaced by another approach. One would, in the first place, have to find a good word for that other approach because without some designation we are still worse off than with it.

For the classics we can say that the cosmos is in itself and it is to be discovered by man. This is somehow changed now. Of course every physicist today, provided that he does not follow a special school, will discover what is in

itself. But, nevertheless, in modern times this became doubtful.

A simple expression of this change is Hobbes' remark, "We understand only what we make." I.e. if we merely discover something it is essentially unintelligible. We understand only what we make. By the way, this sentence of Hobbes' was taken over by Vico who used it for his purposes. If we discover only what we make, since we obviously didn't make the cosmos, the cosmos can no longer be the guiding theme.

Descartes: The beginning is the thinking ____. Not in the cosmos.

Now one can, as some people have done, make the distinction in the following way. These terms are not the best by any means, but they are perhaps useful on a way towards understanding. That premodern philosophy was "objectivistic." Modern philosophy is fundamentally subjectivistic. Now subjectivistic not in the sense of relativism, of course, but that the thinking understanding subject is the origin of all meaning.

This distinction is reflected within a distinction closer to our immediate interest, the distinction between the natural law and the rights of man. The emphasis shifts in modern time from the natural law in the older sense to the rights of man. And the rights are called in continental European terminology, not Anglo-Saxon subjective rights which is an indication of the connection. Now these points to which I alluded and which need, in a way, no discussion are, however, only the necessary, but not the sufficient condition of the discovery of history as is simply proved by the fact that such people as Hobbes and Descartes had the same and even a greater indifference to history proper than the traditional philosophers had.

I will not try to develop this any further. But I would like to mention one other point we have to consider if we would like to answer the question, "What is at the bottom of the fact that since in the last 150 years people speak of history as philosophically relevant." That history is relevant in other respects that was always understood and is wholly uninteresting. For example, if you are engaged in a war which is not going too well, then it is ordinary commonsense known at all times that you have to find out what you did wrong, what were the previous events, were there other wars in that region and how did they go? These are all historical studies without any philosophic interest.

To mention another point of philosophic interest we have mentioned before that, within political philosophy itself, the key change at first sight is that from the concern with the best regime which must be possible but is not

necessarily actual at any time, its actualization depending on chance.

And Machiavelli's opposition to that, the opposition to these imagined commonwealths, the best regimes sketched - more or less - by the ancients. Taking one's bearings by how men do live in contradistinction to how these men ought to live. This led to a new kind of ideals - still to ideals but closer to earth whose actualization is probable. And the probability of the actualization is due to enlightenment.

Say Hobbes or Locke discovers what the best regime is. And, of course, that best regime is not actual. And surely in most parts of the earth it is not actual even if there should be an approximation to it in blessed England. Still, Locke publishes his book, people read it, become convinced of it. The readers naturally are the emphatically literate people - at that time people belonging to the higher classes, not only professors but also parsons, for example, and other opinion leaders who influence the nonliterate and half-literate people.

In other words, if enlightenment is necessary, if the spreading of knowledge is a necessary consequence of the acquisition of knowledge, then the actualization of the best regime is necessary. Is that not so? Chance is controlled. Is this point clear?

Student: It is a necessary consequence . . .

Strauss: Well, Aristotle had discovered the best regime, let us say. And, of course, he doesn't have a ghost of a chance to put it into practice because he doesn't have the power. This is assuming that Aristotle did discover the best regime, of course. But what about the readers of Aristotle or his students in the wider sense? Is the truth not compelling? Must they not admit that he is right? Of course, their interest may be against it and we know what Hobbes said, "As often as reason is against man, man is against reason." But this doesn't last forever. You know, this may still happen in the case of the old foggies. You know, their sons - younger and more generous - would say, "No. It is, indeed, not in my interest to keep this tremendous estate and have these people all as serfs. It is unjust and I can't stand it." Gradually this will spread. This is one crucial point.

This is connected with another point. The necessity of enlightenment is based on another necessity, namely on the necessity of intellectual progress. Man has reached a certain stage of understanding, but only a certain stage. That is to say, there are many obscure spots on the intellectual globe, but they solicit interest. The next generation have already the acquisitions of the preceding generation within them acquired through their studies. They stand

on the shoulders of the preceding generation. And that is where the saying comes from made famous by Pascal that dwarfs standing on the shoulders of giants see farther ahead than the giants. In other words, there is nothing of unbecoming immodesty if we say that we are wiser than these great men of the past. We are dwarfs.

All these kinds of things came together and made possible and maybe even compelling for man in the 18th century to say that the human mind necessarily progresses, and its results necessarily spread. And then, by the spread of the knowledge, the people become enlightened and opinion is changed. And if opinion is changed, power is changed because power will now move in a different direction than it did before.

These very simple things which we have forgotten - they have become entirely a matter of course - were certain "acquisitions" of the 17th and 18th centuries which changed the nature not only of political philosophy, but of political life, very profoundly.

Add this to what I said before about Machiavelli. The older philosophy appealed to the highest demands of virtue. It didn't find many takers for the very simple reason that you were promised a perfect society but at the price of severe self-sacrifice. But now you were told that, by indulgence - your desire for wealth, for example - judiciously, of course, investing your money in property, you would not only become a rich man, but a greater benefactor of mankind than anyone else. Because if you are a rich man and give alms, what kind of help is that? That drunkard will go to his establishment as he went before. But if you make it possible and necessary for him to be a hard-working, sober, austere worker, you benefit him and his family and so forth. This is a fantastic picture, but it is not a fairy tale. It is a very important part of what happened in the last century.

This is a crucial element in the concept of history as it emerged in modern times. All of this is presupposed by Hegel, integrated into his philosophy. He accepted the modern economic teacher, Adam Smith, fully. He integrated it. Naturally by integrating it into this whole, he also modified it. That is surely true.

The consequence is the teaching which Hegel pronounced with particular authority, that the actual and the rational necessarily coincide. The traditional view was the common sense view. They don't necessarily coincide. It is chance if they coincide.

The most specific construction is this, that there is an absolute epoch in which the full coincidence of both takes place. The fulfillment. The epoch in which all fundamental theoretical problems - who cares about the trivial problems - all fundamental problems, theoretical and practical, are solved. The practical problems not only on paper, but in fact. The modern state exists, the situation in Hegel.

Now here we come to this difficulty which we have come to more than once. This full knowledge has been called since time long past, wisdom. But it was also distinguished between theoretical and practical wisdom.

What Hegel has primarily in mind is the theoretical wisdom because the knowledge of the best polity, the best regime, however we might call it, is in Hegel not a matter of a practical philosophy in the Aristotelian sense, but the philosophy of right, as Hegel calls it, is a theoretical problem.

This theoretical wisdom has the unfortunate characteristic that it belongs to a period of decay, the point which Rousseau made, to the disgust of many people, in his first discourse on the arts and sciences, but which is accepted by Hegel as we have seen. In Hegel's very telling formula the owl of Minerva - the goddess of wisdom - begins its flight in the dusk. So when we have reached wisdom, the dusk begins.

Now where do we find traces of that dusk according to Hegel? For Hegel the fundamental - that does not mean the highest thing - but the fundamental thing of what we now call culture is religion. A nation gives to itself the definition of its being in its religion. We know that there is a variety of religions leading up to the absolute religion, Christianity, culminating in the reconciliation of the absolute religion, Christianity, with the world because originally Christianity was simply unworldly. It did not permeate the world in the first stage because the world was pagan. But even in the early Christian stage, including the Middle Ages, there was a separation of the worldly and the unworldly, and that is Hegel's chief objection to the Middle Ages.

Eventually, Christianity permeates the world or, to put it another way, Christianity becomes worldly not in a negative sense. Christianity becomes worldly, i.e. it completely transforms the world. Christianity becomes completely secularized.

As a consequence, as we have seen in that passage from Hegel, the modern state - the rational state - is indifferent to religion. It is secular also in this sense. Especially striking are the passages in Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion where he ends with a discord, as he himself calls it. Christianity has become fully understood, i.e. the religion has been transformed into philosophy. This was taught by Hegel at the University of Berlin. The true theology is Hegel's philosophy. I.e., it is no longer theology proper. This, of course, affects the students and, in a wider sense, all the educated classes or, as they said in the 19th century the classes of culture and property.

But there are also the common people. What about them? They surely do not have the comfort of Hegelian philosophy. Hegel cannot do more than to shrug his shoulders. He

knows that sooner or later the circles of property and culture's thinking will affect the common people. Sooner or later. The circles of culture and property cannot always stop conversation when a maid enters at a dinner. That is the practical way in which these things happen. Or they cannot always speak a foreign language, say French instead of German, so the common people will gradually be affected by what is going on among their betters. But they don't become philosophers or anything like philosophers. They are in a difficult situation. A discord. Hegel has no comfort for us at this point.

But there is something else which today is regarded as a sufficient substitute. According to a rather crude saying of Goethe who was once asked to write something in his diary and he wrote down, "He who possesses science and art, possesses religion. He who does not possess science and art, ought to possess religion." It is not very poetic.

So what about art of which we hear so much? Hegel makes it quite clear that art cannot have the position with us which it had with the Greeks. We have seen that the Greek world was a world of sensible beauty, of art. That is no longer possible. As Hegel puts it, "Art in respect of its highest destiny is for us a matter of the past." I.e. there may still be people who produce sculptures, paintings, dramas. but this can no longer be matters of the first rank. That is absolutely impossible. Art cannot any longer be what it was in its highest times, say in Greece and in the Middle Ages - a bond of the whole society. In these worlds the best and greatest works of art were intelligible and appealing to every member of the society. The depth of understanding would differ, naturally, from individual to individual, but everyone could understand the Madonna. They knew what the Madonna was and what this meant.

Art can no longer be something in which the whole society recognizes itself and its best. The time for art has gone. In other words, the later art - as we have it today - appeals to circles. But as we have seen from the reactions of General Eisenhower and Khruschev to abstract painting. I believe that there are some other examples nearer to home. This is not intelligible any longer for the whole community. You have to be a kind of specialist just as you have to be a specialist in theoretical physics.

What takes the place? Hegel would say that there are two things. At the top, naturally philosophy, including scinece. And I think that the authority of science, at least, is unquestionable in our age. The other is the rational state. I.e., as it reveals itself in reasonable laws. This is a bit more complicated, but still, there is no question that law has, in principle, still got authority in our age, however poor enforcement of law and so on might be.

This is the phenomenon which Hegel has seen clearly. What came later on was what was called by Max Weber "the disenchantment." But Hegel understood it, I think, more precisely. Religion and art have ceased to be forces keeping the society together. That they are still existing within society does not contradict what Hegel says. The meaning of "disenchantment" in Weber is not quite the same. I mention it only in passing.

The man who popularized Hegel's view is Spengler. The decline of the West understood as the decline of the last culture. No further culture is possible.

Now if this is so. If the absolute epoch is the end stage with this ambiguity, the fulfillment and at the same time the way down begins. How can this be reconciled with the belief in Providence to which Hegel refers and which is, at least, a clear enough popular expression of what Hegel surely thought.

Five thousand years up to the peak in around 1800. Let us be generous. One thousand or two thousand years for the spread of it so that all the loose ends which still exist might be taken care of, one of the loose ends now being that China and India have to be westernized completely. This kind of thing. Then what Spengler called the "universal fellahinism." You know what fellahin are? The Arabic expression for the poor peasant populations especially in the Nile Valley. Heirs of the oldest culture in the world completely deprived of any meaning. They are mere relics, leftovers. Until, of course, human life becomes impossible on earth after - well the estimates change - now I believe it is two billion years. And all this takes place only on the earth. The infinite universe is a desert. Nothing of any interest to the mind, spiritual, happens there, at least as far as we know. Is this not a depressing picture and not one which would correspond to a world governed by divine providence.

What would Hegel say? I believe that he would say that we must not be impressed by sheer bulk, by immense numbers regarding space or time. These infinite deserts of space and time are the very conditions for the relatively small space and time where reason is actual on earth. And this is the key. And the rejustification of everything else is the peak. All these masses of uninhabited and uninhabitable stars and so on. All this is necessary for the sake of the mind understanding itself.

Did Hegel give us that analysis of nature as we know it or we believe to know it showing that nature had to have this character, this peculiar infinity or immensity at any rate in order to make history possible? This leads to quite a few other questions.

It is very late, but I would like to add just one point. That is the question of time, especially. Between six billion years and a split second there is only a quantitative difference as is indicated by the use of numbers. The real difficulty arises when we speak of infinite time, a time which can no longer be numbered, which is not eternity, but is in no way numerable.

Therefore, the question is, "What is time?" According to the Aristotelian notion, time is necessarily related to motion. And if there is a time at which there is no motion whatsoever, there was no time.

According to what I have read of present-day speculation of physicists we come back eventually to a hydrogen atom which was there. In the moment that it became decomposed, motion started. Up to this point, no motion, no time. So time is finite. That is one part of this argument. One can also show that the problem of infinite time is a fundamental difficulty on other grounds.

(lapse in tape)

Rousseau regarded it as necessary, but Rousseau attached a much greater importance than Hegel to the purely mechanical causation. Crime, population pressure, etc., as distinguished from the intrinsic needs of the mind towards its own actualization.

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: That it hard to say to what extent Hegel's doctrine is dualistic. Hegel also says that. Mind which has so externalized itself that it is no longer as such recognizable. Only by a deeper study can one see that even in this mindless form it is still mind which has made itself, as it were, mindless.

But what do you have in mind? Because then you would turn around and say, "What about Marx?"

Student: Well, Kant would be the first because (inaudible)

Strauss: The case of Kant is different because Kant - well he does speak about a philosophy of history, there is no doubt about that. But philosophy of history is not, if one may say so, a part of his system. That is one of the most obvious difficulties in Kant. In Kant's system - the practical reason, the reason of judgement - philosophy of history doesn't play any role there.

The problem comes up, nevertheless, and is treated by him in some more occasional writings. To give only one reason why Kant is not immediately relevant here. The problem of the philosophy of history arises in the context of the question, "Will the just order be actualized? Will it be actually established on earth?" But is there not an alternative to

philosophy of history in the answer to this question? We live - and that is assuming that we are tolerably decent people - we try to live virtuously, but we don't quite succeed. Our virtue is, more or less, always imperfect. This is very unsatisfactory and we want to have a fully virtuous humanity. To some extent that depends upon the political organization. If you are compelled by the political order to be nasty, mean to your fellow men - well, that is possible. The laws may make it a punishable offence not to be nasty. So one thing of great importance is to have the right political order.

But assuming that the order is right - we are not compelled by law to act immorally - we still will not be fully moral. What hope is there for morality? The hope cannot be fulfilled by the establishment of the best political order because this does not solve all difficulties.

You see how corrupt you are and I do not mean you in particular. In former times people thought - some people, that is, thought - that we have a chance beyond our earthly life. There is a life after death, there is immortality of the soul. And so, while we cannot become fully virtuous in our finite life on earth, we have a chance after death.

This is a part of Kant's system. The immortality of the soul is a postulate of pure reason. I would say that because the immortality of the soul is a postulate of pure reason the philosophy of history is very uninteresting for Kant. It is not wholly unimportant, but the solution is in life after death.

Now let us draw a general conclusion. The end which is an historical redemption increases in proportion as the concern with redemption in eternity decreases. Does this not make sense?

Student: (inaudible) Because Marx doesn't have to have any immortality of the soul.

Strauss. Not even Hegel has that.

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: I think that the whole difficulty of Kant's moral and political teaching is really concentrated in that. That for Kant there is no doubt that the just political order is of crucial importance. But they were only part of a larger whole and, therefore, the philosophy of history could only be an almost marginal part of Kant's teaching. Differently stated, the problem of the individual which is not solvable by social or political improvement of any kind, retains its full force for Kant. Therefore, a relatively small interest in philosophy of history.

XIII

That is the point where Kierkegaard, criticizing Hegel, rejoins Kant. The indifference or quasi-indifference of Kierkegaard to world history is, in a way, a return to Kant on the part of a moralist who does not expect as much from politics as Hegel does.

For Hegel it is understood that if you have the right social order there will, of course, be crimes, naturally. But that is not really a problem because we have our policemen, district attorneys etc. So the actualization of morality means that you have a reasonably decent state in which there will always be a certain amount of crime and violence (that goes without saying and we take it in our strides. It cannot be helped). And don't make too much fuss about the pure virtue, purity of intention. That only leads to hypocrisy. A man who behaves decently on the whole is a virtuous man and the worms which he might find by analysis in this heart or bosom they are of no interest.

In this respect Hegel reminds - not quite, but a bit - of Aristotle. But it goes much beyond this because Hegel never wrote an Ethics, and when he speaks about virtues he says that we all know what these virtues are and that we are supposed to have them and that we are, more or less, decent people. No searching for purity. This leads to all kinds of bad things and this is, of course, what Kierkegaard opposes. This social-political solution and its concern for purity of the heart - this has lost its meaning almost completely. And that meant a return to Kant..

But to return to the great interest of Kant. He truly was confronted by an already existing philosophy of history. There was Herder. And Kant had somehow to fact it, but he faced it in this way, by not permitting its entrance into the system proper. And that which blocked the entrance directly was the immortality of the soul. This makes perfect sense, doesn't it.

This was more of a lecture than a seminar if we disregard your paper, but we will take up the subject of your paper the next time.

Seminar on Hegel

Session XIV, March 4, 1965

That was a very satisfactory paper. You wisely selected your quotation because it made it clear where Hegel stands. You pointed out that Hegel's view of the Middle Ages is not peculiar to him. How would you call this view of the Middle Ages? If it is not Hegelian in particular? If it is simply a negative judgement of the Middle Ages.

Student: What I meant was that his objections to the content of the Catholic Church at that time were very common.

Strauss: Where? Be specific.

Student: I was just referring to the Protestant Reformation.

Strauss: I see. And what about feudalism which he also includes in his condemning statement?

Student: That was part of the Enlightenment philosophy.

Strauss: Yes. That is clear. The final judgement of Hegel is not so different from quite a few Protestants' and men of the Enlightenment's views. What is the difference? What is the peculiarity of Hegel's view?

Student: His basis for the Reformation is almost purely secular.

Strauss: Yes. That is not immediately clear from our present readings because we have not yet read what he had to say about the Reformation. And, in addition, I believe that it is not simply true.

What is the difference between Hegel and Voltaire in these matters? The most obvious one. For Voltaire it is a terrible barbarism and not justifiable. Hegel sees a necessity. That is the great difference as appears from your very quotation.

He uses unusually strong language as is clear from your paper. "The infinite lie." What does he mean by that? Here you have the Holy Roman Empire, a state which is sanctified. And what is it in fact? Lawless. And the only glimmer you will find of some emerging political order which is not lawless is the cities.

But what is much more important for Hegel is that higher than the power temporal is the power spiritual. The Holy Church. And according to Hegel, it was not only in fact

unholy, but it was necessarily most unholy. If you take the most extreme case - what he says about Africa, there he doesn't use such strong language because there is no high claim. These merely natural men - savages - don't claim to be civilized. But here the contrast with the claimed morality is shocking, but Hegel does not leave it at indignation. He is very much concerned with condemning. In other words, there could not have been modernity but for the horrors of the Middle Ages.

Now let us turn to a discussion of the passages. We have to proceed at a rather fast pace.

We will begin at page 336 where he speaks about Byzantium. At the beginning there is a remark where he says that "the Roman Empire comprised the whole civilized earth" which means that India and China do not belong to it. They were never part of the Roman Empire. And it is not simply because they are uncivilized, but they are dead end streets. There is no future.

Reader: "All that was contemned is exalted. All that was formerly revered is trodden in the dust. The last of the pagans express this enormous contrast, and with profound lamentation."

Strauss: Hegel, of course, does not look at it from the pagan point of view because for Hegel the contemptible and the contemned is, in a fundamental sense, higher than the glorified. In Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind there is a fundamental discussion which deals with master and slave, the great theme. For Hegel there are no natural slaves. The slave is the one who just gives in, who rather switches than fights. And the master is the one who rather fights than switches. That doesn't depend on anything within their nature. Rather it is an act of will. So slavery and mastery are not conventional nor natural, but due to acts of will. The whole construction of the philosophy of History in the Phenomenology of the Mind starts from this fact. that the master who has this contempt for (inaudible) uses the slave and exploits him and enjoys himself. This is the dead-end street. The master who works, who transforms nature, who thus understands (inaudible) this is the starting point of all true civilization. That is directly opposite to the Aristotelian scheme. You see that however remote Hegel is from democracy in the narrow political sense, this fundamental democracy is a part of Hegel.

In the sequel he speaks of the superiority of Western Christianity - Latin Christianity - from the Christian point of view. In the West the root of all culture or civilization is Christianity on which the ancient heritage is grafted secondarily. These Germanic tribes became familiar with Western culture only via Christianity.

In Byzantium the opposite was the case. The classical pagan culture antedated the Christinization.

The modern world which arose from Latin Christianity and not from Greek Christianity is radically Christian. The same would not be true of Byzantium.

Let us turn to page 338 when he speaks of Byzantium. Here we see how the Christian religion can be abstract and, as such, weak precisely because it is so pure in itself spiritually. This is peculiar of Byzantium rather than of the West. The otherworldliness of Christianity implies that it leaves the world absolutely as it is and, since this world as it is exerts some power, it will corrupt the purity. In the West the opposite was, at least, attempted.

There occurs a passage which in my edition is underlined. "The Byzantine Empire is a grand example of how the Christian religion may maintain an abstract character among a cultivated people, if the whole organization of the State and of the Laws is not reconstructed in harmony with Christian principles."

The implication is that in the West the opposite happened. That is, to begin with. But only the Western world is truely Christian.

Let us turn to page 341, first paragraph. The beginning of the section on the German World.

Reader: "The Germanic Spirit is the Spirit of the new World. Its aim is the realization of absolute Truth as the unlimited self-determination of Freedom-that Freedom which has its own absolute form itself as its purport. The destiny of the German peoples is, to be the bearers of the Christian principle. The principle of Spiritual Freedom - of Reconciliation of the Objective and Subjective, was introduced into the still simple, unformed minds of those peoples: and the part assigned them in the service of the World-Spirit was that of not merely possessing the Idea of Freedom as the substratum of their religious conceptions, but of producing it in free and spontaneous developments from their subjective self-consciousness."

Strauss: This, of course, must be properly understood. The key point is that the Germanic nations had, so to speak, nothing of their own. The deepest substance of them was Christianity, however poorly understood. Therefore, a truely non-pagan culture arose in the West.

When he says that true freedom developed there because of the subjective self-consciousness, the conscience, we can say. Hegel means, of course, not the undetermined conscience so that anything a man says, "My conscience dictates," he may do. Rather, the conscience must determine itself.

This self-determining must take place in a universally valid manner. It cannot be a mere idiosyncrasy of one kind or another.

Freedom which is not merely formal, but which has its absolute form for its content. The true freedom is not merely possible as religious substance within the conscience. It must produce in the literal sense - bring forth - into our world. And this is the work of Europe.

Reader: "For the Christian world is the world of completion; the grand principle of being is realized, consequently the end of days is fully come. The Idea can discover in Christianity no point in the aspirations of Spirit that is not satisfied."

Strauss: The idea meaning the philosophic reason, understanding. Christianity is the complete satisfaction.

Reader: "For its individual members, the Church is, it is true, a preparation for an eternal state as something future; since the units who compose it, in their isolated and several capacity, occupy a position of particularity."

Strauss: In other words, still this Mr. X, Mr. Y etc.

Reader: "But the Church has also the Spirit of God actually present in it, it forgives the sinner and is a present kingdom of heaven. Thus the Christian World has no absolute existence outside its sphere."

Strauss: In other words, it has no longer any absolute without.

Reader: ". . . outside its sphere, but only a relative one which is already implicitly vanquished, and in the respect to which its only concern is to make it apparent that this conquest has taken place."

Strauss: This could refer also to the future conquest of India and China of which we have heard something before, but it could also refer to the fact that there are still quite a few non-Christianized ingredients of the Christina world. But this no longer has any substance, any power intellectual or spiritual in itself. The Christian world has no without any longer. In any sense.

What about heaven and the heavenly bodies? Are they not without the Christian world? What about Newton? Didn't he and Newtonian physics conquer them and make them man's properties?

The Germanic nations, by becoming Christianized, acquired the absolute principle and, therefore, they need no longer any other principle taken over from any foreign nation or culture.

They could develop the absolute culture, entirely by themselves by developing the seed laid in them. But their principle is not Germanic. That is crucially important. It is not particular, but universal. God has become man and not a German.

The deeper meaning of the concept of the law without I cannot possibly go into. The most important specimen of a without for Hegel probably would be what Kant taught about the thing in itself which is something without, not only man's actual knowledge, but without any possibility of man's knowing it. In other words, as Hegel means it, it excludes the supra-rational revelation which, of course, would also be without man, or any of the absolute mysteries. Everything has to become rational, has to be understood. In other words, "without" means first it transcends the human world and second, what transcends the human understanding. There is nothing which transcends the human understanding, reason. And there is nothing which transcends the human world. Nature is integrated into culture and not only to the fact that nature has been cultivated, animals have been tamed etc. Because things like Newtonian physics have also been integrated. There is in no sense a "without." The true doctrine for Hegel is, in a way, a "without." It is beyond history in that it is located at the end of history. But being the end of history it still also belongs to history. This, I believe, we should keep in mind.

Let us read the continuation.

Reader: "We have therefore to look for another principle of division.

"The German World took up the Roman culture and religion in their completed form."

Strauss: "As ready made"would be a better translation.

Reader: "There was indeed a German and Northern religion . . "

Strauss: Yes. He goes on to talk about these, but this is rather unimportant.

Reader: "The Christina Religion, which they adopted, had received from Councils and Fathers of the Church, who possessed the whole culture, and in particular, the philosophy of the Greek and Roman World, a perfected dogmatic system."

Strauss: Again, I would translate that as "a ready made, dogmatic" system. He wants to emphasize that. How little creative the Germanic nations were.

Reader: "The Church, too, had a ready made hierarchy. To the native tongue of the Germans, the Church likewise opposed one perfectly developed - ready made - the Latin. In art and philosophy a similar alien influence predominated."

Strauss: Really, "the same alien-ness" came wholely from without. Let us drop the next sentence. So the Germanic world seems externally to be only a continuation of the Roman world. After all Rome itself had become Christian. Go on.

Reader: "But there lived in it an entirely new Spirit, through which the World was to be regenerated - the free Spirit, viz. which reposes on itself - the absolute self-determination of subjectivity."

Strauss: Obstinacy almost. Literally translated it is "obstinacy."

Reader: "To this self-involved subjectivity, the corresponding objectivity stands opposed as absolutely alien. The distinction and antithesis which is evolved from these principles is that of Church and State. On the one side, the Church develops itself, as the embodiment of absolute Truth; for it is the consciousness of this truth, and at the same time the agency for rendering the Individual harmonious with it. On the other side stands secular consciousness, which, with its aims, occupies the world of Limitation - the State based on Heart or mutual confidence and subjectivity generally."

Strauss: Loyalty. Fidelity not in the religious sense. The feudal principle. Go on.

Reader: "European history is the exhibition of the groth of each of these principles severally, in Church and State; then of an antithesis on the part of both-not only of the one to the other, but appearing within the sphere of each of these bodies themselves (since each of them is itself a totality)."

Strauss: "The" totality.

Reader: " . . . the totality); kastly, of the harmonising of the antithesis."

Strauss: This is the overall formula for European history as you see.

The Germans accepted something ready made, alien to them, but what they accepted was something new which had never informed a world before. The basis is now for the first time Christianity. And here we have a characteristic conflict. A conflict between the absolute truth, the objective truth represented by the Church, and the individual who bows to it but has, at the same time, his peculiar obstinacy. This latter leads to the state. A conflict between the two - Church and State - is necessary because each of the two opponents - the Church and State - ultimately the absolute truth and the subject - is the totality. Each raises an absolute claim. For this reason a conflict within each - within the Church and within the State.

The claim to totality on the part of the Church is easily understood. It is the truth. But how can the individual claim to be the totality? The truth must become evident to the individual. It must ultimately justify itself before the tribunal of the individual and, to that extent, the whole objective truth becomes the subject.

He develops this a bit further on page 344, first paragraph.

Reader: "The second period develops the two sides of the antithesis to a logically consequential independence and opposition - the Church for itself as a Theocracy, and the State for itself as a Feudal Monarchy. Charlemagne had formed an alliance with the Holy See against the Lombards and the factions of the nobles in Rome. . . This antithesis exists solely because the Church, to whose management the Spiritual was committed, itself sinks down into every kind of worldliness - a worldliness which appears only the more detestable, because all passions assume the sanction of religion."

Strauss: What is the necessity in that? The Church is the truth. This is wholly unself-contradictory. Where does the antithesis come in? Well, some points are developed later, but the Church, the Holy Church, requires in the Medieval understanding the distinction between the clergy and the laity. The State is, as such, an affair of the layman. It has a character of its own which is not wholly determined by the Church. We cannot now go into the various medieval doctrines, but in a general way a certain independence of the secular government is admitted even by the strictest papalists. So this has a principle of its own and this principle is not the ecclesiastical principle, not the true principle, the absolute one. Therefore, it must be one of nontruth. And the nontruth is the mere individual, the mere subject and the relations among the mere individuals. No universal proper, only private rights. The feudal system.

The contradiction comes out furthermore in this way. The Church in order to be within this world of lawlessness must acquire power and wealth and, therefore, it becomes involved in all the horrible things going with power and property. And this is, as he makes clear in the immediate sequel, the Reformation which recognizes the right of worldliness much more fundamentally than the medieval church did. And the Enlightenment, according to Hegel, simply continues the Reformation - which you will see next time - and therefore leads to the final solution in the modern state.

On page 345, second paragraph.

Reader: "We may distinguish these periods as Kingdoms of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit. The Kingdom of the Father is the consolidated, undistinguished mass, presenting a self-repeating cycle, mere change - like that sovereignty of Chronos engulfing his offspring. The Kingdom of the Son . . ."

Strauss: This is pre-Christian. It could also be Islam, for that matter.

Reader: " . . . is the manifestation of God merely in a relation to secular existence - shining upon it as upon an alien object."

Strauss: As something alien. Therefore the world is not integrated.

Reader: "The Kingdom of the Spirit is the harmonizing of the antithesis."

Strauss: In other words, the modern development is the Kingdom of the Spirit. It is not an accident, I believe, that Hegel omits "holy."

On page 346 in the second paragraph.

Reader: "The third epoch may be compared with the Roman World. The unity of a universal principle is here quite as decidedly present, yet not as the unity of abstract universal sovereignty, but as the Hegemony of self-cognizant Thought. The authority of Rational Law is acknowledged, and privileges and particularities melt away before the common object of the State."

Strauss: Common purpose of the State. In other words, as long as you have a rule of privileges, of private rights - there is no public right in the Middle Ages according to Hegel. There is only private right because there is no general will.

Reader: "Peoples will the Right in and for itself; regard is not had exclusively to particular conventions between nations, but principles enter into the considerations with which diplomacy is occupied. As little can Religion maintain itself apart from Thought, but either advances to the comprehension of the Idea, or, compelled by thought itself becomes intensive belief-or lastly, from despair of finding itself at home in thought, flees back from it in pious horror, and becomes Superstition."

Strauss: In the case of right or law you have a definite progress from private right to public righ, from a merely positive international law based only on treaties to principles of international law. But what is the case of religion? In the case of religion the case is not so clear. Religion progresses to the concept, i.e. to the true philosophy. Or else it decays into lower forms of religion. A merely internal, pietistic base, if not superstition. That confirms what we said in an earlier discussion about the dubious state of religion in the end of the world.

Let us then turn to page 350, first paragraph.

Reader: "These people did, indeed, found kingdoms and sustain spirited conflicts with the various nations that came across their path. Sometimes, as an advanced guard - an intermediate nationality -"

Strauss: He means here the Slavonic peoples and the Hungarians and so on.

Reader: "they took part in the struggle between Christian Europe and unchristina Asia. The Poles even liberated beleaguered Vienna from the Turks; and the Sclaves have to some extent been drawn within the sphere of Occidental Reason. Yet this entire body of peoples remains excluded from our consideration, because hitherto it has not appeared as an independent element in the series of phases that Reason has assumed in the World. Whether it will do so hereafter is a question that does not concern us here; for in History we have to do with the Past."

Strauss: That is a very important passage. Those who assert that Hegel did not admit an end of history base themselves on this passage. You find this interpretation very simply stated, for example, in Collingwood's Idea of History in the section on Hegel. But also elsewhere.

This view is that the future is unknowable and therefore knowledge and reason cannot possibly deal with the future. History can only deal with the past. Hitherto, the Slavonic nations did not pay any role in the history of the mind.

Is this argument conclusive?

Student: Just because history has to do with the past you might on a higher ground know that there isn't going to be anymore history.

Strauss: Yes. Something of this kind one could say. I would only try, perhaps, to state it somewhat more precisely. The fact that there might be all kinds of interesting developments in the European East does not necessarily mean that there can be an entirely new principle there.

For example, for Hegel the peak are the developments in the Protestant countries especially Germany and England. There are very great differences between Germany and England of which Hegel was aware. But the fundamental principle is the same. Therefore, whether the Slavonic nations develop something different from how Germany or England are actually constituted or closer to the Catholic countries, this no one can possibly know, but there cannot be a new principle. This is not contradicted by what Hegel says here. This is, I believe, what you meant.

In the immediate sequel Hegel speaks of the peculiarity of the Germanic nation.

Student: (question inaudible)

Strauss: I see your point and it is well taken. An independent moment, as he puts it, an independent phase. That is true, but the question, nevertheless, would be whether this - how deep this could possibly go? In the face of what Hegel says generally about modern times - the secularization of Christianity culminating in a way in the French Revolution or rather in the poast-French Revolutionary state. It is impossible to see how there could be any fundamental change, although perhaps an interesting variation.

This, of course, becaae crucial for the rational thinkers of the 19th century who were under the spell of the German philosophy of Hegel and who were looking for the mission of Russia. Something fundamentally had gone wrong in Western Europe and which only mother Russia because of her Byzantine past could give to the world - the true Christianity. That was the claim. The true Christianity would reassert itself in Russia. In the writings of Dostoyevsky, both novels and political writings, you find quite a few references. That is my chief source of knowledge about these matters. It is a very strangely modified manner that lives on in communism. One simple formula used by these emphatically slavonic writers - by the way by Tolstoy himself too - the two capitals of Russia, one founded by the man of the Enlightenment, the despot Peter - Petrograd. Even a German name until the first World War - Petersburg. Only in 1914 did they call it Petrograd. The other one, the truely Russian capital - Moscow. Both in Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy the emphasis is on Moscow. Distoyevsky even makes the demand, "Moscow must again be made the capital of the true Russia." And this was doubtless done.

In the immediate sequel Hegel speaks of this peculiarity of the Germans which he calls with the German word "Gemuth." Hegel is not so enthusiastic about it as many Germans are. He makes clear that *gemuth* is surely not the same as character. That is Hegel's way of criticizing it. It is a kind of depth which is a murky depth.

Let us turn to page 353 in the second paragraph.

Reader: "The union of the two relations - of individual freedom in the community, and of . . ."

Strauss: By the "community" he means the local community. One could almost say the city.

Reader: " . . . and of the bond implied in association . . ."

Strauss: "Association" meaning the guilds and such things.

Reader: " . . . is the main point in the formation of the State. In this, duties and rights are no longer left to arbitrary choice, but are determined as fixed relations . . ."

Strauss: That is, legally fixed relations.

Reader: ". . . involving, moreover, the condition that the State be the soul of the entire body, and remain its sovereign, that from it should be derived particular aims and the authorization both of political acts and political agents - the generic character and interests of the community constituting the permanent basis of the whole. But here we have the peculiarity of the German states, that, contrary to the view thus presented, social relations do not assume the character of general definitions and obligations. They perhaps exhibit a social or communal mold or stamp, but nothing universal; the laws are absolutely particular, and the rights are Privileges. Thus the state was a patchwork of private rights, and a rational political life was the tardy issue of wearisome struggles and convulsions."

Strauss: This is a clear statement of the difference between the feudal order at its best - including what it became in the cities - and the reasonable state.

Let us turn to the chapter on Islam. There is a certain superiority of Islam to medieval Christianity as you find on page 355 bottom.

Reader: "In short, while the West began to shelter itself in a political edifice of chance, entanglement and particularity, the very opposite direction necessarily made its appearance in the world, to produce the balance of the totality of spiritual manifestation. This took place in the Revolution of the East, which destroyed all particularity and dependence, and perfectly cleared up and purified the soul and disposition; making the abstract One the absolute object of attention and devotion, and to the same extent, pure subjective consciousness - the Knowledge of this One alone - the only aim of reality; - making the Unconditioned the condition of existence."

Strauss: Literally, "the relation-ness," the relation of existence.

The Christian medieval world leads, in the feudal order, to the complete disappearance of the general or universal in the particular rights and privileges. At this moment Islam emerged or, more, at this moment it became a threat to Europe. And here you have, according to Hegel's presentation, the most radical assertion of the denial of particularity. The one God and before God all men equal, and this was of decisive importance for social life

In this respect, as appears in the sequel, Islam is superior to Judaism because Judaism belongs to one particular nation, whereas Islam claims to be universal. Mohammed is said to have been sent to the red and the black, I mean the white and the black, i.e. to all men. Islam's wish to subjugate all men to the spirit is universal. As he says on page 357

He who converted to Islam received completely equal rights with all other Muslims, the very opposite of feudalism in every respect. But Islam is not exactly the solution from Hegel's point of view. He compares this abstract universalism and egalitarianism to that of the French Revolution.

Reader: "La religion et la terreur was the principle in this case . . ."

Strauss: The fact that Islam converted by conquest, by the sword. In other words, there is a fundamental contradiction between the spirituality of Islam and the means by which it spread because the sword is not an instrument of conviction. It may be an instrument of persuasion, though.

Reader: " . . . as with Robespierre, la liberte et la terreur. But real life is nevertheless concrete, and introduces particular aims; conquest leads to sovereignty and wealth, to the conferring of prerogatives on a dynastic family, and to the union of individuals."

Strauss: In other words, it cannot remain at that primary equality of all Muslims because there are concrete purposes, as Hegel puts it, which cannot be disposed of by reference to the single, one end of man.

And then, on page 359, bottom.

Reader: "The meanest Saracen, the most insignificant old woman approached the Caliph as his equals. Unreflecting naivete does not stand in need of culture; and in virtue of the freedom of his Spirit, each one sustains a relation of equality to the ruler."

Strauss: That is another expression of the same thought. This equality of all Muslims means also indifference to the inequality coming from culture. And without culture, no reasonable state. Culture introduces, necessarily, inequality.

So medieval Christianity offers, indeed, the articulation of society without which society cannot be good. But an unreasonable articulation. Islam is free from the unreasonable articulation, but does not offer a basis for any articulation. Therefore, medieval Christianity and Islam are strictly opposites so their secular fight was more than a political phenomenon. But Islam proved to be unable to undergo the changes towards a higher stage, whereas Christianity proved able to do so.

Then he speaks of the empire of Charlemagne and the development of medieval societies there. Page 363, bottom.

Reader: "In Charlemagne's time the ecclesiastical body had already acquired great weight. The bishops presided over great cathedral establishments, with which were also connected seminaries and scholastic institutions. For

Charlemagne endeavored to restore science, then almost extinct, by promoting the foundation of schools in towns and villages. Pious souls believed that they were doing a good work and earning salvation by making presents to the church; in this way the most savage and barbarous monarchs sought to atone for their crimes."

Strauss: The key point is that religion did not at that time have the power or the minds to restrain the avarice of the powerful.

Reader: " . . . for religion had not yet such an authority over men's minds as to be able to bridle the rapacity of the powerful . . . This institution was on the one hand very beneficial as a protection in cases of violence and oppression; but it was perverted on the other hand into a means of impunity for the grossest crimes."

Strauss: So what Hegel tries to show here is the dialectic of the medieval church. The point is that not by accident, but by an essential necessity, the Church became corrupted. Pious men left their property to the Church with a view to the salvation of their souls. The Church was not eager to acquire property, but it couldn't help acquiring property. And once one has property it is bound to have its effects. People who would not have been interested in becoming churchmen if the church had been poor, became now interested in becoming churchmen. And this is not something which depended on anybody's ill will, but on an inner necessity.

What he says here about the side by side of religion and immorality is well-known in Germany by a famous formula, an expression of (inaudible)
Punishing the heretics, but gracious to the sinners. This has its two sides because the graciousness to the sinners can lead to a neglect of the necessary severity of criminal justice. A greater concern with purity of faith, with obedience to the Church, than with merely moral or legal defects. An important point.

Then in the immediate sequel he develops the point which was made by Mr. _____. The life and spirit of the medieval church is an infinite life, and the infinity lies in the fact that it is the unholiness of the holy.

Let us turn to page 368, line 6 from bottom.

(lapse in tape)

Reader: " . . . not based on the spirit of the people - not having become a vital element in it. It was superficially induced - an a priori constitution like that which Napoleon gave to Spain, and which disappeared with the physical power that sustained it. That, on the contrary, which renders a constitution real, is that it exists as Objective Freedom -

the Substantial form of volition-as duty and obligation acknowledged by the subjects themselves. But obligation was not yet recognized by the German Spirit, which hitherto showed itself only as 'Heart' and subjective choice; for it there was as yet no subjectivity involving unity, but only a subjectivity conditioned by a careless superficial self-seeking. Thus that constitution was destitute of any firm bond; it had no objective support in subjectivity."

Strauss: A seemingly paradoxical expression. "Without the objective support in subjectivity."

The reasonable state is not always possible as we know from Aristotle. But Hegel gives a somewhat different reason. And this is paradoxical, of course, because man is a rational animal. Why should a rational constitution not always be possible?

Aristotle had said that there are tribes which are, by nature, incapable of the best regime, and there are many cases in which people who would be susceptible to a good regime are, by accident, not capable of it. All kinds of accidents could make it impossible.

For Hegel the key point is that the spirit of the people must be prepared for it, as people would say today. An a priori constitution - meaning a constitution which is not in harmony with the spirit of the people - is condemned to failure. This subject is now in the forefront of discussion and is not always honestly faced because of the embarrassing implications for some nations, but the problem, nevertheless, exists as is easy to see.

The constitution must have an objective support in the subjectivity meaning, in the spirit of the people.

He develops this at greater length. There was no rule of law in the Middle Ages, of the general will as we could say although Hegel doesn't use here the expression. But why is this rule of law necessary? What is the root of it? Fundamentally, if we get down to brass tacks, the need for protection.

In the Middle Ages the protection was supplied by powerful individuals, not by the state, not by a general will, not by the union of all individuals who need protection. Hence the rule of general injustice because even if each lord is an honest and pious man, the whole thing it unjust because of the lack of principles. General lawlessness.

Page 370, bottom.

Reader: "The valor that now manifested itself was displayed not on behalf of the State, but of private interests. In every district arose castles; fortresses were erected, and

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that for the defence of private property, and with a view to plunder and tyranny. In the way just mentioned, the political totality was ignored at those points where individual authority was established, among which the seats of bishops and archbishops deserve especial mention. The bishoprics had been freed from the jurisdiction of the judicial tribunals, and from the operations of the executive generally. The bishops had stewards on whom at their request the Emperors conferred the jurisdiction which the Counts had formerly exercised. Thus there were detached ecclesiastical domains - ecclesiastical districts which belonged to a saint. Similar suzerainties of a secular kind were subsequently constituted. Both occupied the position of the previous Provinces or Counties. Only in a few towns where communities of freemen were independently strong enough to secure protection and safety did relics of the ancient free constitution remain."

Strauss: The general lawlessness due to the absence of freedom. No freedom because no freedom for all. For such freedom of all requires subjection of all to law and this is the fundamental defect, according to Hegel, of the feudal order, although in an external sense the Middle Ages were very legalistic. But Hegel would raise the question, "What kind of laws were they? Were they reasonable laws or were they particular laws given on the basis of accidental situations by an emperor or king to this or that Jew or count and so on.

Kant develops this in a very legible way in his critique of the British Reform Bill of the 1830's - one of his last writings where the point of his criticism is that no conclusions can be drawn from the British Reform Bill to what should be done on the European continent because Britain's laws are still so much shot through with things of feudal origin, i.e. with essentially irrational, arbitrary, accidental things that it cannot possibly be the model for continental Europe.

In spite of all this splitting up of all general things through the feudal order, there was something general and that was, of course, the church. Hegel then describes how that was established, especially by Pope Gregory VII, but precisely by this solitary action by which the independence of the church was guaranteed, the church became involved in worldly power and in worldly purposes which led to a worldly understanding of the spiritual. The mediation between God and man in Christ is not spiritually understood, but carnally - namely that this mediation takes place through the church and its practices including, among other things, the worship of relics and so on. The Catholic understanding leads to spiritual servitude. Absolute servitude in the midst of the religion of freedom, i.e. of Christianity.

This is connected, according to Hegel, with the absolute separation of the spiritual and the temporal principle for that separation leads to the subjugation of the laity to the clergy. And the separation of the spiritual and the temporal leads to a gross misuse. Page 379, bottom.

Reader: "With this perversion is connected the absolute separation of the spiritual from the secular principle generally. There are Two Divine Kingdoms - the intellectual in the heart and cognitive faculty, and the socially ethical whose element and sphere is secular existence. It is science alone that can comprehend the kingdom of God and the socially Moral world as one Idea, and that recognizes the fact that the course of Time has witnessed a process ever tending to the realization of this unity. But Piety as such, has nothing to do with the Secular: it may make its appearance in that sphere on a mission of mercy, but this stops short of a strict socially ethical connection with it - does not come up to the idea of Freedom. Religious Feeling is extraneous to History, and has no History."

Strauss: "Piety" he should have said. Piety is outside of history and without history.

Reader: " . . . for History is rather the Empire of Spirit recognizing itself in its Subjective Freedom, as the economy of social morality in the State. In the Middle Ages that embodying of the Divine in actual life was wanting; the antithesis was not harmonized. Social morality was represented as worthless, and that in its three most essential particulars."

Strauss: Which he develops in the sequel. What is the key point? In the Middle Ages piety has not yet become subjected to science. Now science, of course, not in the positivistic sense, but in the sense of Hegel. Without the subjection of piety to science, no freedom. And, which is more immediately grave, the supremacy of piety is incompatible with true <u>sittliches Reich</u> which he translates as social morality.

Then Hegel shows us in three cases - taking the three vows of chastity, poverty, and obedience as examples. <u>Sittliches Reich</u> requires the sanctity of matrimony, of labor, and of following rational laws. And, according to Hegel, the three vows which give the clergy its character and the clergy is higher than the laity - cast aspersion on matrimony, on work, and on obedience to rational laws.

One can say in passing - although this will become clear, perhaps, from the rest of the book - that Hegel sees in the asceticism of the Catholic church the root of immorality. Differently stated, the true morality is not ascetic. This is a long, long story in modern times going up to the present time.

The three contradictions of the Medieval Church (which are not connected, as far as I could figure out, with his critique of the three vows) are these: The truth is here only something given, something positive. Hegel refers to the supra-rational character of the teaching of faith. The second point, the priest owes his dignity to the indelible character of the priest, i.e., not to his qualities of the mind and heart. For example, he doesn't cease to be a priest because of his unchastity. Take this as an example. And, lastly, regarding the vow of poverty contradicted by the immense wealth of the church. And by rejecting this asceticism, this fundamental immorality is done away with. And Hegel sees a great importance of the adoption of Hegel of Adam Smith's Political Economy which was a frank embracing of the fact that the fundamentally unlimited acquisition of wealth is not only good, but indispensable for any morality.

The accusations which Hegel gives are, of course, the ones we know of the Protestant criticism of the Middle Ages.

Hegel emphasizes that, according to the Catholic teaching, marriage is a sacrament, but, he says, "Since the higher stage is that of celibacy, any aspersion is cast on marriage." Hegel himself was a married man, and there was a kind of revenge on Hegel from a source indirectly in favor of the Catholic Church, from a very unexpected quarter: from Nietzsche in his Geneology of Morals. In the most exciting part, the third part, which is entitled "What is the significance of ascetic ideas?" he enumerates many great philosophers of classical antiquity especially, but also some from modern times like Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza who were also not married. And Nietzsche raises the question, "Can there be a married philosopher?" There is, of course, a very famous married philosopher who everyone knows - Socrates. But Nietzsche has a simple answer, "He isn't subject of a (inaudible). So this isn't merely a jocular matter. This simple rejection of the ascetic ideal, which Hegel here implies, has its other side too as shown by the fact that the three vows - as Nietzsche develops at great length - are the vows of the philosophers too on entirely nonChristian grounds. But there is a remarkable agreement there.

Seminar on Hegel

Session XV, March 9, 1965

Thank you very much for your paper which was not only very good, but also - and I believe that I speak for the class - very delightful. Yours was the first, I believe, whose paper was accompanied by enjoyment. That is not meant as a criticism. When reading Hegel himself one is not induced to smile. So this is from a non-Hegelian point of view that the smiling comes in.

Now I would like to take this opportunity here to say something about Mr. Rankin. He is a very unusual man. He is, by training, a mathematician. And I believe that he is the only member of the student body here who came into this department via coming to me. My courses and not so much for courses in political science, but for some strictly idiosyncratic reasons.

And then he attracted the attention of one of my colleagues who has nothing whatsoever to do with political philosophy in any way, shape or form whom he impressed not only by his native intelligence, but also by his very broad reading. So he knows much more about political history - in particular diplomatic history - than some full professors do. So he became eventually a normal member of this department. And I am very happy about this development. I hope that you don't mind these personal remarks. I never had an opportunity to make this remark to anyone.

You make many good points. Some will be repeated when we go over the text. Only a few things I will mention.

When we read Hegel's analysis of the Middle Ages prior to what we read today, we observed that the overall judgement of the Middle Ages is an ordinary Protestant judgement, only Hegel deepens it very much. But the judgement proper is the same.

Now what about Hegel's view of the Reformation and what the Reformation means in the long run? Is this a peculiarity of Hegel or does it have a broader matrix?

Student: The secular view of Protestantism is a step in the right direction, but only a step.

Strauss: Is it a peculiarity of Hegel?

Student: I think not. The Enlightenment generally.

Strauss: Exactly. The understanding of the Enlightenment as an outgrowth of the Reformation, in a way more consistent than the Reformation, was very common. Do you know what the key word is allegedly connecting the Reformation and the Enlightenment?

Student: Liberty of conscience?

Strauss: You can put it this way. I believe that the more common expression is "the right of private judgement," the notion being that in the Catholic system the authority of the Church tells you what to believe and what not to believe, whereas, according to the Reformation, every Christian reads the Bible in his mother tongue and forms his judgement on the basis of his own reading. Now this was, of course, not quite so simple as noone knew better than Hegel because the Reformation culminated in certain official formulations of the dogma and in a certain radical scripturalism. But this minor _____ of the old fasioned view were then disposed of by the Enlightenment.

A large part of the Lutheran dogma does not have direct New Testament backing. That was the first step. Then the radical people like the and, later on, the Unitarians later on dropped the whole trinitarianism and, of course, naturally also original sin and everything that goes with that.

But the notion that the Reformation is fundamentally the same as the Enlightenment was very popular in Rousseau, for example. And it is still very common in our time. Only in our age, in the last thirty or forty years there was a rather passionate reaction to it connected especially with who brought out the fact that the Reformation is not Enlightenment. being a communist, but this difference is, in this respect, not decisive. So this is one point which is not peculiar to Hegel.

What is, of course, peculiar to Hegel is the precision of the analysis of what the peculiarity of the Reformation is and how this turns into the Enlightenment.

What you said about Hegel's morality is, I think, quite sound. In this respect he has something in common with Aristotle, but in a modern way. For Hegel there is no question that there can be decent men and any self-searching that there are all kinds of (inaudible) effective in the best of men is unimportant if their actions are decent. If the man as a whole has led a decent life, then he is a decent man and it is morbid to go beyond that. That is what you meant, didn't you?

Student: I don't know where I brought that in.

Strauss: No. I think that you said this and Hegel goes much beyond Aristotle in his treatment of the virtues, especially in the Philosophy of Right where there is no

longer a doctrine of the virtues necessary for Hegel. The good man is the good citizen in the good society. And the good society is the reasonable society. In other words, by being a good, loyal memeber of it and living according to its laws and being a patriotic citizen of that according to his station - that is all that is reasonably required of man. The whole problem of sin and evil is overcome. That was a necessary stage of human development where the evil of man, the sinfulness of man had to be the primary preoccuption and the tormentedness of man - Hegel speaks of the "unhappy consciousness." That is overcome by a more advanced order.

I think that you understood that even if, as you say, you did not know that you understood it.

You referred frequently to the categoric imperative. What do you mean by that? Is Hegel a Kantian?

Student: Reason has no rule coming from outside itself. Reason is both the matter and the intelligent form. Reason provides the content.

Strauss: Hegel starts from the categoric imperative. In other words, right intention. Precisely. But he denies absolutely that you can deduce from that directly any substantive duties. He says alot about the hypocrisy to which that leads. If you are clever enough you can give the formal quality of rationality to any account. So there is something else. What is necessary is a union of the right subjective principle, the good will as Kant calls it, and the substantive objectivity which is, indeed, rational but which cannot simply be deduced from that form.

The criticism of Kant's morality plays a crucial rule in Hegel's whole thought, specially visible in the Phenomenology of the Mind, but also in his Philosophy of Right. Part of it will come out in our readings today.

One more point only. You noticed an agreement between Hegel and Machiavelli which is slightly disguised, but you discerned it. But what is the difference from Machiavelli? This is one side, the tough side of political life.

Student: Machiavelli's Prince brings about the order knowing what he is working for. But Alexander did not know that he was bringing about the free West.

Strauss: In more general terms without going into these particular historical things, the truth discovered by Machiavelli or stated by him with particular force, is one thing. The rule of reasonable laws is, of course, ultimately decisive for him. Only when Hegel thinks of reasonable laws he knows this element of power implied. And if there were any doubt about it it would be supplied by this remark on Machiavelli.

I would like to say something about the paper which I wrongly attributed to Miss _____. There are a few passages which I will read.

"For Hegel religion is the focus of the knowledge of the identity of the individual and the divine because there is in this identity a connection to the political principle, the state rests on religion and has its roots in it. But religion is the relation of the absolute in the sense of sentiment, imagination and faith, what is in the form of piety. We have seen in the Middle Ages that piety can exist in the presence and can even foster 'that which is most vile, coarse and irrational.' Piety, according to Hegel, does not recognize the idea of duty towards the state. This duty is recognized only through reason" meaning in contradistinction to sentiment, imagination and faith.

I think that that is a fair statement.

"Religion is the deepest builder of convictional loyalty, but its content is a matter of indifference to the state."

We have read passages to this effect. Hegel says that, but he has a kind of preference for Protestant Christianity. But this cannot be made a legal obligation. This will come out in our discussion next time.

"Thus the separation of the Church and the State, and the decline of the former, is a matter of necessity and fortuitousness."

Why did you say "fortuitous?"

Student: Because some of the necessities which brought about the reasonable state were to be deplored by Hegel, but I think that this one is applauded by Hegel.

Strauss: But under no circumstances was it fortuitous. It was necessary. A blessing in disguise and well-disguised. But it was necessary. To the extent to which it was fortuitous it would be uninteresting to him.

"In those religions which recognize the true only in its separate, abstract - in its untrue form - Hegel says that God is represented in the abstract form as the highest being Lord of heaven and earth, living in a remote region far from human actualities. Perhaps this God's world is the cosmos."

The last sentence I didn't follow.

Student: The cosmos is the realm of nature which, I think according to Hegel, man cannot understand as it is not connected with reason.

Strauss: That is not quite true. It is reason, but reason in an alienated form. I may speak of it at the end of today's meeting. Thank you very much.

Now let us turn to the beginning because, if I may make a criticism of Mr. Rankin's paper which does not alter the overall view which I stated - you did not make sufficiently clear the dialectics, the inner necessity of this alleged perversion of Christianity.

Let us turn to page 389, second paragraph which is the beginning of today's assignment.

Reader: "The Church gained the victory in the struggle referred to in the previous chapter and this way secured as decided a supremacy in Germany as it did in the other states of Europe by a calmer process. She made herself mistress of all the relations of life, of science and art, and she was the permanent repository of spiritual treasures."

Strauss: He speaks here, in a way, of the present. "She has made herself" and she "is" the permanent exhibition of the spiritual treasures. This is not uninteresting because Hegel looks at the epoch from the epoch's point of view. He must do that in order not to use hindsight. He wants to show how the Middle Ages were and how they understood themselves. How they had to transform themselves into something else.

Reader: "Yet not withstanding this full and complete development of ecclesiastical life, we find a deficiency and consequent craving manifesting itself in Christendom and which drove it out of itself. To understand this, we must refer to the nature of the Christian religion itself and particularly to that aspect of it by which it has a footing in the present in the consciousness of its votaries."

Strauss: In the presence of the self-consciousness. So Hegel says, "Look at the Middle Ages as they came to be after the church has won its decisive victory over the German emperors, the fight over the investiture and so on." Everything was perfect and yet something drove the church beyond, and what was that? A part of this perfect solution was the presence of the self-consciousness. But this presence of the self-consciousness was not fully satisfied and, therefore, the church had to go beyond this stage.

Now what does presence mean here? It is underlined in the German edition. What does "presence" mean? Well, in the first place, one could say, it is the opposite of the past, of tradition. Whether this is true or not will appear in the sequel. Go on.

Reader: "The objective doctrines of Christianity have been already so firmly settled by the counsels of the Church that neither the medieval nor any other philosophy could develop them further except in the way of exalting them intellectually so that they might be satisfactory in presenting the form of thought."

Strauss: In other words, this was quite alright and no Christian living in the Middle Ages could find any fault with that.

Reader: "And one essential point in this doctrine was the recognition of the divine nature as not in any sense an other world existence, but as a unity with human nature in the present and actual."

Strauss: "In the present." Underlined again.

Reader: "But this presence is at the same time exclusively spiritual presence. Christ as a particular human personality"

Strauss: "As this human being."

Reader: " . . . has left the world. His temporal existence is only a past one. That is, it exists only in mental conception."

Strauss: A literal translation would be "only represented." But if you translate it into English or, for that matter, into Latin as Hegel knew as a matter of course, then you see that represented is, of course, not "present." It is re-presented.

Now what does "presence" there mean? Presence is opposed not so much to the past, but to the beyond. "Presence" is presence in this world. And it must be, in Christianity, spiritual presence. It is also opposed to the past, namely to that which is only represented and not directly present.

In other words, the difficulty with the medieval Catholic position is concerned with the status of the presence of Christ in this world. How is he present?

Reader: "And since the divine existence on earth is of essentially a spiritual character it cannot appear in the form of a Dalai Lama."

Strauss: You know that. In case you don't read the papers about Tibet, you know it from Hegel.

Reader: "The Pope, however high his position as the head of Christendom and the vicar of Christ, calls himself only the servant of servants. How, then, did the Church realize Christ as a <u>definite and present existence</u>?"

Strauss: How, then, did the Christ possess within itself Christ as this one, unexchangeable with any other this one?

Reader: "The principal form of this realization was, as remarked above, the Holy Supper, in the form it presented as the Mass: in this the Life, Suffering, and Death of the actual Christ were verily present, as an eternal and daily repeated sacrifice. Christ appears as a definite and present existence . . ."

Strauss: Christ appears as this one. It is Christ himself as this one.

Reader: " . . . in a sensuous form as the Host, consecrated by the Priest; so far all is satisfactory: that is to say, it is the Church, the Spirit of Christ, that attains in this ordinance direct and full assurance. But the most prominent feature in this sacrament is, that the process by which Deity is manifested, is conditioned by the limitations . . ."

Strauss: No. Fixed would be a better translation.

Reader: " . . . that the Host, this thing, is set up to be adored as God."

Strauss: Whether that is the correct interpretation of the Catholic teaching of transubstantiation is a matter which we must leave open. But here the point is that Christ is present, but he is present in the Host, meaning in each particular congregation in this host.

Reader: "The Church then might have been able to content itself with this sensuous presence of Deity; but when it is once granted that God exists in external phenomenal presence, this external manifestation immediately becomes infinitely varied; for the need of this presence is infinite. Thus innumerable instances will occur in the experience of the Church, in which Christ has appeared to one and another, in various places; and still more frequently his divine Mother, who as standing nearer to humanity, is a second mediator between the Mediator and man (the miracle-working images of the Virgin are in their way Hosts, since they supply a benign and gracious presence of God)."

Strauss: You see, again, the word "presence." The concern with presence which is a legitimate concern according to Hegel, but which, according to him, is misunderstood by Catholic Christianity.

Reader: "In all places, therefore, there will occur manifestations of the Heavenly, in specially gracious appearances, the stigmata of Christ's Passion, etc.; and the Divine will be realized in miracles as detached and isolated phenomena."

Strauss: Again, as this one or that one in a particular way.

Reader: "In the period in question the Church presents the aspect of a world of miracle; to the community of devout and pious persons natural existence has utterly lost its stability and certainty."

Strauss: Why has it utterly lost its ultimate stability?

Student: Miracles popping up all over the place?

Strauss: Or could. Or could. This alone deprives natural existence of its ultimate certainty.

Reader: " . . . rather, absolute certainty has turned against it, and the Divine is not conceived of by Christendom under conditions of universality as the law and nature of Spirit, but reveals itself in isolated and detached phenomena, in which the rational form of existence is utterly perverted."

Strauss: So the Church is concerned with a sensible (inaudible) and this leads to the belief in miracles. The divine is in the world. That is true. But in Catholic Christianity the divine is in the world not as law and nature of the spirit, but as interruption of the lawfulness.

Hegel has sketched first the power and beauty of the Church in this way. But it is also understood that there is need for evidence of its truth. The Church must be present in this world, it must be a visible Church. But visible as Church, Hegel says. Visible to the mind's eye. Yet, in fact, there is dependence for visibility of the Church on miracles, traditions and so on.

Now the next paragraph.

Reader: "In this complete development of the Church, we may find a deficiency: but what can be felt as a want by it?"

Strauss: In other words, what we feel as a deficiency has no historical significance because it did not affect medieval man. Only an affect felt by the medieval church could induce it to undergo any changes. Is this clear?

Reader: "What compels it, in this state of perfect satisfaction and enjoyment, to wish for something else within the limits of its own principles - without apostatizing from itself? Those miraculous images, places, and times, are only isolated points, momentary appearances - are not an embodiment of Deity, not of the highest and absolute kind. The Host, the supreme manifestation, is to be found indeed in innumerable churches; Christ is therein transubstantiated to a present and particular existence: but this itself is of a vague and general character; it is not his actual and very presence as particularized in Space."

Strauss: In other words, the multiplicity of hosts deprives this Host of the absoluteness. It cannot be the absolutely sacred because there are many of them. Yes?

Reader: "That presence has passed away, as regards time; but as spatial and as concrete in space it has a mundane permanence in this particular spot, this particular village, etc. It is then this mundane existence in Palestine which Christendom desiderates, which it is resolved on attaining. Pilgrims in crowds had indeed been able to enjoy it; but the approach to the hallowed localities is in the hands of the Infidels, and it is a reproach to Christendom that the Holy Places and the Sepulchre of Christ in particular are not in possession of the Church. In this feeling Christendom was united;

consequently the Crusades were undertaken, whose object was not the furtherance of any special interests on the part of the several states that engaged in them, but simply and solely the conquest of the Holy Land."

Strauss: Because of the Sepulchre, the uniqueness. What is, then, the link? Carnal understanding of Christianity. A carnal presence, an absolute presence which the host as being many hosts could not have. Only a single carnal thing. This one in this world. And this condition was only fulfilled by the Holy Sepulchre.

As for the beginning of this section, not for the need or defect which we feel in studying a historical phenomenon but the need which a historical subject itself feels. Only this can explain this history, the concrete development.

Let us take a concrete example. If we study some early Greek doctrine or work of art and find it very defective, this cannot possibly explain the development of Greek art. Our feeling wasn't theirs. We have to find out what defects felt by the Greeks of the time led from one period of Greek art to another. And this applies here.

In order to show how necessary that is, let us say that we find the Middle Ages defective. This would not explain that something else came out of it. We find also China and India defective. We saw that they are dead end streets and nothing came out of it. Only a defect felt by medieval men, whereas no defect was felt by the Indias and Chinese according to Hegel's hypothesis. Only this can explain why mankind went from the Middle Ages to modernity.

Again, regarding this construction which Hegel makes of the Crusades, we must also see the empirical basis. You remember that Hegel's philosophy of history is, in one sense, empirical. And he raises the question, "What is that act of Christendom as a whole, visible act of Christendom as a whole, most characteristic of the Middle Ages?" And, then of course, not 1066 and all that. This was a limited thing in Britain. Rather the Crusades. Hence it is necessary to understand the Crusades from the very principle of medieval Christianity. This point, Hegel, though, is clear.

In the sequel this comes out.

Reader: "The West once more sallied forth in hostile array against the East. As in the expedition of the Greeks against Troy, so here the invading hosts were entirely composed of independent feudal lords and knights: though they were not united under a real individuality, as were the Greeks under Agamemnon or Alexander. Christendom, on the contrary, was engaged in an undertaking whose object was the scouring of the definite and present existence . . ."

Strauss: Of the this one. The true peak of individuality.

Reader: ". . . the real culmination of Individuality. This object impelled the West against the East, and this is the essential interest of the Crusades."

Strauss: I believe the comparison of the Trojan War and the Crusades was repeated by Spengler. I couldn't swear to that. But from a very different point of view. You know, all the cultures go through the same kind of development.

Hegel is much more concerned with the radical difference. There could not be a single leader as Agamemnon or Alexander the Great because the peak the "this one" was Christ. But Christ here understood carnally. Go on.

Reader: "The first and immediate commencement of the Crusades was made in the West itself. Many thousands of Jews were massacred, and their property seized; and after this terrible prelude Christendom began its march. . . Few reached it; the rest were sold by the merchants to the Saracens as slaves."

Strauss: The Crusades thus were much more irrational than the Trojan War. The Trojan war was declared to be irrational by some Greeks because it was immensely foolish for a single woman of doubtful manners to bring this enormous sacrifice. This one must remember. But Hegel says that the Crusades were still much more irrational. And this is, of course, in connection with his whole judgement of the Middle Ages.

Let us turn to page 393, line 10.

Reader: "You must not look for the principle of your religion in the Sensuous, in the grave among the dead, but in the living Spirit in yourselves. We have seen how the vast idea of the union of the Finite with the Infinite was perverted to such a degree as that men looked for a definite embodiment of the Infinite in a mere isolated outward object. Christendom found the empty Sepulchre, but not the union of the Secular and the Eternal; and so it lost the Holy Land."

Strauss: In other words, the external failure of the Crusades was a necessary consequence of the irrationality of the fundamental conception.

Reader: "It was practically undeceived; and the result which it brought back with it was of a negative kind; viz., that the this one embodiment which it was seeking, was to be looked for in Subjective Consciousness alone, and in no external object; that the this one in question, presenting the union of the Secular with the Eternal, is the Spiritual self-cognizant independence of the individual."

Strauss: Of the person, he says here.

Reader: "Thus the world attains the conviction that man must look within himself for . . ."

Strauss: "for the this one which is of a divine character."

Reader: "Subjectivity thereby receives absolute authorization, and claims to determine for itself the relation of all that exists to the Divine. This then was the absolute result of the Crusades, and from them we may date the commencement of self-reliance and spontaneous activity. The West bade an eternal farewell to the East at the Holy Sepulchre, and gained a comprehension of its own principle of subjective infinite Freedom. Christendom never appeared again on the scene of history as one body."

Strauss: So this was the absolutely decisive event. The bond between the worldly and the eternal must, indeed, be found in a this one which is the Aristotelian_____. This one as distinguished from any general or universal. This table, this man, this house, this dog as that which is truly in Aristotle's terms in contradistinction to the form or to the concept.

So the bond between the worldly and the eternal must be found in a this one, but not in any thing, but only in the subjective consciousness, in the ego. Because the ego, too, is a this one.

Therefore, that is the turning point of the Crusades.

Now on page 394, line 3 following, where he speaks of some particular crusades.

Reader: "The Spaniards, united with Frank knights, undertook frequent expeditions against the Saracens; and in this collision of the Christians with the chivalry of the East - with its freedom and perfect independence of soul - the former became also partakers in this freedom."

Strauss: In one respect Islam is superior to medieval Christianity. Freedom and complete independence of the soul. This, in spite of all the defects of Islam of which Hegel has spoken before, made Islam superior to medieval Christianity. One could say that there is no Islamic clergy comparable to the Catholic clergy. This could be seen as a sign of that.

Page 395, line 3.

Reader: "The fall of the Church was not to be effected by open violence, it was from within - by the power of Spirit and by an influence that wrought its way upwards - that ruin threatened it."

Strauss: In other words is a quite teleological state which one sees here. Theoretically, it would be thinkable that the political powers of the Middle Ages might have reduced the power of the Church and in a way subordinated the Church. But this would not have been good for open violence could have been understood and would have been understood then as this

worldly, merely sinful. Therefore, the undermining of the power of the Church had to come from an entirely spiritual ground.

Now on the same page, line 18.

Reader: "A rupture, the first of its kind and profound as it was novel, took place. From this time forward we witness religious and intellectual movements in which Spirit - transcending the repulsive and irrational existence by which it is surrounded - either finds its sphere of exercise within itself, and draws upon its own resources for satisfaction, or throws its energies into an actual world of general and morally justified aims, which are therefore aims consonant with Freedom."

Strauss: So no merely political subjugation of the Church, but the development was in two ways. Either the spirit goes within itself or else it turns towards the actuality of universal and justified purposes which, because they are universal and justified, are purposes of freedom.

The first phenomenon are the order of monks and of knights of which he speaks in the immediate sequel. And the other thing is the development of scholastic theology which took place in the high Middle Ages after the first Crusades. He speaks of it on page 397, second paragraph where he compares scholastic disputations to the tournaments of the knights. These are tournaments of thought. It is a kind of knightly philosophy from Hegel's point of view by which he implies scholastic disputation, originally called dialectics if we go all the way back to Aristotle, is not dialectics in Hegel's sense. This only in passing.

Now the second, the turning towards universal, justified purposes of which he speaks on page 398, that is the transformation of feudalism into the state. The Church was absolutely superior morally in spite of all defects to sheer feudalism because feudalism did not have a spiritual rational principle. In the moment the state emerged the situation was fundamentally alterred.

Let us read page 398, second paragraph.

Reader: "The moral phenomena above mentioned, tending in the direction of a general principle, were partly of a subjective, partly of a speculative order. But we must now give particular attention to the practical political movements of the period. The advance which that period witnessed, presents a negative aspect in so far as it involves the termination of the sway of individual caprice . . ."

Strauss: "Subjective" caprice. Let us keep this word in mind.

Reader: "Its affirmative aspect is the rise of a supreme authority whose dominion embraces all - a political power properly so called, whose subjects enjoy an equality of rights, and in which the will of the individual is subordinated to that common interest which underlies the whole."

Strauss: Yes and this is the progress from Feudalism to Monarchy.

Reader: "The principle of feudal sovereignty is the outward force of individuals - princes, liege lords; it is a force destitute of intrinsic right. . . . in Monarchy, on the contrary there is one Lord and no Serf, for servitude is abrogated by it, and in it Right and Law are recognized; it is the source of real freedom."

Strauss: And then, a little bit later.

Reader: "But by the arbitrary will of an individual exerting itself . . ."

Strauss: Which is a characteristic of monarchy.

Reader: " . . . so as to subjugate a whole body of men, a community is formed; and comparing this state of things with that in which every point is a centre of capricious violence, we find a much smaller number of points exposed to such violence. The great extent of such a sovereignty necessitates general arrangements for the purposes of organization, and those who govern in accordance with those arrangements are at the same time, in virtue of their office itself, obedient to the state."

Strauss: What is, then, the state as far as we can gather from this passage? We have seen the feudal arrangement based on sheer superiority of force. Violence. What do we find in the monarchy? There is a very famous definition of the state of which one is reminded. What is the definition of the state which is most popular in present day political sociology? Let us never forget our brother disciplines.

Student: Monopoly of violence.

Strauss: Yes. Who made this definition? Max Weber.

So Hegel says in a way that the difference between the monarchy the state, and feudalism is that the state has the monopoly of violence. But Hegel, being a broader man than Max Weber, doesn't leave it at that. Something else which is as important. And what is that?

Student: The fact that a large state has to be administered by set rules and that these are changed on a simply arbitrary basis.

Strauss: In other words, the monopoly of violence is only the condition of the rule of law and, therefore, the state

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is characterized by rule of law in the first place, and the monopoly of violence in the second place.

Monopoly of violence means the abolition of private violence. This is a very silly word actually. "Monopoly." Only one seller of violence. That is the literal meaning. We have seen this in the case just settled by Judge _____ who denied that these policemen had bought the violence in a legal manner. I.e., a buying and not merely taking without right.

Hegel also makes clear in the sequel which we do not have time to go into, the various forms in which feudalism entered the modern state. He emphusizes the importance of nations. In the most obvious and important cases these states were nation-states. France. Spain, England. Germany and Italy are the difficult cases as they got their nationality somewhat late. It would be a very interesting question which Hegel does not take up here of the necessary connection between the modern state and the nation. In order to answer that question one would, of course, first have to know what the nation is. If one takes the commonsense definition, a nation is a group of men who use the same language and are or believe to be (it doesn't make the slightest difference) of the same descendence. Then you get into trouble with the case of, say, Switzerland where there are three different languages and with the Dutch where the language is from German. That is a long question. There are great difficulties. But in a crude way of course it is true that the modern states are nation-states.

Needless to say, this notion of nation had infinite practical consequences as you all know from the self-determination of nations. And especially in the case of the underdeveloped and emerging nations where you don't know who makes them nations, whether it is some so-called intellectuals which take the unit made only by the deplorable fact of colonialism.

Then there follows in the sequel a remark on Switzerland and especially on the origin of Switzerland. The three primal cantons of Switzerland and here he makes a remark about gunpowder to which you referred. That is on page 402.

(lapse in tape)

Strauss: . . . freedom from the other kind of wars.

Reader: "We may indeed be led to lament the decay or the depreciation of the practical value of personal valor - the bravest, the noblest may be shot down by a cowardly wretch at safe distance in an obscure lurking place; but, on the other hand, gunpower has made a ration, considerate bravery - Spiritual valor - the essential to material success. Only through this instrumentality could that superior order of valor be called forth - that valor in which the heat of

personal feeling has no share; for the discharge of firearms is directed against a body of men - an abstract enemy, not individual combatants. The warrior goes to meet deadly peril calmly, sacrificing himself for the common weal; and the valor of cultivated nations is characterized by the very fact that it does not rely on the strong arm alone, but places its confidence essentially in the intelligence, the generalship, the character of its commanders; and, as was the case among the ancients, in a firm combination and unity of spirit on the part of the forces they command."

Strauss: But the interesting thing is that they have gunpowder. That will have to be considered. And also something which Hegel, in the sanguine 19th century believed, which we no longer believe - that this abstractness of fighting, brought about by gunpowder, does away with hatred. And that, I think, has not proved to be true.

It is very terrible. We will not be able to finish this discussion, but one more thing. In the next paragraph, he quotes a passage from Machiavelli. Let us stick to the barest essentials.

When he speaks of the Papal territory, there were innumerable dynasts and yet they were all subjugated to the rule of the Pope. Do you have that?

Reader: "How thoroughly equitable in the view of social morality such a subjugation was, is evident from Machiavelli's celebrated work "The Prince." . . since an indomitable contempt for principle, and an utter depravity of morals, were thoroughly ingrained in them."

Strauss: In other words, Machiavelli was perfectly right, as you rightly understood him. He doesn't suit our notions. That reminds me of the passage of a remark which made in his The Gathering Storm when he spoke of Mussolini's attempt to subjugate Ethiopia, knowing very well that Britain had conquered these territories before and so they didn't have a great right to protest against their efforts. He said, "It simply wasn't suitable to the temper of the 20th century." In the 19th century, you know, the Italians tried to conquer Ethiopia but failed dismally. That would have been entirely different.

And Hegel says. "So if there would be a similar mess in the 19th century, you couldn't do anyting. What can you do against people who are 100% criminals except to subjugate them?" And whether the use of deception - sets a beautiful example in inviting these people to a negotiation table and then, while they are sitting there, having them massacred. Is this more inhuman than formally declaring war against these people and having much greater bloodshed on both sides? Hegel takes a very tough line here.

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A very grand passage occurs on page 406, paragraph 2. Read only the last sentence which is on page 407. "Mankind has not been liberated so much from servitude as through servitude." That is a great sentence and surely in need of profound consideration. That men owe many blessings to servitude.

In a way, that is the whole lesson of Hegel's Philosophy of the Mind - the serf, the slave, subjugated by the master, succumbing to the master because of a failure of nerve. This man who has to work and who does not enjoy the fruits of his work (the fruits of his work are enjoyed by the master) he is the origin of all higher culture because he is compelled to actualize all the powers of his mind and of his heart in order to acquire self-respect.

This is a profound thought with deep present-day implications into which I do not wish to go for reasons of simple propriety.

Then he speaks about the importance of art. A certain overcoming of the medieval church took place in the development of high art. Hegel contends that the beautiful art and pious art are two very different things. What Hegel has in mind - the French speak of a certain kind of private art which they call _____ - you know the kind of simple pious art that they sell in the neighborhood of the Church, _____, in Paris. I think that it is intelligible from any religious point of view, not only Christian, that art has something which is not entirely in agreement with the spirit of piety.

In one of Gide's novels - the Narrow Gate I believe, is the English title - this is very beautifully developed by the heroine.

I only draw your attention here to that. And he speaks, of course, of humanism. What it means let us read.

Reader: "For Art received a further support and experienced an elevating influence as the result of the study of antiquity (the name humaniora is very expressive, for in those works of antiquity honor is done to the Human and to the development of Humanity)."

Strauss: So you see here the connection between the discovery of the "this one" in the human subjectivity. The human subjectivity and humanism. And Hegel would have to explain to us why humanism of the 16th century is claiming to be a restoration of classical ways of thinking, and why this is not simply a restoration but a modification. This he doesn't talk about.

On page 410 at the end of paragraph 2, Hegel makes a point which is very characteristic when he speaks of the age of discovery, and the discovery of the magnet and the compass.

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Reader: "The recognition of the spherical figure of the earth led man to perceive that it offered him a definite and limited object, and navigation had been benefited by the new-found instrumentality of the magnet, enabling it to be something better than mere coasting; thus technical appliances make their appearance when a need for them is experienced."

Strauss: In other words, the mere history of technology would never explain anything. How many discoveries and observations have been made which were forgotten in the moment they were made because there was no felt need for them. Therefore, we have to go back to the center of the human mind in order to understand.

We still have to discuss quite a bit in the sequel, but the time is up.

Seminar on Hegel

Session XVI, March 11, 1965

Now I will turn to Mr. _____'s paper. You had to deal with the most difficult and grave questions. If I start from the end what is the precise difference between Hegel and the Enlightenment?

Student: The Enlightenment believed that it established what should be the proper role for men's thoughts, for all men's thought, not only the majority of men. Secondly, the Enlightenment believed that it could deduce the principles of morality from social instincts discovered in man rather than from metaphysical principles.

Strauss: I wonder whether this goes to the root of the matter. But there is something which you said that Hegel shares with the Enlightenment.

Student: He agrees with the Enlightenment, first of all, that men have increased their freedom in a sense through science and also because I think that he believes that for most men it is good that philosophy can be popularized, and make people think that they have attained the status of philosophers.

Strauss: Well, that is a bit vague. Could not one say that Hegel shares with the Enlightenment its this worldliness? But where does he deviate from the Enlightenment?

Student: The way he describes the Enlightenment it cut off a realm of thought for man, metaphysics and religion. In one paragraph he says, "The Enlightenment banished all of the speculative." And two paragraphs later he describes the principle of the freedom of the will as speculative.

Strauss: Because it did not know the freedom of the will as Hegel understands it. That is the point.

Student: But Hegel implies that the principle can be known without looking to history and he is only trying to provide some demonstration of it for people in general like tracing it through history.

Strauss: I don't think that this will do. One could say that the Enlightenment, as Hegel understands it, was fundamentally natural science and a model of political science based on natural science. In other words, a precursor of what we have now. This he regards as radically defective. The key point is for him that the natural in the fullest sense cannot make intelligible freedom. And, therefore, he agrees there with Kant.

Let me turn to two other points. You began by making some remarks about Hegel and Hobbes. One can, perhaps, state the difference as follows. In the first place, Hobbes does not simply teach that monarchy is the best order. That is a kind of recommendation. It doesn't have the same certainty as the general teaching about the character of the sovereign, that he must have these and these powers. But that the sovereign should be one man is not a necessity from Hobbes' point of view.

But that doesn't go to the root of the matter because there are various kinds of monarchy, the kind which he calls institutional and the kind which he calls patrimonial. If this is the term which he uses - patrimonial - I am speaking from memory. At any rate, this is crucial. Hegel would never accept the patrimonial, patriarchal monarchy as a possible form of monarchy. Only the institutional, constitutional.

The greatest difficulty which your assignment poses concerns, of course, the question of Catholicism. There are these statements to which you refer which deny that a reasonable state is compatible with Catholicism. And the consequence would seem to be that only Protestants can be full members of the reasonable state. Hegel clearly did not mean this. He did not draw this conclusion. The reasonable state is not in this sense a Protestant state.

How is this possible? How is this possible if these judgements about the Catholic Church stated here with great force are his last words about Catholicism?

Student: I think that Hegel would say that it would be possible for Catholics as well as Protestants to be members of a rational state if they took their religion less seriously than the men of the Inquisition and the Crusades, that is, if they were willing to say that they didn't want to accept anything incompatible with the state.

Strauss: Who is the great political hero of Protestantism according to Hegel?

Student: Frederick II of Prussia.

Strauss: And he was a Lutheran. Still, what was his persuasion? What kind of company did he keep? French philosophers. So Frederick the Great was an enlightened despot who accepted the principle that everyone should become blessed according to his fashion. According to his private view, perfect toleration.

Then what about the Enlightenment? Hegel presents the Enlightenment as a kind of necessary continuation of Lutheranism, of the Reformation, freedom of judgement of each still bound by the Bible and Luther. In the Enlightenment the Bible

itself loses this authoritative character. But is it true from Hegel's point of view that the Enlightenment necessarily proceeds from Protestantism? Who is the arch rationalist according to Hegel?

Student: Descartes.

Strauss: Yes and Descartes was a Catholic. So, in other words, Hegel emphasizes this more than once that there are certain respects in which Catholicism was superior to Protestantism.

Student: I think that the difference is this. He says that religion is the form in which truth exists for non-abstract consciousness. So I think that he would say that, whereas it is possible for a philosopher - a man of deep insight - to become enlightened without changing his religion, for the people at large for whom religious disposition is more important and who can never fully understand the truth, they must first have a reformation before they can accept the political teachings of the Enlightenment.

Strauss: At any rate, for Hegel the Enlightened view out of which, through Kant, his own view came is not simply a product of the Reformation. We will go into this later.

This is our last meeting and we must discuss the most important points. Let us begin on page 451, line 5 from bottom.

Hegel had given an account of what had happened up to his time. He had died in 1831, that is to say after the July Revolution in France.

Reader: "At length, after forty years of war and confusion indescribable, a weary heart might fain congratulate itself on seeing a termination and tranquillization of all these disturbances."

Strauss: He says, "an old heart" in the literal translation. He was sixty years old and was to die one year later.

Reader: "But although one main point is set at rest, there remains on the one hand that rupture which the Catholic principle inevitably occasions, on the other hand that which has to do with men's subjective will."

Strauss: That is one great difficulty. And the other is the one caused by the non-Catholics or by the "completely enlightened people."

Reader: "In regard to the latter, the main feature of incompatibility still presents itself . . ."

Strauss: Of one-sidedness, the main one-sidedness.

Reader: "One-sidedness still presents itself in the requirement that the ideal general will . . ."

Strauss: No. "that the general will should also be the empirical general."

Reader: " . . . i.e. that the units of the State, in their individual capacity, should rule, or at any rate take part in the government."

Strauss: That the individuals as such should rule or participate in the government. In other words, a simplistic solution of Rousseau's problem. The general will is the will of the preponderant majority.

Reader: "Not satisfied with the establishment of rational rights, with freedom of person and property, with the existence of a political organization in which are to be found various circles of civil life each having its own functions to perform, and with that influence over the people which is exercised by the intelligent members of the community, and the confidence that is felt in them, "Liberalism" sets up in opposition to all this the atomistic principle, that which insists upon the sway of individual wills: maintaining that all government should emanate from their express power, and have their express sanction."

Strauss: Consent. The explitic consent.

Reader: "Asserting this formal side of Freedom - this abstraction - the party in question allows no political organization to be firmly established. The particular arrangements of the government are forthwith opposed by the advocates of Liberty as the mandates of a particular will, and branded as displays of arbitrary power. The will of the Many expels the Ministry from power, and those who had formed the Opposition fill the vacant places; but the latter having now become the Government, meet with hostility from the Many, and share the same fate. Thus agitation and unrest are perpetuated. This collision, this nodus, this problem is that with which history is now occupied, and whose solution it has to work out in the future."

Strauss: This is probably the strongest statement in favor of the view that Hegel spins these fundamental, unsolved problems. That is the general importance that this passage has for our overall problem.

What precisely is the problem? The rights of man - let us use this simple expression - this principle is recognized now. And if it is not recognized this will come. But what is lacking in the liberal doctrine (liberal as understood in the early 19th century).

Student: Democratic government.

Strauss: In other words, this liberalism tended to be democratic. There were still property qualifications and this kind of thing, but it tended to be democratic.

Student: There has to be a disposition in the whole people to accept reasonable principles.

Strauss: But this is too general. This doesn't help us. How do we get a government? That is the question. In other words, Hegel denies that the rights of man include political rights strictly speaking, a right to participation in government. And what is the reasoning behind this?

Student: The individual will may not be rational.

Strauss: To repeat again, one must recognize the freedom of each. No abridgement of these rights according to race or creed. That goes without saying for Hegel. But this does not include the right of each to participation in government via voting since government rests on a principle different from freedom, and this principle is competence or excellence which not every man has.

Hegel had spoken of monarchy. but he also makes clear that the monarch is not the truly governing man. He has to formalize the decision by signing on the dotted line, but who frames the decision?

Student: He seems to favor a civil service . . .

Strauss: The ministers or higher official and they are supposed to be competent men. A high class civil service including, of course, a military service. This guarantees its continuity by cooptation naturally. You know, who will be minister next time will be in the same governing group.

The question is whether this is not much more unreal than constitutional democracy if it is a democracy which has a written or unwritten constitution guaranteeing stability of government. What Hegel regards here as an absolutely terrible thing - that as soon as the opposition comes into power there will be another opposition - is not such a terrible thing as we have come to see in some of the more stable countries.

But the main point for the overall judgement is that here Hegel does not see a clear way of how the West will find its way between the acceptance of the rights of man with its political implications - in other words, the democratic solution - or what he regards as better, the rights of man without the political implications, i.e. without democratic consequences. All kinds of things are possible there. Something like the constitutional monarchy of Prussia of that time which was not very constitutional. It did not have a written constitution. But it did have a certain orderliness and regularity of procedure, surely not an

arbitrary, despotic regime. And one could find it in another way, perhaps, in the Napoleonic Caesarism which came to France after the failure of liberalism in 1848. But of democracy Hegel doesn't seem to have thought at all.

Now let us go to some other passages and as much as we can cover in that short time. We have not finished the section on the Reformation which we discussed last time. We have seen what Hegel says in praise of the Reformation, but what was the defect? Let us turn to page 424, the third paragraph.

Reader: "In the first instance this reconciliation must take place in the individual soul, must by realized by feeling; the individual must gain the assurance that the Spirit dwells in him - that, in the language of the Church, a brokenness of heart has been experienced, and that Divine grace has entered into the heart thus broken. By Nature man is not what he ought to be; only through a transforming process does he arrive at truth. The general and speculative aspect of the matter is just this - that the human heart is not what it should be. It was then required of the individual that he should know what he is in himself; that is, the teaching of the Church insisted upon man's becoming conscious that he is evil. But the individual is evil only . . ."

Strauss: He means here the Protestant Church.

Reader: " . . . when the Natural manifests itself in mere sensual desire - when an unrighteous will presents itself in its untamed, untrained, violent shape, and yet it is required that such a person should know that he is depraved, and that the good Spirit dwells in him. . . Pretestantism took this turn of minute and painful introspection, possessed with the conviction of the importance of the exercise, and was for a long time characterized by a self-tormenting disposition and an aspect of spiritual wretchedness; which in the present day has induced many persons to enter the Catholic pale, that they might exchange this inward uncertainty for a formal broad certainty based on the imposing totality of the Church."

Strauss: This is a point which we must not forget. This is the essential defect of Protestantism according to Hegel. He speaks of it somewhat earlier - of having something pedantic about it, something pettily moralistic. That is the same point which he means here. There is no objective certainty. The certainty of salvation must be found within the individual. But how can he find it? He must observe himself and see with his own eyes the sinfulness within himself and the breakthrough of divine grace as well. And this is the meaning which the subjectivism of the Reformation takes on in practice and which leads to a dead-end street. Hegel's own view is that the individual cannot know what he is except through his being, the whole course of his life. Through introspection you always get a distorted view of yourself. You have no means of comparison.

In the sequel he develops his doctrine of monarchy, the need for government independent of all arbitrariness. And here Hegel says - and this is the simple solution which he developed in his philosophy of right - let us turn to page 427 to see this.

Reader: "The State must have a final decisive will: but if an individual is to be the final deciding power, he must be so in a direct and natural way; not as determined by choice and theoretic views, etc. Even among the free Greeks the oracle was the external power which decided their policy on critical occasions; here birth is the oracle - something independent of any arbitrary volition."

Strauss: We must have ultimately something which is independent of all arbitrariness, of all arbitrary will. And as regards the individual who is at the head of the government the only way to get it is simple birth because if you make it dependent on any character, any qualities, that becomes a matter of judgement. Think of Aristotle's perfect king who is so superior to all others. But this is not practical in reality. As Aristotle makes clear if he were also the most beautiful and tallest member of the community in addition to being the wisest and most fully virtuous, then it might be. But since he might not be tall and beautiful there would perhaps being a questioning of his authority, the matter of judgement. It must not be a matter of judgement. It must be purely natural. Birth alone would do that. This is the doctrine developed at great length in Hegel's philosophy of right.

A key institution in the monarchies is the standing armies which developed at that time as he says in the sequel.

The decisive development was the subjugation of the hereditary aristocracy during this time in all the European countries. That was necessary for the coming into being of the modern state, but on the other hand, Hegel is all in favor of there being privileged members of the state, the highest officials.

Reader: Page 430 in the center. "But the aristocracy have a position assigned them, as the support of the throne, as occupied and active on behalf of the State and the common weal, and at the same time as maintaining the freedom of the citizens. This in fact is the prerogative of that class which forms the link between the Sovereign and the People - to undertake to discern and to give the first impulse to that which is intrinsically Rational and Universal; and this recognition of and occupation with the Universal must take the place of positive personal right."

Strauss: Which was the state of the feudal nobility. Very simply it had the privileged position by virtue of positive personal right, whereas in the modern state they have this position by virtue of their knowledge.

Student: I thought I understood you earlier to say that Hegel rejects the notion of patriarchical monarchy and that (inaudible)

Strauss: But the key point is that he is a monarch by virtue of his birth, but patriarchic monarchy means that he regards the state as his property. You can see the difference. Louis XIV was surely not a feudal monarch, but (inaudible). But Frederick the Great said that the king is the first servant of the state. The latter is what Hegel means. The king as a servant of the state or as a part of the state. Go on where you left off.

Reader: "This subjection to the Head of the State of that intermediate power which laid claim to positive authority was now accomplished, but this did not involve . . ."

Strauss: Not yet, he says.

Reader: " . . . did not yet involve the emancipation of the subject class."

Strauss: Of the serfs. In other words, this was still a great defect of the enlightened monarchy of the 17th and 18th century.

Reader: "This took place only at a later date, when the idea of right in and for itself arose in men's minds. Then the sovereigns relying on their respective peoples, vanquished the caste of unrighteousness."

Strauss: Who is that caste of unrighteousness?

Student: The French noblesse.

Strauss: The hereditary nobility all over Europe. You see, Hegel was very far from being in favor of the ancien regime.

Another characteristic of the monarchy of the 17th and 18th century concerns foreign relations. The principle becomes conquest. There is no longer any possibility of the unity of Christendom as there was in the Middle Ages. And the only help against conquest was the balance of power. That is on page 431. Let us read the remark on page 432, line 14 from the end.

Reader: "The pretensions of Louis were founded not on extent of dominion, (as was the case with Charles V) so much as on that culture which distinguished his people, and which at that time made its way everywhere with the language that embodied it, and was the object of universal admiration: They could therefore plead a higher justification than those of the German emperor."

Strauss: It is more Spain than Germany which he has in mind at that time. In other words a claim to universal empire based on the higher rank of civilization is not simply rejected by Hegel as you see by this remark.

Let us turn now to the question of Protestantism and on the center of page 435.

Reader: "For in the State there must be government, and Cromwell knew what governing is. He, therefore, made himself their ruler, and sent that praying parliament on about their business."

Strauss: You see how secular Hegel is.

Reader: "With his death however his right to authority vanished also, and the old dynasty regained possession of the throne."

Strauss: In other words, that was no way to a stable government - the Revolution.

Reader: "Catholicism, we may observe, is commended to the support of princes as promoting the security of their government - a position supposed to be particularly manifest if the Inquisition be connected with the government; the former constituting the bulwark of the latter. But such a security is based on a slavish religious obedience, and is limited to those grades of human development in which the political constitution and the whole legal system still rest on the basis of actual positive possession."

Strauss: Meaning not on rational ground.

Reader: "But if the constitution and laws are to be founded on a veritable eternal Right, then security is to be found only in the Protestant religion, in whose principle Rational Subjective Freedom also attains development."

Strauss: We know this by now from Hegel, but these passages suggest that you can only have a rational formation under a Protestant state and we see that this conclusion is drawn not from Hegel. In the immediate context he draws our attention to the fact that Frederick the Great - the hero of Protestantism as he is called - understood the Protestant principle from its worldly angle, and therefore was led to religious tolerance.

Now let us turn to page 438 because here the question of Reformation and Enlightenment comes up.

Reader: "Protestantism had introduced the principle of Subjectivity, imparting religious emancipation and inward harmony, but accompanying this was the belief in Subjectivity as Evil"

Strauss: And the corruptness of the will.

Reader: " . . . and in a power whose embodiment is 'the World.' Within the Catholic pale also, the casuistry of the Jesuits brought into vogue interminable investigations, as tedious and wire-drawn as those in which the scholastic theology delighted, respecting the subjective spring of the Will and the motives that affect it. This Dialectic, which unsettles all particular judgments and opinions, transmuting the Evil into Good and Good into Evil, left at last nothing remaining but the mere action of subjectivity itself, the Abstractum of Spirit - Thought. Thought contemplates everything under the form of Universality, and is consequently the impulsion towards and production of the Universal. In that elder scholastic theology the real subject-matter of investigation - the doctrine of the Church - remained an ultramundane affair;"

Strauss: Beyond. Why not leave it simply at that. Namely, something beyond thought. Supra-rational.

Reader: "In the Protestant theology also Spirit still sustained a relation to the Ultramundane; . . . A practical interest makes use of, consumes the objects offered to it: a theoretical interest calmly contemplates them, assured that in themselves they present no alien element."

Strauss: Alien to it.

Reader: "Consequently, the ne plus ultra of Inwardness, of Subjectiveness, is Thought. Man is not free, when he is not thinking; for except when thus engaged he sustains a relation to the world around him as to another, an alien form . . ."

Strauss: Not only to the word. It would also be in the case of God. If he does not think that he is related to something else, to something other. Whereas if he thinks, understands, it becomes his own.

Reader: "This comprehension - the penetration of the Ego into and beyond other forms of being with the most profound self-certainty, directly involves the harmonization of Being."

Strauss: No. The reconciliation. In other words, the reconciliation which was formerly sought in God. It is available in thinking.

Reader: "For it must be observed that the unity of Thought with its Object is already implicitly present, for Reason is the substantial basis of Consciousness as well as of the External and Natural. Thus that which presents itself as the Object of Thought . . ."

Strauss. Say, "the object is no longer a beyond."

Reader: " . . . not of an alien and grossly substantial nature."

Strauss: Not of another, substantial nature. It has the same substantial nature. What does he mean? The Protestant view from which he starts. The emphasis stronger than in Catholicism for Hegel on the corrupted nature. Man is completely corrupt. The will.

The world, as distinguished from the inner grace, belongs to the Devil. Therefore, naturally, the longing for the beyond.

Now how is the situation with Catholicism. In Catholicism what is decisive is the good will, not specific actions. This interpretation is, of course, based on a very special form, namely, on the basis of the doctrine of probability as developed especially by the Jesuits and as polemically presented by Pascale. This is simply presupposed.

What Hegel has in mind is this: The attempts of some Jesuits (this is very controversial, what is meant). According to some these were no more than scholastic exercises and, whereas, Pascale and the Protestants took them to be very serious directions of the conscience. I cannot enter into this subject. But the question was this, for example. Dueling - forbidden. But when some of these Jesuits said, "It depends. You may kill in a duel, but do not do it with the intention to kill, but with the intention to save your honor. Then it is not blameable." In other words, every act depends on the intention. The intention, Hegel says, the inner thinking. This is a very summary argument which wants to show that both from modern, 17th century Catholicism and Protestantism the emphasis shifts entirely on the inner. And Hegel says that if this is properly understood it means that it shifts onto thought. The evidence in philosophy, of course, would be Descartes' cogito ergo sum which he has in mind.

Then comes the key point. Now the sphere is discovered on which - and fully discovered and laid bare - on which reconciliation is possible. And that is thought because thought knows no beyond. This is the meaning of the thesis that thought is free. Thought is never - as Hegel understands it - it is never dependent on something other than thought.

Therefore, here the conflict between thought and non-thought which is the root of nontheoretical practice, is overcome. Thought recognizes itself in every sphere.

Now what does Hegel have in mind by that? It seems to be simply a fantastic assertion. If we read on we will get some enlightenment from the sequel.

Reader: "Thought is the grade to which Spirit has now advanced."

Strauss: Did it not advance to that in Plato and Aristotle? Why not?

Student: It was directed towards Nature. It wasn't the same thing.

Strauss: One can put it this way, but more simply and obviously, these societies, the political order was the Greek city with all its qualifications - slavery, Greekness and so on. Thought - go on.

Reader: "It involves the Harmony of Being in its purest essence, challenging the external world to exhibit the same Reason which Subject possesses."

Strauss: First of all, it is only a demand, a postulate. Thought turns now to the external demanding that it exhibit its reasonableness in itself.

Reader: "Spirit perceives that Nature - the World - must also be an embodiment of Reason, for God created it on principles of Reason."

Strauss: This is, then, the theological, popular version of the thought. But we will soon find what this means in a speculative, nonpopular manner.

Reader: "An interest in the contemplation and comprehension of the present world became universal."

Strauss: The present world. The world which we can see and observe just as it was the key problem of Christianity from the very beginning and a certain misunderstanding of the presence led, as we have seen, to the Crusades. Do you remember that?

Reader: "Nature embodies Universality, inasmuch as it is nothing other than Sorts, Genera, Power, Gravitation, etc."

Strauss: It should be translated "force" instead of "power." So, in other words, that Nature is rational is shown by the fact that Nature embodies universals. Species and genera, forces of Nature - of gravity - and so on.

Reader: " . . . phenomenally presented. Thus Experimental Science became the science of the World."

Strauss: He says that experience has become the science of the world. Experience which is always present experience.

Reader: "For experience involves on the one hand the observation of phenomena, on the other hand also the discovery of the Law, the essential being, the hidden force that causes these phenomena - thus reducing the data supplied by observation to their simple principles."

Strauss: In other words, modern natural science, experimental science, discovers laws of nature and laws mean rationality. It discovers the rationality of Nature.

Reader: "Intellectual consciousness was first extricated from that sophistry of thought, which unsettles everything, by Descartes. As it was the purely German nations among whom the principle of Spirit first manifested itself, so it was by the Romanic nations that the abstract idea (to which the character assigned them above - viz., that of internal schism, more readily conducted them) was first comprehended. Experimental science therefore very soon made its way among them (in common with the Protestant English), but especially among the Italians."

Strauss: "Especially" should be at the beginning of the sentence. What he wants to make clear is that the discovery of thought is not peculiar to the Protestants, but common to Catholic and Protestant nations.

Reader: "It seemed to men as if God had but just created the moon and stars, plants and animals, as if the laws of the universe were now established for the first time; for only then did they feel a real interest in the universe, when they recognized their own Reason in the Reason which pervades it."

Strauss: They recognized their reason in <u>that</u> reason - the reason of Nature. That is the basis of rationalism which Hegel simply accepts. Nature is a system of the laws of Nature and, therefore, Nature is reason. Thought knows no beyond as we see at this point.

Let us turn to the bottom of page 440.

Reader: "Right and Morality came to be looked upon as having their foundation in the actual present Will of man."

Strauss: Again, the present. No longer reliance on tradition and authority. The present will of man is the basis.

Reader: " . . . whereas formerly written in the Old and New Testament, or appearing in the form of particular Right in old parchments, as privilegia, or in international compacts. What the nations acknowledge as international Right was deduced empirically from observation (as in the work of Grotius); then the source of the existing civil and political law was looked for, after Cicero's fashion, in those instincts of men which Nature has planted in their hearts."

Strauss: Which Nature was believed to have planted into their hearts. Hegel does not accept that.

Reader: "e.g., the social instinct."

Strauss: He says "for instance" because he knows that there were people who denied that. Men like Hobbes. But fundamentally it is the same character.

Reader: " . . . next the principle of security for the person and property of the citizens, and of the advantage of the commonwealth - that which belongs to the class of 'reasons of State.'"

Strauss: That is a very rought description of the moral political science of the Enlightenment. Very rough, but Hegel knew what he was talking about.

Reader: "On these principles private rights were on the one hand despotically contravened, but on the other hand such contravention was the instrument of carrying out the general objects of the State in opposition to mere positive or prescriptive claims."

Strauss: The word "despotically" is deliberately chosen. It is enlightened despotism, yet it is despotism. It rides roughshod over all acquired rights, over all traditional rights. On the basis of this allegedly rational science of right and morality.

Reader: "Frederick II may be mentioned as the ruler who inaugurated the new epoch in the sphere of practical life - that epoch in which practical political interest attains Universality, and receives an absolute sanction. Frederick II merits especial notive as having comprehended the general object of the State, and as having State steadily in view, ceasing to pay any respect to particular interests when they stood in the way of the common weal. His immortal work is a domestic code - the Prussian municipal law. How the head of a household energetically provides and governs with a view to the weal of that household and of his dependents - of this he has given a unique specimen."

Strauss: This would also be a subject of critical attention, I suppose. But for Hegel Frederick II is the greatest example of Enlightenment policy, based on Enlightenment moral treatment.

Let us read the first sentence of the next paragraph.

Reader: "These general conceptions, deduced from actual and present consciousness - the Laws of Nature and the substance of what is right and good, have received the name of Reason."

Strauss: "Laws of Nature" does not, of course, mean here the moral laws of Nature, but Newtonian laws and this kind of thing. Founded on the present consciousness. Here is a double meaning. We see it or understand it with our own minds not depending on any extraneous sources and, secondly, the mind as it has now become. Yes?

Student: I was just wondering whether the connection between "despotism" and "household" and the phrase "have received the name of reason" - is that a deliberate reference back to Aristotle's ideas about household relationships?

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Strauss: No. I don't think so. You are quite right by drawing our attention to the domestic, to the paternal character. This, in Hegel's view, was still a defect of the old order. The paternalism. That is one of the key points of the attacks of old liberalism of the 18th century based on Rousseau against the enlightened despotism of such people as Frederick II which Hegel shares. It is not yet the rational state. Therefore he says that one has called "reasonable" that which is not yet true reason, but it is relatively rational.

At the end of the paragraph which you just began he speaks of the difference between the Enlightenment and Luther.

(lapse in tape)

Strauss: . . . a present one and not one which goes back to the past. You have to read the Bible in order to become aware of it without necessarily seeing that it is necessarily so. That this content is a present one . . . go on.

Reader: " . . . of which I can gain an inward conviction and that to this basis of inward demonstration every dogma must be referred."

Strauss: Everything must be referred, not "every dogma." In other words, Luther could never see, say that the Incarnation was evidently necessary. He could only see that it was transmitted to him and that it gave him a sense of being safe. But he could not see that it had to be so necessarily. That alone is reason.

Page 442 in the third paragraph.

Reader: "This formally absolute principle brings us to the last stage in History, our world, our own time."

Strauss: Yes. The end. That is one of the passages which is in favor of the view that there is an end.

Student: (inaudible) a rejection of revelation.

Strauss: Revelation as revelation theologically understood, yes. Because this is only in the element of what Hegel calls _____ in German, a representation would be in a liberal English translation. But representation means not present, but re-presented. Or, disregarding all etymology, representation is not thought, is not rational thought. And Christianity is true if rationally understood, but it is no longer what you would find in any dogmatic statements, Catholic or Protestant, and would be radically different.

But what is now the last stage which transcends the Enlightenment? He speaks of that in the following paragraph.

Reader: "Secular life is the positive and definite embodiment of the Spiritual Kingdom - the Kingdom of the Will manifesting itself in outward existence. . . This is absolute Will - the volition to be free."

Strauss: That is the key point which embodies Kant's criticism of all earlier morality. The Enlightenment sought the source of right and morality in man's natural urges or inclinations, in this respect not different from the old tradition. The difference between the Enlightenment and, say, Thomas Aquinas in this respect we cannot discuss here because in this respect there is agreement.

There are natural ends, ends which do not originate in the Will, but are accepted by the Will, imposed on it by Nature. And, therefore, Will is not free. Will is dependent on something, be it the Will of God, be it Nature. The truly free will wills nothing but itself, because otherwise it would be dependent on something, i.e., the truly free Will wills nothing but its freedom, its self-determination.

This radical criticism by Kant of all earlier moral philosophy is simply accepted here. Hegel criticizes Kant as he intimates partly in the sequel, by raising the question which he does here immediately afterwards. The next question is, "How does the Will become determined if it cannot be determined from without by God or by Nature?"

He feels that the defect of Kant is that Kant's Formal Ethics doesn't show the way towards any content of the Will.

Let us turn to page 447, line three.

Reader: "Moreover, because the government, as the concrete centre of the power of the State, could not adopt as its principle abstract individual wills, and reconstruct the State on this basis; lastly, because it was Catholic . . ."

Strauss: He is speaking of the French Revolution here.

Reader: " . . . and therefore the Idea of Freedom - Reason embodied in Laws - did not pass for the final absolute obligation, since the Holy and the religious conscience are separated from them."

Strauss: In other words, if there is something holy which is not identical with the rational, then the rational cannot acquire its full power. That is the relatively non-polemical expression of what Hegel had in mind.

The holy must be identical with the rational, not higher than the rational. And this has very grave and obvious implications.

In the sequel Hegel develops what he means by "objective freedom." The freedom which Kant has brought out is subjective freedom. The Will must not be determined by anyting outside of itself. But there are also objective freedoms and these are the determinations of the Wills stemming from the Wills. Hegel gives here only the result of that. He discusses it in the next paragraph.

Reader: "The two following points must now occupy our attention: 1st. The course which the Revolution in France took; 2nd. How that Revolution became World-Historical.

1. Freedom presents two aspects: the one concerns its substance and purport - its objectivity - the thing itself; the other relates to the Form of Freedom, involving the consciousness of his activity on the part of the individual; for Freedom demands that the individual recognize himself in such acts, that they should be veritably his, it being his interest that the result in question should be attained."

Strauss: I repeat, this subjective freedom is what Kant has provided for us and the other which he has not. And what is that - the objective or real freedom.?

Reader: "The three elements and powers of the State in actual working must be contemplated according to the above analysis, their examination in detail being referred to the Lectures on the Philosophy of Right.

1) Laws of Rationality - of intrinsic Right - Objective or Real Freedom: to this category belongs Freedom of Property and Freedom of Person. Those relics of that condition of servitude which the feudal relation had introduced are hereby swept away, and all those fiscal ordinances which were the bequest of the feudal law - its tithes and dues, are abrogated. Real Liberty requires moreover freedom in regard to trades and professions - the permission to every one to use his abilities without restriction - and the free admission to all offices of State. This is a summary of the elements of real Freedom, and which are not based on feeling - for feeling allows of the continuance even of serfdom and slavery - but on the thought and self-consciousness of man recognizing the spiritual character of his existence."

Strauss: Here you see the importance of the difference between feeling - sentiment - and reason. Feeling is wholly insufficient to bring out the full meaning of freedom. Only thought can.

Now the second point concerns government. Read only the last sentence of that paragraph.

Reader: "The Few assume to be the deputies, but they are often only the despoilers of the Many."

Strauss: In other words, the men who claim to be the representatives of the people.

Reader: "Nor is the sway of the Majority over the Minority a less palpable inconsistency."

Strauss: That is the great question of government which we have discussed before. Hegel simply rejects the democratic implication.

In the following paragraph in the center of the paragraph.

Reader: "There may be various opinions and views respecting laws, constitution and government, but there must be a disposition on the part of the citizens to regard all these opinions as subordinate to the substantial interest of the State, and to insist upon them no further than that interest will allow; moreover nothing must be considered higher and more sacred than goodwill toward the State; or, if Religion be looked upon as higher and more sacred, it must involve nothing really alien or opposed to the Constitution."

Strauss: The minimum demand is that the State be as sacred as religion. The minimum demand.

In order to show how alien Hegel is to democracy we read on page 449, bottom.

Reader: "The first Constitutional form of Government in France was one which recognized Royalty; the monarch was to stand at the head of the State, and on him, in conjunction with his Ministers, was to devolve the executive power; the legislative body, on the other hand, were to make the laws. But this constitution involved from the very first an internal contradiction; for the legislature absorbed the whole power of the administration: the budget, affairs of war and peace, and the levying of the armed forces were in the hands of the Legislative Chamber. Everything was brought under the head of Law. The budget, however, is in its nature something diverse from law, for it is annually renewed, and the power to which it properly belongs is that of the Government. With this, moreover, is connected the indirect nomination of the ministry and officers of state, etc. The government was thus transferred to the Legislative Chamber, as in England to the Parliament."

Strauss: That shows perfectly clearly that Hegel didn't have any regard for parliamentary government even on a nondemocratic basis. Government and subjects are radically different.

Then he comes to speak about the solution which was achieved in England with which he has a certain sympathy, but England doesn't live up to his standards of excellence. That is on page 453, line 8 from bottom.

Reader: "England, with great exertions, maintained itself on its old foundations; the English Constitution kept its ground amid the general convulsion, though it seemed so much the more liable to be affected by it, as a public Parliament, that habit of assembling in public meeting which was common to all orders of the state, and a free press, offered singular facilities for introducing the French principles of Liberty and Equality among all classes of the people. Was the English nation too backward in point of culture to apprehend these general principles? Yet in no country has the question of Liberty been more frequently a subject of reflection and public discussion. Or was the English constitution so entirely a Free Constitution - had those principles been already so completely realized in it, that they could no longer excite opposition or even interest? The English nation may be said to have approved of the emancipation of France; but it was proudly reliant on its own constitution and freedom, and instead of imitating the example of the foreigner, it displayed its ancient hostility to its rival, and was soon involved in a popular war with France."

Strauss: In the next paragraph Hegel develops that the English had one thing which was very important and that is the local self-government and this kind of thing. The criticism comes in the following paragraph.

Reader: "Parliament governs, although Englishmen are unwilling to allow that this is the case."

Strauss: Because they are [illegible] monarchists.

Reader: "It is worthy of remark, that what has been always regarded as the period of the corruption of a republican people, presents itself here: viz. election to seats in parliament by means of bribery. But this also they call freedom - the power to sell one's vote, and to purchase a seat in parliament. . . This is quite opposed to the appreciation of principles and abstract views which every one can understand at once, and which are besides to be found in all Constitutions and Charters."

Strauss: So Hegel would prefer the British order to the simply democratic order introduced by the French Revolution.

I think that it is fitting that we should conclude this seminar - and we must now come to an end - with Hegel's statement on the French Revolution. Page 446.

Reader: "The principle of the Freedom of the Will, therefore, asserted itself against existing Right. Before the French Revolution, it must be allowed, the power of the grandees had been diminished by Richelieu, and they had been deprived of privileges; but like the clergy, they retained all the prerogatives which gave them an advantage over the lower class."

Strauss: Turn to page 447, line 6. After having finished this description of pre-revolutionary France, he goes on to say.

Reader: "The conception, the idea of Right asserted its authority all at once, and the old framework of injustice could offer no resistance to its onslaught. A constitution, therefore, was established in harmony with the conception of Right, and on this foundation all future legislation was to be based. Never since the sun had stood in the firmament and the planets revolved around him had it been perceived that man's existence centres in his head."

Strauss: No. No. "That man stands on his head." Hegel deliberately choses that expression. "He stands on his head," that is to say, on his thought. And he builds actuality according to it.

Reader: "Anaxagoras had been the first to say that ____ governs the World; but not until now had man advanced to the recognition of the principle that Tought ought to govern spiritual reality. This was accordingly a glorious mental dawn. All thinking beings shared in the jubilation of this epoch. Emotions of a lofty character stirred men's minds at that time; a spiritual enthusiasm thrilled through the world, as if the reconciliation between the Divine and the Secular was now first accomplished."

Strauss: Hegel reproduces here the feelings he himself had as a young man. He was nineteen years old when the French Revolution started and he was at a Protestant theological institution in _____, southern Germany. And he and his friends celebrated, planted a tree of freedom and so on. And this is still a late expression of the expectations which, as Hegel put it, "All thinking beings had their time." And Hegel is not blind. Of course, he also went through the disappointment. But this is all part of the story.

We have now to conclude this seminar.